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[I]t is a risky business to see history as the location of God's
work, and both the Jewish people and the church have been
hurt by false readings of its signs. Yet to reject this risk is to
close ourselves to any living relationship to the God of this
world. If God is a living God, then we must accept the risk
of living with Him and under Him, hie et nunc}
A doctrine ofprovidence seeks to supply a conceptual model of God's
relation to the world. As the meeting place for the church's doctrine ofGod and its
understanding of the nature of the world, it becomes a key focal point for dealing
with a host ofproblems in explicating who God is and how God cares for the world.
Critical changes in worldview have effected radical changes in the way many
theologians understand the Christian doctrines of God and providence. When
Langdon Gilkey, for example, put into words the confusion implicit in the 'God Who
Acts' theology, he also helped to seal the fate of the traditional understanding of
providence.2 The very notion of God "acting" had become associated with direct,
and sometimes miraculous intervention, a thought ruled out of court by the modem
scientific view of the universe as a closed system ofnatural causes. God could no
longer be said to "act" in the universe, either in the non-human world or in humans,
beyond a general and immanent influence.
Contemporaneous with the recognition of the problems with a doctrine of
providence which resulted in its eclipse, several theologians began to alert the
'Paul M. van Buren, A Theology of the Jewish Christian Reality. Part 1: Discerning the Way
(Toronto, Can.: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, Limited; New York, NY: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc.,
1980; Harper and Row paperback edition, 1987), 65; cf. ibid., 95, 110-119.
2Langdon Gilkey, 'Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language,' The Journal
ofReligion 41 11961): 194-205.
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theological community to the long-standing neglect of the doctrine of the Trinity.
These two doctrines had each arrived at this point by slightly different routes, but the
same Enlightenment, Modernist and Post-modern influences have played a role in
the demise ofboth.4 The point of relevance in asking about the connections between
the two doctrines derives from the close connection between one's doctrine of
providence and one's doctrine ofGod.5 This is not a neutral issue, since the choice
made by a theologian about a doctrine of God can either weaken, or enrich, his or her
retrieval of providence. Since for orthodox Christian theology God has been
understood as triune, Karl Barth asked whether a doctrine ofprovidence, in order to
be Christian, should not also be explicitly trinitarian.6 As an intrinsic aspect of one's
view ofprovidence, therefore, this thesis will ask of each author which model of the
Christian God they are associating with their doctrine of providence.
Until traditional views of providence lost credibility, the doctrine had served
in dogmatic and systematic theologies as the locus of a wide range of issues.
Included among them were, the doctrine of God, divine action, divine foreknowledge
and sovereignty, theological determinism, election, predestination, salvation,
theology of history, eschatology, hope, human free will, prayer, miracles, and
theodicy.7 Stated minimally, a doctrine ofprovidence was essentially an attempt to
3Karl Barth (cf. his The Doctrine of the Word of God, vol. 1, pt. 1, trans. G. T. Thomson,
Church Dogmatics [Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1936) and Karl Rahner (The Trinity, trans.
Joseph Donceel [Kent, UK: Bums and Oates, 1970]) have played leading roles in this project. Cf.
also Claude Welch's assessment of the status of the Trinity doctrine (In This Name: The Doctrine of
the Trinity in Contemporary Theology [New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952]) at a time
which corresponds to Gilkey's assessment of the state of providence ('The Concept of Providence in
Contemporary Thelogy,' The Journal of Religion 43, no. 3 [July 1963]: 171-192). Cf. also James
Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as Trinity (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1983), esp.
chaps. 8-14; and William Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modem Thinking about
God WentWrong (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), chap. 10.
4While a full historical documentation of these developments is beyond the scope and
purpose of this thesis, Chapter One will look at a few anecdotal sources of evidence which seem to
support this conclusion.
5Cf. Brian Hebblethwaite and Edward Henderson, 'Introduction,' in Divine Action: Studies
Inspired by the Philosophical Theology ofAustin Farrer. eds. B. Hebblethwaite, and E. Henderson
(Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1990), 1.
6Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Creation, vol. 3, pt. 3, trans. G. W. Bromiley and R. J. Ehrlich,
Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1960), 30-56.
7Cf. similar lists by Edward Farley, review of Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian
Interpretation of History, by Langdon Gilkey, in Religious Studies Review 4, no. 4 (October 1978),
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provide a religious structure ofmeaning for human experience of life as a sequence
of events, that is, as history. For Christians, this structure ofmeaning was
underwritten by the creator God of the Bible, usually understood as giving the world
existence, maintaining it in being, and governing its affairs with the aim of directing
it to a final consummation. God's direct and personal oversight and direction of
human history were understood to be the source of its meaning and ultimate hope.
Thus, this thesis will follow the themes of history, meaning, and hope as they are
addressed by the models ofprovidence reviewed in Chapters Two, Three and Four.
The thesis will unfold according to the following structure. Chapter One will
highlight several of the main contributing factors in the loss ofcredibility of older forms
of doctrines ofprovidence. It will quickly become evident that older views of
providence assumed a certain understanding of the God ofChristian Theism which has
come under heavy criticism. Subsequent chapters will look at how a few contemporary
theologians have responded to the problems with traditional views ofprovidence,
noting also the model of the Christian God each chooses to associate with providence.
A central claim of this thesis is that in the past many construals of providence
have been based upon an inadequate view of the Christian God (that is, God as a
monadic Substance or Subject). If the richness and complexity of the scriptural
portrayal of God's dynamic nature and providential relationship to the created order
are to be given a significant voice, it will need to reflect the roles of Father, Son and
Spirit in God's ongoing care of the world.
Chapters Two through Four will review six models of providence with the
intent of capturing key ideas in these models which serve to highlight the heuristic
value of their perspectives, and which in turn establish an agenda for further
reconstruction. Exhaustive analyses of these models lies outside the scope of this
thesis and, therefore, it will not be able to engage all the questions about an author's
overarching theological model as these influence his or her doctrine ofprovidence.
233; and Owen C. Thomas and Ellen K. Wondra ("Introduction to Theology. 3rd ed. [Harrisburg, PA:
Morehouse Publishing, 2002], 122).
8Cf. Patrick Miller, 'Revisiting the God Who Acts,' Theology Today vol. 54, n. 1 (April,
1997), 3. Cf. Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God. Creation and the Culture of
Modernity. The 1992 Bampton Lectures (New York, NY; Melbourne, Australia; Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 181-84.
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Chapter Two of the thesis will review models ofprovidence by two
theologians who do not hold to a doctrine of the Trinity, but who address key
problems with traditional versions of providence (Maurice Wiles and Langdon
Gilkey). Chapter Three will look at providence as treated by two trinitarian
theologians, but who do not apply a doctrine of the Trinity to providence in a
systematic manner (Paul Helm and John Sanders). Reasons for this are explored, and
illustrative options are presented as suggestions for ways one might make this
connection.
Chapter Four will review two models of the doctrine of providence by
theologians who treat a doctrine of the Trinity as the fundamental grammar of the
doctrine of God and who explicitly connect their doctrines of the Trinity to their
doctrines of providence (Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jiirgen Moltmann).
Finally, Chapter Five will summarise key ideas arising from previous
chapters, noting the areas of commonality among the authors reviewed, as well as
key differences. This summary constitutes an agenda for further work on a doctrine
ofprovidence, and a beginning outline is offered as a suggestion toward developing a
trinitarian model ofprovidence within the context of an overarching model of the
Trinity-world relation conceived as a divine-human community.
This thesis is working with the concept ofprovidence as treated in Christian
theology. Although there should be an apologetical benefit from constructing a
credible model ofprovidence, apologetics is not the primary focus of the present
treatment, but rather, this thesis attempts to list problems and possibilities for a
Christian doctrine ofprovidence for those who are already Christian theists.
While there is a great deal of variety among Christian theologians in their
views about the nature ofprovidence and about the nature of the Christian God, the
authors reviewed in the following chapters assume this God is personal, at least in an
analogous sense, and acts in, upon, or through the world.
I recognise the problems in continuing to use masculine titles or pronouns in
referring to God without defending their continued use, but for the sake of avoiding
cumbersome substitutes, I have elected to follow this convention and do not mean to
imply thereby that the issue is unimportant.
iv
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The scope of this thesis precludes extensive treatment of several key issues
associated with a doctrine ofprovidence. Some of these will be noted in Chapter
One, but one other limitation to be observed here involves treating providence only
from the perspective of its application to humans. This is not to imply, however, that
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In an influential, mid-twentieth century article, Langdon Gilkey noted that
traditional forms of a Christian doctrine ofprovidence had suffered a serious loss of
credibility. Karl Barth had argued earlier that, in spite of a failure by many
theologians to link a doctrine of providence explicitly to a doctrine of the Trinity, if a
doctrine ofprovidence is to be Christian, it should also be trinitarian, since orthodox
Christianity understands God to be triune. In view of these assessments, this thesis
examines the doctrine of divine providence, and argues that many systematic
formulations of it have failed to capture its specifically Christian, which is to say
trinitarian, nature, but that when they do they provide a more adequate framework for
the doctrine and the hope it offers.
Chapter One of this thesis will examine the present status of a doctrine of
providence, noting especially those problems that have led to its demise. The thesis
will focus on the question as to whether a doctrine of providence can still function as
a framework ofmeaning for human history, and therefore as a source of hope for
human endeavour. In view of the intrinsic link between a doctrine of God and a
doctrine ofprovidence, addressing problems with traditional forms ofprovidence
requires one to respond to contemporary critiques ofChristian Classical Theism.
This Chapter raises the question as to whether, in addressing problems with a
Christian doctrine of providence, the doctrine can be credibly reconstructed within
the framework of a trinitarian model ofGod. Criteria are then suggested by which to
evaluate the Christian models of providence reviewed in subsequent chapters.
Chapter Two evaluates two Christian theologies ofprovidence by theologians
who are not trinitarian, but who address key problems with traditional versions of
providence.
Chapter Three looks at two theologians who are trinitarian in theology, but
who do not apply an explicitly trinitarian structure to their doctrines of providence.
Vll
The Triune Provider
Reasons for this are explored, and illustrative options are presented as suggestions
for ways one might make this connection.
Chapter Four reviews two models of providence which are constructed with
explicit connections to a relational model of the triune God.
Chapter Five summarises key ideas arising from previous chapters, noting the
areas of commonality among the authors reviewed, as well as key differences. This
summary constitutes an agenda for further work on a doctrine of providence, and a
beginning outline is offered as a suggestion toward developing a trinitarian model of
providence within the context of an overarching model of the Trinity-world relation




PROVIDENCE AND THE TRINITY TODAY
In order to understand some of the key issues with which contemporary
theologians struggle in constructing a credible doctrine of providence, the first
section of this opening chapter will summarise a few of the factors which have led to
the present shape of the discussion on providence. This survey will note, on the one
hand, why for many Christians the doctrine has lost its significance, and on the other
hand, record the renewed interest in the doctrine.
As noted in the Preface, since a doctrine of providence and a doctrine of God
are closely related, and given that a doctrine of the Trinity has served as the orthodox
doctrine ofGod for most in the Christian tradition, the second section of this chapter
will briefly note a parallel and related eclipse and renewal of the Trinity in
contemporary theology. The current context for both doctrines (providence and
Trinity) seems to be one of rediscovery and reconstruction, and as such provides the
background against which each of the authors considered here are working.
The final section of the chapter will outline the criteria of analysis to be used
in succeeding chapters.
As an introductory survey, this chapter does not function as a definitive
analysis of contemporary treatments of providence, but serves rather to highlight key
issues that arise in current discussions of the doctrine. This will set the context for
the discussion of providence by particular theologians reviewed in chapters Two
through Four, as well as establish the framework for the positive proposals put
forward in Chapter Five.
1
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The State of the Doctrine of Providence Today
Henri Blocher notes that 'the theme of God's antecedent [providential] Plan,
which looms large in Scripture, is one of the most neglected ones in theology
today.'9 Jonathan Boyd, reviewing works on history, notes: 'Once, the word
providence efficiently communicated the idea that God loved us, ruled time to its
minute details, and was himself a historical agent. That time is gone, however, and
the word has rusted up through misuse beyond utility.'10 In contrast to these negative
evaluations of its credibility, a doctrine of divine providence once commanded a
central role in a system ofChristian dogmatics. It defined God's ongoing relation to
the world in general, and to the church in particular. William Burt Pope, writing
toward the end of the nineteenth century, captured the ubiquity of this doctrine in a
Christian system of theology with these words: 'It silently accompanies theology . . .
into all its regions of study.'11 It is clear from a study of the Christian faith that
belief in God's originating activity, and in God's subsequent 'general oversight of
creation'12 as well as active caring for individual humans, has formed a fundamental
assumption of that faith.13 What was once taken for granted, however, has been
seriously questioned in that part of the world influenced by the Enlightenment,
Modernity and Postmodernity.
9Henri Blocher, 'Yesterday, Today, Forever: Time, Times, Eternity in Biblical Perspective,'
Tvndale Bulletin 52, no. 2 (2001): 201.
l0Jonathan Tucker Boyd, 'If Ever We Needed the Lord Before,' Books and Culture (May-
June 1999): 41. I owe this reference to Terrance Tiessen, Providence and Prayer: How Does God
Work in the World? (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 16.
"William B. Pope, Compendium of Christian Theology, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (n.p.: Phillips and
Hunt, 1880), 456.
|:H. Ray Dunning, Grace. Faith, and Holiness: A Weslevan Systematic Theology (Kansas
City, MO: Beacon Hill Press ofKansas City, 1988), 256.
I3As Thomas Oden notes, '[f]rom Hebrew Scriptures, classical Christian exegetes have
constantly mined key texts that inform the Christian teaching of providence. If Scripture is taken
seriously, providence must be taken seriously. . .. The theme [of providence] is intimately
interwoven with essential Judeo-Christian affirmations of the divine majesty, omnipresence, and care'
(The Living God, vol. 1, Systematic Theology [HarperCollins Publishers, Inc, 1987, 1992; Peabody,
MA: Prince Press, 1998], 302).
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A Doctrine in Crisis
The problems for a doctrine ofprovidence in the setting of contemporary
Western culture are closely associated with sharp critiques of the God of Classical
Theism with which the doctrine has often been linked. Phillip Clayton notes the
widespread dissatisfaction with the God ofClassical Theism,14 and Sallie McFague,
for example, rejects Classical Theism's concept ofGod.15 Two symptoms of this
disillusionment in the mid-twentieth century were the 'God is dead' movement and
the fate of the Biblical Theology movement.
Symptoms of the Crisis
One of the overt indications of problems with the God of Classical Theism
was the 'death of God' movement. Although short-lived, it brought into sharp focus
the growing disillusionment with traditional understandings of God and
providence.16 In contradistinction to the claim of traditional Christianity that God
was both sovereignly present and active in the world, the death-of-God theologies
brought into sharp relief the sense of God's absence. Resonating with this sense of
the absence ofGod, John A. T. Robinson helped to popularise this movement with
his book, Honest to God.17 Drawing upon work by Paul Tillich, Dietrich Bonhoeffer
and RudolfBultmann, he pointed out that belief in a God "'up there,"' an 'Other
l4Philip Clayton, 'The Case for Christian Panentheism,' Dialog 37, no. 3 (Summer 1998):
203.
15Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological. Nuclear Age (Philadelphia,
PA: Fortress Press, 1987), 59-69. Cf. also Jiirgen Moltmann's critique of all forms of theological
monotheism (by which he means unitarianism), monarchianism, hierarchical structures, and
metaphors of power (with their political and ecclesial correlates) (The Trinity and the Kingdom: The
Doctrine ofGod, trans. Margaret Kohl [London, UK: SCM Press, Ltd.; New York, NY: Harper and
Row, Publishers, Inc., 1981], 192-202).
16Cf. Albert Outler's comments on the significance of this movement (Who Trusts in God:
Musings on the Meaning of Providence [New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1968], 25-26). Cf.
also, Alistair Kee (The Way of Transcendence: Christian Faith Without Belief in God [Middlesex,
England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1971], 75, 78); and Peter C. Hodgson, Winds of the Spirit: A
Constructive Theology (London, UK: SCM Press, 1994), 62.
17John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1963).
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beyond the skies' who worked by supernatural means in the world was no longer
credible, not only for those outside the church, but also for many within it.18
Another symptom of the theological stress contributing to the demise of
belief in the God ofClassical Theism, and in providence, was the fate of the biblical
theology Movement.19 Underlying the biblical theology movement was a felt need to
discover (or rediscover) a unity in the 'Christian canon,' and 'to recover for both
Testaments their significance and power in the life of the church.'20 Brevard Childs
and James Barr, however, wrote sharp critiques of the movement.21 The crisis for
this movement was linked to a perceived failure ofBarthian and neo-orthodox
22
theology in particular, and revelation-centred theology in general.
The significance of the perceived demise of the biblical theology movement
for a doctrine ofprovidence consists in the way in which this movement was linked
to a concept of God's action in history. Langdon Gilkey contributed what became a
widely influential23 critique24 ofG. Ernest Wright's book, God Who Acts: Biblical
Theology as Recital (a work seen by many as 'a classic of the biblical theology
18Robinson, Honest. 125-6, 17, 22; cf. ibid., 21-24, 38-9, 64, 78-79, 83, 123-126, 130-132,
136-41.
19Cf. Brevard Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press,
1970), 13-87; James D. Smart, The Past. Present, and Future of Biblical Theology (Philadelphia, PA:
The Westminster Press, 1979), 62; and James Barr, The Semantics ofBiblical Language (London,
UK: Oxford University Press, 1961), 274-5. Cf. also G. E. Wright, God Who Acts: Biblical Theology
as Recital. Studies in Biblical Theology, no. 8 (London, UK: SCM Press, 1952), 11-12.
20Smart, Biblical Theology. 73, 80; cf. Wright, God Who Acts. 11.
2lChilds, Theology in Crisis: Barr, Semantics.
22Cf. Smart, Biblical Theology. 23, 25, 26, 31, 36. James Smart, however, maintains that
'neither internationally nor in America has there been any sign in either the '60s or the '70s that
biblical theology is dying or dead' (ibid., 83). He affirms Brevard Child's opinion that there was a
crisis, but thinks the crisis is located not in the questionable category of a '"biblical theology
movement'" (ibid., 12), but rather 'in the whole vast enterprise of biblical scholarship' (ibid., 22; cf.
ibid., 18-48).
230wen C. Thomas, 'Introduction,' in God's Activity in the World: The Contemporary
Problem, ed. Owen C. Thomas, in American Academy ofReligion series, Studies in Religion, no. 31
(Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 5; cf. Child's earlier assessment: 'the article carried a tremendous
force' (Crisis. 65).
24Langdon Gilkey, 'Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail ofBiblical Language,' The
Journal ofReligion . 41 (1961): 194-205.
4
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movement.'25), and ofBernhard W. Anderson's, Understanding the Old Testament.
Wright had proffered the thesis that 'the central message of the Bible is a
proclamation of the Divine action; and ifwe discard that, we shall have nothing left
which makes the Bible what it is. . . . [T]hat which constitutes Biblical faith ... is
first and foremost a confessional recital of the gracious and redemptive acts of
God.'26 Gilkey critiqued this view of divine action for two reasons: first, it not only
attempted to retain the univocal biblical language about God's acts in history, but
secondly, since it held to a modern worldview in which miracles do not occur, it was
forced to deny anything more than an analogical meaning to the concept of 'mighty
act' of God. The proponents of the 'God who acts' theology were left with nothing
27
more than 'what the liberals used to call religious experience and religious insight.'
In Child's critique he noted that the very aim of the Biblical Theology
Movement to make the Bible more accessible and relevant to the church created a
new problem: there was an implicit suggestion that 'the Bible had a particular
perspective that demanded an adjustment on the part ofmodern man,' which meant
that in order to have a Christian faith one must share in the perspective of the ancient
world of the Bible. Moreover, it was also suggested that 'God was to be known in
his great acts to the people of God, not in the ideas or values that could be detached
from the Biblical record.' But in the contemporary context of the mid-twentieth
century the action of this God was increasingly limited to his work in the church.28
While a survey of the nature and history of the Biblical Theology Movement is
25Owen Thomas, 'Introduction,' Activity. 4; Even if Smart is correct in rejecting Childs'
assessment ofWright's book as 'a fair representation of the content of the consensus' of the
'American biblical theologians' (Childs, Theology in Crisis. 24), that doesn't minimize the
widespread influence of this common (but putatively erroneous) perception.
26Wright, God Who Acts. 120.
27Gilkey, 'Cosmology,' 199-203. Gilkey's own critique of the biblical theology movement
thus became a source of its downfall (cf. Gary Dorrien, 'Making Sense of Ultimacy: Truths of
Experience in Langdon Gilkey's Theological Development,' in The Theology of Langdon B. Gilkev:
Systematic and Critical Studies, eds. Kyle A. Pasewark, and JeffB. Pool (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1999), 4).
28Childs, Theology in Crisis. 58.
5
The Triune Provider
outside the scope of this paper, the point of relevance here is that such emphases as
these did not help the cause ofmaintaining a credible doctrine of providence.
From the foregoing summary it seems clear that significant developments in
theology, culture, and biblical studies reflected a deep dissatisfaction with traditional
models of God and the God-world relation. As a result both the notions ofChristian
theism and providence had fallen upon hard times.
Sources of the Crisis
During the time leading up to this crisis,29 however, the doctrine of
providence had enjoyed a place of privilege in the 'dominant worldview' and
theological systems of 'Western culture.'30 God's sustaining and governing of
creation was interpreted more "deterministically" in Augustine and Calvin than in
Aquinas31 or Arminius and his followers,32 but all were agreed on creation's total
and continuing dependence on the Creator's active involvement both for being and
for the power to act.
The doctrine of providence was also presented 'in general and timeless
terms,' that is, not tied to the ebb and flow of fortune. Rooted in an understanding of
God who exists timelessly and changelessly in eternity, the doctrine ofprovidence
reflected God's superior perfection, wisdom, and infallibility. Thus, 'Providence
29Several authors have charted this crisis. For example, G. C. Berkouwer (The Providence of
God, trans. Lewis B. Smedes, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1952, rpt. 1983)); Langdon Gilkey ('The Concept of Providence in Contemporary
Theology,' The Journal of Religion 43, no. 3 (July, 1963); Albert Outler (Who Trusts'): and Horton
Davies (The Vigilant God: Providence in the Thought ofAugustine. Aquinas. Calvin and Barth [New
York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1992]).
30Julian N. Hartt, 'Creation and Providence,' in Christian Theology: An Introduction to its
Traditions and Tasks, eds. Peter C. Hodgson, and Robert H. King (Fortress Press, 1982; London,
Great Britain: SPCK, 1983), 115, 118. Cf. Berkouwer for a similar assessment (Providence. 10). Cf.
Thomas Oden's survey of the classical writings of the church on providence (Living God, chap. 7); cf.
also Benjamin W. Farley's historical overview (The Providence ofGod [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1988], chaps. 4-7).
31Cf. Hartt, 'Creation and Providence,' 120-121.
32Cf. Richard A. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius:
Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Book House, 1991), 240-248, 250-268.
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seemed to be a "truth" which could rely upon universal assent,' even when other
doctrines came under fire.
Gilkey summarises the medieval consensus on the doctrine of providence as
follows: first, the doctrine of providence expressed 'the sovereignty ofGod over
historical (and natural) events and so a sovereign ruling action fulfilling God's final
purposes for his creation.' In this model God's eschatological goal defines the shape
of God's electing and providential action. Second, 'God's providential activity'
controls both 'objective historical actions and events' and individual decisions such
that God's goals for each individual are achieved. Third, God is not 'one external
cause among other causes' in the world, but as primary cause works 'in and through'
secondary causes to achieve his ends. Fourth, providence works through human
freedom, defined as 'voluntary willing.' Finally, since it is the providential will of
God achieving his plan for creation, the concept of a blind chance or 'fate' behind
the events of history is ruled out. And as long as freedom is understood as volitional
(versus libertarian), God's providential and salvific will works to increase the level
of freedom in sinful humans who, if left on their own, would be unable to actualise
God's purposes for them. 4
In spite of the problems that Modern and Post-modern thought have with
such a view of the God-world relation, it did provide a model for maintaining
confidence in 'the core conviction ofChristian faith that God is redemptively present
in history.' Albert Outler stresses that 'the intent of the traditional doctrines of
"providence"' was to show how God is present in the world and especially in history
as its ultimate context ofmeaning.36 It is some version of this central claim which
each of the authors in this study wish to retain, even though the models they
construct for enshrining this truth differ considerably from one another.
33Berkouwer, Providence. 10-11.
34Langdon Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation ofHistory (New York,
NY: Seabury Press, 1981), 161-162.
35Peter C. Hodgson, God in History, Shapes of Freedom (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press,
1989), 12.
360utler, Who Trusts. 13. Cf. Gilkey, 'Cosmology': 189.
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Such confidence in God's overarching and meticulously detailed care was put
to a severe test in the ensuing centuries, a test which created the contemporary
context in which traditional views ofprovidence are seriously questioned.
Modernity and the Loss of the Medieval Consensus
While it is risky to draw causal links too firmly between popular conceptions
of the world and the fate of theological doctrines, it seems to be no accident that
certain widely accepted assumptions ofWestern culture, since the rise of the
Enlightenment, have posed a challenge to belief in God and God's active presence in
the world. The term 'modernity' connotes both a time period and an ethos in Western
civilization which has perpetuated many of the ideas and goals of the Enlightenment.
Stanley Grenz pictures it as being characterized by the goal of the human conquest of
nature for the benefit ofhumankind, by an understanding of the 'human person as an
autonomous rational subject,' and by a view of the world as 'a machine' governed by
fixed laws.37 The conviction that 'knowledge is certain, objective, and good' formed
the core set of 'epistemological assumptions' ofmodernity. These assumptions fuelled
the spirit of optimism and belief in progress that characterized the modern mindset.38
Both Gilkey and Berkouwer saw the prevalent, modern scientific worldview
of the cosmos as a closed system ofnatural causation, along with the vastly
heightened sense of the pervasiveness of evil, as key causes for the demise ofbelief
in a doctrine ofprovidence.39 They also noted the negative influence ofmodernity's
stress on human autonomy, along with its weakened notion of God's nature and
ability to control events in the world.40 In rejecting the abstract God of Deism,
"Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, U.K.:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996), 2-3.
38Grenz, Primer. 4.
39Gilkey, 'Providence': 180, 176; Berkouwer, Providence. 15-17. Cf. Horton Davies for a
similar assessment ("Vigilant. 3-5). Hebblethwaite and Henderson see 'the problem of evil' as the 'old
difficulty' for providence, while 'the new difficulty is our modem scientific understanding of both the
natural and the human worlds' that offers 'the prospect of a complete understanding of what happens
in the world in purely this-worldly terms' ('Introduction,' in Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the
Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer. eds. Brian Hebblethwaite, and Edward Henderson
(Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1990), 1-2).
40Gilkey, 'Providence': 179; Berkouwer. Providence. 25-1. Cf. Gilkev. Reaping. 194.
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Liberal theology posited a God of love 'incapable ofwrath.' But in the face of a
growing consciousness of evil this 'eternal Philanthropist was exposed as a
delusion,' and the view ofprovidence as the hidden telos of evolution also fell into
discredit.41
When the premodern worldview was challenged by the Enlightenment and
the rise ofmodern science, adjustments were made in the doctrine of providence and
at first it survived as a key element in liberal theology—now as a concept of
"'evolutionary providence'"42 in which God is the hidden explanation of its
progress.43 This progress was understood to be inevitable, even when interpreted
naturalistically.44 Challenges to the older, static concept of nature, with the idea of
providence as maintaining a given order, arose especially in the area of geology
(with a new understanding of aeonic changes governed by inexorable laws seemingly
'unrelated to animal or human adaptation'), and in the area ofbiology (with its
concept of evolutionary 'random mutations and subsequent natural selection').45
Loss of a teleological category of purpose in science45 was—and is—due at least in
part to its naturalistic assumptions.47
A closely related dilemma feeding the doubt about God's providential care
was the modern question about the ontological status of the reality to which religious
40
statements referred. Scientific statements about reality were taken to be factual,
reflecting 'a typically modern preference for explanations that remain within the
4lBerkouwer, Providence. 26-7.
42Gilkey, Reaping. 205.
43Hartt, 'Creation and Providence,' 133.
44Cf. Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language (Indianapolis,
OH; New York, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969), 343; idem, Reaping. 207, 210-216,
195-196; and idem, 'Concept of Providence,' 171-175.
45Gilkey, Reaping. 204-205.
46Hartt, 'Creation and Providence,' 115, 126.
47Cf. Philip Clayton, God and Contemporary Science. Edinburgh Studies in Constructive





natural order,'49 while religious statements were understood to be subjective value
judgments.50
In the face of such fundamental doubt about providence, Gilkey states that the
liberal view ofprovidence collapsed in Europe by nineteen eighteen, and in America
by the mid-thirties, because the broader pervasive worldview in which it was held
had also collapsed.51 Since there was no longer a sure faith in the inevitable progress
of human civilization, there could be no faith in a providential purpose undergirding
the evolution of nature and history. Because of a heightened 'sense of the
meaninglessness ofhistory,' not only was 'a view of Providence based on natural
theology . .. out of the question,' but 'even a theologically derived concept of
Providence' was impossible.52
Gilkey lists the following set of reasons for 'this sudden divine evacuation of
the scene ofhistory': first, a change in New Testament studies shifted from thinking
of Jesus' conception of the kingdom ofGod 'as a future historical commonwealth'
realised through human efforts (Ritschl), to that of an 'eschatological kingdom which
was to enter history suddenly through God's action, not to be built by and out of
history' (Johannes Weiss); second, 'the dissolution of the conception ofhistorical
progress'; third, the assumption (even by 'almost all neo-orthodox theologians') of
'the relative autonomy of the casual nexus,' taken in conjunction with an 'emphasis
49Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?
(New York, NY; Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988), 7.
50Cf. Gordon Kaufman's critique of this division (Systematic Theology: A Historicist
Perspective [New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968], 308). Philip Clayton argues that even
while Christian theology is now once again being granted a voice in the context of a culture which
celebrates particularity, he also cautions that the 'old fact/value distinction' still constitutes a problem
for theology in a culture where 'the authority of scientific conclusions as an overarching framework of
knowledge has never been so great' (Contemporary Science. 2-3, 5).
51Cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 197.
52Gilkey, 'Providence': 173-4. Similar assessments have been made by Berkouwer
(Providence. 7-11, 12, 13, 17-23), Robinson, (Honest. 8-9, 21), Alister Kee (Way of Transcendence.
184), and Mark C. Taylor (Erring: A Postmodern A/theology [London, UK: The University of
Chicago Press, Ltd.; Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1984, pbk., ed., 1987], 4). Gilkey
disagrees with Jiirgen Moltmann and Schubert Ogden in their contention that it was the classical
'notion of the absolute determiner of all events, good and evil' which caused 'the "death of God" in
our time.' While Gilkey agrees that what was understood as the classical view of God (and of
providence) was 'the cause of rejoicing over that death [of God],' he attributes the 'cultural demise' of
that model of God to 'our wider secular spirit' (Reaping. 242).
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on human autonomy, on man's freedom to be self-creative and so creative as
"maker" ofhistory,' left little place for understanding 'how God can be involved in
natural and social process'; fourth, a shift (in 'dialectical or neo-orthodox theology')
to a concept of revelation as a transforming 'self-communication ofGod through his
Word' limited talk of divine action (and hence providence) to the realm of 'personal
encounter' with God, resulting in an individualising and 'interiorizing' of
providence.53
In more conservative circles, as well, doubt about the credibility ofbelief in
God's providential involvement in the affairs of the world led to what David
Livingstone terms a 'privatization of Providence.' This shift of focus for providence
was accompanied by a move away from postmillennialism (associated with
evolutionary progress) to a 'resurgence ofpremillennialism,' resulting in 'a theology
with a far more robust emphasis on intervention than on providential superintendence
of the world order.'54 Focus could thus shift from belief in the gradual progress of
history toward the kingdom, to that of the second coming of Christ effecting an
apocalyptic consummation of creation. On this latter view one could believe in a
hidden general providential plan or strategy, while still maintaining confidence in
God's personal and particular direction and help in individual lives.
Some theologians sought to avoid the problems with a doctrine ofprovidence
by adapting their theology to some form of existentialism. This allowed them to
circumvent 'the objectivity of orthodoxy and natural theology, on the one hand, and the
subjectivity of "religious experience," on the other.' One's religious experience ofGod
was '"real" in the sense that it involved a communication with and so knowledge of a
divine reality over against us.' It was '"inward" in the sense it was not derived from, or
[sic] could its validity be determined by, matters of fact or propositions concerning
them.' And it was '"existential" in that it was personal and transforming knowledge.'55
53Gilkey, Reaping. 223-226.
54David N. Livingstone, 'Evolution, Eschatology, and the Privatization of Providence,'
Science and Christian Belief 2. no. 2 (October 1990): 125, 126. Gilkey's analysis of the
'interiorizing' of providence in 'twentieth-century Krisis theology' seems to agree with this
assessment (Reaping. 226, 216-217; cf. ibid., 216-226, 403, n. 74).
55Gilkey, 'Providence': 182; Cf. Stanley Grenz' comment that, in light of the problems with
traditional views of providence, 'Existentialist thinkers limited truth to encounter' (Theology for the
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It thus avoided several problems: the problem of the authority (infallibility) of
scripture, the need to repudiate findings of science, and conflict with an empiricist
and positivist philosophy of science. At the same time, however, it also isolated the
criteria for discerning God's interaction with the world from the possibility ofpublic
critique.56
Albert Outler drew a direct link between the mood of the times (as reflected
in the death of God movement) and a loss of the doctrine ofprovidence. He observes
that this modern attitude in Western culture, reflected in the phrase 'the world
"come-of-age,"'
means man on his own in a cosmos that has no room and no
need for God. And with this triumphant revelation, out goes
the linchpin of traditional Christian doctrine: the belief in the
providence ofGod as the ultimate environment of human
existence. This is the crux of our crisis, and its scope and
57
purport are as grave as any our forefathers ever had to face.
As Julian Hartt puts it, the dominance of the Modern perspective resulted in
CO
the loss of the Medieval 'consensus' on providence. By the early nineteen
hundreds, therefore, the doctrine of providence had suffered a serious blow, and by
the nineteen sixties, with a few exceptions, its presence had reached a nadir in many
of the theological systems of the day.59
The modern 'flowering of. . . historical consciousness' emphasised the
historical conditioning and particularity of the Christian religious experience, and
Community of God [Carlisle, U.K.: The Paternoster Press; n.p., USA: Broadman and Holman
Publishers, 1994), 156).
56Cf. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Theology and the Justification of Faith: Constructing
Theories in Systematic Theology, trans. H. F. Snijders (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1989), 19, 139-140, 145. Horton Davies notes that difficulties with traditional
views of providence 'forced many believers to become fideists' (Vigilant. 2).
"Albert Outler, Who Trusts. 6. It is as 'the ultimate environment of human existence' (ibid.)
that this thesis will analyse each model of providence, treating it as a context of meaning.
58Hartt, 'Creation and Providence,' 125-139; cf. ibid., 116. Cf. also, Berkouwer, Providence.
11; and Gilkey, Reaping. 207-208, 216-217. Cf. also Emil Brunner's similar assessment of the fate of
the nineteenth century's concept ofprogress (The Christian Doctrine ofCreation and Redemption,





also pictured God, not as a beyond-history architect and governor of cosmic reality,
but as himself conditioned by historical process.60 While modem science has largely
failed to discern evidence of the purpose and teleology in nature and history as held
by the consensus view ofprovidence,61 some contemporary philosophers and
theologians have also failed to discover a ground of ultimate meaning behind all the
pluriform views of reality.62 As Hodgson comments, 'ours is an age of
thoroughgoing pluralism and relativism, an age for which there is no center but only
63
a multiplicity of evanescent centers and value-free projects.' This
'thoroughgoing .. . relativism' adopted by some theologians has come to be labelled
as a shift to post-modern forms of theology, which raise another set ofproblems for
providence.
Postmodernity and the Loss of Providential Meaning
One example of a more extreme form ofpost-modem "theology" is Mark C.
Taylor's, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology. In this exercise in deconstructive
theology, he argues that the death of God leads to the death of the self and of
history.64 Obviously it also leads to a death of providence, since there is no fixed
beginning (or ending), no overarching divine metanarrative giving meaning and
purpose to all of life. As Taylor argues, there is no hidden 'providential Reason,' no
'divine Logos,'65 no hidden divinity behind history giving it secret and symbolic
60Hartt, 'Creation and Providence,' 130-131. Gilkey repeatedly emphasises that both a new
sense of time as linear (Augustine [cf. Reaping. 175]) and of God's present transformation of the
structures of society (Calvin [cf. ibid., 186]) made possible the modern historical consciousness (with
its new understanding of creative human freedom and of 'the relative autonomy of the casual nexus'
[ibid., 224]), resulting in a desacralisation of the world where it was impossible to believe in 'an all-
governing providence' (ibid., 194). Cf. Pannenberg for a similar conclusion (Anthropology in
Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell [Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press,
1985], 503, 505.
6lHartt, 'Creation and Providence,' 115, 126; cf. Hodgson, God in History. 31.
52Hodgson, God in History. 31-36.
63Hodgson, God in History. 31.
64Taylor, Erring, chaps. 1-3.
65Taylor, Erring. 55, 58-9, 66.
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meaning. There is no unified story with beginning, middle and end, no 'kairotic'66
moment or event giving meaning to the whole. This means that 'the person who
cannot recover origins can never know the end.'67 Moreover, in his view, 'history
AS
. . . appears to be [solely] the work of creative imagination.' Modern historical
consciousness, taken to its logical conclusion, can thus lead to a post-modern death
of history, and therefore also of God's involvement in history, which was a key
aspect of traditional views of providence.
Taylor observes that there is a natural continuity between the anthropological
turn ofmodernity and the 'posthumanistic a/theology' of postmodernity.69 He relates
this to 'the death ofGod,' showing how the post-modern move continues and further
radicalises the modern suspicion of authority: 'Carried to completion, humanistic
atheism negates itself and leads to posthumanistic a/theology.'70 Taylor insists,
therefore, that neither the Christian God, nor humans, underwrite an overall meaning
or ontology of history. History, rather, is a story of human construction (a fiction)
intended to 'ease the trauma of dislocation by weaving scattered events into a
seamless web.'71 Whereas Moderns affirmed the legitimacy of all histories as so
many perspectives on the whole, post-modern thought questions whether there is any
whole at all. Traditional versions ofprovidence (such as Paul Helm's72) seek to give
expression to God's overarching plans laid in eternity, in the "beginning," "before"
even the creation of the world, and thus in the past. Eschatological versions (such as
73
Pannenberg's ) seek to root providence in the triune God who transcends the time-







72Helm's Reformed doctrine of providence will be analysed below, in Chapter Three.
73Pannenberg's trinitarian doctrine of providence will be treated in Chapter Four.
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making the details of providence in the present dependent on the future for their
source ofmeaning. According to Taylor's criteria both types of approaches must be
categorised as Modern attempts to establish a 'totalizing' metaphor which represents
history as developing linearly.74 Convinced that there is no such unified story, no
integrating law to provide such unity, no history, and hence no 'wholly other God,'




God is now fully immanent as the 'incarnate word.' Apparently, even in a
post-modern a/theology the search for meaning, and the categories of 'meaning' and
'presence,' are still a part of the paradigm. While letting go of the God who is 'the
transcendent Author/Creator/Master who governs from afar,'77 Taylor is attempting
to construct a revised concept of "god," one which can be more radically "present"
than the God of Classical Theism. Thus, even in post-modern theology there exists a
desire to make "God" present, which, as Outler says, was the very concern of the
traditional doctrine ofprovidence. It may be the case that the essentially unrelated
God ofAquinas required the addition of a doctrine of providence78 in order to make
this God seem relevant (or more accurately, to clarify how this God is relevant and
present), but the extreme revision of the concept of "God" by Taylor means 'the
absent God is replaced by the signs and symbols themselves, the endless milieu of
significations that is language.'79 And while this drops the traditional referent for
'God,' it does not do away completely with the meaning-making function of the
concept—in effect it substitutes "another" (or "others"). But the problem with his
approach consists in his reifying traditional metaphors and models of God into
ontological absolutes. By then dismissing these models, he seems to think he has also
gotten rid of the very concept of 'god' itself.
74Cf. Taylor, Erring. 70-71.
75Taylor, Erring. 72, 169; cf. ibid., 157, 103-105.
76Taylor, Erring. 103.
"Taylor, Erring. 103.
78Cf. Ruth Page, God and the Web of Creation (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1996), 7-8.
79Hodgson, God in History. 37.
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William Dean characterises his own New Historicist approach to doing
theology as less deconstructive than Taylor's,80 finding instead more in common
with Gordon Kaufman's recent theological work—although he expresses concern
over the potentially empty or ambiguous nature of Kaufman's neopragmatic concept
of God.81 In advocating 'new historicism' as a basis for doing Christian theology in
America, he rejects both 'the objectivism of the realists' and the radical
epistemological relativism of the nonfoundationalists. The postmodernism of the 'new
historicism' seeks a middle way—it still accepts 'a dependence on particular histories
and a resulting uncertainty about history in general,' but it also assumes there 'is an
historical past that can be known.'82 Nevertheless, it cannot appeal to knowledge of a
God beyond history who providentially guides its progress. What is ultimate is not so
much "something" (or some "One") beyond history, ofwhich humans have some
intuition, as it is the historical process itself.
Although both Taylor and Dean work hard at avoiding ultimate
metanarratives, both their models reflect an epistemological incoherence: How can
one say, categorically, what is not, when one denies the very category of is/is not? In
the very claim that 'there is neither fixed center that orients nor an eternally present
logos that directs. ... no special time or special place,' no kairos, only 'the
everlasting flow, the ever-never-changing-same, the eternal cross(ing) of
differences—the arising and passing-away that does not itselfarise andpass away,,M
Taylor, in fact, is creating a totalising metaphor or metanarrative: the claim that there
80Cf. Dean, History Making History: The New Historicism in American Religious Thought.
SUNY Series in Philosophy, ed. Robert C. Neville (Albany, NY: State University ofNew York Press,
1988), 19-21, 136-144. Dean wonders whether deconstructive works like Taylor's, if left at the
methodological stage, 'leaves to the term God any significant use at all' (ibid., 137).
81Dean, History. 142-143; cf. ibid., 140-141. Kaufman has more recently emphasised that
'God' is our name for the mystery that emerges from our experience of the world as a trajectory
motivated by a hidden, 'deeply mysterious,' creativity (In Face ofMystery: A Constructive Theology
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993], 293; cf. ibid., 4-5, 268-273, 279, 293, 294, 415-
418).
82Dean, History. 17.
83Mark C. Taylor, Erring. 169.
84Mark C. Taylor, Erring. 169 (italics mine). Cf. Albert Outler's distinction 'between clock-
time (chronos) and life-time (kairosY (Who Trusts. 49; cf. ibid., 48-51).
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is no ultimate source ofmeaning, no unifying thread, is itselfa unifying thread.
Stated positively, it seems that Taylor has reified open-ended process as the ultimate
meaning-making category.
Issues Raised by Modern and Post-modern Concerns
Clearly, in theologies such as these, the concept of an extrinsic divine
providence weaving continuity and meaning into the events of history is an anomaly.
At the same time, they lose the concept of any ultimate hope. Humans are always
becoming, but never arriving, finally dissipating back into their constitutive
elements. While these models may prove to have potential for focusing one's energy
on the here-and-now, they seem to rob one of the traditional source of the deeper
significance of the present. With the loss ofprovidence, and of the God of
providence, one also loses the rich concept of kairos and the meaning and hope
implicit in it. It would appear that with the loss of transcendence humans have also
lost the basis for moving beyond convention as a basis of self-critique.85 Moreover,
the orthodox Christian claim that humans not only have their being from God, but
their identity (and therefore significance) over-against the creating/sustaining God
{Coram Deo), seems to embody something fundamentally important to the Christian
faith. Can one continue to say he or she is doing Christian theology if he or she
ultimately rejects the concept of creator and some version of providence?
This brief look at some of the effects ofmore recent developments in
methodology and theological construction in Christian theology illustrates the fact
that a doctrine of providence continues to face difficult problems. The unrelated God
ofClassical Theism has posed for some theologians insurmountable problems in
thinking ofGod in relation to the world.86 In response to this problem, they have
85Kathryn Tanner argues that it is only by disentangling the Christian concept of God's
transcendence from the ways in which it has been subverted to serve particular political hierarchies in
history, that we have resources with which to critique present oppressive political structures (The
Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992], viii,
3-7). ~
86Cf. John Cobb, Jr.'s and David R. Griffin's succinct critique in their, Process Theology: An
Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1976), 7-10; cf. also John J.
O'Donnell, S.J., Trinity and Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process
Theology and the Theology ofHope (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1983), 17-21.
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opted for various degrees of relativism and pluralism in their theological approaches.
They assume an exclusively naturalistic and anthropocentric ("historical") basis for
doing theology, assuming from the outset that whatever God there might be, this God
does not exist outside of human constructions of the concept "God," and therefore
"God" only "guides" or "directs" individual and societal histories insofar as the
87
meaning put into the concept serves a pragmatic and humanitarian purpose. This
epistemological assumption determines in advance what can be said about God and
about providence.
A common thread running through the consensus view of providence, the
'death ofGod' movement, and the Post-modern concern with liberation from all
sources of domination, is a concern for optimal human existence and a salutary
"presence" of "God" with us—in other words, a context in which maximal meaning
and thriving can occur. In spite of the rhetoric involved in the Death ofGod
Movement which implied that the concept of 'God' as such was no longer necessary,
it was really the God ofClassical Theism which seemed to be resented. On the one
hand, some of the late modern critiques of providence attempted to re-locate the
context ofmeaning in a deistic view of history.88 If a God "out there" is in some
sense involved, it is only as the initiator of a self-sustaining web of intra-mundane
causes. The glory ofmodem humanity is to no longer need mythical notions of a
cosmic baby-sitter, but rather, God's universal provision of life itself, with its self-
regulating laws, is all the "providence" necessary for radically free human creativity.
On the other hand, others thought of God as the immanent divine telos behind
evolutionary progress. In both cases, the effect was a distancing of God from the
particular vicissitudes of human experience and history.
87Cf. Dean, History, 17-18.
88Nancey Murphy argues that the Newtonian view of the universe was behind the widespread
deistic theologies ('Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridan's Ass and Schrodinger's Cat,' in
Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert John Russell,
Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed.
Robert John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center
for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997), 325; cf. Hartt for a similar assessment ('Creation and
Providence,' 127); cf. also, Christopher Mooney, Theology and Scientific Knowledge: Changing




These kinds of critiques reflect serious scientific and moral objections to
belief in providence, as well as questions about theodicy, the causal joint between
divine and mundane causes, God's role in history, and the efficacy ofprayer. The
lack of relationality ascribed to the God of classical Christian theism has also evoked
womanist concerns about relationality89 and personalism.90
With respect to some in the post-modern move, they seek to jettison even the
concept of such an indirect providence, claiming to be content to exist without
ultimates. But as Peter Hodgson comments, 'it is odd that the postmodernist sense of
"incurable loss" and all-pervasive differance should here [in Mark C. Taylor's
a/theology] issue in the total "having" of divinity and an undialectical immediacy.'91
The question becomes, therefore, for which (or whose) God should one look? While
post-modern theologies reject speaking of some essence ofChristianity, do they not
in fact invest Christian concepts or symbols such as 'God' or 'providence' with some
92
meaning? Otherwise, there would be little point in using these terms.
Post-modern theologies create obvious problems for any doctrine of
providence which takes as its basis a definite origin in the past (an act of creation), a
continuing creation (including incarnation), or a consummation at the end (final
redemption). As reflected in contemporary criticisms of traditional Christian
concepts of the creator God, such models entail that God constitutes the ultimate
89Cf. Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Feminist Reconstructions of Christian Doctrine: Narrative
Analysis and Appraisal (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 129; J. A. DiNoia, O.P.,
notes the feminist critique of the unrelated, 'androcentric conceptions' of God in 'classical Christian
theism,' along with their suggestion that 'the ideal of a distant, detached, and omnicompetent male'
God needs to be changed or replaced 'by one in which female attributes of relationality and
engagement figure' ('Knowing and Naming the Triune God: The Grammar of Trinitarian Confession,'
in Speaking the Christian God: The Holy Trinity and the Challenge of Feminism, ed. Alvin F. Kimel,
Jr. (Leominster, UK: Gracewing; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1992),
166.
90Cf. Rufus Burrow, Jr., 'Development ofWomanist Theology: Some Chief Characteristics,'
The Asbury Theological Journal 54. no. 1 (Spring 1999): 52-53.
''Hodgson, God in History. 37.
92As Sallie McFague concedes, metaphors for God must refer to 'something, or there would




context ofmeaning for the individual's history, and for history as a whole. As
Mark Taylor rightly notes, the 'thorough interdependence' between the concepts of
'God,' 'self, history and book' means that any change in one category alters 'all of
the others.'94 Thus, to the 'death of God' Taylor adds 'the disappearance of the self,
the end of history, and the closure of the book'95 If one accepts Taylor's logic, then
contemporary attempts to retrieve and reinterpret a Christian doctrine ofprovidence
must by definition be non-starters—at least as long as one retains the concept of God
as a personal entity not reducible to the world itself.
Although such Post-modern treatments of "God" and the "God"-world
relation leave little, if any, room for a doctrine ofprovidence, Taylor rightly discerns
the intrinsic connection between one's concept of God, providence, anthropology,
history, meaning, eschatology and hope. This will mean that any attempt to retrieve
a doctrine of providence will entail reflection upon the Christian model of God, as
well on other key doctrines.
Moreover, it could be argued that in deconstructing God and providence, in
claiming that humans write their own stories, Taylor is nevertheless asserting that
humans are defined by narratives. That is, as long as there are humans who function
as persons, there will be events, narratives, and therefore meaning. Taylor's view
envisions many disconnected micro-narratives, as opposed to the Modern concept of
a single meta-narrative. If the developmental psychologists are correct, therefore,
and humans invariably seek to make meaning out of their experiences, then it would
seem that humans are narrative-based creatures, defined by their contexts and their
relations. As Michael Root puts it,
narratives help us understand events by locating them within
larger meaningful patterns . . . [this] configurational
understanding is the sort of understanding provided by a
93Gilkey makes a similar point (Maker ofHeaven and Earth: The Christian Doctrine of
Creation in Light of Modern Knowledge [New York, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959;
Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1965], 308).
94Mark C. Taylor, Erring. 7.
95Mark C. Taylor, Erring. 7-8.
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narrative. Within a narrative, an event ceases to be an
isolated monad and becomes part of the whole.96
The question is, who or what constitutes the context in which events are
woven together to form a narrative; and who in fact does the writing? Traditional
versions ofprovidence answered both questions with the word 'God.' The narrative
in this view is already written, and humans simply play out their pre-assigned roles.
As Chapter Two will show, this view is still current (Paul Helm), but so are a range
of other configurations. For example, God establishes the context, but humans write
most of the story (Maurice Wiles and Langdon Gilkey); God establishes the context
and then partners with us in writing the story (John Sanders); God himself is the
context, and partners with us in writing both our story and his story (Jiirgen
Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg). These summaries do not capture the nuances
of the positions represented, but they do express the way in which contemporary
retrievals and reconstructions of providence attempt to find in the doctrine a context
ofmeaning.
ContemporaryAttempts to Retrieve theDoctrine
In spite of the difficulties faced by a doctrine of providence in the
contemporary context just outlined, many theologians continue to work with the
doctrine. Some of these treatments take the form of traditional confessional
theologies.97 These tend to be more conservative, often written to reaffirm
qo
traditional forms of providence. Others adopt a more ecumenical focus. They are
interested in finding a way to recapture or reassert a level of consensus on the nature
96Michael Root, 'The Narrative Structure of Soteriology,' Modern Theology 2 (1986): 151-
152; quoted in Kathryn Greene-McCreight, Feminist Reconstructions ofChristian Doctrine: Narrative
Analysis and Appraisal (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 129.
97See for example, Millard Erickson's Baptist perspective, Christian Theology. 2nd ed. (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Books, of Baker Book House Company, 1983, 1998); Wayne Grudem's Reformed
statement of the doctrine, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids,
MI: Zondervan Publishing House, a Division ofHarperCollins Publishers, 1994); and H. Orton
Wiley's Arminian version, Christian Theology, vol. 1 (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill Press ofKansas
City, 1940; 14th printing, 1971).
98See Moltmann's, Trinity; and his, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation.
The Gifford Lectures, 1984-1985, trans., Margaret Kohl (London, UK: SCM Press, 1985). Cf. also
Thomas Oden's summary of the 'ecumenical consensus' of the orthodox faith of the Christian church
on this topic (Living God, ix; see esp. chap. 7); and Langdon Gilkey's, Reaping.
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and effects of God's presence in history. While they do not necessarily expect to
establish unanimity, they do hope to find some common ground on the subject. Still
others take the form ofphilosophical theology, concerning themselves with the
problem of evil, theodicy," and the relation between divine sovereignty and human
freedom.100
Another important area of discussion related to providence involves the topic
of divine action as it arises in current discussions between science and theology. The
debate revolves around the problem of how to account for the possibility of God
acting in a world which is otherwise fully explainable in terms of intramundane
causes.101 Many feel that modern science has progressively excluded the need for a
"God-of-the-gaps" explanation in accounting for human experience or for the way
things work in the world. While a doctrine ofprovidence usually accepts that God
can and does act in the world, this question of divine action remains an important
apologetic concern for providence in a culture which accords high status to the
sciences' ability to explain things. It deals specifically with what is theoretically and
conceptually possible within the framework of a scientific view of the world. One
example ofwork on this issue is that ofWilliam Stoeger (Staff Astrophysicist at the
Vatican Observatory Research Group, Steward Observatory, University ofArizona).
He explains that finding a way 'to describe God's action in the world in a coherent
and acceptable way—faithful to the sources of revelation and at the same time
99Cf. Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press Inc.; Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998); Austin Farrer, Love Almighty and
Ills Unlimited: An Essay on Providence and Evil. Containing the Nathaniel Taylor Lectures for 1961
(London, UK: Collins, 1962).
l00Cf. Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Cornell Studies in the
Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Paul Flelm, The Providence of
God, in Contours of Christian Theology, series ed., Gerald Bray (Leicester, UK: Inter-Varsity Press,
1993). John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1998). Terrance Tiessen's typology of eleven models of providence gives special
focus to the issue of divine sovereignty and human freedom (Providence and Prayer").
101Cf. Jack Dodd's atheistic approach to science ('Response by Jack Dodd,' in Science and
Theology: Questions at the Interface, eds. Murray Rae, Hilary Regan, and John Stenhouse




understandable in light of our scientific knowledge of creation—is the central
102
question confronting theology today.'
Ultimately, the scientific and philosophical debate about the possibility of
divine action may never settle the theological issue ofbelief in providence. As Philip
Clayton points out, even for those 'involved in natural theology in the traditional
sense—moving inductively from scientific results to construct one's theology— ....
[such] . . . results . . . underdetermine one's choice among metaphysical
interpretations.'103 Whatever scientifically informed model of divine action one
adopts, belief in providence will involve an irreducible faith commitment.104 For the
purposes of this thesis, therefore, it will be necessary to distinguish between the
theological doctrine ofprovidence in distinction from the more philosophical and
scientific connotations associated with divine action. While it is important to note
the significance of the complex and wide ranging discussion about divine action as
seen from a scientific perspective,105 a detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the
scope of the present work.
However, since traditional views of the doctrine of providence have
emphasised God's preserving (sustaining), concurring (co-operating), and governing
activities in relation to the world he created ex nihilo, this thesis assumes that such
l02William Stoeger, S.J., 'God and Time: The Action and Life of the Triune God in the
World,' Theology Today 55, no. 3 (October 1998): 365; cf. ibid., 365-388. Cf. Robert John Russell,
Nancey Muiphy, and C. J. Isham, eds., Quantum Cosmology and the Laws ofNature: Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed.
Robert John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center
for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1996); and Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur
Peacocke, eds., Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., A Series on
'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican
Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997).
l03Philip Clayton, Contemporary Science. 259.
l04Cf. Dunning, Grace and Holiness, 257, 258. Cf. also, Benjamin Farley, Providence of
God. 17-18; and Diogenes Allen, 'Faith and the Recognition of God's Activity,' in Divine Action:
Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer. eds. Brian Hebblethwaite, and
Edward Henderson (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1990); and Thomas Oden, Living God. 299.
l05For example, this discussion shapes Maurice Wiles' approach to providence, and it also




action is possible, even if it must be reconceptualised in light of contemporary
scientific understandings of the world.106
There are, however, several practical reasons for noting this discussion. First,
the science-theology discussion ofdivine action can serve the more negative function
of showing which kind of analogies will no longer work—for example, the clockwork
universe and the deistic God. John Polkinghorne's general principle, that 'the
discussion of science-and-religion is a valuable but second-order task,'107 would
seem to apply to the specific scientific and philosophical discussion about divine
action in relation to the theological concern ofprovidence. Constructing a model of
divine action which integrates the results ofmodern science entails the adoption of a
metaphysical analogy or model (for example, panentheism) which 'provides a
guiding framework' for integrating those results with explicitly biblical and
• 108 •
theological claims about God. In this way theology supplements science. It will
be the coherence of one's whole model of the God-world relation, as it integrates
theological insight with scientific insight, which provides the credibility of one's
view of divine action.
Second, the extensive dialogue between theology and science on this issue
forms a significant part of the context influencing how some theologians think about
106Cf. Christoph Schwobel's assertion that belief in the possibility of divine action is
'constitutive' of 'Christian faith' (God: Action and Revelation. Studies in Philosophical Theology,
no. 3, eds. H.J. Adriaanse, and Vincent Briimmer [Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992], 24; cf. ibid., 25).
Maurice Wiles agrees (God's Action in the World. The Bampton Lectures for 1986 [London, UK:
SCM Press Ltd., 1986; Reissued by XPRESS REPRINTS SCM Bookroom, London, UK, 1993], 2-
13). For similar conclusions, cf. Owen C. Thomas, 'Preface,' in God's Activity in the World: The
Contemporary Problem, in American Academy ofReligion series, Studies in Religion, no. 31 (Chico,
CA: Scholars Press, 1983), v; idem, 'Summary Analysis,' in ibid., 403; Owen C. Thomas, 'Recent
Thought on Divine Agency,' in Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of
Austin Farrer. eds. Brian Hebblethwaite, and Edward Henderson (Edinburgh, Scotland: T. and T.
Clark Ltd., 1990), 35-50. Among the many works addressing divine action and science, a few are, Ian
Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, vol. 1, The Gifford Lectures 1989-1991 (New York, NY:
HarperSanFrancisco, 1990); Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming-
Natural, Divine and Human, enlarged edition (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1990); John
Polkinghome, Science and Christian Belief: God's Interaction with the World (London, UK: SPCK,
1989); and Stephen Happel ('Divine Providence and Instrumentality: Metaphors for Time in Self-
Organizing Systems and Divine Action,' in Chaos and Complexity. 177-203).
107Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship Between Science and Theology
(Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1991), 60.
l08Philip Clayton, Contemporary Science. 260.
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providence.109 In their work on this subject, many scholars are not only struggling to
rethink what it might mean for God (as Spirit) to act on or in the physical world,
what a divine act might be, but also to rethink the locus of such action. Whereas in
the past causal language was appropriated from philosophy as a vehicle for
expressing God's action in the world, this has increasingly led to difficulties in
allowing for libertarian versions of human freedom, in accounting for the notion of
inter-personal influence, and in distinguishing between what God does and what
humans do. Thus, the problem of divine action involves not only a question of locus
(where does God act), but also questions of definition (what is a divine act) and
means (how is a divine act carried out).110
A third reason for noting this discussion is to pay attention to the fact that
theologians do not always maintain a clear distinction between the concepts of
providence and divine action.111 In the same way that some authors understand the
defining feature and central core of a doctrine ofprovidence to be the issue of divine
sovereignty and foreknowledge as it affects human freedom, so others seem to
reduce providence to the problem of divine action.
l09Wiles, God's Action. Book length monographs on providence written from a scientific
perspective are William G. Pollard, Chance and Providence: God's Action in a World Governed by
Scientific Law (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958); and John Polkinghorne, Science and
Providence: God's Interaction with the World (London, UK: SPCK, 1989). Two other informative
sets of articles on the relation between science and theology, as it impacts providence and divine
action, have been drawn together by Ted Peters (Ted Peters, ed., Cosmos as Creation: Theology and
Science in Consonance [Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989]); idem, Science and Theology: The
New Consonance [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 1998]).
"°Owen C. Thomas summarises the complexity involved in the question, 'How does God act
in the world?' in the following six points: '1. By what means? E.g., God acts in the world through
secondary causes. 2. In what way or manner? E.g., God acts in the world uniformly, purposively,
persuasively. 3. To what effect? E.g., God acts in the world to heal diseases and to inspire good
actions. 4. With what meaning or for what reason or purpose? E.g., God acts in the world to achieve
the divine purpose ofjustice and peace. 5. To what extent or degree? E.g., God acts in the world
everywhere and always. 6. On analogy with what? E.g., God acts in the world as the mind acts on the
brain.' As Thomas notes, 'the various approaches' adopted by theologians and philosophers on divine
action 'can be compared only in so far as they are treating the same question' ('Summary Analysis,' in
God's Activity. 234-235).
mThis can be seen in the way many authors simply treat providence in terms of divine
action. For example, in the series, 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' divine action is the
problem in primary focus, but resolution of that problem is seen as crucial for reconstructing a
credible doctrine of providence.
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A final reason for noting the complex but important debate about how to
conceive of divine action in the world is precisely its link with the natural sciences.
This debate keeps theological speculation about providence firmly rooted in the hard
reality of the world as seen through the lens of a scientific perspective. This does not
mean that the concept of divine action must be explained from a purely scientific
standpoint before one can believe in providence, but it does keep work on providence
connected to what many accept as the empirical realities ofmodern life. This is
especially important in light of the growing acceptance of the fact that both
112
theologians and scientists are rational beings looking at the same world.
Although the breadth of treatment in any particular theology of providence
exceeds the limits implied by confessional, ecumenical, philosophical, or scientific
approaches to the topic, these categories do bring into focus some of the dominant
interests in current work on providence.
A final context in which a few theologians have worked out a doctrine of
providence consists of constructing a trinitarian framework for the doctrine.113
Although these trinitarian models of providence explicitly raise the question about
the relation of a Christian doctrine of God as it relates to providence, the focus given
to a doctrine the Trinity in this thesis is not the question as to whether God is a
Trinity, nor resolving how God is Trinity—that would entail a different study. This
project, instead, is asking: Do those treatments ofprovidence that seek to make
explicit connections with the doctrine ofGod as Trinity provide more adequate
formulations ofprovidence than those which are not trinitarian? Do they suggest
resources for the doctrine that advance its credibility in light of the important
problems and concerns regarding providence?114
In order to provide a framework for this theme, the survey in the following
section records some of the more prominent issues connected with contemporary
ll2Cf. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen's reflection on this issue in his chapter on, 'The Shaping of
Rationality in Science and Religion,' in Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (Cambridge, U.K.;
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997); cf. also idem, Justification of
Faith.
113Two of these works on trinitarian providence will be analysed in Chapter Four of this
thesis (Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jiirgen Moltmann).
ll4Criteria for evaluating these questions will be presented in the section below on method.
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discussions of the Trinity as a way of acknowledging the context in which current
discussion of a trinitarian view ofprovidence takes place.
A Doctrine of Providence and the Doctrine of the Trinity
More specifically, this section will note the grammatical or normative
function claimed for a doctrine of the Trinity, and briefly note reasons for the eclipse
and subsequent resurgence of interest in the Trinity, especially as these have
relevance for a doctrine ofprovidence.
A Doctrine of the Trinityas Grammatical Rule
Those who think of a doctrine of the Trinity as the definitively Christian
understanding of God give first priority to its grammatical function in delimiting
what one can say about the nature of God. Some of these trinitarian theologians then
make another methodological decision and interpret all other Christian doctrines
from an explicitly trinitarian perspective. In this regard, the grammatical status of a
doctrine of the Trinity allows it to function as a material criterion for a Christian
doctrine ofprovidence. It will be treated as such in this thesis.
Methodologically, this means that for these trinitarian theologians one must
first work from the presupposition that a trinitarian understanding of God is a
given,115 and only then work out its implication for other doctrines. If this initial
decision is found to aid in the retrieval and restatement of other doctrines, that is a
bonus, but it cannot be one's initial motive in developing a trinitarian doctrine of
providence.
Although the doctrine of the Trinity early came to comprise 'the fundamental
grammar of our knowledge ofGod,'116 it has not often played a central role in the
113Cf. Claude Welch, In This Name: The Doctrine of the Trinity in Contemporary Theology
(New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 238; cf. ibid., 242, 245.
"6Thomas Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God. One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh,
UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1996), 2. For similar assessments of the grammatical or normative status of
a doctrine of the Trinity, cf. Claude Welch, In this Name, vii-ix; Schwobel, 'Introduction. The
Renaissance of Trinitarian Theology: Reasons, Problems and Tasks,' in Trinitarian Theology Today:
Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph Schwobel (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd.,
1995), 4; cf. ibid., 1-30; Gerald O'Collins, S.J., The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting
the Trinity (Mahway, NJ: Paulist Press, 1999), 6; Thomas Oden, Living God. 209, and chap. 5. Cf.
also, Edmund J. Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity.
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Christian doctrine of providence,117 and as a key doctrine in its own right, it has
suffered neglect.118 However, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in the
Trinity, and two of the models ofprovidence reviewed in this thesis are explicitly
trinitarian. Since some of the reasons for the earlier lapse of interest in the doctrine
have correlative relevance to difficulties with Classical Christian Theism and with
traditional models ofprovidence, it will be helpful to note a few of them here.
The Eclipse of theDoctrine of the Trinity
Karl Barth and Karl Rahner were among the first theologians in the twentieth
century to alert the Christian community to its neglect of the Trinity. Just as belief in
a traditional form ofprovidence became problematic in an atmosphere ofnaturalistic
presuppositions, so too a doctrine of the Trinity came into question when historical
criticism raised serious questions about the Gospel of John 'as a primitive historical
source.'119 John Thompson records the British Council ofChurches' report which
'points out that historical critical studies "bear hard on the doctrine of the Trinity" for
two reasons. First, there are in the New Testament very "few biblical texts which
can be claimed to have an explicitly trinitarian significance." Second, "many of
those passages which do appear to support the doctrine of the Trinity belong to later
stages of the New Testament tradition.'" Since it is assumed that 'the earliest strata
of tradition are the most reliable,' and since the deity of Christ (a claim 'inextricably
Theological Resources, eds. John P. Whalen, and Jaroslav Pelikan (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster;
London, UK: Hutchinson and Co. [Publishers] Ltd., 1972).
ll7Cf. the lack of mention of the Trinity in Benjamin Farley's history of the doctrine of
providence (Providence of God). Although some systematic theologies do mention the trinitarian
nature ofprovidence, they do little to work out the implications, choosing instead to relate the doctrine
of the Trinity to soteriology (cf. for e.g., H. Orton Wiley, Christian Theology, vol. 1). Thomas Oden
insists providence is a trinitarian work (Living God. 229), but actually relates it more to God's single
essence and to God's attributes (ibid., chap. 7). Barth is a notable exception to this trend in the first
half of the twentieth century, and Pannenberg and Moltmann in contemporary theology.
"8Catherine Mowry LaCugna traces the early rise and subsequent decline of the doctrine of
the Trinity in her, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFranisco,
1991; Harper Collins Paperback edition, 1993), 8, 21-198; cf. her chapter, 'Re-conceiving the Trinity
as the Mystery of Salvation,' in Readings in Modern Theology: Britain and America, ed. Robin Gill
[London, UK: SPCK, 1995]). Cf. also the accounts of Claude Welch, In This Name: and James
Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as Trinity (London, UK: SCM Press, 1983).
II9Welch, In This Name. 4.
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linked with the Trinity') 'is not explicitly stated there,' this makes it difficult to take
120
a doctrine of the Trinity as normative.
The eclipse of interest in the Trinity may also be due in part to the focus in
classical Christian theism on a monistic view ofGod which drew heavily upon Greek
notions of deity, thus emphasising God's perfections in terms of static and absolute
attributes.121 This came into acute focus in christology. Michael Langford points
out, for example, that the broader problem of how to relate the concept of God as an
eternal, unchanging, "affectionless," and transcendent Being, to the concept of a
personal God of love in caring relationship with the world, finds a focus in
Christology, 'in the question of the nature ofChrist.'122 Eugene TeSelle notes that,
whereas some early theologians saw in the Logos orWord a mediating principle
between the immutable domain of divine spirit and the changing realm ofmatter,
'the more the full divinity of the Word was stressed, the more the Word was elevated
above the firmament, so to speak, and disappeared into the transcendent divine
realm.'123 Gilkey offers a similar assessment, observing that after Nicea and
Constantinople each member of the Trinity was 'defined as fully divine,' thereby
'negating every creaturely attribute: temporality, potentiality, changeableness,
relatedness, and dependence.'124 Colin Gunton notes an opposite problem:
Enlightenment influences resulted in seeing Jesus, not as an incarnate revelation of
l20John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (Oxford, UK: New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 8.
mCf. Leonardo Boff s overview of these and other factors in Trinity and Society, trans. Paul
Bums, Theology and Liberation Series (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books; Kent, UK: Bums and Oates,
1988 [Originally published as A Trindade, a Sociedade e a Libertacao (Petropolis, RJ, Brazil: Editora
Vozes Ltda, 1986; 3rd ed. 1987)], 13-20.
l22Michael Langford, Providence (SCM Press Ltd., 1981), 145.
l23Eugene TeSelle, 'Divine Action: The Doctrinal Tradition,' in Divine Action: Studies
Inspired by the Philosophical Theology of Austin Farrer. eds. Brian Hebblethwaite, and Edward
Henderson (Edinburgh, U.K.: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1990), 83; cf. ibid., 84.
124Gilkey, 'God,' in Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks, eds.




God, 'but as a man pointing to God.' For this reason a doctrine of 'the Trinity
125
becomes automatically problematic.'
In view of these developments, christology, as a means of understanding the
Trinity's providential relation to the universe, seems both to be part of the solution
and part of the problem, that is, Jesus Christ, as the divine-human person embodies
the eternity-time relation within himself, but there is no easy solution to the problem
of understanding how the divine and human natures form a unity in one person.
Once the Enlightenment and Modernity made dominant the criteria of
nature,126 immanence, relatedness, historical consciousness, and becoming for the
understanding ofGod,127 the seemingly unrelated, immutable and impassible Trinity
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was seen by many as no longer relevant.
Whether or not these critiques are deserved, the doctrine of God as Trinity
has suffered a fate of irrelevance similar to that of the God of Classical Theism. It is
precisely this set ofproblems with the categories of absolute perfection and omni-
causality which has invoked sharp criticism of both the classical model of the
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Christian God and ofprovidence.
Besides the problems involved in discerning God as a Trinity on the basis of
a natural theology (that is, by reason alone, without special revelation),130 and in
addition to the rejection of the Trinity by 'the Socinians and Arminians of the
seventeenth century,' Walter Kasper points out that with the Enlightenment a new
conceptual problem arose with respect to the Trinity. Whereas the ancient and
l25Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd.,
1991, 2nd ed., 1997), 3.
l26Walter Kasper notes that 'nature' is here 'understood after the manner of the Stoics, . . .
[as] the critical court of appeal and the norm of religion' (The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J.
O'Connell [New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1984, 1987], 24).
127Cf. Gilkey, 'God,' 72, 77-78, 79.
l28William J. Hill illustrates this by looking at the treatment given the Trinity by
Schleiermacher, Paul Tillich, Cyril Richardson, and others—including Maurice Wiles (The Three-
Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1982; rpt. in paperback, 1988), 34-109; cf. ibid., 253ff.
129Cf. Sallie McFague, Models of God, ix.
l30Cf. Stanley Grenz, Community of God. 82. Cf. also, Walter Kasper, God of Jesus. 313.
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medieval church understood 'person' in substantive or 'ontological terms,' in 'the
modern period, person ... is defined as a self-conscious free center of action and as
individual personality' or as 'subject.'131 Thus, 'the idea of three persons in one
nature became impossible, not only logically but psychologically as well. For the
modern self-conscious person could see in other persons only competitors. The
? 132
combining of oneness and threeness became an insoluble problem.'
In Claude Welch's account of the loss of interest in the metaphysical doctrine
and religious significance of the Trinity, it seems evident, on the one hand, that for
liberal theologians a doctrine of the Trinity is not needed when one defines one's
religious faith as an expression of a universal moral code. 'Conservative'
theologians, on the other hand, retain faith in the doctrine as a datum of revelation,
but fail to integrate it with other doctrines and with spiritual life.
Several authors have noted the failure of the church to maintain the distinct
roles played by the persons of the Trinity in creation. Augustine and Aquinas are
seen as major contributors to this state of affairs, by thinking of all of the Trinity's
works ad extra as undivided.134 The point here is not that there could be a lack of
unanimity among the three "persons" of the Trinity, but that a trinitarian distinction
was not required in explicating God's action toward the creation.135 It would appear
that there is a close connection between an emphasis on Western monotheism and a
loss of the Trinity in its doctrines of creation and providence.
l3lKasper, God of Jesus. 285, 288.
l32Kasper, God of Jesus. 285. John Thompson also notes this problem with language in
relation to the Trinity, both because the concept stretches language to its 'limit,' and because of the
changing meaning of terms like 'person' (Modern Trinitarian Perspectives. 6-7). Cf. Philip Clayton's
critique of substance language as applied to a doctrine of God ('Christian Panentheism,' 203, 204).
133Claude Welch, In This Name. Chap. 1. Cf. Karl Rahner's similar assessment of the
doctrine's practical irrelevance in the life of the faith community (The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel
[Kent, UK: Burns and Oates, 1970], 10-11, 13-14). Cf. also Christoph Schwobel, 'Introduction,'
Trinitarian Theology. 8-9.
l34The classic principle was, 'opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa (the actions of the Trinity
outwards are undivided)' (Gunton, Promise. 4). Christoph Schwobel makes this point with regard to
Augustine: 'Introduction,' Trinitarian Theology. 5; LaCugna makes a similar point with regard to
Aquinas: God For Us. 165-66, 158, 159, 161, 214.
135Cf. Rahner's treatment of this problem (Trinity. 15-24); cf. also Robert Jenson, The Triune
Identity (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1982), 126-127.
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In a Newtonian understanding of the universe, whereby it eventually came to
be seen as self-sustaining, many found it natural to picture God as having created the
universe with its clearly defined, smoothly functioning laws, and then retiring from
direct involvement with its existence (a deistic model). When this view of the
universe was combined with the Medieval emphasis on the essentially unrelated God
ofClassical Theism, the Augustinian and Aquinian doctrine of the undividedness of
the Trinity's works ad extra, Reformation interest in personal salvation, and
Schleiermacher's relegation of the Trinity to an appendix, there did not seem to be
much need of, or place for, an emphasis on the Trinity as related to providence. If a
need still existed for explicit correlation between the two doctrines, it was to some
degree already covered by the ancient doctrine of appropriations as exemplified in
the ecumenical creeds, or simply assumed as already implied in treatments of
christology, pneumatology, and soteriology.136 However, the large amount of recent
work on the Trinity as the definitively Christian doctrine of God raises again the
question about how to relate this doctrine to other doctrines in theology, including
providence.
A Revival of Interest in the Trinity
Although the doctrine of the Trinity had been long neglected, theologians
• 137
now evidence a renewed and growing interest in this topic.
Among the many factors that account for a resurgence of interest in the
doctrine of the Trinity in Western theology, a major influence seems to be its
'encounter with Eastern Orthodoxy, its liturgy and its theology, in the ecumenical
l36Cf. Pope's comment on this latter method of covering providence (Compendium of
Theology, vol. 1: 456).
137Cf. John Thompson, Modem Trinitarian Perspectives. 3-19; cf. also Gunton, Promise, xi,
xv, 1-2; and Dalferth, 'Eschatological Roots,' 147. There is a plethora of recent material on the
Trinity, but a few of the prominent works include Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 1, pt. 1
(Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1936); Karl Rahner, Trinity; Claude Welch, In This Name;
James Mackey, God as Trinity; Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us; Christoph Schwobel, ed.,
Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd.,
1995); Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God. Creation and the Culture ofModernity.
The Bampton Lectures 1992 (New York, NY; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993);
idem, Promise; Robert Jenson, Triune Identity; idem, The Triune God, vol. 1, Systematic Theology
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997); Moltmann, Trinity; Wolfhart Pannenberg,
Systematic Theology. 3 vols, (trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co.; Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1991, 1994, 1998).
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context.'138 Lesslie Newbigin adds two further contributing factors to the 'strong
revival of trinitarian thinking in Western theology'139: the blaming of the classical,
unitarian concept of God (as either ultimate substance or subject) as having fostered
first, 'our prevailing individualism,' and second, the validation of'patterns of
domination in human affairs.'140 In response to these imbalances some
contemporary theologians seek to replace an emphasis on individualism with one of
social relation, and second, to reject a relation of domination in favour of one of
shared responsibility. For some of these theologians a doctrine of the Trinity appears
to offer resources for this project.141 Christoph Schwobel reports that 'it has to be
acknowledged that one of the factors operative in the increased interest in trinitarian
theology is an acute awareness of the interrelationship between theological concepts
and the conceptions that inform our views of the natural and social world,' that is, it
profoundly influences the shape of one's worldview.142
This renewed interest in the relevancy of a doctrine of the Trinity to not only
other areas of theology, but also to life both sacred and secular, can be easily
illustrated. Catherine LaCugna has applied the doctrine to anthropology, ethics,
spirituality and sacramental theology.143 Barbara Brown Zikmund links the Trinity
l38Schwobel, 'Introduction,' Trinitarian Theology. 3.
139Lesslie Newbigin, 'The Trinity as Public Truth,' in The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age:
Theological Essays on Culture and Religion, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge,
UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), 6.
140Newbigin, 'Trinity,' 5-6.
14IColin Gunton, for example, sees in the doctrine of the Trinity resources for overcoming the
either/or option between individualism and collectivist socialism as fostered by Modernity (The One,
the Three and the Many"). Cf. also Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society: and Miroslav Volf, "'The
Trinity is our Social Program": The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement,'
Modern Theology 14 (July 1998): 403-423.
142Schwobel, 'Introduction,' Trinitarian Theology. 11; cf. ibid., 9-10.
l43LaCugna, God for Us. John D. Zizioulas has also applied the doctrine of the Trinity to
anthropology. See his 'On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood,' in Persons: Human
and Divine, eds. Christoph Schwobel, and Colin E. Gunton (T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1991); idem, Being
as Communion (London, UK: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985); and idem, 'The Doctrine of the
Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution,' in Trinitarian Theology Today:




to women's experience.144 Leonardo Boff finds in the doctrine resources for
liberation.145 Francis Watson addresses the significance of the relationship of
biblical hermeneutics, narrative and interpretation to 'the triune, narratively-encoded
God ofChristian faith.'146 The authors of The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age explore
'its relevance to the question of interreligious dialogue.'147 James B. Torrance
demonstrates the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity for the worship of the
church.148 William Stoeger applies the doctrine of the Trinity to the problem of
divine action.149 Colin Gunton links the Trinity to both creation and providence.150
And Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jtirgen Moltmann make explicit connections between
the Trinity and providence. Implicit in these applications is the assumption that since
the Christian doctrine ofGod is that of a Trinity, it would seem logical to ask what
difference this fundamental grammar might make in the elucidation of other
doctrines. This will comprise one of the questions asked of each author throughout
the course of this investigation.
In spite of the many difficulties associated with both a doctrine of providence
and a doctrine of the Trinity, there seems to be sufficient warrant for discussing them
together to make the effort worthwhile. First, when the doctrine of the Trinity is
described as the grammar of the Christian doctrine of God, its normative function for
what can be said about God, and about other doctrines, is highlighted.
144Barbara Brown Zikmund, 'Trinity and Women's Experience,' Christian Century (April 15,
1987): 354-356.
i45Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society.
146Francis Watson, Text, Church and World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological
Perspective. [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company; Edinburgh, UK: T. and
T. Clark Ltd., 1994], 84; cf. 137-153, 207-8. Kevin Vanhoozer has also related the Trinity to the issue
of hermeneutics (Is There Meaning in This Text: The Bible. The Reader, and the Morality of Literary
Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1998).
147Cf. esp., Gary Badcock, 'Karl Rahner, the Trinity, and Religious Pluralism,' in The Trinity
in a Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on Culture and Religion, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand
Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), 143.
148James B. Torrance, Worship. Community and the Triune God of Grace (Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996).
149William Stoeger, 'God and Time.'
150Colin Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study. Edinbmgh Studies
in Constructive Theology (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1998).
34
The Triune Provider
Second, given the problems with providence which implied for some that
God (as traditionally understood) is absent from human history, it would seem that
some response to critiques ofChristian Classical Theism is required. Concern about
the apparently uni-causal and non-reciprocal relations ofGod to the world151 has
pushed many theologians toward more immanental models of the God-world
relation. Julian Hartt summarises this movement toward more immanent views with
respect to providence as follows. The Medieval consensus held to a God ofperfect
substance and 'eminent cause.' In turn, 'liberal theologians of idealist persuasion
responded with subject as the replacement for substance and with immanent
teleology in the place of the theological determinism of the consensus.' A more
recent alternative is the God ofProcess thought who supplies 'not energy or being,
152but aim and relative order.'
Third, a trinitarian doctrine of creation could imply a trinitarian doctrine of
providence, especially when a doctrine of providence is subsumed under a doctrine
of creation.153 There is precedent for this in the history of linking the work of the
"individual" trinitarian Persons to their distinct roles in the economy. This is seen
most clearly in the work of redemption, but it is also true of a doctrine of creation:
'The Father creates through the Son and by the power of the Spirit.'154
l51Cf. Moltmann, Trinity: McFague, Models of God: and Cobb and Griffin, Process
Theology. Although not the only issue, this is the special burden of Gilkey's and Moltmann's work
on providence, to be reviewed in chaps. 2 and 4, respectively. Denis Edwards expresses a similar
concern ('Discovery of Chaos and the Retrieval of the Trinity,' in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur
Peacocke, A series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert John Russell [Vatican
City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences, 1997], 157-158).
152Hartt, 'Creation and Providence,' 133, 134. For a survey of the way God's transcendence
and immanence have been viewed, see Stanley Grenz and Roger Olsen, Twentieth-Century Theology:
God and the World in a Transitional Age (Carlisle, UK: The Paternoster Press; Downer Grove, IL:
Intervarsity Press, 1992). Cf. Sallie McFague's Models of God: and idem, The Body of God: An
Ecological Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993).
153As, for example, in Gunton's Triune Creator, and Pannenberg's Systematic Theology, vol.
2, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.; Edinburgh,
UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1994). Cf. also Colin Gunton, 'Relation and Relativity: The Trinity and the
Created World,' in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph
Schwobel (Edinburgh, Scotland: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1995), 92-112.
l54Thomas Oden, Living God. 251; cf. also, ibid., 229, 246-251.
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Finally, the current interest in divine immanence and relationality seems to
relate naturally to a doctrine ofGod in which one member of the Trinity becomes
incarnate in human form while continuing to be divine, who remains present to
humans through the Holy Spirit, and who mediates the Father's presence.155 This
connection is doubly important since it is not only about how God is present (a
question of function) but which God is present (a question of identity and ontology).
Robert Jenson agrees, and argues that in a culture which is increasingly pluralistic, it
behoves Christians to clearly identify 'which god we mean' ifwe expect 'Christian
discourse to be intelligible.'156 Moreover, Jenson raises the next logical question:
'how must reality be interpreted, if its God is triune?'157 This question can be
adapted to the present project: How must providence be interpreted if it is the work of
a triune God? This question is especially relevant since a doctrine of providence has
traditionally been the locus of the question of how the Christian God relates to the
present world.
Although allusions to methodology have been made in the foregoing material,
it will be necessary at this point to give a more explicit exposition of the criteria to be
used in this thesis for analysing models ofprovidence.
Method
The foregoing survey has revealed how complex the question of a doctrine of
providence is in the present milieu in which theologians work. Once the
Enlightenment made it possible to question the church and the shape of its basic
doctrines, it was only a short step to ask whether God was actually as the Christian-
classical synthesis had pictured him, and further, whether God was present and active
in the world in just the way the consensus had affirmed. This is the broad context in
which a doctrine ofprovidence must be considered today.
While previous sections have charted some of the contemporary problems
with providence, the scope of this thesis would not allow a full delineation of the
l5'Cf. Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationalitv and Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville,
KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 15, 165.
156Jenson, Triune Identity. 112.
157Jenson, Triune Identity. 161.
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problems, nor would it be able to respond to all of them. Moreover, the authors
reviewed in the following chapters will themselves highlight what they think are
major concerns with providence.
Since this is a thesis exploring the contemporary problematic of a Christian
theology ofprovidence, it will be impossible to critique the whole set of doctrines
and arguments which are required to give a particular theological model, as a whole,
its credibility and coherence. Thus, many central doctrines will only be treated
tangentially, that is, when discussion of them is necessary in order to understand a
particular author's treatment ofprovidence.
At the risk of oversimplifying important concerns, the number and
complexity of the issues involved with providence make it necessary to mark off
certain aspects of the discussion which cannot be fully explored in this thesis. Such
topics as divine action, divine sovereignty and human freedom, the relation between
time and eternity, and theodicy, as distinct subjects of discussion in their own right,
are not the main foci of this thesis, even though reference to them figures
prominently in some of the authors surveyed. Instead, this thesis focuses on how
current models of providence define God's relation to history, and thus how they
i co
m t
function as instruments ofmeaning-making. The way meaning is defined, and the
kind ofmeaning constructed will in turn indicate something about the shape ofhope
(present and future) engendered by a model of providence.
Against this general background, not all authors treat a doctrine ofprovidence
as having the same content, nor do they emphasise the same aspects of the doctrine.
Even when there is some consensus on the scope of sub-doctrines to be included in
the discussion, some then treat providence primarily from the perspective of the
problems associated with the philosophical discussion of divine sovereignty, divine
l58The concept of doctrines of providence functioning as 'instruments ofmeaning-making' is
used here mainly in the sense of discovering or recognising meaning, although they do shape that
meaning to some extent. As used in this thesis, 'meaning-making' assumes a critical realist view of




foreknowledge, and human freedom159; others see theodicy as the primary
concern160; and still others centre attention on the issue of divine action.161
Nevertheless, these differing perspectives identify important concerns
associated with providence. This means that some kind of criterial structure is
required which allows the insights of a particular model to be incorporated into, and
made relevant to, the larger discussion.
In order, therefore, to establish a context for evaluating these doctrines of
providence, it will be helpful to first outline some of the important functions a
doctrine ofprovidence was traditionally designed to serve. Although not all authors
would agree on the precise number and character of these functions, the following
list will serve as a general guideline for comparing what recent treatments of
providence consider important, and whether they have retained, discarded or
otherwise accounted for any of these functions. Second, the use of key terms as used
in this thesis will be clarified. Finally, it will be necessary to establish the criteria
being used for evaluating models ofprovidence.
Traditional Providence and Its Function
A doctrine ofprovidence traditionally affirmed that God, through his
continuing relation to all that is not divine, maintained creation in being and enabled
it to serve its God-given purposes. With this claim another truth surfaces:
providence is the work of God which ensures that creation functions as a urn-verse
instead of a multi-verse, cosmos versus chaos, and has both a beginning and a
consummation, a history. It is God's (often) hidden preserving, enabling and guiding
which ensures that creation is able to support life and that humans are able to enter
into a personal relationship with a personal God which will eventually culminate in
God's dwelling with redeemed humans for eternity. Although this was an
explication of the Christian God's providential relation to the universe, it was not
l59Cf. Helm (Providence'): John Sanders (Risks): and Terrence Tiessen (Providence and
Prayer).
160Cf. Richard Swinburne, Providence.
l6lCf. for e. g., the collection of essays in, Divine Action: Studies Inspired by the
Philosophical Theology ofAustin Farrer. eds. Brian Hebblethwaite, and Edward Henderson
(Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1990).
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explicated in trinitarian terms, but instead, according to the formula opera trinitatis
ad extra sunt indivisa,162
As noted above, Albert Outler characterised the traditional role of providence
as defining 'the ultimate environment of human existence.'163 Everything occurred
by and through God's direct involvement, and for the purpose of God's sovereign
and benevolent purposes. Human history derived its overarching source, meaning
and hope from this providential context.
This multidimensional function of a doctrine ofprovidence, as it addressed
one's ultimate concerns, gave it a close relation to one's worldview. There are
several definitions ofworldview, but common to them all seems to be the idea that 'a
worldview is the sum of a person's basic assumptions, held consciously or
subconsciously, about life and the nature of reality'164
The fact that a doctrine of providence stated how the Christian God related to
the world meant that it served both as a doctrine in its own right, and as a model for
the God-world relation in general. This feature of a doctrine of providence accounts
for its ubiquity in a system of theology, for its practical importance in guiding and
reassuring Christian life, and for the complexity of the doctrine itself.
Theologians use a wide variety of terms in connection with the function of a
theology of providence. A few examples are, worldview, metaphysical model,
tradition, narrative, model, root metaphor, doctrine, belief, theory, system of
theology, history, and meaning. While each author does not utilize all of these terms,
even those terms he or she does use are not always invested with a univocal meaning
or application. It is necessary, therefore, to briefly suggest a way of thinking about
the inter-relations ofworldviews, metaphors, models, theories and doctrines as these
terms are used in this thesis.
162Although this is a common criticism, and often seems to be an emphasis in traditional
treatments of the God-world relation (see chap. 3 of this thesis), I will argue in chap. 5 that trinitarian
action ad extra is indeed undivided, but not undifferentiated.
1630utler, Who Tmsts. 6. Cf. Hartt, 'Creation and Providence,' 125.
l64Kenneth D. Boa, and Robert M. Bowman, Jr., Faith Has Its Reasons: An Integrative
Approach to Defending Christianity (Colorado, CO: NavPress, 2001), 111. Cf. N. T. Wright, The
New Testament and the People of God, vol. 1, Christian Origins and the Question of God (London,




The traditional way of referring to providence is to treat it as one doctrine in a
systematic theology, usually as an explication of God's present relation to the world.
But the doctrine ofprovidence itself can contain sub-doctrines (for example,
preservation, concursus, government); control how other doctrines are defined; and
serve as a shorthand description for understanding the character of the whole God-
world relation within a particular theological tradition.165 Thus, providence can be
confusingly referred to as a theology of providence, a doctrine, or a model.
The present project will regard systematic treatments ofprovidence as
models. In order to justify this decision, it is necessary to first define the concept of
'model' as used here, and then relate this to other key terms used in connection with
providence.
This thesis will adopt Sallie McFague's working definition of a model as 'a
metaphor with "staying power." A model is a metaphor that has gained sufficient
stability and scope so as to present a pattern for relatively comprehensive and
coherent explanation.'166 The metaphorical character of a model is reflected in its
'"is" and "is not'" quality—'an assertion is made but as a likely account rather than a
definition.'167 This feature allows for the 'symbiotic relationship between image and
concept, between the language ofprayer and liturgy and the language of theory and
1 68
doctrine.' Wentzel van Huyssteen, in agreement with McFague, suggests that 'an
essential link exists between metaphors and models, since both produce creative and
exploratory proposals for new designs or interpretations.' Thus, 'models may be said
to function as extended and systematized metaphors in terms ofwhich things are
explained.'169 Ian Barbour notes that models function 'neither as literal pictures nor
l65Cf. Owen C. Thomas and Ellen K. Wondra (Introduction to Theology. 3rd ed. [Harrisburg,
PA: Morehouse Publishing, 2002], 122) for a somewhat similar assessment.
l66Sallie McFague, Models ofGod. 34.
I67Sallie McFague, Models ofGod. 33.
l68Sallie McFague, Models of God. 32-33.
169Van Huyssteen, Justification of Faith. 138.
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as useful fictions, but as partial symbolic representations of what cannot be directly
observed.'170 This explanatory feature ofmodels correlates with the meaning-
making function ofworldviews. Thus, one might adapt van Huyssteen's argument
here, and suggest that a model ofprovidence, as part of one's worldview, 'controls]
and regulate[s] the way we reflect on God and humanity, and on the multifaceted
relationship between God and humanity.'171 John Mclntyre, for example, has
developed a multifaceted definition of'the love of God' which serves as 'an
integrating theme or principle' (or model) by which to view all the other doctrines in
a systematic theology.172
A model is not only 'a metaphor with staying power,' but can also name an
integrated matrix ofbeliefs and practices (a tradition) which forms a coherent whole.
This 'whole' or model then serves as an interpretative framework for evaluating
various kinds of experience. This explanatory function ofmodels reflects their
ability to 'form a critical link between the language of religious experience and the
theoretic plane of theological reflection.'173
In light of these considerations, perhaps one need not radically segregate the
categories 'model' and 'doctrine.' Rather, they can be thought of as different, but
related, levels of 'extended . . . metaphors,' the first being more comprehensive and
complex, the latter as nested within the first, but having a symbiotic relation with the
larger model.
Van Huyssteen goes so far as to equate worldview with the concept of 'root
metaphor.' At the same time, however, he also uses 'root metaphor' to identify 'the
essence of a religion.' For example, he suggests 'salvation in Jesus Christ' as the
root or 'basic metaphor of our Christian faith.'174 Apparently the term 'root
l70Barbour, Religion. 49; cf. ibid., 45.
171Van Huyssteen, Justification of Faith. 139.
l72John Mclntyre, On the Love of God (London, UK: Collins, 1962), 35.
l73Van Huyssteen, Justification of Faith. 183; cf. ibid., 182. Ian Barbour develops a similar
view (Religion. 46).
l74Van Huyssteen, Justification of Faith. 140, 141.
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metaphor' functions here as that which best defines the non-reducible distinctives of
one's model of faith.
Terrance Tiessen understands 'worldview,' 'system of theology,' and a
theological position as categories synonymous with 'model.' As such, they are
'metaphysical systems' pulling 'together a number of theories (about causation, time,
knowledge, freedom, power, agency, etc.)' into a coherent whole. He further
explains, however, that 'these models also function as theories within the picture that
constitutes our metaphysical model. They are part of the larger picture that
constitutes our overarching concept of reality.'175 This view of the nature and role of
models seems to reflect their metaphorical and explanatory function (as noted by van
Huyssteen), as well as something of the multiple levels to which the category
'model' can apply.
For the purposes of this thesis, perhaps worldview or 'metaphysical model'176
can be thought of as the largest (broadest) category ofmodel, an example ofwhich
would be Deism. Within the larger category ofworldview, one's system of theology
demarcates a more narrowly defined level ofmodel. An example might be a
particular version ofDeism, such as Maurice Wiles' neo-Deism. A system of
theology, viewed as an integrated whole, can also embody stories, doctrines and
beliefs, but is more carefully and conceptually defined than worldview. The criterial
role such a system plays in what one can say about his or her experience of the world
and ofGod's relation to it, also plays a more prominent role at this level.
Within this system of theology is an even narrower level ofmodel, namely,
individual doctrines. At this level the concept of 'model' is especially applicable to
more complex doctrines such as a doctrine ofprovidence or a doctrine of God. Here
the conceptual clarity is even more explicit than in worldview or system of theology,
and yet they retain their metaphorical quality, functioning as 'extended and
systematized metaphors in terms ofwhich things are explained.'177 Even in this
category there are different levels of complexity. For example, a doctrine of
l75Tiessen, Providence and Prayer, 20.
l76Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 20.
177Van Huyssteen, Justification of Faith. 138.
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providence can function as a precise rule in understanding how God acts in the
world, or as a shorthand expression for the system of theology or worldview in which
it is embodied. This ability to function at several levels ofmodel at once, accounts
for the sometimes ambiguous way a doctrine ofprovidence can also be referred to as
either a 'theology' or a 'model' (with 'model' here understood as either worldview or
system of theology).
Thus a worldview, system of theology, or doctrine each functions at its level
as a dominant explanatory metaphor. Each category ofmodel has a metaphorical
quality, functions as an interpretative grid or theory, and has (or embodies) the
conceptual belief status of a doctrine.
In view of a doctrine ofprovidence's connection to one's worldview, and its
meaning-making role in relation to viewing history as an important locus of God's
involvement in the human world, it is important to clarify how the concept 'history'
is being used in this thesis. 'History' will be understood in the broad sense of 'a flow
of events in time and space,' rather than in the more specific sense of 'the written
record of the flow of events.'17
This thesis also assumes that 'human existence is essentially historical,' and
as such 'is a becoming which expresses itself in time and space, in the history of the
1 7Q
world.' Furthermore, each human is a socially constructed being. It is this organic
unity of the history of humanity (and the cosmos), as ultimately governed by God,
which constitutes a doctrine ofprovidence as a context ofmeaningfor history as
such.
In addition, humans, as historically situated creatures, seem to invest a great
deal of their energy in making meaning out of, or understanding, their experiences of
the world. Richard John Neuhaus states that 'people—all people, we may
assume—are meaning-asking and meaning-making creatures.'180 Developmental
178John Sailhamer, An Introduction to Old Testament Theology: A Canonical Approach
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995), 51-52; cf. 54-72.
179Jacques Dupuis, S.J., Toward a Christian Theology ofReligious Pluralism (Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis Books, 1997), 317.
180Richard John Neuhaus, 'From Providence to Privacy: Religion and the Redefinition of
America,' in Unsecular America, ed. Richard John Neuhaus, Encounter Series (Grand Rapids, MI:
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psychologist Robert Kegan argues that humans of all cultures share in a meaning-
181*
making process that produces an ever better grasp on reality. It is an assumption
of this thesis that a doctrine ofprovidence, as part of one's worldview, plays an
essential role in understanding one's existence as God's creature.
Since a doctrine of providence plays a complex role as a model of the God-
world relation, as well as having a hermeneutical function in one's worldview, this
thesis treats it as a key model. This methodological decision, while not minimising
the important differences in presuppositions behind the different theologies of
providence, will allow them to be analysed according to general criteria which apply
to all Christian models ofprovidence. This decision is already justified in part
because each of the authors reviewed here has either written a systematic treatment
of the doctrine182 (two ofwhich are actually part of a fully developed systematic
theology),183 or they have written what they refer to as a theology ofprovidence.184
It would seem, therefore, that the concepts ofworldview, history, meaning,
God and models ofprovidence are inseparably linked. Moreover, the orthodox claim
that the Christian God is triune adds another dimension to the discussion, and will in
fact constitute a material criterion in assessing models ofprovidence. First, however,
it is necessary to suggest some formal rules for working with models.
Criteria ofAnalysis
Three of the functions served by a traditional doctrine ofprovidence (that is,
as defining God's role in history, and in this way giving history a context of
meaning, and therefore hope) will serve as the main foci of interest in the review of
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., in cooperation with The Rockford Institute Center on Religion
and Society, 1986), 54.
18'Robert Kegan, The Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 31, 294; cf. also 4, 43, 44, 107, 108, 293.
Maurice Wiles refers to the 'search for meaning' as a 'fundamental human process' (God's Action.
81).
182Maurice Wiles, God's Action; Langdon Gilkey, Reaping.
183Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic, vol. 2; Jurgen Moltmann, Trinity and Creation, and God
in Creation (although Moltmann also addresses providence in his other works as well).
l84Paul Helm, Providence; John Sanders, Risks.
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the models ofprovidence in the following chapters. The challenge presented to such
an overview and assessment of theologies of providence is twofold: first, how to
compare doctrines and models which have been constructed upon the basis of very
different sets ofhermeneutical, theological and philosophical presuppositions;
second, how to mark out an area of investigation which, while taking cognisance of
many other important issues, engages a narrow set of questions without arbitrarily
treating them out of context. In order to facilitate these goals, the following criteria
are suggested for working with, and assessing, theological models.
Many of those who maintain a belief in some form ofprovidence do so upon
the basis of a reasonable faith commitment. As part of a rationally held system of
theology, a doctrine ofprovidence will have a role similar to that of an accepted
theory in science. John Puddefoot claims that both scientists and theologians are first
convinced of the 'Tightness" of a theory or doctrine (but not compelled to believe by
"objective" evidence) and then they 'start to want it to be true and start to look at the
evidence in a way that will allow the evidence to corroborate it. Without that prior
conviction the evidence does not really have a chance.'185 While such a rationality
model could be accused of being another form ofwish-fulfilment, it seems that
Puddefoot does believe in a reality that transcends the observer. The points of
relevance here for a discussion ofprovidence consist, first, in the recognition that
one's doctrine of providence will ultimately be most convincing to those who already
agree on an understanding of the Christian God, and second, those views of
providence which most adequately account for the varied data of the Christian faith
and human experience will prove the more credible.186
This highlights the fact that each theologian has made a choice of a model of
the Christian faith with which he or she can identify, the one which seems most
185John Puddefoot, 'Response by John Puddefoot,' in Science and Theology: Questions at the
Interface, eds. Murray Rae, Hilary Regan, and John Stenhouse (Edinburgh, U.K.: T. and T. Clark Ltd;
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 143; cf. ibid., 141.
I860f course, the 'data' itself is theory-laden, and there are wide divergences within the
Christian tradition as to what constitutes orthodox belief (cf. Ian Barbour, Religion. 33). Each person,
however, will have to decide which elements of the faith are essential to the core of his or her faith,
and then from that basis assess the relative merits of each model of providence.
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intellectually and experientially adequate.187 The theologians reviewed in the
following chapters are already working from a prescriptive set of assumptions about
God, the Christian scriptures, and the nature of the world and of God's relation to it,
provided by the tradition from within which they work. This means, in turn, that an
assessment of a theologian's treatment of a particular doctrine must address the
188
context of that doctrine as comprised by his or her whole 'theological position.'
Adapting these insights to the focus of this thesis, one might ask how each theological
position treats the traditional functions of a doctrine ofprovidence, and also what role
the doctrine plays in the theologian's present belief system or worldview.
By thinking of one's doctrine ofprovidence as a faith commitment to an
explanatory model of the God-world relation, it is now possible to propose some
general criteria which can be applied to a given model. Ian Barbour suggests that
successful models have three characteristics: they are analogical, have fertility, and
form an intelligible unit.189 In keeping with these features, he recommends four
criteria for assessing models: 1) agreement with data; 2) coherence; 3) scope; and 4)
fertility.190
Formal Criteria
These criteria are formal in the sense that, with some adaptation, they can be
applied to any model or theory.
In the first criterion, 'agreement with data,' Barbour notes that 'religious
beliefs must provide a faithful rendition of the areas of experience that are taken by
the community to be especially significant.' He understands the 'primary data' to
consist of 'individual religious experience and communal story and ritual.' While he
rightly suggests that 'here the data are much more theory-laden than in the case of
science,'191 I would add that for many in the Christian community there is a certain
187Cf. David H. Kelsey's treatment ofmodel choice (The Uses of Scripture in Recent
Theology (London, UK: SCM Press, 1975), 182; cf. ibid., 177, 163, 160, 136, 137-138.






givenness about the Christian scriptures. Although the scope of this thesis does not
allow an elaboration and defence of this position, in the present thesis I will assume
this givenness of the authority of the Christian scriptures as part of the data which a
doctrine ofprovidence must take into account. At a minimal level, the authority
of these scriptures derive from their role as the basis for the Christian community's
identity. As David Kelsey says, they shape 'the common life of the Christian
community. "These texts are authority for the church's common life' is analytic in
"These texts are the church's scripture.'"192 This claim, or a rebuttal of it, will
influence the status and role each theologian accords the Christian scriptures as a
source of data for understanding providence. Thus the 'data' which a model of
providence needs to take into account includes (in no particular order) the Christian
community's private and corporate religious experiences, the Christian scriptures,
and the full range of one's experience of the world.
Moreover, while many theologians continue to take seriously the importance
of a doctrine of providence, they do not agree on whether to keep the traditional
form, revise the tradition, or on how much revision may be required. But the
traditional forms of the doctrine themselves constitute an important segment of the
data current models must take into account.
In the second criterion, coherence, the key idea is that of 'consistency with
other accepted beliefs.'193 Perhaps the greatest threat to the coherence of any
doctrine ofprovidence is in accounting for the problem of evil, but other
inconsistencies can arise as well: in how one tries to resolve the relation between
divine sovereignty and human freedom; in the relation between present history and
the eschaton; and in the way one uses scripture to defend a particular view ofGod.
Barbour sees the third criterion, scope, as the locus for extending the
interpretative role of religious beliefs 'beyond the primary data' to include 'other
aspects of our personal and social lives.' Moreover, 'in a scientific age, they must




also at least be consistent with the findings of science.' In this way 'religious beliefs
can contribute to a coherent world view and a comprehensive metaphysics.'194
This criterion can be broadened slightly to analyse how each author defines
providence, delimits it, and uses it (the issues of definition, scope, and function).
Three questions can be asked in this connection. First, the definitional question: of
what does the author understand the doctrine of providence to consist? An important
but distinct aspect of this definitional question raises a second question, the problem
of limits or scope: how many (or few) issues does the author include within the locus
of the doctrine in order to construct a coherent and comprehensive theological
model? Third, there is the question of function: what role does the author see the
doctrine playing in a systematics, and in the life of the faith community? Treatments
ofprovidence do not always give clear answers to these questions, but they are at
least implicit in the explication of each model.
In the present study the fourth criterion, 'fertility,' operates at more than one
level. For example, 'at the personal level,' says Barbour, 'religious beliefs can be
judged by their power to effect personal transformation and the integration of
personality.'195 Each model ofprovidence purports to be more adequate than other
such paradigms as a means of ordering one's life in the most prudent manner.
There is, however, another important level of fertility. As noted above, a
doctrine is a theorised form of a religious belief or practice. As a model, it is a
metaphor with staying power, a root metaphor. As part of its metaphorical role, it
not only enables the interpretation of data, but also enables new insights.196 These
can be insights with regard to the world and life in general, or with respect to the
concept of providence itself. New ways of thinking about God, and about humans in
relation to God, can lead to new insights about the human situation. Barbour agrees
with Ernan McMullin that 'a good model... is not a dispensable temporary
194Barbour, Religion. 39.
' "Barbour, Religion. 39.
,96According to Bernard J. Lee, S.M., 'metaphor is not an interpretation after the fact, but an
enabler of fact in the first place and even a constitutive feature of fact' ('An "Other" Trinity,' in
Trinity in Process: A Relational Theology of God, eds. Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., and Marjorie Hewitt
Suchocki [New York, NY: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1997], 192); John Sanders notes that
metaphors 'afford fresh insights' [Risks. 17).
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expedient but a fruitful and open-ended source of continuing ideas for possible
extensions and modifications. Like a poetic metaphor, it offers tentative suggestions
for exploring a new domain.'197 This feature ofmodels is related to the aesthetic
quality of a theological position taken as a whole,198 to the hermeneutical function of
one's worldview, and to the function of a model of providence in enabling one to see
new options in the God-world relationship.
While these four formal criteria can be applied to many religious models, the
fact that the models reviewed in this thesis are Christian doctrines ofprovidence
suggests the necessity of a material criterion.
Material Criterion
One of the pieces of "data" a model of providence must account for is the
Christian form of a doctrine ofGod. If, as argued above, the Christian God is triune,
then it can be asked further whether a doctrine ofprovidence, in order to be
Christian, should be in some way explicitly trinitarian.199 Such a claim has not
appeared to be self-evident in traditional forms of the doctrine.
On this view, the ubiquitous presence of the Trinity in a systematics is not
unlike that of providence (as noted by Pope, above). While the two doctrines do not
carry equal grammatical weight, their character as pervasive themes in a systematics
suggests at least a formal connection between them in that they each relate directly to
the other doctrines in theology, thus forming a thematic thread linking the doctrines
together, as well as giving those doctrines a distinctive context which shapes their
meaning. It is this feature of a doctrine of the Trinity that Pannenberg and Moltmann
have followed, and which this thesis will adopt as a material criterion for a doctrine
ofprovidence.
In order to ask this question ofmodels of providence, however, it is necessary
at this point to state the present author's own working assumptions about the Trinity
l97Barbour, Religion. 44.
198Cf. Kelsey, Uses of Scripture. 137-138.
199Cf. Schwobel, 'Introduction,' Trinitarian Theology Today. 6; idem, God: Action and
Revelation. 42-43; cf. also, Thomas Torrance, Doctrine of God. 2; Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation.
50, 175; and Kasper, God of Jesus. 310-311, 313.
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in order to make explicit the basis upon which the various treatments of God and
providence will be evaluated. In addition to accepting its normative function as the
Christian doctrine ofGod, this doctrine is taken to mean that the God ofChristian
Theism is understood as Father, Son and Holy Spirit as they constitute one God.200
This minimally stated version of the doctrine, while not a fully developed doctrine of
the Trinity, is more developed than New Testament references to Father, Son and
Holy Spirit. It amounts to speaking of God 'in a trinitarian fashion.'201 The primary
focus on providence in this thesis precludes addressing many of the problems
associated with a doctrine of the Trinity, and instead limits itself to asking if the
authors at least speak 'in a trinitarian fashion' when constructing a doctrine of
providence.
Theological models ofprovidence, therefore, function as interpretive grids of
both a theologian's inherited tradition and ofhis or her experience of the world, and
909 •
have an accountability to the tradition within which they are formulated. In view
of the normative function of a doctrine of the Trinity, this thesis will be asking not
only how each author has accounted for the triune aspect of the Christian God (an
'agreement with data' and 'coherence' issue), but also in turn how a doctrine of the
Trinity influences the current shape of a doctrine ofprovidence (a 'fertility' issue).
Conclusion
As the above review highlights, a number of factors have contributed to the
loss of confidence in traditional views of a doctrine of providence. Among those
factors, the following seem to have especially exacerbated the credibility gap in
accounting for the providential activity in history of the good and loving God of
Christian theology: the apparent success of the sciences in explaining the universe in
terms of natural causes alone; the influence of epistemological foundationalism
200Claude Welch, In this Name. 218-219. Similarly, Thomas Torrance argues that 'God's
distinctive self-revelation as Holy Trinity, One Being, Three Persons, creates the overall framework
within which all Christian theology is to be formulated' (Doctrine ofGod. 2).
201Jenson, Triune Identity. 44-45; cf. ibid., 47.
202Cf. Vincent Briimmer, The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 20.
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(modernity) and nonfoundationalism (postmodernity) on how and what one can
know; modern historical consciousness; stress on human autonomy and self-
creativity; the heightened consciousness of systemic evil in the world; an increasing
focus on relational metaphysics; and a willingness to radically redefine the concept
ofGod. In the face of intense doubt about either an active presence of God in history
or of a divine teleology undergirding the universe, accounting for God's wise and
caring relationship to the world has become a problem for many theologians. On the
one hand, under the critique ofModernity belief in providence as a general structure
was relinquished by many. Faith in a public providence was abandoned, leaving
only private providence. On the other hand, deconstructionist post-modern critiques
do not accept the validity ofprovidence as a structure for any narrative, public or
private. Thus, personal providence is brought into question.
This situation need not be interpreted to mean the significance of a doctrine
ofprovidence for Christian theology is now less, but it does mean that many of the
theological, metaphysical, philosophical, and scientific assumptions upon which the
more traditional (and optimistic) models of it rested, have fallen into disrepute. Thus
Gilkey, in the mid-twentieth century, could rightly record a nadir in the career of the
doctrine ofprovidence.
Nevertheless, a concern to make "God" relevant, that is, present to and in
human activity and history (which had been a concern of a traditional doctrines of
providence), helped to fuel the Death of God Movement, lent impetus to the Biblical
Theology Movement, undergirded existential theologies, continues to haunt post¬
modern theology, and remains a pivotal issue for speaking ofprovidence in a
contemporary context. Although some treatments ofprovidential concerns avoid
traditional terminology, they nevertheless continue to look for ways of understanding
both God and God's relation to the world which sees God as intimately involved in
its history, or at least as its ultimate source ofmeaning and hope.
Since this discussion involves Christian theology, one cannot avoid asking
which model ofGod a theologian has in mind when constructing a doctrine of
providence. After a long period of neglect and for reasons similar to those which led
to a lack of confidence in providence, renewed interest in the Trinity is evidenced in
many areas of theological discussion. For those who accept that a Christian view of
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God requires a Trinity, a question is raised as to how that might influence the shape
of a doctrine ofprovidence. As the following chapters will show, some find little or
no explicit relevance, while for others it requires that providence be given an
explicitly trinitarian structure. Two questions arise from the issue of how (and if) the
Trinity and providence should be related: first, how might a doctrine of the Trinity
regulate what is said about providence; and second, do trinitarian models of
providence have the potential of resolving some of the current problems with
providence?
In this overview of the current state of interest in providence and the Trinity,
the following key issues have surfaced: the problem of God's presence—if, where
and how God is actively and personally present in human history; the problem of
locating a source of ultimate meaning for individual lives and for the various
contexts ofhistorical experience; and the problem of how to conceive of God as
having real relations with creation.
It is in response to various construals of these empirical, existential,
conceptual and theological problems that theologians in the last half of the twentieth
century have attempted to reshape the doctrines of God and ofprovidence. This
thesis will focus on what theologians have been saying about providence during this




NON-TRINITARIAN THEOLOGIES OF PROVIDENCE:
MAURICE WILES AND LANGDON GILKEY
Introduction
The authors chosen for review in this chapter serve to introduce a number of
issues which will be followed throughout the thesis. First, they reinterpret a doctrine
ofprovidence in light of the key issues and concerns noted in the previous chapter
that led to a loss of credibility for traditional versions of the doctrine. Wiles and
Gilkey re-construct the doctrine with the aim of satisfying four broad criteria: a
concern to construct a Christian doctrine ofprovidence that can be accepted by those
whose perception of the world is influenced by a scientific understanding of the
world as a network of intramundane causes; a concept of God which is anti-
supernaturalistic; a non-interventionist view of the God-world relation; and an
understanding of historical reality as open to the truly new, and of humans as
radically free.
Their methods have in common the following general features. First, they
both work from within the broad paradigm of the Christian tradition. Second, they
each develop a doctrine of providence based on a natural theology approach. Third,
as a way of achieving this latter goal, they reduce traditional Christian doctrines to
what they understand to be their essential meaning or basic purpose, and on the basis
of this generic set of essential concerns, reconstruct a doctrine of providence which
speaks to a modern naturalistic worldview. Although Wiles does not explicitly
specify the topic ofGod acting in or through history as such, he clearly has this in
mind as an assumption. Gilkey goes further, and makes the problem of God's




A final issue is the matter of their doctrines of God. Although Wiles is doing
Christian theology, he both rejects a doctrine of the Trinity, and his doctrine of
providence does not require a Trinity. Gilkey's model ofprovidence develops a
trinitarian framework for the doctrine, but this is a "trinity" of three essential
dimensions of a monistic God's relationships with humans.
MauriceWiles: God "Outside" of History
Wiles has been described by David Pailin as a liberal theologian.203 Nancey
Murphy also refers to him as an example of the liberal type of theologian. She
describes the "ideal" type of 'liberal theology' as characterised by the three
following, interrelated areas: epistemology (knowledge of God is rooted in religious
experience); philosophy of religious language (it expresses in symbolic and
metaphorical terms human experience of God); view of divine action (God does not
intervene from the outside, but is immanent and active within the processes ofnature
and history).204 Although Wiles does not fit the type as easily as Murphy suggests,205
these general categories do serve to capture the major contours of his approach to
doing theology.
Wiles sees the Christian theologian as situated in the tension between the
worldview and doctrinal formulations of the past, and the worldview and concerns of
his or her contemporary culture. The theologian's task is to mediate between these
two worlds, and in the process answer the question: '[Wjhat then should Christians
say today?'206
203David Pailin, 'Maurice Wiles: Profile of a Liberal Theologian,' Epworth Review 21, no. 1
(January 1994): 33-42.
204Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern
Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996), 6-7, 77-
80.
205See below under the heading, 'Neo-Deism,' re. Wiles' view of indirect divine action
regarding human affairs.




This apologetic concern bears the primary responsibility for Wiles' positing
of a non-interventionist view of God's relation to the world.207 This model of the
God-world relation in turn determines his approach to theology in general, and to the
doctrines ofGod, the Trinity, incarnation, resurrection and providence in particular.
Wiles adopts a bottom-up approach to doing theology, and as such his ruling
criterion for theological construction is 'our ordinary experience' of the world.
208
Based on his interpretation ofwhat that experience 'requires us to say,' a God who
intervenes in the affairs of the world in terms of an efficient causality is incompatible
with a scientific view of the way the world works,209 inconsistent with a loving
impartial God,210 and irreconcilable with the requirements of human freedom.211 He
then sets about reconstructing the more traditional formulations ofChristian doctrine
to fit with these criteria.
207While this thesis will argue for a stronger version of divine-human interaction than Wiles
allows, it agrees with Wiles in his view that the concept of 'interventionist' models of the God-world
relation are inadequate if they imply intermittent divine abrogation of the very regularities of creation
which God has established. Cf. an argument to the same effect by William Stoeger, S.J. ('Describing
God's Action in the World in Light of Scientific Knowledge ofReality,' in Chaos and Complexity:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and
Arthur Peacocke, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert John Russell
(Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for Theology and
the Natural Sciences, 1997), 249.
208Wiles, The Remaking ofChristian Doctrine (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1974; repr.,
London, UK: XPRESS REPRINTS, SCM Bookroom, 1994), 37.
209Wiles, Remaking. 37-8; Wiles, 'Providence,' Epworth Review 21, no. 1 (January, 1994):
78.
2l0Wiles, 'Divine Action: Some Moral Considerations,' in The God Who Acts: Philosophical
and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas Tracy (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994), 22-3; idem, 'Providence,' 79-80.
2llWiles, 'Divine Action,' 22; Wiles, God's Action in the World. The Bampton Lectures for
1986 (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1986; Reissued by XPRESS REPRINTS SCM Bookroom,
London, UK, 1993), 54, 104; Remaking. 136; cf. God's Action. 90, 6, 26, 36, 38, 62, 80, 93, 108. Cf.
George F. R. Ellis' similar view ('The Theology of the Anthropic Principle,' in Quantum Cosmology
and the Laws ofNature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., A series on 'Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action' [Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA:




Wiles' non-interventionist view of God forces him to take bottom-up
approach to theology, which in turn exerts an important influence on his view of how
and what one can know about God, God's purposes, and God's providential action.
A fundamental presupposition forWiles is that the only access to knowledge about
God is 'through the totality ofman's lived experience.'212 In the absence of direct
divine interventions, it follows that there are no divine revelations as traditionally
understood, but only one's coming to recognise God's purposes in the world. This
naturalistic approach becomes the ruling criterion against which Wiles tests all
213claims to adequacy and coherence in Christian doctrines.
Wiles takes seriously the fact that 'ever since the time ofKant, theologians
have been acutely aware of the extreme difficulty of reasoning from experience of
the world to affirmation about a transcendent God.'214 He rejects, however, the
Barthian response to this dilemma, because in the end it too receives its revelation
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only through the 'medium' of ordinary experience. But neither does Wiles allow
himself to be forced into atheism. Although claims to knowledge of God as
transcendent creator can never achieve certainty,216 and one can never talk about the
nature of God in himselfbeyond making some calculated inferences based on one's
experience of the way the world is, he or she may come to know something about
God through the indirect means of his or her 'ordinary experience of the world,'217
since the world is understood to be the result of God's creative activity.218
2l2Wiles, Remaking. 27.
213Cf. Wiles, Remaking. 113, 112.
2l4Wiles, Remaking. 22.
2l5Wiles, Remaking. 24; of. Wiles, What is Theology?. 45-46.
2l6Pailin, 'Maurice Wiles,' 36-7. Cf. Wiles, Faith and the Mystery of God (London, UK:
SCM Press Ltd., 1982), 29, 70, 129; and idem, 'The Role of a Critical Theology in the Church
Today,' chap, in Explorations in Theology 4 (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1979), 12.
2l7Wiles, Remaking. 25.
2l8Wiles, Remaking. 29; cf. ibid., 25-26, 26. Cf. also, Wiles, 'Divine Action,' 26, 27.
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Wiles is adopting the epistemological constraints of the naturalistic
presuppositions of a scientific worldview, and then using the data seen with these
glasses to positively limit what one can claim to know about God, and yet he is still
wanting to make claims which go beyond what science allows. Of course, one can
concede to Wiles that if one works from the basis of a naturalistic understanding of
evolutionary theory, it is not irrational to conclude that there is 'a basic
"directionality" to the evolutionary process.'219 Such a conclusion is compatible
with Wiles' insistence that there is a built-in "grain" in the evolutionary process.
One might say, therefore, 'if there is "purposiveness without purpose" in natural
history, then the Christian language of divine guidance and care may find at least a
handhold within the biological sciences.' Nevertheless, as Wesley Wildman insists,
i 220
one cannot 'use evolutionary biology either to prove or to disprove theism. But to
go further, and affirm such particular religious claims as the existence of the
Christian creator God, or of the immortality of the human soul, is to reach
conclusions not supported by any purely scientific understanding of the world. Thus,
in order to do theology, Wiles finds himself forced to exceed the very limits he
claims a naturalistic, scientific worldview imposes on theologians.
In spite of his agnosticism about how much one can know about God, Wiles
avoids a Feuerbachian version of the God-world relation through his theological
realism—the loving creator God of Christian theism does exist.221 Even though his
epistemology is rooted in an experiential foundationalism, it is a foundationalism that
sees one's ordinary experience of the world as the medium through which one comes
into contact with reality, with what is there. Part ofwhat one comes in contact with
is a feeling of'absolute dependence' (Schleiermacher), of'ultimate concern'
222
(Tillich). Wiles is ready to admit that faith may very well be mistaken about
calling that reality "God," that what one thinks is an encounter with God may rest
2I9Philip Clayton, 'Biology Meets Theology,' Christian Century (19 January 2000): 64. [61-
64],
220Wildman, quoted by Clayton, 'Biology Meets Theology,' 64, 63.
221Cf. Wiles, A Shared Search: Doing Theology in Conversation with One's Friends (London,





after all on a misapprehension of some psychological aspect of one's being. But,
he is not willing to stop there, since for him the concept ofGod serves as the best
explanation of our origins and ultimate end. To this extent belief in God reflects a
true state of affairs. He therefore wishes to argue that 'if the concept ofGod is of
such crucial practical significance as Kaufman claims, then it would be strange if it
were nothing more than a useful instrument toward human living and corresponded
• 224
in no way to the ultimate reality ofhow our world is.'
In keeping with his theological realism, therefore, Wiles is not advocating
that one reductionistically call his or her own limit experiences "God" (a
Feuerbachian move).225 Rather, he is advocating a recognition that in one's 'feeling
of absolute dependence,' or 'feeling of ultimate concern,' God is the 'reality of
which we are aware,' a reality 'which we cannot know by any other route.'226 Thus,
the epistemological limits within which Wiles works, combined with his insistence
that "God" refers to the objective reality ofChristian theism, determines what he can
say about the God-world relation.
The God-World Relation
These theological presuppositions have convinced Wiles to develop a neo-
deistic view of the God-world relation.
Neo-Deism
Contemporary Christian theologians who are deist in their view of the God-
world relation, and who have also sought to develop a doctrine ofprovidence, are
few and far between. Beyond the obvious fact that the very definition of deism
223Wiles. Faith and Mystery. 11.
224Maurice F. Wiles, 'Can Theology Still Be About God?', in Theology at the End of
Modernity, ed. Sheila Greeve Davaney (Philadelphia, PA: Trinity Press International, 1991), 231 (Also
in Maurice Wiles, A Shared Search: Doing Theology in Conversation with One's Friends [London, UK:
SCM Press Ltd., 1994], 152).
225Cf. Wiles, Remaking. 27.
226Wiles, Remaking. 26-27. Cf. Wiles, 'Can Theology Still Be About God?,' 231; cf. also




entails an uninvolved, radically transcendent God, a contributing factor to the
scarcity of deistic models ofprovidence may be due in part to the current popularity
ofmore immanentist views of the God-world relation.227 Those theologians who do
favour deistic emphases in their models of the God-world relation include Maurice
Wiles, Arthur Peacocke, and Gordon Kaufman. None of these authors are deists in
the classical sense, as each is concerned to show that God is in some way in active
relationship to the universe, but each emphasises the transcendence of God in such a
way as to lend elements of deism to his model of the God-world relation.
Arthur Peacocke's model is actually panentheistic, but he especially stresses
God's independence and transcendence.228 Like Wiles, he insists that because of
God's self-limitations God does not intervene in the operation of the world by means
of special providences and miracles (traditionally understood), since these kinds of
action would 'abrogate the scientifically observed relationships operating at the level
of the events in question.'229 God's presence to the world is uniform at all times and
places, and any variation in the perceived "'revelation'" of God's purposes disclosed
in particular events is the result of variation in human awareness of these
purposes.230 Peacocke differs from Wiles in that he takes a stronger view of God's
interaction with the world through God's granting of information and therefore
insight through observed "'providential patterns.'"231 Wiles rejects Peacocke's
227Cf. D. Bloesch, A Theology ofWord and Spirit: Authority and Method in Theology, vol.
1, Christian Foundations (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 250; and Stanley Grenz, and
Roger Olson, Twentieth Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age (Carlisle, UK:
Paternoster Press; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992).
228Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural. Divine and
Human, enlarged edition (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1990), 158-9, 370-72, n. 75.
229Peacocke, Theology. 121-123, 182, 183; cf. Wiles, Remaking. 37-8.
230Peacocke, Theology. 181; cf. Wiles, God's Action. 81, 89.
23lPeacocke, Theology. 165; cf. ibid., 161, 164, 370, n. 62; and idem, 'The Sound of Sheer
Silence: How Does God Communicate with Humanity?,' in Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, and
Michael A. Arbib, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert John Russell
(Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for Theology and
the Natural Sciences, 1999), 234-245. Diogenes Allen also appeals to 'the patterns made by events in
nature, history, and individual lives' as the means by which 'we are able to discern God's providential
activity' (Christian Belief in a Postmodern World: The Full Wealth of Conviction [Louisville, KY:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989], 174).
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model of '"top-down" causation as too general or 'gradual' to produce 'the
[traditional] kind ofprovidential control that we have been considering.'232
Another view of God's relation to the world bearing some similarities to
Wiles' is that ofGordon Kaufman. In this model the world is seen as a single
creative act ofGod, but as a master act containing many sub-acts. Thomas Tracy
notes that Kaufman maintains that God does not act specifically in history (which
includes the whole created order). Kaufman instead locates 'all of God's activity at
the foundation of the world process, as an act of laying down its essential structure of
laws of development.' God achieves God's overall purpose through a series of sub-
acts which are still part of the initial structure given to the universe. Kaufman does,
234
however, allow that 'God's sub-acts are sometimes "responsive to our acts.'"
Although Wiles notes his indebtedness to Kaufman for this depiction of God's
creative act, he distinguishes his treatment from Kaufman's in that he has 'not
followed Kaufman in speaking of God performing any of the sub-acts which together
contribute to God's one act of creating our world.'235 At the same time, however, for
both Wiles and Kaufman, the unity ofGod's creative act rules out any special divine
interventions.236
While there are similarities betweenWiles' model of the God-world relation
and eighteenth century deism (in which God created the world, designed it to run
independently according to the laws God built into it, and then left it to its own
devices), this traditional version of deism does not quite capture Wiles' theological
position. Aside from the fact that Wiles explicitly claims to be working with 'the
232Wiles, 'Providence,' 79.
233See Gordon Kaufman, 'On the Meaning of "Act of God,'" in God's Activity in the World:
The Contemporary Problem, ed. Owen Thomas (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983).
234Thomas Tracy, 'Enacting History: Ogden and Kaufman on God's Mighty Acts,' The
Journal ofReligion 64, no. 1 (January 1984): 25, 26, 27.
235Wiles, God's Action. 96, 97; cf. Kaufman, Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective
(New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 303. In Kaufman's more recent work he has
become much more agnostic about the referent behind the symbol 'God.' For this reason Wiles notes
that his own project speaks of God in more 'personalistic terms' than Kaufman would want to use
(Shared Search. 13).
236Cf. Wiles, Remaking. 37-8.
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creator God of Christian theism,'237 the main difference between classical deism and
his own view is that the created universe forWiles is not simply established by God
and then abandoned, but rather is a single act encompassing the whole, and as such
amounts to a continuous creation.238 This allows for God's presence to the world to
be 'all-pervasive,' but only in the sense that God gives it existence and general
purpose.239 For this reason, Wiles' theological system as a whole must be classed as
a theist position. His self-admitted deist tendencies, however, allow him to be placed
in the neo-deist category. The intent here is to capture the idea of God's self-
imposed, non-interference with the created universe, other than sustaining its natural
laws of operations.240 In one sense, every aspect of creation is in constant and
absolute dependence upon God's creative and sustaining activity, but in another
sense God's transcendence is strictly maintained since the creation has been endowed
with its own purpose and built-in teleology, its own emergent properties.241
As a result of this emphasis on God's transcendence and restricted level of
involvement with the created processes, Wiles' view of the God-world relation in
general, and of the Christian doctrine ofprovidence in particular, has been referred to
as, 'tacitly deist,'242 "'continuous deism,"'243 a 'deistic sort ofChristianity,'244
237Wiles, Remaking. 27.
238Wiles, God's Action. 107-108, 48; cf. Wiles, 'Divine Action,' 24-25; and Wiles,
Remaking. 38, 34. Thomas Tracy's summary of Schleiermacher's view of providence as an aspect of
continuous creation bears a striking resemblance to Wiles' model ('Particular Providence and the God
of the Gaps,' in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert
John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine
Action,' ed. Robert John Russell [Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley,
CA: The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997]), 295-304.
239Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 12; cf. ibid., 24; Wiles, Remaking. 38.
240Wiles, God's Action. 21-22.
24lWiles, God's Action. 34.
242Daniel Hardy, 'Theology Through Philosophy,' in The Modem Theologians: An
Introduction to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century. 2nd ed., ed. David F. Ford (Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.; Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1997), 256.
243Helm, Providence. 76.
244Helen Oppenheimer, review ofGod's Action in the World, by Maurice Wiles, in The
Journal ofTheological Studies 38 (1987): 583.
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having a resemblance to 'quasi-deism,'245 and as a 'new deism' or 'continuism.'246
The reason for this impression lies in Wiles' insistence that God, creating the world
as a whole out of nothing (ex nihilo),ul does not intervene directly in its affairs by
means ofparticular divine action.248 He accepts, for instance, the concept ofGod's
activity as 'primary causation' in relation to the physical universe.249 This is similar
to Brian Hebblethwaite's adaptation of Farrer's use of double agency in which God
adopts a constant and consistent action toward creation with the effect that all non-
divine entities are 'teleologically ordered' in such a way that God's hidden action
250makes 'them make themselves.'
As Wiles understands a scientific description of the world, God cannot be
9 S1
thought to intervene or interact in the web of finite causal forces and events, and as
a result of this 'modern world-view,' the contemporary theologian cannot adopt
many of the 'various cultural assumptions characteristic of the ancient world' of the
Bible.252 That means there were no miracles marking significant stages of salvation
history: no divinely engineered Exodus, no incarnation of a divine Son, no
9ST • ...
resurrection of Jesus from the dead. This non-interventionist view of God is
extended even to the level of communication: God does not grant special revelations
245Roy Kearsley, review of God's Action in the World, by Maurice Wiles, in The Scottish
Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 6, no. 2 (Autumn 1988): 129.
246Richard Sturch, review ofGod's Action in the World, by Maurice Wiles, in Themelios
(Oct./Nov. 1987): 30; idem, The New Deism (Bristol, UK: The Bristol Press, 1990), 3.
247Wiles, Remaking. 33; Wiles maintains that 'there can be no going back on that conviction
[i.e., of creation ex nihilo] for the Christian theologian. In my judgement it is both philosophically
and religiously essential. Creation is creation out of nothing or it is nothing.' Any other God would
be a dispensable hypothesis (God's Action. 16).
248Wiles, God's Action. 62; cf. ibid., 34, 34-5, 92-3. Wiles, Remaking. 38.
249Wiles, God's Action. 34.
250Brian Hebblethwaite, 'Providence and Divine Action,' Religious Studies 14, no. 2 (June
1978): 229. However, Hebblethwaite's model seems to imply a kind of top-down supervenience
concept of the God-world relation on the analogy of the relation between human mind and brain,
which would constitute a too direct type of divine action for Wiles.
25lWiles, 'Providence,' 78.
252Wiles, What is Theology?. 5.
253Cf. Wiles, 'Providence,' 78.
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of himself to either particular groups of people or to individuals—to do so would be
to show an arbitrary favouritism. This is the most important reason for which Wiles
rejects a traditional view ofprovidence.
Divine Action and Providence
Although Wiles recognises a distinction between a doctrine of providence
and the topic of divine action,254 he often blurs the distinction. His non-
interventionist view of the God-world relation is the main reason for this. It may
fairly be asked whetherWiles ever develops a doctrine of providence at all, or deals
255
instead only with the narrower philosophical issue of divine action. In his article,
'Providence,' he evaluates some of the central claims of 'older understandings of
providence'256 and finds them wanting. He so limits God's direct action to the single
and continuous creative act of the whole he is forced by logical necessity to deny that
'God's providential activity ... is operative at all in ordering how events in the
world turn out.'257 With that conclusion one must say his model of the God-world
relation embodies only a very attenuated view of providence.
It seems clear that forWiles 'divine action' describes God creative role, while
'providence' serves the religious function of referring, not to a specific act or activity
ofGod, but to a 'retroactive' assessment of the religious significance of one's
experience of the world as the effect of God's creative act.258 Thus, the character of
Wiles' understanding of these terms reflects a radical remaking of their traditional
meaning, and in turn requires a radical remaking ofmost of the rest of Christian
doctrines if they are going to be made consistent with his neo-deistic view of the
God-world relation. It is a matter of some relevance to the focus of this thesis that
254Wiles, God's Action, chap. 5; cf. ibid., 82.
255Contrary to the approach adopted in this thesis, Wiles sees the concept of divine action to
be the more fundamental problem affecting the credibility of faith in providence than the concept of
providence itself (God's Action. 82). This may be due in part to the philosophical and scientific
orientation of the concept of divine action, versus the more theological focus of providence.
256Wiles, 'Providence,' 83,
257Wiles, 'Providence,' 81.
258Wiles, God's Action. 81, 83, 89.
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this view of the God-world relation reflects a non-traditional understanding of God
(unitarian versus trinitarian), and ofGod's action in the world (as a single act
excluding particular actions).
God as Transcendent Final Cause
This does not mean forWiles that God is simply "apart" from the world, but
it does require that talk of God's involvement in creation be limited to 'general
statements about the kind ofworld God has created rather than to claims about
particular, specifiable acts ofGod in history.'259 The kind ofworld in mind here is
populated with human beings who are radically free in how they respond to, and
work with or against God's general purpose.
Again, this does not mean God is impersonal—God is both incorporeal and
yet personal260—but neither does it logically entail (for Wiles) that a personal God be
a divine agent in the particulars of the world.261 For this reason Wiles is not willing
to go the whole way with Farrer's notion of double agency. In the first place, this
would imply that God acts on the world in the mode of 'efficient causation.' Wiles
identifies this concept as 'the heart of the problem.' To speak in these terms would,
for Wiles, involve a literal or non-symbolic use of symbolic language, and as such is
inappropriate to the nature of religious language. Although traditionally such
efficient causation language seemed appropriate for describing God's acts, today it
must be rejected as 'implausible' for scientific reasons, and also as being 'religiously
unsatisfactory in view of their apparently occasional and highly selective character.'
This is the view that leads Wiles to reject the more traditional model of providence as
involving an unfair and arbitrary manipulation of the events of the world.262
Instead, he suggests one 'think in terms of final causation,' and start with a
259Wiles, God's Action. 62 (italics mine).
260Wiles, 'Continuing the Discussion,' Theology 85 (January 1982): 10; cf. Wiles, Faith and
Mystery. 12: The 'God to whom I commit myself as a Christian is a personal God, the living God, a
God of love.'
261Wiles, 'Continuing,' 11-12.
262Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 27, 28, 29.
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less personal model, something along the lines of the
Aristotelian God who moves human beings by the attraction
ofhis own perfection. This could then be, and would
certainly need to be, modified in a more personal direction.
People, as well as impersonal ideals, can operate by final
causation as effective 'agents' of the free actions of other
human persons.263
A Relational Ontology in a Neo-Deistic Framework: God's Immanence
This 'more personal direction' might seem surprising, in light ofWiles'
naturalistic approach to doing theology, but for him God is either a transcendent,
personal creator, or there is little reason for maintaining the concept. In the interest
ofmaintaining this personal aspect he argues for adopting the concept of'spirit' as
'the primary co-ordinating concept for our reflective understanding ofGod.'264 This
would replace the traditional 'Father' concept. Wiles sees 'spirit' language as
capturing the essentially personal aspect of humans, and as also reflecting not only
individuality in separation from others, but its constitution "'only in my relatedness
to some other. Spirit is that which lies between, making both separateness and
conjunction real.'"265 'Spirit' is that aspect ofhuman beings which allows them to
transcend themselves, know themselves 'as persons.'266 Just as in much of the Old
Testament "'the Spirit is God in his outreach towards men, interacting with their
created spirits and integrating their thoughts and emotions and wills with his
own,"'267 so the term '"spirit"' 'is that which makes a person most fully a person,
precisely by taking him out of the confines ofhis individual self through his or her
relationship and communion with others.'268
Thus the term 'spirit' works better than 'Father' in capturing the relational
character of the divine-human relation, 'for it speaks at the same time of a personal,
263Wiles, 'Continuing,' 11-12.
264Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 117.
265Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 120, 119-120 (italics mine).
266Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 119-120.
267Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 120-121.
268
Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 121.
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but not limitedly individual, transcendence and of an essential relatedness.'269 Wiles
is not advocating a simple shift in emphasis from one person of the Trinity to another
(from 'Father' to 'Spirit') as being more religiously meaningful: 'rather it is no
longer to allow the concept of "Spirit" to be appropriated as the name for one person
of the Trinity, but rather to put it to work as the primary determinant for all our
reflective apprehension of God.' This means '"spirit" is not... a direct description
of the nature of God.' It is a symbol, 'rooted in our experience of spirit in ourselves
270
and made possible by our understanding of spirit as a dimension of human life.' It
'signifies [a holy and transcendent] God's communion with man. .. . Thus to know
God as Holy Spirit is to know him as . . . the absolutely other entering into the most
intimate conceivable relationship with man.'271 Thus, 'Holy Spirit' does not describe
God, but rather names the human experience of God.
Wiles notes that the difference between his model ofprovidence and Kathryn
Tanner's more traditional view, may really be rooted in their differing conceptions of
'God and God's relation to the world.'272 'Two main models have been
characteristic ofChristian tradition: the one more personal—God as creator, Father or
Lord; the other more pervasive, God as Spirit—a hidden immanent power at work in
the world.'273 He recognises the strengths and weaknesses associated with both. The
first (God as Father) lends itselfmore easily to the notion of agency, 'but... it
becomes more and more impossible seriously to envisage that sort of agency at work
in the world as we know it.' The second model (God as Spirit) lends itself to the idea
269Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 120, 24, 117-118. Wiles approves of Geoffrey Lampe's
rejection of the Trinity (ibid., 126). Lampe expresses a view of God as spirit which would seem to be
compatible with Wiles' view: 'We are speaking of God himself, his personal presence, as active and
related.' (G. W. H. Lampe, God as Spirit. The Bampton Lectures, 1976 [Oxford, UK: Clarendon
Press, 1977], 208).
270Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 121.
27lWiles, 'The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology,' chap, in Explorations in Theology 4





of 'God's universal and effective presence in the world, but the language of agency
• • 274
seems forced and inappropriate' when referring to 'God as Spirit.'
Although these two pictures are very different, and while he opts for the less
personal of the images, Wiles thinks it is wise to continue the dialogue between the
two views, since out of this interaction there may emerge 'a viable replacement for
older understandings ofprovidence.'275 Working toward such a 'replacement' is part
of the purpose of the present thesis.
In spite of the lack ofpersonal agency implied in the symbol 'Spirit,' Wiles
nevertheless, applies it to divine action. He shifts the basis of the analogy of
personal agency from 'our own experience as personal agents' to that of 'our self-
reflexive relation to ourselves and still more our relatedness to other persons. For
there can be a rich communion between persons simply by their mutual presence to
one another.'276 Drawing upon Gabriel Marcel, Wiles points out that in human
relationships there is a difference between 'a purely physical' type of presence, and
that of 'a deeper sense of "presence."' It is this deeper kind of 'all-pervasive'
presence which God as 'spirit' allows one to picture.277 Thus, Wiles is able to place
the concepts of 'incarnation' and 'inspiration' on an equal footing with the rest of
God's uniform activity, 'for inspiration is not [on this view of God as spirit] "an
impersonal influence communicated to a human person externally by a remote
deity"; rather it conveys "the deeper meaning of a 'real presence' of God
himself.'"278 Nevertheless, in spite ofWiles' argument, from the human perspective
this inspiration seems to be personal only because the human interpreter of the divine
significance of his or her experience is apersonal being. The inspiration here is of
the same order that one derives from the work of a skilled painter. God does not
convey information directly, in the mode of the Word speaking in human symbols
274Wiles, 'Providence,' 83.
275Wiles, 'Providence,' 83.
276Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 122.
277Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 122, 12, 124.
278Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 124.
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and language, but rather displays his being and purpose through the character of his
work of creation as a whole.
A Critique ofWiles' View ofProvidential Action
One cannot critique Wiles' view of the God-world relation in general, and of
providential action in particular, without taking into account his reasons for holding
this view-that is, his criteria of scientific worldview, moral concerns, and human
freedom. The heart ofWiles' concern is to find a way ofmaintaining a meaningful
sense of God's relation to the world, while complying with these three criteria. He
argues that his kind ofproject is able to recast the traditional view of divine action
97Q
into a metaphysical framework that is credible in today's world. This means the
rejection of an outmoded 'controller' God, and the introduction of a God who
invariably leaves ample room for the discovery and exercise ofhuman freedom and
potential.280
This section will ask whether a modern scientific worldview does in fact
require the exclusion ofGod's direct interaction with events in the world; whether
Wiles' attempt to ameliorate the moral problem of such direct interaction succeeds;
and whether his view of the conditions necessary for realising human indeterministic
freedom is adequate, given the personal nature ofGod and humans.
It will also attempt to show that Wiles' theological realism, his desire for at
least a minimally relational ontology, and his model of continuous creation provide
three openings for a more interactive relation between God and humans, and hence a
more orthodox view ofGod as Trinity, and of God's particular actions in the world.
Divine Action and Science
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address Wiles' concerns
with providence as they arise from a modem scientific worldview, it is worth
mentioning that there are many theologians and scientists who do not see the
observed regularities of universe as being nearly so closed to divine interaction as
279Cf. Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 127.
280Wiles, God's Action. 60, 51, 54.
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Wiles conceives them to be.281 For example, Wolfhart Pannenberg, in dialogue with
science, notes that 'the idea that God can bring forth what is new and unusual only
by breaking the laws ofnature has been overruled by the insight that for all their
regularity the laws of nature do not have the character of closed (or, better, isolated)
systems.'282 William Stoeger argues convincingly that the Taws of nature' are
actually idealised human constructs describing observed regularities of nature, and
are therefore theory-laden and corrigible,283 leaving open the possibility that 'higher
laws' operating at the level of the personal may in fact only appear either to abrogate
or fulfil laws operating at the physical level.284 John Polkinghorne, recognising with
Wiles that God's creative and providential activity reflects God's faithfulness to the
kind ofworld he has created, nevertheless insists that 'the steadfast consistency of
285
God in relation to his creation is not to be confused with a dreary uniformity.'
From a theological perspective, the same assertion amounts to a claim about general
and "special" providence: 'the God-world relation and the God-man relation are
constant; but that is best conceived as the constancy of consistent action in the
execution both of an over-all purpose and ofparticular purposes for individual lives
within it.'286
28lWiles does grant the logical possibility ofmiracles where God would act directly as
primary cause, but he rejects the probability ofGod taking advantage of such openness since his
failure to do so on every occasion would raise a question about God's morality (God's Action. 65-66).
282Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.; Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1994), 73.
283William Stoeger, S.J., 'Contemporary Physics and the Ontological Status of the Laws of
Nature,' in Quantum Cosmology and the Laws ofNature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action.
2nd ed., eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C. J. Isham, A Series on 'Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory
Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1993, 1996), 205-231.
284Stoeger, 'Describing God's Action,' 253.
28:,John Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship Between Science and Theology
(Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1991), 56.
286Hebblethwaite, 'Providence and Divine Action,' 229. Cf. Fraser Watts' model of 'God's
influential [interactive] presence in the world' in terms of 'a strong view of general providence' (out
of which arises 'special providence . .. [albeit not entirely]') as this influence relates to 'cognitive
processes' ('Cognitive Neuroscience and Religious Cosciousness,' in Neuroscience and the Person:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo C. Meyering,
and Michael A. Arbib, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert John
Russell [Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for
Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1999], 340-344).
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Perhaps the most one can safely conclude from current attempts to find
openings in a scientific understanding of the universe for interactive divine action is
something like the summary provided by Denis Edwards: 'The unpredictability,
openness, andflexibility discovered by contemporary science [at both the micro and
macro levels] .. . provides the basisfor a worldview in which divine action and
scientific explanation are understood as mutually compatible, but it is notpossible to
identify the "causaljoint" between divine action and created causality.'' Edwards notes
further that 'a trinitarian theology suggests a dynamic relational presence ofGod in
every quantum event, chaotic system, and human free act, but it suggests a presence and
a causality that finally escapes comprehension.'287 This is more cautious than
Polkinghorne's view, and yet more optimistic than the view ofGod and the world
which fuelled the death ofGod theology. It amounts to a set of fallible resources for
funding a worldview which embraces openness and the possibility for nondeterministic
action on both the divine and human levels.288
On this view, God first posits and then holds in being, not a static,
predetermined pattern and balance of created cause-effect, but a dynamic system of
chance and lawfulness, a dynamic interplay of openness, freedom, contingency, and
necessity. God interacts with this 'intrinsic openness of the universe . . . [through a]
top-down causality.' But both Polkinghorne and Peacocke refer to this causality, not
in terms of energy, but rather in terms of information. In this way God is not reduced
9RQ • • 900
to 'one cause amongst others,' something Wiles wants to avoid as well.
In a time when science is showing the world to be an open system of
interacting energies (instead of a closed, mechanical system of cause and effect), this
allows for two developments: first, whichever view of God one adopts (a dynamic
287Denis Edwards, 'Discovery of Chaos and the Retrieval of the Trinity,' in Chaos and
Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey
Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert
John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for
Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997), 173. Cf. Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality. 172, 174, 173.
288Edwards, 'Discovery ofChaos,' 98.
289Edwards, 'Discovery of Chaos,' 168.
290Wiles, God's Action. 56.
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Trinity or a single Subject) this new understanding of the openness in the physical
make-up of the world makes it possible to develop models which allow the world to
retain its integrity (with no gaps) and yet be open to God's influence,291 something
which even Wiles' model requires. Second, it allows opportunities to model ways in
which a relational Trinity shares with the physical and human worlds (in an
analogous way) a relational ontology.
Even if the scientific worldview problem could be resolved to Wiles'
satisfaction, more important forWiles is the moral objection to divine interaction and
the anthropological problem of human freedom.
The Moral Problem of Direct Divine Action and Human Freedom
The problem of evil forms part of the centrepiece in Wiles' reconstruction of
the doctrine ofGod, and of God's relation to the world. The central problem for
traditional theism, as Wiles sees it, is not so much the fact that God intervenes to
help some, but that God does not intervene on all occasions to counteract evil and its
consequences. It is here that he employs his argument for a non-intervening God,
even to the extent of ruling out any direct divine communication with humans.
Nevertheless, in his model God is still ultimately responsible for creating the kind of
world in which, in order to develop free human beings, such things as inequities,
evil, and suffering must form part of the fabric of life.292 Wiles understands that for
the theist there are no final answers to the problem of evil,293 but at this point he
finds in God's 'unremitting' love in the person ofChrist a basis for faith to believe in
291Tracy, 'Particular Providence,' 304-324. Cf. Robert John Russell's concept of 'a "non-
interventionist view of objective special providence'" as made possible by God influencing, without
disrupting 'the natural process,' the ontologically indeterministic world of quantum events ('Special
Providence and Genetic Mutation: A New Defense ofTheistic Evolution,' in Evolutionary and
Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. Robert John Russell, William R.
Stoeger, S.J., and Francisco J. Ayala, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed.
Robert John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center
for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1998), 200, 203.
292Wiles, God's Action. 45, 48, 67, 80.
293Cf. William Alston for a similar conclusion ('Divine Action: Shadow or Substance?,' in
The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy [University
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994], 56).
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evil's final overthrow.294 Wiles believes his model of God's strictly uniform action
of creation reduces the morally reprehensible possibility of arbitrariness in God's
providential relation to the universe.
Although Wiles cannot accept a God who imparts faith and grace to some and
not to others, he does recognise that some people naturally come to have a better
understanding of, and response to, God's purposes in the world—this fact of life can
be attributed to the accidents of "fate," the random vagaries of finite causes and
events. The inequities resulting from a traditional view ofprovidence are the result
of an arbitrarily acting and communicating God (in Wiles' view). Wiles, therefore,
embraces the former source of inequities because he feels this is the price that must
be paid in order for human freedom and personality to develop. There are,
however, a number of important questions arising from this view.
First, one must ask about the kind ofpersonal maturityWiles is advocating
here. For Wiles, 'freedom' seems to equate to a high degree of autonomy and
9Qft • • • 907
independence from God —a distinctly Enlightenment ideal. But both the
Christian tradition and modern psychology would seem to indicate that, contrary to
Wiles, it is precisely infree intimate interaction with another that one achieves not
only identity, but freedom to be truly one's self.298 Wiles use of 'spirit' moves in this
direction, but Wiles is still thinking in terms 'individual,' not 'being as
communion.'299 Furthermore, divine "intervention" in the Christian tradition need
not be seen as encouraging an immature childishness, but rather provides the basis
294Wiles, God's Action. 51-52, 53.
295Cf. Wiles, God's Action. 37-38, 108.
296Cf. Wiles, God's Action. 17.
297Cf. Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins
to Existentialism, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, Inc., A Touchstone Book,
1967, 1968), 320-24.
298Cf. Stephen Happel, 'Divine Providence,' in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur
Peacocke, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert John Russell (Vatican
City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences, 1997), 201.
299Cf. Zizioulas, Being as Communion. 120-122.
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for psychological and emotional wholeness from which truly mature levels of love
are possible. Jesus, for example, was not advocating an immature, dependent, and
childish faith when he said, 'without me you can do nothing.'300 Paul Tournier notes
that 'it is ... by dependence upon God that we have the means ofknowing the
greatest possible freedom.'301 Wiles mistakenly identifies radical human autonomy
and maturity with radical independence on the personal level.
Second, Wiles' God is not free to maximise the key aspect ofhuman nature
Wiles himself extols—that is, the ability to relate to the other in an interactive mode
at the level of 'Spirit.' Wiles' view of radical human autonomy undermines the
relational ontology he seeks to develop. The aspect of 'spirit' by which humans
transcend themselves, and through which they are mutually constituted in and with
the other is, in the end, restricted to an intra-human level. Oddly enough, God, who
must be thought able to transcend all human ways of relating, is restricted to relating
to humans only on the bare ontological level of giving them existence and then on
the psychological and social level as a silent "presence" discerned by the human.
One is led to ask whether Wiles has adequately represented a relational ontology.
From the Christian perspective Wiles espouses, can one realise his or her full human
potential without an interactive relation to God? The Christian tradition has usually
said 'No,' often expressing the relational constitution of humans in terms of the
fittingness of freely worshiping and interacting with God, and describing the goal of
human life as "'enjoying the divine relation of Son to Father, sharing the divine life."
The blessed, although not themselves divine, interact with the Father as closely as
does the Son, and so are involved in the work ofGod as well as the adoration of
God.'302
Wiles' model of freedom fails to capture the possibility (once creaturely
otherness is achieved) of consciously choosing to form community with God. It
300Jn. 15:5 RSV.
30lTournier, To Resist or to Surrender?, trans. John S. Gilmour (German orig. ed.: Sich
Durchsetzen oder Nachgeben [Zurich, Switzerland: Rascher Verlag, n.d.]; this ed. trans, from Tenir
tete ou ceder [Geneva, Switzerland: Editions Labor et Fides, 1962]; Richmond, VA: John Knox Press,
1964), 39.
j02Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press Inc.; Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1998), 115, 119.
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would seem that one potential benefit of the development of free human beings
would be the possibility of exercising that ability at a higher level, the level of
becoming a co-worker with God. This is not a violation of one's freedom, but is
instead precisely possible because of that freedom. Wiles advocates a limited
version of this, but the personal aspect of it is all from the human side.303 In a truly
interactive model, however, the potential weight of responsibility and privilege for
the free human participant increases exponentially. There is no unfairness in this
synergy since it is based (initially) upon what humans come to discern and believe
about God and about God's purpose for them. If God then "intervenes" by
communicating specific information (in the form of guidance), extending further
providential grace, and enabling the individual to become an even more positive
agent for the common good, this particular providential action could still be
conceived as part of God's means of 'making . .. [humans] make themselves,' and
would still require that the mechanism ofGod's agency remain hidden.
Third, by removing God to the "perimeter" of the affairs of the world, Wiles
feels he has minimized the problem of God being the immediate and direct cause of
evil in the world, but he has also restricted God to very indirect and risky means of
achieving his purposes. More importantly, God is removed from that close
relationship with humans by means ofwhich any notion of God suffering with them,
and ofplaying a redemptive role, can be made meaningful. Moreover, as noted
above, this type of relation leaves humans to the mercy of finite causes.
A Personal God and the Trinity
Wiles holds that religious talk of God's providential "action" is better
understood as poetic in nature. Instead, therefore, of speaking in literal terms of
God's special causative agency, Wiles prefers to think in terms of 'action' as an
awareness ofGod's overall purposes which functions as a call to align ourselves with
them.304 He interprets all claims to experience ofGod's special providences as
303Wiles. God's Action. 81, 103, 105, 108.




consisting of retroactive interpretations of significant religious experiences.
Where the Bible explicitly affirms God acting in special or miraculous ways in the
world, Wiles either rejects these as reflections of an outmoded worldview, or
relegates them to the status of legends.306 Nevertheless, he affirms that the personal
God to which such action is ascribed in the Bible is the same God to whom he refers.
The question is whether one can make such innovative revisions to the nature
of the acts ascribed to God in the Bible and still be speaking about the same God.
And there is the further question regarding the legitimacy of a Biblical view of
special providence: assuming (as Wiles does) that in contrast to a modern scientific
worldview, the common worldview of the Biblical writers expected divine
interventions, does this automatically rule out the intelligibility of divine interaction
in the affairs of the world?
It seems clear that Wiles does intend to speak in literal terms of special
causative divine agency with respect to the creative act of God as a whole. Two
issues come to the fore at this point. First, the creation ofworld as a whole would
mean that the scientific regularities are themselves part of the continuous creative act
ofGod, a fact which Wiles assumes excludes the probability of God "subsequently"
interacting with the matrix of created causes. Nevertheless, since the one creative act
is an open process, God is free to adjust the shape of the developing story in response
to the radically free choices humans make.307 If God cannot intervene in the
particulars, how does he accomplish these revisions, or rather, how does he
continuously reintegrateparticular actions and events into his overall purpose for the
world in such a way that that purpose will be achieved? Wiles insists, for example,
that
God's purpose is fixed and unchanging only in the most
general sense. God is affected by our actions in such a way
that the particular form of that purpose is changed to take
account of them. So ifwe affirm our confidence in God's
ultimate triumph [and Wiles does], we are not affirming that
305Wiles, God's Action. 81, 83, 89; cf. idem, Remaking. 38.
306Wiles, 'Divine Action,' 17, 27.
307Wiles, God's Action. 104-105, 107-108.
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some fixed target will be reached,.... It is a genuinely
unknown future ofwhich we are speaking.'308
It would seem that God's integration of the consequences of free human
actions into his purpose, such that the form of the purpose continues to change,
leaves the door open to divine interaction. It looks as if the parameters ofWiles'
model of the God-world relation requires some mechanism by which God takes into
account what happens in the world, but without leaving it fully to its own devices.
Although Wiles' doctrine of continuing creation opens the door to a more interactive
view of the God-world relation, he rejects such a possibility as morally unacceptable.
Wiles affirms that the 'unremitting character' ofGod's love, as 'seen in the
figure of Christ,' provides the confidence that all evil will eventually be overcome.
God remains engaged with the world as long as it takes in order to complete both
creation and salvation for all.309 It would seem that some version ofmiddle
knowledge is required by Wiles' model of continuous creation, but he rejects this
Tin
option. It remains unclear, therefore, how God's love will ultimately achieve the
set of conditions in which 'what is is God's will.' Perhaps this is the reason Wiles
asserts that 'we must continue to walk by [a] faith' which is, nevertheless, 'not a
wholly blind and unreasonable faith.'311 Thus, the most he will say about the
possibility of 'personal life beyond our present order of existence' is that it is 'not
philosophically absurd.'312
The second point arising from Wiles' acceptance of special divine agency in
the creation of the whole has to do with the fact that this act is of such a unique
character 'there is no analogy within the world for any activity involving such
absolute creativity as is being affirmed here. Any attempt to speak of the "how" of
God's creative action can only be by way of a highly tentative form of imaginative
308Wiles, God's Action. 51.
309Cf. Wiles, God's Action. 48, 51, 52.
310Wiles, God's Action. 107, 72-73.
3llWiles, God's Action. 52.
3I2Wiles, God's Action. 51-52.
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construction.'313 But Wiles himself rejects the doctrine of the incarnation on these
same grounds, namely, that its claim to uniqueness makes it impossible to
substantiate, because it is a one-of-a-kind event, and no standard is available by
which to assess its probability.
Moreover, the fact that Wiles is not restricting himself to the God of classical
Deism forces him to move beyond the idea of God as a pragmatic concept,314 or as an
impersonal final cause, and to posit a personal God who loves his creation and
• 315
suffers with it, and whose final purpose for his creation will ultimately triumph.
At this point it would seem Wiles has moved beyond the limits ofwhat his own
experiential foundationalism can allow him to say about God. He either needs to
retract some ofhis more positive claims about God's nature and purpose (as
Kaufman does in his more recent works), or construct a set of criteria that allows him
to say more than what he does. To make the positive claims about God that he does,
• •• ••316
he would need at least to allow for a more direct kind of divine communication.
Wiles is left with a unitary God, not quite the God of classical Deism, nor yet
the God of the Bible who is able to relate to the creation in a multiplicity ofways.
The relational nature of God and humans that Wiles wishes to emphasise would seem
to make the doctrine of the Trinity a natural way ofpicturing that relationality. In
maintaining a link to the Christ event in doctrinal construction, and in speaking of the
revealing work of the Spirit in a doctrine of revelation, Wiles can even sound
"trinitarian." For example, he adopts the Johannine figure of Jesus as embodying
'the truth in himself as a person, [noting] that his full significance was not grasped by
his disciples during his lifetime, but that it will be disclosed by the Spirit in the life of
the church.'317 But Jesus is not, in this view, the incarnation of a divine Son or
✓r
3I3Wiles, 'Divine Action,' 25.
314Cf. Gordon D. Kaufman, In Face ofMystery: A Constructive Theology (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1993), 4, 8, 268-271, 273, 279, 290, 291, 293, 416.
3l5Wiles, God's Action. 51.
316Cf. Vernon White for a similar set of problems arising out ofWiles' model (The Fall of a




Logos, and the 'Spirit' is simply a name given to one's experience ofGod's all-
pervasive presence.
Wiles rejects the doctrine of the Trinity for the following reasons: the
ambiguity of the evidence in the NT and in the early church; the incoherence of a
non-interventionist view of divine action when it is combined with a doctrine of a
special incarnation of the divine Son; and because, in his view, the only way one can
claim to have knowledge of 'the inner life of God' is if one first believes in a
318
specially inspired 'revelation given in clear propositional form.' It seems clear
that the hermeneutical presuppositions ofWiles' neo-deistic model of the God-world
relation pre-determine how he will interpret all human experience of the divine,
including any claims of special revelation.
Just because, however, some factions in the early church held to a binitarian
view ofGod, need not require Wiles to reject the doctrine of the Trinity as having
inadequate foundations in the tradition. For example, as noted above, he is willing to
go beyond Kaufman and say that the usefulness of the "God" concept allows one to
11 Q
say God probably exists. In spite ofWiles' agnosticism about what one can know
about God, he further intuits that God is loving, created the world ex nihilo, suffers
with humans, has an ultimate purpose which will eventually triumph, and is the
ultimate Sovereign. Given Wiles' methodology, if he is able to discern all of these
features of the God-world relation, the option is at least open to him to construct, for
example, a functional Trinity which can give expression to Christian experience of
God in terms of three levels of relationship. Ruth Page suggests such a model as
follows: 'a fixed relationship' which grants the security of'unconditional love'; a
'flexible relationship' in which God continues to provide 'care and concern ... for
those creatures to whom freedom has been given to discover the possibilities and the
constraints of finite existence'; and a relationship as 'friend' and 'companion':
friendship, referring to a 'one-to-one relationship' marked by 'a mutual desire for the
other's well-being and interests,' and companionship referring to God's solidarity
318Wiles, 'Some Reflections on the Origins of the Doctrine of the Trinity,' chap, in Working
Papers in Doctrine (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1976), 17, 14, 16.
319Maurice F. Wiles, 'Can Theology Still Be About God?,' 231.
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with creation in all of its circumstances.320 A doctrine of the Trinity could thus be
based on two supports: the shape ofChristian experience of God on the one hand,
and its ability to picture God's presence with humans in the traditional terms of
fellowship with the Father, through the Son and in the Spirit. Whichever model of
the Trinity is used, it has the advantage of giving at least analogical expression to the
church's experience of God as personal and relational, and does so through imagery
that more adequately corresponds to traditional Christian experience.
In Wiles model, the "personal" aspect of God is seen only indirectly, as
• T91
reflected first in God's intentional 'act' of deciding to create the world, and second
in God designing its character in such a way that it brings forth human persons. The
personal aspect of God (in relation to humans) is known only indirectly from the
perspective of the human side of the relationship—since this is the only perspective
available to them. It is the personal nature of the human experience of the 'ultimate'
that suggests a God who is not less than personal,322 not the actions of God as a
personal agent. Brian Hebblethwaite rightly suggests that if one is going to retain a
'personal theism,' such 'a one-sided personal relation' fails to give adequate account
ofGod's action in humans. Moreover, in spite ofWiles' intention to the contrary,
it threatens to collapse the distinction between God and the world. It becomes
difficult to conceptualise how the world as God's creative act maintains its own
integrity over against God. Ian Barbour suggests it not only departs 'significantly
from the biblical witness,' it also jeopardizes 'both divine and human freedom.'324
Colin Gunton, for example, arguing in support of a trinitarian view of
creation and providence, suggests that if the divine creative love is qualified
pneumatologically, 'the third person of the Trinity' can be seen as 'the one whose
320Ruth Page, 'God With Us: Warming to the Trinity,' Theology in Scotland. 4, no. 2
(Autumn 1997): 34-40. Cf. also her GodWith Us: Synergy in the Church (London, UK: SCM Press,
2000), 29, 10-29. "
321
Wiles, God's Action. 96, 107.
322Cf. Wiles, Faith and Mystery. 12-13.
323Hebblethwaite, 'Providence and Divine Action,' 229.
324Ian Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science, the Gifford Lectures, 1989-1991, vol. 1
(SanFrancisco, CA: 1990), 258, 269.
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function is to make the love ofGod a love that is opened towards that which is not
itself, to perfect it in otherness.... God is not... a closed circle, but a self-
325
sufficient community of love freely opened outwards to embrace the other.' It is
the special role of the personal Spirit to enable creation to realise its redemptive
potential made possible by Christ.326
In this model the Spirit is both the self-effacing, creative energy of God
which enables humanity to maintain its distinction (rather than Wiles' 'radical
freedom'327), as well as God in personal relation with humans enabling their personal
character, as well as being the means through which they enjoy communion with
God as mediated through Christ.
Although Gunton and Wiles are working with very different definitions of the
Spirit, there are overlapping conceptualities in their accounts of the Spirit's function
which point toward a more positive and personal agential role for the Spirit in God's
providential action in the world. This role helps to instantiate both the ontological
dependence of humans on the Creator, and maintains ontological and personal
distinction between humans and the Creator.
Initial AssessmentWiles' Model
As indicated above, when Wiles begins to identify the human experience of
the sense ofwonder that anything exists at all, the sense of purpose underlying the
surface events of the world, the feeling of absolute dependence, the experience of
ultimate concern, and the sense of a 'creative mystery' in the processes of the world,
with something more than a reasonable hypothesis that "God" might exist, that is,
with a positive and specific entity (the personal, sovereign, creator God of Christian
theism), he has staked a claim which requires a more direct mode of knowledge than
325Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study. Edinburgh Studies in
Constructive Theology (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 128.
326Cf. Gunton, 'God the Holy Spirit: Augustine and his Successors,' chap, in Theology
Through the Theologians: Selected Essays 1972-1995 (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1996),
118; and Gunton, Triune Creator. 188.
327Wiles, God's Action. 93.
328Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology. 2nd ed. (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark
Ltd., 1991, 1997), 199.
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he allows. It is not enough to say that because the Biblical writers were speaking in
terms of their own worldview about a common human experience of a religious
reality one can re-frame that experience to fit his or her own worldview, and still be
speaking about the same God. Wiles says that in terms of a modern scientific
worldview, the Biblical writers' understanding of their religious experience was
wrong—not the fact of the religious experience, but the concepts and content by
which it was expressed. Wiles declares that such a view ofGod is no longer
credible. He is reduced to stating that, after all, Christians are speaking about their
religious experience, which must take its shape from the worldview they happen to
hold at the time. So Wiles needs to either step back from his more positive claims
about this God, or step forward and find a way to allow this God to communicate
more directly with humans.
Wiles' theological realism, his desire for at least a minimally relational
ontology, and his model of a continuous creation which continues to incorporate the
results ofparticular free human acts, has opened the door to a more interactive model
of the God-world relation. These are some of the areas where theologians such as
Gilkey, Pannenberg, and Moltmann can provide suggestions for a way of
interweaving some of these threads into a new paradigm that allows the transcendent,
sovereign God ofWiles to be truly with his creation.
Langdon Gilkey: God in History
The traditional claim that God governs the world according to an eternal and
comprehensive blueprint is the very assertion many contemporary theologians have
questioned. Lutheran theologian Philip Hefner, therefore, suggests that 'the great
challenge to faith and theology today is to comprehend how this world's history can
be said to be unfolding within God's will and guidance.'329 Benjamin Farley
concurs, stating that 'central to the Bible is the view that God is active in history
overcoming evil and creating new possibilities. It is precisely how this [providential
329Philip Hefner, 'Fourth Locus: The Creation,' in Christian Dogmatics, eds. Carl E. Braaten,




activity] should be interpreted that has become problematic for theology.' This is
the central issue addressed by Langdon Gilkey.
Gilkey, like Albert Outler,331 develops his doctrine ofprovidence as a direct
attempt to respond to the contemporary crisis with providence as reflected in the
death of God movement.332 Gilkey's work on providence (as part of a theology of
history) is carried out with a central apologetical aim in mind: to construct a
Christian doctrine ofprovidence which respects the intent of traditional formulations
of this doctrine, but which also reinterprets those essential concerns in a way
compatible with a modem scientific (and naturalistic) understanding of the world,
333
and especially in terms of the modem experience of life as historical passage. A
part of that apologetical agenda involves the argument that secular experience itself
reveals a hidden religious concern for the ultimate, and thus requires a religious or
Christian element in any model that would adequately express this reality.334
In the interest ofmaking a doctrine ofprovidence relevant (intelligible) to
'modem consciousness' (which understands 'reality' to be 'in passage, deeply and
inescapably temporal'), Gilkey argues that one must work 'in terms of temporality or
process.'335 With this general criterion in mind, he adopts Tillich's correlation
330Benjamin Farley, The Providence ofGod (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1988),
220.
33'Albert Outler, Who Trusts in God: Musings on the Meaning of Providence (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1968).
332Cf. Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language
(Indianapolis, IN; New York, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1969), 148; and Gilkey, 'A
Retrospective Glance at My Work,' in The Theology of Langdon B. Gilkev: Systematic and Critical
Studies, eds. Kyle A. Pasewark, and JeffB. Pool (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), 513.
Niels H. Gregersen claims that Gilkey's theology of providence (Reaping the Whirlwind) is 'still the
best monograph on the subject' ('Providence in an Indeterministic World,' CTNS Bulletin 14, no. 1
[Winter 1994]: 16).
333Langdon Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation ofHistory (New
York, NY: The Seabury Press, 1976), 199. More recently, Peter Hodgson has also addressed the issue
ofwho God is and how God relates to history using a Hegelian and Process framework (God in
History: Shapes of Freedom (Nashville, TN: Parthenon Press, 1989). Cf. also his Winds of the Spirit:
A Constructive Christian Theology (London, UK: SCM Press, 1994).
334Gilkey, Reaping. 294; cf. ibid., 129, 152-153.
~'33Langdon Gilkey, 'God,' in Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and
Tasks, eds. Peter Hodgson, and Robert King (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1982; London, U.K.:
SPCK, 1983), 82; cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 144.
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method of doing theology.336 In order to facilitate this strategy, he takes a bottom-
up, or natural theology approach in developing his doctrines of God and providence.
The fact that Gilkey basis his doctrinal constructions on human experiences
ofGod means that God is defined only in relation to creation, and specifically in
relation to human understandings of creation. One must, therefore, understand his
reinterpretation of God and providence within the context of his phenomenological
analysis of the ontological structures of nature and of history. For this reason, a brief
summary ofGilkey's theological method seems in order.
There are four essential steps in Gilkey's method: first, a phenomenological
and existential analysis ofmodern secular experience; second, 'an ontological
explication and argument'; third, a search for the eidetic or core meaning of
traditional Christian symbols; finally, a correlation of the key aspects ofhuman
experience of the world with the central ideational meaning of Christian symbols.
This correlation results, in Gilkey's view, in a more adequately thematised and so
more fully understood 'secular experience of sacrality,' thus enabling a more
adequate response to the conditions of ambiguity in historical experience.338
In the first and second steps of this method, Gilkey works on the assumption
that in order for any claims to knowledge of God (however indirect) to be credible,
they must reflect or correspond to the dominant metaphysical or ontological
assumptions of a given community or society.339 Gilkey has taken seriously what he
336Cf. Mark Kline Taylor's summary ofTillich's method (Paul Tillich: Theologian of the
Boundaries, in the series, The Making ofModern Theology: 19lh and 20th Century Texts, ed. John de
Gruchy [London, UK: Collins Liturgical Publications, 1987], 126-127). Gilkey suggests that in the
'formal equation between secular questions and Christian answers,' 'meaning results from an
interaction of experience and symbol' (Naming. 456; cf. 452-457). Gilkey notes that although he and
David Tracy developed their theological methods independently of each other, his method of doing
theology corresponds closely with that of Tracy, as represented in Tracy's Blessed Rage for Order
(Gilkey, Reaping. 368-369, n.l; 371, n. 17).
337Gilkey, Reaping. 371, n. 17.
338Gilkey, 'The Universal and Immediate Presence of God,' in The Future ofHope: Theology
as Eschatology. ed. Frederick Herzog (New York, NY: Herder and Herder Inc., 1970), 100.
339He recognises of course, that if there is no such consensus, then the attempt to convince
people of either the existence of God, or of God's providence, 'never gets started' (Gilkey, 'The God
ofNature,' in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Russell,
Robert John, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine
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understands to be two of the prevalent features ofmodern Western culture: a
privileging of the scientific (and naturalistic) understanding of nature, and modern
historical consciousness. That is why he spends so much effort developing, on the
basis ofmodern scientific understandings of nature, a 'universal' set of 'principles of
all experience' which can serve 'as suggestions for a possible metaphysics or
ontology' for 'all of finite actuality.'340 While he carries out this attempt specifically
in reference to 'nature' in his article, 'The God ofNature' (with a focus on the
existence ofGod), he earlier undertook a similar task with respect to the modern
experience ofhistorical consciousness in, Reaping the Whirlwind (with a focus on
discerning God's providentialpresence). It may be helpful to summarise the
conclusion of these analyses.
In 'The God ofNature' he delineates the ontological structure of 'all of finite
actuality' as follows:
(1) Temporality or passage .... (2) The definiteness or
determinedness ofactuality as the given .... (3) The role of
possibility, of genuine possibilities that have not been actual
before, of novelty .... (4) The role of order as self-
maintaining ....
(5) There is apparently self-determination in that
['achieved'] actuality [and 'possibility'], a self-constitution at
each level ofbeing from the spontaneity evident in inorganic
existence, through self-direction in organic and social life, to
the self-choosing and autonomy ofhuman existence.341
Reflecting this phenomenological analysis of the ontology of reality, 'God'
then becomes the name for the "'continuing and necessary Power'" grounding and
sustaining ongoing temporality and contingency; for 'the continuing ground of our
freedom' or 'self-constitution'; and for the ground ofpossibilities experienced within
an overarching order.342
Action,' ed. Robert John Russell [Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley,
CA: The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997], 216).
340Gilkey, 'God ofNature,' 216.
34lGilkey, 'God ofNature,' 216-217 (italics mine).
342Gilkey, 'God ofNature,' 218-219.
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In Reaping the Whirlwind, Gilkey begins with a phenomenological and
existential analysis of the human experience of history as process.343 Through this
analysis he discerns that key areas ofhuman life (historical, political and social) are
characterised by an ultimate concern.344 This existential ultimate concern arises at
the boundary where the finite meets the infinite. Here one is confronted not only
with concerns requiring answers beyond his or her finite ability to give, but also with
the intuition that a transcendent "something" or "someone" grounds the whole of
existence in all its aspects. While Gilkey thinks that this transcendent ground of
being, freedom, possibility and process is sensed within the experience of all peoples,
and while he considers each major religion to represent a valid response to it, he
turns to his own particular religious milieu (the Christian symbol set) in order to
interpret this ultimate. Following Whitehead, Gilkey posits 'a factor "God"' in order
to explain what it is that ties actuality and possibility together in a coherent
manner.345 Moreover, Gilkey justifies his use of the Christian symbol set (especially
those doctrines he thinks relevant to the findings of his phenomenological analysis of
history346) by arguing that it enables a more coherent and experientially adequate347
account of one's experience ofhistory as containing, on the one hand, 'destiny and
343Although there is an obvious overlap in the results of these two ontological analyses (i. e.,
of nature and of history), the different point of entry in each brings to light a slightly different set of
categories. For example, the analysis of history allows Gilkey to use more obviously theological
terminology for his findings, such as 'grace,' 'sin,' 'providence,' and 'eschatology.'
344Gilkey, Reaping. 37, 339, n. 21., 127; cf. ibid., 129.
345Gilkey, Reaping. 125. Gilkey, however, does not follow those '"process" views of God
which deny that God is the source or ground of finite reality and give to "creativity" that status of
ultimacy traditionally accorded to God' ('God,' 82).
346These include 'sin and grace,' 'estrangement, self-destruction and reconciliation,'
'creation and . . . providence,' 'Christology, grace and eschatology' (Gilkey, Reaping. 127).
347Gilkey identifies two criteria for intelligibility or credibility for doing theology in a
modem context: 'coherence among its fundamental concepts and adequacy to the facts of experience'
(Reaping. 128). Gilkey's concept of what counts as'facts of experience' (italics mine) assumes that
all such "facts" are heavily theory-laden (Naming. 432). Philosopher Philip Kitcher, however,
cautions against overstating the case for theory-ladenness, since, if no adjustment of theories could be
derived from the impingement of 'inputs from nature,' it would no longer be possible to arrive at
'intersubjective agreement' between those with differing 'background cognitive states' (The
Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend. Objectivity Without Illusions [Oxford, UK; New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993; paperback ed., 1995], 167, 67]).
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freedom,' 'grace' and 'reconciliation,' and on the other hand, 'fate, sin,'
'estrangement, [and] self-destruction.'348
The third and fourth steps ofGilkey's method involves a search for the
'ideational (eidetic)' meaning349 of key Christian symbols (doctrines), in this way
reducing their range ofmeaning to a generic idea or essential concern which can then
be affirmed on the basis of a natural theology (and thus correlated to his ontology of
nature and history). This method enables him to correlate the phenomenological and
existential findings ofhis earlier analysis (which points to a transcendent ground of
'ultimate' meaning350) with the central meanings of the key symbols of the Christian
TCI
tradition (which names the 'dimension of ultimacy' God ). For example, the
concept of the divine Logos, often interpreted in Christian tradition as the Son (the
second Person of the Trinity), now becomes the impersonal 'graded and ordered
envisionment of God of the infinite realm ofpossibility.' In this way he can
restate these symbols as expressions of the modern experience of the world as
understood in process terms: 'becoming' takes priority over 'being,' and the future
(with its open potential and possibilities) can really improve on the present. Thus,
'these [symbols] are not doctrines about a being called God, but doctrines about the
creaturely as the sacred manifests itself in and through the creaturely. . . . [W]hat we
understand through these unique symbols and so in this unique way is the appearance
of the sacred in and through the finite, and not the sacred itself.'353 Since 'God is in
some important sense "hidden" within temporal passage,' this requires the use of an
'analogical rather than univocal mode of speech,' and also means 'that the divine
348Gilkey, Reaping. 127; cf. 129, 146, 294.




353Gilkey, Naming. 466- 467; cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 302, 430, n. 6. Gilkey claims precedent
for this method of using indirect language about God in both Schleiermacher and Calvin, although he
differs from Schleiermacher in that he does not think 'symbols . . . [can] be drawn out of feelings,' but




presence is to be recognized and acknowledged more through a religious discernment
than by means of objective inquiry.'354
With these methodological parameters in mind, the following section will
outline Gilkey's view of the God-world relation.
The God-World Relation: 'Creative Providence'
In keeping with his natural theology approach, Gilkey seeks to arrive at a
doctrine of God consistent with his analysis and interpretation of 'the abstractions of
the scientific understanding of nature.'355 In this way he can claim scientific
sponsorship for the idea of God and, therefore, a wider credibility in a society that
privileges scientific knowledge.
God Defined in Relation to Creation
Gilkey's reasoning proceeds as follows: 'the scientific understanding of
nature' reveals certain principles or structures of nature,356 each ofwhich can be
interpreted as 'a trace of God': 'power,' 'order,' 'a redemptive principle,'
• • • T57
contingency and temporality, 'spontaneity' and 'freedom,' and 'order.' 'God is
the eternal source of order amid novelty, uniting the determined past with the
possibilities latent in the open future—and thus God is as essential for the unity and
development of nature as for its being.'358
Gilkey admits his theological method and presuppositions result in 'a view of
God' which is 'hardly traditional,' grounded as it is in human experience of God's
354Gilkey, 'God,' 84. It would seem that Tillich is the common factor behind both Gilkey's
'religious discernment' and Wiles' 'ecstatic reason' (Wiles, 'Divine Action,' 26, 27). Gilkey argues
further that, since 'we are nature,' nature can be 'known from the inside . . . both in terms of self-
awareness and in terms of the awareness of the other as person' ('God ofNature,' 217).
355Gilkey, 'God ofNature,' 217.
356Gilkey often uses the term 'nature' inclusively to refer to 'all that is,' thus including
humans ('God ofNature,' 217).
357Gilkey, 'God ofNature,' 217, 218-219.
358Gilkey, 'God ofNature,' 219-220.
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'activity in and on us and on our world.'359 Thus, in one's symbolic language about
God
our direct referent is not the divine as it is in itself....
Rather is our language multivalent, language about the finite
with regard to what appears in and to our experience, the
ultimate or sacral dimension there, but understood in terms of
these symbols. Thus the symbol of God as creator refers not
to some pictured absolute, but only to the ultimate and sacral
ground of our contingency.360
Expressing this definition more fully, Gilkey defines the symbol 'God' as
'the unconditioned ground' of the ever-changing sequence of 'the not-yet future
[becoming] real in the freedom of the present,' and then 'vanishing] into the
nonbeing of the past.' This 'unconditioned ground' or 'deeper reality, experienced in
the continuities present in changing time, in the freedom also present in time, and in
the novelpossibilities impinging on time, is the initial referent for the word
"God."'361
One immediate significance of this indirect approach to knowledge of God is
that Gilkey's doctrines ofGod, creation, providence and eschatology are intrinsically
intertwined, since they are abstractions from common human experience, as well as
interpretations of that experience.
As the source of all that is, God is 'unconditioned, infinite, and absolute.'362
Gilkey thus adopts the traditional doctrine of'creatio ex nihilo,' but not in the sense
that everything is willed and actualised by God in eternity.363 For Gilkey, the myth
of creation does not refer to a beginning, but rather to the ongoing dependence of
creation on its Creator.364 He affirms the traditional symbol of creation ex nihilo for
359Gilkey, Reaping. 310.
360Gilkey, Naming. 466.
36'Gilkey, 'God,' 83; cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 244, 248, 249, 250, 303; and Gilkey, 'God of
Nature,' 219.
362Gilkey, 'God,' 84; cf. Reaping. 307.




two reasons: first, 'to separate God from the origination of the totality of the being
which is ours ... is ... to reduce God to one metaphysical factor balanced by
others,' and 'secondly, it is to relinquish the essential sacrality of existence, of life, of
being—the dynamic vitality which is fully as sacred as is form itself.'365
In the interest ofmaintaining a further link with tradition, Gilkey finds a
Trinitarian framework' for understanding God: 'being, truth and love,' or 'being,
logos, and love.'366 But this is not the traditional Trinity. It does not refer to three
"persons," but rather identifies three ways in which Christians experience the
personal God as the ultimate. This functional Trinitarian framework' corresponds to
the basic ontology of the experience of life as history.367 Thus, it defines God as the
ground ofbeing, of freedom and possibility, and of love, grace or redemption.368
This trinitarian doctrine of 'creative providence'369 does not define God's
being in se, but only complementary aspects of his relation to creaturely existence.
For example, Gilkey understands the historical Jesus to have been a mortal man who
was peculiarly able to exemplify authentic human being through his open
relationship to God. The very fact that this (now dead) person still mediates to
Christians experiences ofGod's unconditional acceptance and love, and thus
facilitates experiences of'authentic life,' is itself evidence that some infinite ground
of 'power that transcends his passing and continues as the ground of our fleeting
364Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth: The Christian Doctrine ofCreation in Light of
Modern Knowledge (New York, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959; Garden City, NY: Anchor
Books, 1965), 312-318.
365Gilkey, Reaping. 248-249 (italics mine).
366Gilkey, Reaping, 310, 297; cf. ibid., 310-318.
367Although Gilkey does not develop his limiting criterion, this ontological connection is,
presumably, the only reason for restricting the number ofways for expressing how God relates to us.
Otherwise, since there are no authoritative special divine revelations of the nature of God's being, he
would have insufficient criteria for such a specific number. John Cobb, for example, questions the
traditional number of three with respect to the Trinity. He wonders if there are not equally good
reasons, arising from within the biblical and early church traditions themselves for holding to a
'binity' or even a 'quaternity' (John Cobb, Jr., 'The Relativization of the Trinity,' in Trinity in
Process: A Relational Theology of God, eds. Joseph A. Bracken, and Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki [New
York, N.Y.: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1997], 2-3).




present, must come to us through this lordly figure of the past.'370 Thus, Jesus is not
the divine logos, but rather exemplifies one who made the most ofGod's
envisionment ofpossibilities (logos) for his life.
Gilkey's Trinity does not denote a type ofmodalism, since God functions in
these roles simultaneously. A doctrine of God as a functional "trinity" is thus
required by Gilkey's model because God is related to the world as giver of existence
(being), as the source of freedom and the provider ofpossibilities (logos), and as
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reconciling grace (love)--a 'threefold divine activity.'
Divine Sovereignty and 'Creative Providence'
Gilkey wants to reinterpret, and yet retain, the following crucial elements in
the classical formulations ofprovidence: first, 'the sovereignty of God over history
. . . [as] controlled, directed and defined by God's eschatological goal'; second, the
link between God's providential activity and 'external or "objective" events, both
natural and historical'; third, 'the purpose ofprovidence, and so the ultimate goal of
history,. . . [as] the establishment and so the freeing of freedom—the transformation
for all men and women of fate into destiny'; fourth, Gilkey rather selectively
interprets traditional doctrines ofprovidence as showing that 'God does not work in
history as an external cause but in and through the creaturely forces and dynamic
factors ofhistory'—Gilkey does not follow the tradition's assertion that God also acts
directly in the external events ofhistory, that is, by-passing secondary means; finally,
Gilkey affirms that 'providence works through not against human freedom'372—he
especially wants to avoid theological determinism. In the interests of his apologetic
purpose, he develops a theology of providence from within the hermeneutic of a
naturalistic, modern historical consciousness.
Divine Sovereignty Reinterpreted
The fact that God is the sovereign source of all that is raises the question of





total being with the dynamic relatedness and the reciprocal activity of God as the
ground, guide, dialogical partner, and redeemer of our freedom.'373 Gilkey resolves
this theodicy problem by revising the classical doctrine of the sovereignty of God
such that God is now se/f-limited, participates in temporality, and is 'subject to
change.'374 In this way Gilkey aims to strike a necessary balance between God's
transcendence and immanence: God cannot be only immanent in history, for this
would make 'history's estrangement' an aspect of God's being; neither can God be
fully transcendent to creation, for then God would be unable to communicate new
possibilities through which alone the distortions ofhistory's structures can be
redeemed.375 As the ultimate ground ofboth being and meaning, of destiny, freedom
and possibility, God does not unilaterally enact or even orchestrate the events of
history (as in the biblical view376), but works only in and through secondary causes in
<577
a naturalistic fashion.
This results in an analogical view ofdivine action in which God is fully
immanent within (but not subject to) the 'dynamic process' of historical being.378
God's action is uniform,379 albeit ordered in accordance with each level of
complexity. God cannot, however, be thought of as a competing cause on the
creaturely level. God's 'providential creativity' is what funds the whole process of
'continuing existence'380 from within, and thus necessarily in a hidden way, as the
372Gilkey, Reaping. 240.
373Gilkey, 'God,' 82; cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 414, n. 31. Since Gilkey rejects the biblical
practice of speaking univocally about God acting, working, doing, or speaking, he clearly means to
speak analogically of God as 'dialogical partner,' and ofGod's 'reciprocal activity' (Cf. Gilkey,
'Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language,' in God's Activity in the World: The
Contemporary Problem, ed. Owen C. Thomas, in American Academy ofReligion series, Studies in
Religion, ed. Charley Hardwick, no. 31 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 32).




378Gilkey, Reaping. 249. 'In the sense of ground, limit and resource of our being and its




ground ofbeing, process and possibilities. There are no divine interventions, no
double agency,381 'no divine wonders . . . and no divine voices.'382
The picture drawn here, however, ofGod interacting with creation through
the constant offer of best possibilities for creaturely action, even though hidden in the
very depths of the constitution of each creature, would seem to entail some form of
efficient causality. John Cobb, writing from a Process perspective, argues that 'God
must be some kind of a cause of events or else there is no point in speaking ofhim at
all.' Cobb's solution is to speak of God as efficient cause in terms of 'real' or 'actual
influence.'383
If one is going to retain the notion of creation ex nihilo, and of some form of
creative providential interaction with creation, it may not either be necessary, or even
possible, to exclude the idea ofGod working in specific instances in order to bring
about an effect in creation (particular providence) in much the same way as a human
might act to produce an effect on or in inanimate or animate nature.
Gilkey contends that the threat of divine determinism is not reduced by
moving the direction of God's actionfrom thefuture (as in eschatological theologies)
instead offrom eternity (in classical theology). All this achieves is the 'total
abdication' of God from the present,384 and consequently denigrates the value of the
present creative process. Instead, he suggests that 'the problems of theodicy, of
human freedom and of the goodness of the future .... can be resolved only by
... an explicitly ontological doctrine of the self-limitation in every present of the
divine power in relation to the freedom of the creature.'385 Gilkey's use of the idea
380Gilkey, Reaping. 249.
381Cf. F. Michael McLain's critique ofGilkey on this point ('Narrative Interpretation and the
Problem of Double Agency,' in Divine Action: Studies Inspired by The Philosophical Theology of
Austin Farrer, eds. Brian Hebblethwaite, and Edward Henderson [Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark
Ltd., 1990], 144-151).
382Gilkey, 'Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language,' The Journal of
Religion 41 (1961): 196.
383Cobb, 'Natural Causality and Divine Action,' in God's Activity in the World: The
Contemporary Problem, ed. Owen C. Thomas, in American Academy of Religion series, Studies in
Religion, ed. Charley Hardwick, no. 31 [Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983] 101, 115, 114).




of'ontological. . . self-limitation' reflects a certain ambiguity here, since on the one
hand, he explicitly rejects any extrinsic reduction of God's total sovereignty. Thus,
he rejects Process theology's attempt to set 'an ontological limit to God, that is, by
conceiving God as a finite factor in the creation of the present.'386 On the other
hand, however, God does not provide the total ground ofhistorical reality, because
the creature is self-creative to some degree, and creation 'is the work of God in union
with the freedom he creates.'387 Although, presumably, Gilkey sees this self-
limitation of the divine sovereignty as conforming to a regular "pattern" (or "law"),
yet the "pattern" itself is determined by the wisdom ofGod's moment-by-moment
decisions as to which elements of creaturely implementation he will reposit in being,
which possibilities he will offer, and which creaturely artefacts he will no longer
uphold in being. Gilkey seems to imply that only at some future point (perhaps
beyond death) will God no longer sustain the negative associated with each
individual. Leaving aside the problems involved in speculating about what might be
the requirements imposed on divine self-limitation in order to make possible this
kind ofworld, Gilkey has at least left an unspecified range of actions open to God in
order to accomplish God's ultimate purposes.
God, therefore, is sovereign in the sense of being the ultimate source of
being, process, possibilities, judgment and grace (redemption), but 'not as the all-
powerful, extrinsic and necessitating ordainer of what we are and do.'388 In adopting
this view, Gilkey aligns himself 'unequivocally with the "Arminian" tradition of
interpretation, holding that human creativity, both for good or ill, does not reflect the
foreordination ofGod but rather the centered response to events, in judgment,
decision and action, ofhuman beings.'389 Thus, he understands 'the divine
sovereignty' to work 'through a genuine freedom, as, so to speak, "playing it by ear"
in history in the light ofwhat men do.' He finds support for this view, not only from
385Gilkey, Reaping. 235; cf. ibid., 307-308.
386Gilkey, 'Universal and Immediate Presence,' 97.
387Gilkey, Reaping. 308.
388Gilkey, Reaping. 247.
389Gilkey, Reaping. 413-414, n. 31.
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his phenomenological analysis of human experience, but also from 'the Old
Testament accounts of history.'390 Gilkey's model ofprovidence, in this instance,
resembles that ofTimothy Gorringe's description ofprovidence as 'rough theatre.'391
'Creative Providence'
Although Gilkey's Reaping the Whirlwind places a central focus on
providence as 'God's continuing action in our common life, [and] in the general
history in which we live,'392 his larger project involves a theology ofhistory that
TQT • • •
includes 'providence, christology and eschatology.' In his view, the combination
of these doctrines provides 'a better theological clue to the mystery of history.'394
In light ofGilkey's method of arriving at a Christian understanding of the
'ultimate' by means of the interaction of inherited symbols with secular experience
of the world, the symbol of 'providence' thus comes to refer to 'the divine ultimacy,
experienced in our historical life as providence—an ultimacy that establishes,
grounds, limits, judges and rescues the present.'
There is an important ontological connection between God's providential
action, the structure of contingent creaturely being and process, and one's experience
of creative autonomy:
God's providential presence, the ultimacy that undergirds our
being, is experienced and found through these characteristics
and powers of our finite being and thus is not capable of
dissolving them else it would not be experienced and known
at all. For ultimacy appears precisely within the exercise of
our contingent being, the discovery of our relative meanings,
the achievement of our relative truths and spiritual creations
and the enacting of our free decisions as their possibility. It
is the ground, the dimension, the context that makes our
390Gilkey, Reaping. 414, n. 31.








contingency, relativity, temporality and free human being
possible.39
Clearly there are both creative and providential types of action reflected in
this single divine work, and thus Gilkey, following Schleiermacher, refers to his
• • .... 397doctrine ofprovidence as 'creative providence,' or 'providential creativity.'
The first element in Gilkey's doctrine ofprovidence is that of "preservation,"
but what God "preserves" or "sustains" is being-in-process-of-becoming. It is
always in movement—what it achieves in each moment ofjudgment and decision is
continually reposited, faced with new possibilities, enabled to make a new decision,
the "cycle" repeating constantly. God is thus 'the power of actuality or being that
constitutes or reconstitutes being from moment to moment, that brings achieved
actuality out of the vanishing mortality of the past into the life of the present; that
moves what is objectified and gone into the role of a determining factor in the living
1QO
present.' Whether this becomes a progressive or degenerative spiral depends on
the use made by the creature of its freedom to choose and enact the truly new.
The second component in this doctrine of providence (again reflecting a link
with tradition) is that of concursus. Although God concurs with creaturely activity in
that he not only reposits it in being, but empowers it to choose, this concursus
respects the autonomy of the creature in its self-actualization.399 The ability of finite
"beings" to unite 'past actuality and future possibility' comprises 'a process of self-
determination, a response of centered freedom to its given destiny in the light of real
possibilities. Each present is a union ofobjectified actuality, alternative possibilities and
integrating decision.'400 Since this 'freedom' and ability to select from the range of
options open to it cannot be wholly derived from past actuality (this would be full
determinism), nor from future possibilities (which do not yet exist as actualities), Gilkey
postulates that it must again be a given from God. 'As a result, we call this ground or
396Gilkey, Reaping. 248.
397Gilkey, Reaping. 249; cf. 248, 414, n. 32.
398Gilkey, Reaping. 303.




power ofbeing, creative of the self-determining reality of each occasion through which
it comes to be, the creative "accompanying" or "concurring" providence ofGod.'401
Thus God manifests his sovereignty not only in preserving (or repositing)
creaturely being, but also in 'ordaining and ordering' 'possibility for the whole
process.'402 It is at this point that Gilkey employs a reinterpreted version of the
traditional'logos' concept as the third element in his doctrine ofprovidence, and as
reflecting the second aspect of God's "trinitarian" relation to creation as its
transcendent, 'unconditioned ground': 'God, as the ground of future possibility, is at
the same time the ground of order and intelligibility,... now reconceived in a
dynamic, temporal mode.'403 This 'realm ofpossibility' is not random, not determined
solely by the actualities created by creaturely free choices, but rather forms 'an ordered
structure of graded options in continuity with the past,'404 and therefore remains
relevant to it even while it makes possible the genuinely new.405
As noted above, however, although this 'graded and ordered envisionment of
God of the infinite realm ofpossibility' provides the structure of created reality, it is
more than 'a static timeless order of endlessly repeated forms':
Rather, for a process view in which "being" is always in the
process ofbecoming through the self-actualisation of novel
events, the rational structure of experience represents the
ingression ofpossibilities from the future—perhaps repeated,
perhaps new—into the self-creative events ofprocess. Thus
the divine logos is a creative vision of future possibility,
arising out of the infinite divine life, of forms not yet
actualised and therefore merely potential, as well as of
possible forms already resident in actuality. The logos points
not to the endless recurrence of the past but to the future and
to novelty, to unrealised potentiality, as the ordering divine
vision which lures process, nature, social history and personal
lives, into new forms of life, of society and of selves.406
40lGilkey, Reaping. 304-305, 305.
402Gilkey, Reaping. 251.
403Gilkey, 'God,' 84; cf. Reaping. 314, 305.
404Gilkey, Reaping. 305.
405Gilkey, 'Universal and Immediate Presence,' 109.
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Thus, 'the future which God brings presupposes the present which he also
providentially founds—and both require for their actualization our human creaturely
(and often wayward) autonomy, energy, commitment, faith, and activity.'407
The fourth feature ofGilkey's doctrine ofprovidence is that ofjudgement or
'nemesis,' as it is combined with grace or redemptive love. Because the ontology of
history includes sin or fate in its constitution, providence needs a redemptive aspect.
Redemption, however, takes the initial form ofjudgment or nemesis. Ifone already
understands the negative in history as deriving its ultimate meaning from a model of
creative providence, then even nemesis can be seen as possibility of renewal. God's
redemptive, reuniting love often appears as judgement since it must oppose that in the
creature's freedom which opposes its own good.408 God's 'ultimately sovereign' love
will finally achieve salvation for all.409 For this reason God's 'forgiveness and reunion
on the basis of forgiveness are the center ofour hope for time.'410 One might even
interpret the concepts ofpossibilities, judgment, grace, and redemption as aspects of
God's governance—thus making explicit another connection to the tradition that Gilkey
himself does not specify.
When one recognises his or her alienation from authentic selfhood as it was
manifested in Jesus, when one consciously accepts one's finitude and dependence upon
God, just then redemption begins to take place 411 It is faith in God's 'creative
sovereignty'412 and 'creative providence' which makes such conscious decision
possible. It is this faith, and this act of faith, which grounds hope for the future and
therefore redemptive action in the present.
406Gilkey, Reaping. 313.
407Gilkey, 'Universal and Immediate Presence,' 109.








Although eschatology forms a distinct topic from that of creative providence,
some note ofGilkey's treatment of it seems to be in order because of the role
eschatology plays in providing the goal and shape ofprovidence.
Creative Providence and Eschatology
Gilkey notes that 'the goal ofprovidence, the character of God's hidden work
within the ambiguity of social existence, is defined and so clarified both
eschatologically and christologically.' It is defined christologically by Jesus, who 'as
the Christ [is] transparent to the ultimate power, meaning and love of God and so
gives in promise the character of the kingdom as a community of the fullness of
being, meaning and love.' Eschatologically, therefore, God's goal 'for history and
beyond history' is 'the promised kingdom as the community of humans' in which
each individual experiences 'the power to be and to determine . . . [his or her] own
being for the future,' enjoys life in 'community' as 'the participation of all in the
common life' in the context of'responsible love.'413 Only against this background
does present history find its true and full meaning.
Creative providence, under the conditions of temporal existence, does not
complete God's goal for creation—this will only be achieved in eternity, which,
although based upon the achievements ofhistory in time, will supersede both sinful
ways of relating and the ability to abuse the gift of freedom. In taking this view
Gilkey follows Augustine and Calvin in giving eschatology a defining role in his
theology of history.414 It must be noted, however, that given the epistemological
limits set by his natural theology approach, as it is based on a phenomenological
analysis of the ontology of the human experience ofhistory and on the 'eidetic
shape' of key Christian symbols, Gilkey has to admit that what can be said about
'eschatological hope ... is very tentative indeed.'415 One can only speculate, on the
basis of his or her present experience of 'God as power or being, as truth and as
love,' and on one's experience of a lure toward 'authentic' being, taken in concert
413Gilkey, Reaping. 288-289; cf. ibid., 267, 287-299.




with the present experience of'the redemptive forces ofhistory,' that there awaits an
ultimate completion or perfection of these experiences of 'reunion' and
reconciliation in the ultimate 'harmony' of the divine life itself.416 Given this basis,
instead of a hope based upon a sovereignly given, revealed and enacted promise,
does one not rather have a hopefor hope, a hope in hope, and perhaps, in the end,
only a wish for an ultimate hope?
While Gilkey rightly highlights the important connection between providence
and eschatology, his vision for how God will achieve his goal for creation is vague,
and perhaps pantheistic.417 Although Gilkey (contra Whitehead) makes God (not
'creativity') the ultimate ground,418 he still seems to run the risk ofmaking creation
an emanation (albeit a freely posited one) ofGod's own being. Two features of
Gilkey's work support this conclusion. First, the being ofboth God and creatures
have, intrinsically, process characteristics. Only in this way can God's experience be
spoken of as enlarged or enriched,419 and this same feature makes the final shape of
God's eternal purposes dependent upon creaturely choices in time. Second, Gilkey
speaks of an ultimate completion of 'our being with an "alien" righteousness, with
the creative perfection of the divine love, and with the transforming harmony of the
divine experience.'420 While one ought not to conclude too much from this
ambiguous language, it at least seems to imply that only when present created life is
re-created and in some profound sense reunited with, or "subsumed" into, the infinite
'consequent divine experience'421 will it be complete.
Gilkey takes as the defining example of this new life the resurrected existence
ofChrist,422 but because he does not understand Jesus to be divine, Gilkey fails to
appropriate the resources in the traditional symbol of christology for explicating both
4l6Gilkey, Reaping. 295-296, 297.
417Cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 297-298.
418Gilkey, Reaping. 249.
4l9Gilkey, Reaping. 297, 428, n. 47.
420Gilkey, Reaping. 295-296, 297, 298.
42'Gilkey, Reaping. 317, 318; cf. ibid., 297.
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the unity and distinction between Jesus and the Father, and subsequently, between
humans and the Father. Thus, the most he can say about 'Jesus as the Christ'423 is
that he is the best example available, under the conditions of time, of cooperation
between God's offer ofprovidential possibilities and human actualisation of those
possibilities, of God's purposes being fulfilled for the human creature. Two further
questions arise at this point: first, since 'the final kingdom ... is not in history,'424
can one really know what life under the conditions of eternity will look like, apart
from a more direct revelation from God; and a second, closely related question: if
insight into the character of life in the kingdom derives from a religious 'intuition,'
can one really specify which of the aspects of the ontology ofhistorical life will
enjoy completion?
Although Gilkey does not make it clear whether historical being and
experience, as such, comes to an end 'in the infinity of the consequent divine
experience,'425 or whether, as historical beings humans enter into a perfected way of
relating to God, to others, and to our own authentic selves,426 his requirement of a
link between present historical ontology and that of eternity would lead one to expect
some kind ofprocessive ontology even there. From this perspective his view of
creative providence would resemble an Irenaean soul-making theodicy in which the
degree of otherness (and therefore autonomy) achieved in temporal existence will be
perfected in a higher (authentic) life ofhistorical being and relating in eternity. This
would accord well with his close linkage of creation, providence, and eschatology.
Thus, the transition from this life to the next (through death and resurrection), while
taking up the positive features of a life achieved here, would seem itself to constitute
a creative and perfecting act. At this point, however, one is led to ask whether
Gilkey's model does not after all require the kind ofdivine intervention he does not
allow within the present, temporal frame of reference? Wiles avoided this potential







problem by suggesting that immortality is intrinsic to the very constitution of
humans.
Gilkey, like Moltmann,427 is rightly concerned to maintain a strong link
between what God and humans achieve in historical constructions in the present, and
the eschatological future of the kingdom: 'eschatology does not replace but depends
on and completes God's providential work in history.'428 Faith and hope in the
present are rooted in God's 'creative sovereignty,'429 that is, in the fact that in any
historical situation God is able to present creative possibilities which make possible
truly new, redemptive kairotic moments.430 The idea seems to be that since God is
eternal and unconditioned, creation can never out-sin God's ability to offer
redemptive possibilities.431 But ifGod is self-limited to working ' through our
freedom and [is therefore] limited by our freedom,'432 unless he is going to change
his way of relating, it is hard to see how the abuse of freedom can ever finally be
conquered.
Gilkey, himself, recognises that without some definitive eschatological
transformation, the sin that arises from the human abuse of freedom can never be
eradicated from their relationships, no matter how many perfect possibilities God
offers them.433 Yet, Gilkey can refer to the salvation of 'all that has actual being.'434
If, as Gilkey argues, all reality (including God) is primarily processive in character,
then this phrase implies the freezing ofprocess in eternity, which seems to negate
427Cf. Jiirgen Moltmann, 'Preface to the New Paperback Edition,' trans. Margaret Kohl, in
Theology ofHope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology. trans. James W.
Leitch (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1967; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 84.
428Gilkey, Reaping. 241; cf. ibid., 244, 297.
429Gilkey, Reaping. 315, 316, 321.
430Gilkey, Reaping. 285.
43'Gilkey, Reaping. 265.
432Gilkey, Reaping. 279. Cf. John J. O'Donnell's critique of Schubert Ogden on this point
(Trinity and Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the
Theology ofHope. Oxford Theological Monographs, eds. J. Barr, P. W. Bide, J. Macquarrie, et. al.
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1983), 181.
433Gilkey, Reaping. 265-266; cf. ibid., 276, 278-279, 315, 321.
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Gilkey's basic ontology of reality as relational and historical. At the very least, it
appears that, after all, God's providential work in history must consist ofmore than a
continuation of the status quo, it must be capable also ofparticular divine actions
bringing history (and the individuals who create it) into another level or plane of
existence.
One is forced to ask whether Gilkey can have it both ways, that is, hold to a
view of God's sovereignty that is defined as a loving self-limitation of God's power,
while also affirming a final overcoming of all that is negative in creaturely co-
creations and in creaturely ways ofbeing. In any case, regardless of the ambiguity,
the foregoing summary depicts Gilkey's model of providence and eschatology as
constituting the ultimate meaning of history. Because the connection between
history and providence is not easily restored, a more explicit summary of the way
Gilkey links them may help to further define the problem, as well as point to areas
needing strengthening.
Providence as a Context ofMeaning forHistory
The question ofGod's involvement in history, and the kind ofmeaning that
provides for human experience of the world, leads ultimately to the question of hope,
for a key aspect ofmeaning is that of significance. For example, Langdon Gilkey
suggests that 'Providence and das Nichtige are closely related concepts,' because it is
not a lack of '"purpose"' so much as it is a lack of 'a meaningful structure in relation
to which our work, our plans, our joys, and our day-to-day life find significance, and
so continuity,' which threatens us with 'Nothingness.' It is providence which
establishes and maintains a context in which and out ofwhich the self can exist, thus
ensuring the significance and continuity of the self, and so the future of the self, and
hence its hope.435
Albert Outler, in his reinterpretation of providence, stresses that the doctrine
traditionally was concerned with God's presence in the world (and therefore in
history), a concern no less important today.436 The area ofdifficulty, for Christian
434Gilkey, Reaping. 297.
435Langdon Gilkey, "The Concept of Providence in Contemporary Theology," The Journal of
Religion 43, no. 3 (July, 1963): 189.
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theology in a secular context, is not so much the existence ofGod as it is God's
active providential presence in the world.437 As noted, for example, in the above
review ofWiles' treatment ofprovidence, he does not question the existence of God,
only the traditional ways of picturing God's relation to the creaturely realm.
G. C. Berkouwer also raised the issue of history and meaning in connection
with a belief in providence.438 In his view, however, a doctrine of providence is
primarily a personal faith issue, and must be based on the Word of God, not on an
interpretation of the vicissitudes ofhistory, either personal, national, or cosmic.439
But this still leaves open the question of the relation of providence to the wider
spheres of historical reality.
Gilkey takes up this concern with providence, history and meaning, giving a
greater emphasis to the issue of corporate history because of the importance in
Western culture ofmodern historical consciousness.440 He argues that classical
doctrines of providence tended to see God as 'an all-determining Absolute of past
and present,' while eschatological theologies like Moltmann's understand God to
totally abdicate any involvement in present history, thus removing himself 'into the
relative chill of abstract, because future, possibility.' Gilkey also sees this abdication
of present involvement in the deistic view of the God-world relation. He wishes,
therefore, to find a position somewhere between what he understands as the all-
determining God of classical providence and the absent God of the futurist and deist
models.441 In the context of the authors surveyed in this thesis, Gilkey's model of the
God-history relation would then fit somewhere between the classical view on the one
hand (as represented by Paul Helm), and Moltmann and Wiles on the other.442
436Outler, Who Trusts. 24.
4370utler, Who Trusts. 27.
438Berkouwer, The Providence of God, trans. Lewis B. Smedes, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1952, rpt. 1983), 7.
439Berkouwer, Providence. 29; cf. 162, 166.
440Cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 207-208.
441Gilkey, 'Universal and Immediate Presence,' 97.
442Gilkey also includes Wolfhart Pannenberg, Johannes Metz, Gustavo Gutierrez, Rubem
Alves, and Carl Braaten in his assessment of the eschatological theologies (Reaping. 227).
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Gilkey notes that 'for liberalism providence provided the sole clue to the
meaning ofhistory; for neo-orthodoxy it was christology; and for contemporary
political theologies it has been eschatology.'443 In order to find a third way between
theistic supernaturalism and deistic naturalism Gilkey suggests that a better theology
of history can be derived from a combination of 'providence, christology and
eschatology'444 which funds relative historical progress. Since God continually
reposits the being ofpast actualisations of free decisions, God is continually co-
creating each entity 445 Thus, 'continuous creativity, providence and eschatology
unite with one another [sic] with finite freedom as the way in which God creates the
moving process, sustains it in its temporal being and directs it through its own
freedom to its fulfillment.'446
In keeping with the nineteenth century liberal theologies, he wishes to affirm
the central importance ofhistory in a doctrine ofprovidence, but without adopting
their largely optimistic view of progress.447 However, he 'takes history seriously,'
not only as the locus for God's redemptive activity, but as itself under God's
governing care. In other words, Gilkey refuses to adopt what he understands as the
neo-orthodox and eschatological theologies' reduction or negation of the significance
of contemporary history in God's redemptive (and so providential) purposes. To do
so would, in his view, destroy any hope of finding meaning in the present crisis of
meaninglessness, negate any hope for bettering future existence (in this life, at least),
and paralyse any praxis for political change and renewal 448
When Gilkey looks to the Bible, however, for resources for relating
providence and history, he finds himself forced to turn to the Old Testament. The
New Testament, while it 'presupposes the creative and providential activity ofGod
443Gilkey, Reaping. 238.
444Gilkey, Reaping. 238.
445Cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 303, 307, 308.
446Gilkey, Reaping. 312.




portrayed in the Old,' tends to eclipse the relation of divine providence to present
history by focusing instead on the 'redemptive activity of God in and through Christ,
in the church and to come in the future.'449
While he is correct to read New Testament eschatology as presupposing 'the
creative and providential activity of God portrayed in the Old,'450 he moves too
quickly to assume that the relative eclipse ofprovidence in the New Testament only
signals a differentfocus from that of providence,451 and thereby he inadvertently
minimises the importance the New Testament attributes to God's new providential
work in history—and thus sees the New Testament as undermining the significance of
present history itself. But this shift in focus to a different aspect of God's work in
the world might also reflect a deeper insight into God's providential relation to the
world. As Frank Tupper notes, 'God's work of reconciliation illuminates and
clarifies God's providential work in the whole of creation and thereby uniquely in the
arena of contingent human history.'452 One might say that God's new works of
incarnation, redemption, and sanctification, through the Son and the Spirit, are
themselves new providential works, paradigmatic instances ofGod's ongoing
presence and care. Since Gilkey, presumably, thinks that God was working in both
the Old and New Testaments as he continues to work in all cultures,453 then God's
pervasive providential creativity itself continues to provide the same overarching
context ofmeaning for individual and corporate history in the New Testament as it
did in the Old and does in the present. Gilkey, however, has already ruled out the
miraculous in the Old Testament accounts ofprovidence, and this in turn means that
he is not reading the New Testament view ofprovidence as its authors would have
understood it from the Old Testament. This is ironic, since in the Old Testament he
finds not only a clear doctrine ofGod's providential presence in both Israel's and in
449Gilkey, Reaping. 410, n. 4; 241-242.
450Gilkey, Reaping. 241.
45lGilkey, Reaping. 410, n. 4.
452Frank Tupper, 'The Providence of God in Christological Perspective,' Review and
Expositor 82, no. 4 (Fall 1985): 580.
453Gilkey, Reaping. 244, 267, 268, 284, 317.
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general history, but also a shifting interpretation of that presence as their experience
of God changed. He uses this latter characteristic of the Old Testament view of
divine providence as creating the precedent for his own reinterpretation in light of
modern historical consciousness.454
Gilkey's hermeneutic also means that the way God acts in the New
Testament, providentially and trinitarianly, in bringing in redemption, must now rule
out the miraculous, a view which no doubt accounts for the fact that Jesus as the
Christ is reduced by Gilkey to the paradigmatic example ofGod's providential and
eschatological intent for all other humans. Thus, Gilkey's hermeneutic entails only
an 'analogical^55 reading ofprovidential activity in both the Old and New
Testaments, which means that God is not thought of as acting directly on the
secondary level. While this view of divine action may appease the modem sense of
human autonomy and the naturalistic presuppositions ofmodem science, it tends to
reduce God's providential activity to a uniform level across Old Testament, New
Testament, and subsequent eras. It imposes a Modem set ofpresuppositions on the
Christian symbol set which fails to take into account the New Testament sense of the
developing aspect of God's providential relation to individuals and the history they
create. This can be illustrated in the new life of empowerment and direction through
the Spirit, after Pentecost. It can also be seen in the already-not-yet aspect of the
eschatological kingdom in the world. In the New Testament God's providential and
saving activity moves to a new level of intensity, specificity and clarity—it 'restores
Creation on a higher plane.'456
Gilkey's model also fails to allow for a more fully interactive and
communicative relation of God to individuals, and through them, to the structures of
their corporate history. While his reinterpretation ofNew Testament experiences of
personal and communicative encounter with God in analogical terms may account
454Gilkey, Reaping. 244.
455Gilkey, Reaping. 241-242.
456Leo Scheffczyk, Creation and Providence, trans. Richard Strachan (London, UK: Burns
and Oates Limited; New York, NY: Herder and Herder, 1970), 32.
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for those experiences, it does not explain the full range of their original meaning, nor
explain what exactly was new in the new life offered through the Son and Spirit.
As noted above, the science-theology conversation seems to be finding more
room for the possibility of special divine action than had previously been allowed.
Gilkey's model ofprovidence already has at least an implicit element of efficient
causality, as seen in the repositing ofpast actualisations, providing power (and
therefore autonomy and freedom) to make decisions and produce actions which
actually affect God's own experience, which make a real difference in the shape of
history, and which limit the range ofpossibilities God can offer to the next moment;
and in the effecting of the resurrection of individuals. It would appear, therefore, that
the only reason Gilkey must exclude the concept of direct divine action on the level
of secondary causes is not so much on scientific grounds, as on the basis ofwhat a
secular culture considers acceptable. The key element defining Gilkey's particular
balance between God's sovereignty and human freedom, between general and special
providence, is his view of God's self-limitation as constitutive for human ontology.
The result of this view, however, leaves Gilkey with a rather vague conception of the
relation between providence and the relative meaning it provides to present history,
and the ultimate meaning supplied to that history by eschatology, which providence,
in some unspecified way, helps to usher in.
Although Gilkey has been criticised for introducing God (in his providential
role) as a necessary factor for finding meaning in the ambiguities of history,457 he
notes that even those who insist ('a priori') that there are no ultimate or metaphysical
sources ofmeaning, do in fact 'smuggle in surreptitiously a structure ofmeaning, and
so a basis for social hope, in terms of science and "myths" derived therefrom.'458
Thus, Pasewark's criticism ofGilkey for bringing in 'God' as a factor for a doctrine
ofprovidence fails to take into account the significance ofGilkey's interpretation of
the divinely given nature of the universal elements in secular experience ofhistory,
and also fails to take into account Gilkey's view that the historical self-consciousness
457Kyle Pasewark, 'Power, Freedom, and History: The Symbol ofDivine Providence in
Langdon Gilkey's Theology,' in The Theology of Langdon B. Gilkev. 325, n. 71. Pasewark does not
fault the use of the God hypothesis for other areas of theology.
458Gilkey, Reaping. 370, n. 7.
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ofmodern men and women has its roots 'in the biblical tradition and the
understanding of human being found there.'459 It is precisely because Gilkey
introduces the idea of a transcendent source for the secular experiences of grace and
redemption that he feels he has the basis for a coherent theory ofmeaning in history.
Gilkey is attempting to construct a theology ofhistory which, precisely because it is
a theo-logy, provides a more experientially adequate and coherent model of actual
secular experience of ultimacy. Gilkey argues that his theological interpretation of
history survives or fails as a whole.460 Thus, his thesis that human experience of
ultimacy and meaning is engendered by a divine ground is both a presupposition and
a conclusion—related to each other in a dialectical fashion. Given the close
connection between creaturely ontology and divine creative providence, the
synergism between divine Ground and human autonomy, it would be impossible to
exclude God from Gilkey's doctrine ofprovidence and still have a Christian theology
of history, or even to describe the human experience of history in terms of ultimate
meaning.
Gilkey argues that only if one can discern a dimension in present history
which can be explained only by reference to God can the meaning of, and hope in
and for history be sustained. Gilkey insists that it is God, as Creator and Redeemer,
who provides the ultimate context ofmeaning for human experience,461 and therefore
who imbues one's consciousness of transition and change with a sense ofpurpose
and meaning. The idea that human histories are not simply random events, but
somehow participate in and contribute to an overall purpose is a central concern of a
doctrine ofprovidence.
459Gilkey, Reaping. 409, n. 1. There appears, however, to be an inconsistency in Gilkey's
analysis ofmodern historical experience at this point. If the modem historical consciousness of
Western culture has its roots in 'the biblical tradition' (italics mine), can Gilkey in turn assume that
his ontology of humans as historical in their self-consciousness applies universally?
460Gilkey's method differs from David Tracy's in that Gilkey's model gains its credibility
only as an integrated whole, and not upon the basis of each of the parts (or 'moments') being first
'validated one by one and on their own terms' (Reaping. 371, n. 17; cf. ibid., 144); cf. Kelsey on the
importance of treating theological models as wholes (The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology
[London, UK: SCM Press, 1975], 136-138).
46lGilkey, Reaping. 129; cf. ibid., 130, 311.
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In trying to reinstate providence in a Christian theology of history, one might
say that Gilkey is attempting to retain the concept ofgeneral providence, but a
general providence which does more than maintain existence, even more than a self-
developing existence. He wants to see history itself as under God's ongoing (active)
tutelage and guidance, through a divine sharing with creatures (especially humans)
the wisdom (as possibilities) and power (as continually reposited actualities, with
freedom to choose) to shape that history. In this way he moves a step nearer to
special providence than Wiles, but without actually accepting the idea of
interventions or miracles (because of God's self-limitation). Through the natural
means of creaturely actions (albeit as guided by God's offer of relevant possibilities)
'the appearance of the new, even a revolutionary new,' is made possible.462 But
Gilkey's general providence remains vague as to how God will eventually overcome
the abuse of freedom which is the source of sin and fate in history.463
Since Gilkey has opened the door to special divine actions further than Wiles
would allow (but without moving beyond a concept of general providence), might it
be possible to conceive ofprovidence as playing an even more important role in
giving meaning to individual and corporate histories if God could be conceived as
acting in a more direct and personal way in the affairs of history? This has clearly
been the view of traditional doctrines ofprovidence, and ofboth Old and New
Testaments. The story of God's redemptive actions in the New Testament,
moreover, pictures God the Father (through the mediation of the Son and the Spirit)
as taking up a direct relation to both individuals and their history. This New
Testament witness becomes the basis for the trinitarian theologies ofprovidence
reviewed in Chapter Four, below.
Gilkey, in arguing for the criterion ofmaintaining a link between what
humans co-create in history now, with eschatological reality, is right to retain the
symbol 'resurrection.' It serves this criterion more adequately than does immortality
(Wiles). It allows for a structure of continuity in dis-continuity, which Gilkey's
462Gilkey, Reaping. 239.
463Gilkey, Reaping. 237. Cf. Edward Farley's critique on this point (review of Reaping the
Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History, by Langdon Gilkey, in Religious Study Review 4,
no. 4 [October 1978]: 235, 237).
109
The Triune Provider
model ofprovidence seems to assume. As noted above, however, a problem arises at
this point since Gilkey denies the supernatural element ofChrist's resurrection as a
divine intervention breaking into this realm of history. If, however, the regularities
underlying the "laws" ofnature are grounded, not in a once-for-all given order of
nature (Deism), then they must be rooted in God's personal faithfulness (a concept
implied by Gilkey's notion of'creative providence' or 'continuous creativity'464).
Thus, Gilkey's own system of creative possibilities calls for the extraordinary, the
'radically new.'465 As a new work of God far above present creaturely potentials, the
resurrection still meets Gilkey's criterion of relevance.466 If one holds to the concept
of a personal God, and to a continuous creation, then it would seem that the option is
left open for God to effect within history a revelation of himselfwhich manifests an
eschatological quality of interpersonal relating, a revelation which functions not only
as promise and goal, but also as empowerment.
Initial Assessment ofGilkey's Model
Clearly in Gilkey's model, God is spirit, and relates to creation on several
different levels. As the One who creates, continually re-co-creates, and perfects
through the lure of love, God is at once the ground ofbeing, truth (structure and
meaning), and redeeming (empowering) love. While such a functional trinitarian
relation to the world may not require an ontological Trinity, it would at least seem
that such a differentiated relation might allow for the possibility of one, and once
permitted, such a Trinity might provide the resources for a more clearly defined
model ofhow a personal God relates to the world on three distinct levels. Gilkey's
model would be strengthened if he had developed a more differentiated concept of
the relation between time and eternity, and between God and humans.
Gilkey has defined providence as a symbol within a larger system of symbols,
and has reinterpreted the symbol of providence as a way of speaking of the ultimate
(and therefore religious) concerns which confront humans in the historical, social and
464Gilkey, Reaping. 311.
465Gilkey, 'Universal and Immediate Presence,' 109.
466Gilkey, 'Universal and Immediate Presence,' 109.
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political dimensions of their experiences of life. One very important feature of
Gilkey's reinterpretation of providence is the way in which his phenomenological
and existential analysis ofmodern historical experience takes into account the
ambiguity manifested in nature and in human experiences of destiny and fate,
freedom and compulsion. Whether or not one thinks his model ofprovidence is the
best available explanation of one's experience of the world, this particular element of
his model fulfils an important criterion for a doctrine of providence: it takes into
account the negative aspects of human experience as well as the positive.
In an important sense, Gilkey has sought to retain the significance of the
individual in God's providential activity, while also restoring the efficacy and
significance of creaturely history in that activity. It would seem, however, that
Gilkey has been forced to accept a kind ofparadox in his model of providence:
without letting go of human freedom, he also wants to conclude that God's provision
ofbeing, freedom and grace will be sufficient to win all people to God, in the "end."
But he does not really have an adequate basis for this double assertion, since he
seems to have sacrificed the kind of divine sovereignty and divine action which
would ultimately ensure the fulfilment of God's plans. At a minimum, if this lacuna
represents neither paradox nor contradiction, it does reflect an inadequately worked
out ontology of divine love—that is, he fails to show the mechanism by which this
love (expressed in the self-limited way ofGilkey's model) can eventually redeem all
people without violating their freedom. It would seem that there is an intrinsic
incoherence in Gilkey's model—his panentheistic universalism seems to require a
determinism his Arminianism disallows.
The logic ofGilkey's model would seem to imply that the concrete and
particular structures of divine-human, human-human, and human-non-human
relations in eternity may continue to evolve, while the quality of relating will be
perfected at each level of capacity for relating. Perhaps one could say theform of the
"final" establishment of the kingdom will continue to depend upon the synergism of
divine and human creativity, while the content of that kingdom, the way ofbeing and
relating, will be perfected by divine fiat. Otherwise one could ask, Why have a
"next life" at all?
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This view of the kingdom would seem to correlate with Jesus' direction to
'seek first his [the Father's] kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall
be yours as well,'467 that is, seek first the quality of kingdom life, including particular
forms ofjust societal structures, and the physical bases of life will be available for
all. This view of the kingdom allows it to have the already-not-yet character
suggested by Gilkey. It makes the kingdom to consist primarily of right relations,
and therefore to be an urgent, primary and real possibility both now and in eternity.
Thus, insofar as one enters the kingdom in the present (in time), in terms of right
relating, one can carry over into eternity the same mode of relating, and the healthful
concrete structures of societal life which naturally arise out of these dispositions.
This view of the kingdom gives a strong focus to soteriology, but to soteriology in
service of the purpose of creation, and therefore to soteriology in light of providential
eschatology. This soteriological focus provides a way of serving Gilkey's purpose of
saving not only individuals, but the historical realities they create, in an
eschatological community.
A question for this thesis then becomes: Would a trinitarian doctrine of
providence facilitate the creation of a model of a differentiated doctrine of
providence in which Father, Son and Spirit each sustain (according to the uniqueness
of their being) a particular feature of created reality, especially in the area of
kingdom community relations?
Conclusion
Even though, because of their acceptance of a modern scientific assessment
ofnatural causation, both Wiles and Gilkey reject the biblical concept of God acting
and speaking in signs, wonders and audible voices, they both see a doctrine of
providence as having an important function in explicating one's experience ofGod
and of the world. First, it thematises that experience. Second, it enables one to
evaluate his or her experiences of the world as to whether they reveal 'traces' of God
acting. And third, it enables one (by faith) to "see" God acting, or at least to discern




both Wiles and Gilkey to speak of some experiences as being more religiously
significant because they reveal more of God's purposes.
Both raise the issue of the relation between God's sovereignty, as represented
in his providential decrees, and human freedom. They retain belief in the Christian
creator God and some form ofprovidence by raising and meeting objections to the
idea of divine decrees with a doctrine of divine self-limitation. In their view, only
such a qualification of divine providence accords with the pervasive human
experience of the high degree of ambiguity, randomness, evil and suffering in the
world, and yet enables one to retain belief in a good God. The result of each of their
models is a kind of 'rough theatre.' This version ofprovidence avoids making God
the sole initiator of events and actions on the creaturely level, and allows for a true
openness of the future, for co-creativity and co-responsibility ofhumans for the
shape and meaning of history.
It is clear that in the natural theology ofWiles it is special providence which
suffers an eclipse. While Gilkey's model moves a step further and supports God's
particular and universal influence on each particular occasion of experience, it still
falls short of God acting directly or unilaterally to bring about a particular effect in
the space-time continuum—God is limited to what creatures have already made of
their prior possibilities. In this regard, Gilkey's model would seem to satisfy Wiles'
moral requirement for God's providential action: no one receives preferential
treatment from God. Thus, even in grace there is a kind of "fateful chance" which
limits how much God can guide the actions of humans.
Several questions suggest themselves at this point. Does the kind of general
providence advocated by Wiles and Gilkey actually satisfy the type of human
autonomy they think God has created? If such autonomy, as the basis of becoming
an other, is the purpose ofGod's creation of humans, why would God not wish to
then enter into direct communication with individuals? Is the idea ofGod
communicating particularly and directly a scientifically outdated, mythological, and
morally reprehensible concept? Might it not, rather, reflect the highest context for
human existence? Does human freedom require an exclusion ofmore direct
communication (or fellowship) with God? If they can think of God as able to limit
his powers in order to make space and time for creatures, might God not also be able
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to accommodate his interaction and communication to the human level without
violating the principles of free relating? As noted above, contemporary discussions
between theology and science have at least opened the door to new ways of
conceiving of God acting in the space-time causal nexus in order to produce
particular effects, and thus to establish fellowship with humans.
Even though the question of christology is not the primary focus ofWiles'
and Gilkey's doctrines ofprovidence, their christologies help to give point to some
of the questions just mentioned. It at least raises the question as to the distinctive
providential role played by Jesus Christ in salvation history, and therefore his
meaning for providence in present history. Both Wiles and Gilkey perceive Jesus as
the Christ to be the definitive example of authentic human being and relationality (at
least for Christians). In their view, however, Jesus is not divine, and therefore does
not constitute a special revelation of God's self to humans—special revelation
understood in the sense of requiring a direct divine act. One is led to ask, however,
whether this view of Jesus actually gives an adequate interpretation of his own self-
understanding. For example, was his practice of speaking to the Father in prayer
only an exercise in soliloquy (Wiles), and if so, then what confidence does one have
that he actually did successfully carry out God's best options for his life (Gilkey)?
Moreover, if Jesus mistakenly thought the Father heard and answered his prayers in
an "interventionist" manner, then to what degree did this mistaken concept ofGod's
relation to the universe lead to mistakes in Jesus' working out ofhis own destiny?
Wiles brings into focus the importance of thinking in terms of God's creation
of the whole. This implies an important, intrinsic unity of all God's works ad extra.
Gilkey's model makes this unity of divine works even more explicit, and also moves
the discussion more overtly toward a relational ontology—with his talk of the divine
lure. Gilkey's God is more directly involved in the events within creation, and
specifically, with individual humans. This creative and providential ground becomes
the ontological basis for the formation of an eschatological, divine-human
community. This raises the question as to whether the models ofWiles and Gilkey
adequately picture life in the present as correlating to life in the eschaton, that is,
with respect to personal interaction? Can humans be constituted as personal beings,
because created by a personal creator, without ever being able to communicate with
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God in a more direct fashion than inductive inference? It seems doubtful whether
their models ofprovidence provide an adequate account of the personal experience
of grace and guidance so strongly held by much of the Christian tradition.
Since neither Wiles nor Gilkey hold to a doctrine of the Trinity, this issue
cannot be addressed by appealing to the personal nature of God as reflected in the
actions of the Son and Spirit. Their choice here reflects an important methodological
point: the shape of one's doctrine of God, and subsequent doctrine ofprovidence,
depends in a fundamental way upon one's methodological presuppositions. In this
case, since neither Wiles nor Gilkey hold to univocal language about God acting in
the world, the decision to jettison the doctrine of the Trinity rests on methodological
principles.
Furthermore, the kind of space between God and humans that Wiles and
Gilkey define as being necessary for human freedom to develop would seem to
preclude any level of personal contact with God—whether as Spirit or Son. In both
models God must remain at the subconscious level, present only as an anonymous
'lure,' or even more remotely hidden in the 'grain of things.'
Wiles and Gilkey have faced squarely contemporary problems with
providence by limiting God's involvement in history to the level of general
providence. This has required a minimising of the more relational and personal
aspect of the Christian God—as embodied in a doctrine of the Trinity. The next
chapter will look at two theologians who are trinitarian, and ask whether they find in
this doctrine resources for a doctrine ofprovidence which ameliorates some of the






PAUL HELM AND JOHN SANDERS
Introduction
Wiles and Gilkey advance two models ofprovidence which aim at reclaiming
history as a locus of God's presence and action. However, their concrete focus for
this providential presence is either vague and impersonal (Wiles—the general 'grain'
of things), or centred mostly in the human response to, and transformation by, the
subtle, persuasive lure of God's initial aim (Gilkey).
One of the fundamental questions with which both Wiles and Gilkey struggle
is the problem of the relation between divine sovereignty and human freedom. This
question constitutes a longstanding and central point of contention between models
of providence, and even when not extensively engaged, it remains as an underlying
concern.468 This Chapter will look at two theologians (Paul Helm and John Sanders)
who represent opposite sides in this ongoing debate and whose models of providence
are defined according to how they resolve this problem. Both Helm and Sanders
have used the designation of 'risky' versus 'risk-free' to describe the basic difference
between their views.469 Even though they select only a narrow aspect ofprovidence
468This can be illustrated by Terence Tiessen's recent survey ofmodels of providence as they
address this issue (Providence and Prayer: How Does God Work in the World? [Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2000]).
469Helm is correct to point out that this designation actually represents two families of views
(The Providence of God, in Contours of Christian Theology, series ed. Gerald Bray [Leicester, UK:
Inter-Varsity Press, 1993], 39). Ardel Caneday, arguing for a Calvinist view ofprovidence, critiques
Sanders for using this categorisation, claiming that it is an overly simplistic labelling ofmodels
('Putting God at Risk: A Critique of John Sanders's View of Providence,' Trinity Journal 20, ns
[1999]: 134). In spite of this criticism, however, both Helm and Sanders have usefully employed it as
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as the main focus of their discussion, nevertheless, they claim to construct a
comprehensive theology of providence.
As noted in Chapter One, problems associated with this debate lie at the root
of the modern loss of confidence in providence. This question is especially relevant
in light of the fact that both the monarchical view of God and the immanent-
evolutionary model of God's relation to the world have suffered discredit along with
the concepts ofprovidence associated with them.
Both authors are aware of the sense of contradiction experienced by
Christians who try to retain belief in divine providence in the face of its apparent
absence in the world. Each author, in his own way, seeks to champion a model of
providence which can account for this problem, that is, serve as a credible meaning-
making model of the God-world relation in which God's apparent absence
constitutes part of the solution. In order to achieve this goal, both hold to the
comprehensive scope of providence and, in differing versions, to particular or
personal providence.
Gilkey recognised that the modern understanding of freedom as 'creative of
the new,' and not just as the voluntary willing of the divine will, did not represent the
views of all those in the 'entire modern period,' nor of everyone in contemporary
Western culture.470 Paul Helm and John Sanders represent two streams of
contemporary Protestant theology which have not accepted the idea of self-limitation
in God's relation to the world to the extent that Gilkey does, nor of the radical kind
of "hands off' freedom accorded to creation that Wiles advocates. They represent,
instead, a more confessional type of theology, concerned with clarifying how more
traditional understandings ofGod's interaction with the world can still be held as
credible.
Paul Helm constructs a statement ofprovidence from within the Reformed
tradition. Because God's sovereign control constitutes such an important emphasis
in this model of providence, Helm's primary concern is to defend God's absolute
sovereignty (and a risk-free model ofprovidence), and yet avoid making God
a heuristic tool or as a kind of shorthand for getting at the fundamental debate which divides their
perspectives on providence.
470Gilkey, Reaping. 395, n. 36, 395, n. 34.
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culpable for evil in the world, especially for human sin. To this end he argues for a
compatibilist view of human freedom. John Sanders adopts an Arminian view of
God's relation to humans, positing a 'risk' model ofprovidence in which God
sovereignly limits himself as to how much ofhis purpose he will achieve and, more
importantly, how he will achieve it. God has conferred on humans the power to
thwart at least some of God's desires for them, although his ultimate purposes will
prevail.471
In spite of their fundamental differences with regard to their models of
providence, both Helm and Sanders maintain a strong view of the Bible as special
revelation, and they believe the Christian God is a Trinity. Helm, however, does not
specifically raise the issue of the relation of the Trinity (as such) to providence, and
Sanders only raises it for the resources it holds for understanding God in more
personal and relational terms. In adopting this stance toward the relation between
• • 472
Trinity and providence, they represent a common perspective.
Treating the Christian Scriptures as special revelation gives these two models
ofprovidence a different methodological base than those ofWiles and Gilkey.
Rather than working from the perspective ofnatural theology (a bottom-up approach)
they begin with what God has already revealed about himself, his purposes and his
actions in Scripture. Instead of having to find hints and patterns in history and in the
individual experiences of life, they focus on constructing a model of providence
which gives a coherent account of the biblical data upon which it is based.
I will not challenge this methodological decision as such, since their use of
scripture constitutes one (key) element in the cluster of doctrines making up their
model ofprovidence. In keeping with the theme of this thesis, however, I will ask
how each model as a whole answers the question ofmeaning in human lives, and if
and how it incorporates a doctrine of the Trinity in achieving this.
47IPerhaps I should record here my own prejudices in this debate. Although both Helm's and
Sanders' models of freedom seem to embody some unresolved, counter-intuitive claims, both provide
coherent arguments for their views. Nevertheless, I am Wesleyan-Arminian in theological
perspective, and therefore have stronger sympathies with Sanders' model. In any case, recording this
debate is not intended to be a precursor of an attempt to resolve it, but rather to explore what each
model contributes to our thesis questions regarding providence, meaning, Trinity and hope.
472Cf. Tiessen's non-trinitarian summaries in his Providence and Prayer.
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In the earlier part of the overviews ofHelm's and Sanders' theologies of
providence, I will attempt to set out the key features of their models, offering
minimal comment and critique. In the second section of the treatments, I will
attempt to bring into focus how their models ofprovidence relate to the issues of
Trinity, meaning in history, and divine presence in relation to humans. These
sections will involve more extensive critique and interaction with other authors as I
seek to probe Helm's and Sanders' models for insight into the possible viability for a
trinitarian view ofprovidence.
Paul Helm: The Divine Controller
This section ofChapter Three gives consideration to Paul Helm's strong view
ofGod's sovereign, intimate and ultimate control over, in and through all that
happens in the world.473 Such Calvinist models ofprovidence have been referred to
disparagingly by some as reflecting the 'monarchical' or 'royal metaphor' of God's
relation to the world.474 Perhaps of all the models considered in this thesis, the
monarchical model seems to incur the most disfavour within the academic
community and within our culture generally. In spite of the widespread
dissatisfaction with the metaphysics underlying Classical Theism,475 Helm remains
committed to the 'unattenuated' God of'Christian theism.'476
For those who continue to work with this model, even such a widespread
experience of evil as two world wars is not sufficient to dislodge their faith in this
kind ofprovidence, since belief in it is primarily rooted in an infallible divine
473Helm, Providence. 22, 23, 25.
474McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological. Nuclear Age (Philadelphia, PA:
Fortress Press, 1987), 63-65.
475Cf. Nancy Frankenberry, 'Classical Theism, Panentheism, and Pantheism: On the Relation
Between God Construction and Gender Construction,' Zygon 28, no. 1 (March 1993): 30-34;
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (origin, pub. in
Britain as The Trinity and the Kingdom of God by SCM Press Ltd., London, UK; New York, NY:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1981), 10-20; and John Cobb, Jr. and David R. Griffin, Process
Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1976), 8-10.
476Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press; Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988, 1997), 23; cf. Helm, Providence. 16.
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revelation, and not based on any amount of experience, positive or negative.477 For
that reason, those who argue for this model can derive a sense of security from their
experience of the world because of their faith in God's overall control. Of all the
models considered in this thesis, this view of providence maintains the strongest
sense ofGod's transcendent control over the details of life and, therefore, the
strongest sense that all of life contributes to the divine purpose.
An Overview of Helm's Theological Agenda and Method
Paul Helm has recently constructed something of an apology for this 'risk
free' model ofprovidence. As a Reformed theologian and philosopher of religion,
Helm's sympathy lies with an Augustinian view of God's creative and providential
relationship to the world.478 Helm adopts 'the "no-risk" view of divine providence
. . . because it best accords with the classical view of divine providence.'479 Helm's
model clearly reflects this association with a classical view ofChristian theism, and
it also reflects his acceptance and philosophical defence of the classical attributes of
absolute perfection ascribed to God, such as omniscience, omnipotence,
immutability, goodness and love 480 Maintaining the consistency of these attributes
with each other, and with those biblical references to God which seem to contradict
some of them, forms a key hermeneutical constraint in the formulation ofHelm's
concept ofprovidence.
Developing his doctrine ofprovidence from a Reformed perspective, Helm
seeks to maintain a strong emphasis on God's sovereign control over the created
order. Only thus can God be thought able to achieve infallibly his purposes—'in so
far as theism requires a belief in divine providence the [concept of the]
indeterminacy of the future ... is inconsistent with it.'481 This requires, in Helm's
477Helm, Providence. 223-224.
478Helm, Providence. 22-23; cf. ibid., 129.
479Helm, Providence. 177. Philip Clayton designates this traditional understanding ofGod
and ofGod's providential relation to the world as 'classical philosophical theism' ('The Case for
Christian Panentheism,' Dialog 37, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 202.
480Helm, Eternal God. 15-16, 39, 161, 185.
481Helm, Eternal God. 124.
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view, that God timelessly determine the whole of creation, both what is for us its
eventual outcome, as well as the means used to achieve that outcome. Helm defines
providence as 'the all-embracing rule of the one God'482 This focus naturally leads
to a great deal of attention being given to the problem of how divine and human
activity are related.
In order to understand Helm's doctrine ofprovidence one must pay attention
to his sources and how he uses them.
The Source of Helm's Doctrine of Providence
Although he works primarily as a philosopher of religion, Helm uses his
philosophy in the service of his conservative Reformed theology. This means that
the 'data' ofhis doctrine ofprovidence is provided by the 'divine revelation'
embodied in scripture. This does not mean that a doctrine of providence is explicitly
spelled out in scripture. Rather, one must 'draw together' the scattered accounts of
'the activity of God in the individual lives ofmen and women,' as recorded
throughout the Bible, 'into a balanced and consistent whole' or model. Reason is
applied through a combination of deduction, induction and abduction until the model
A 0"5
has been constructed which best accounts for all the data.
The 'data' derived from scripture not only becomes the central source of
material for constructing a model ofprovidence, but also serves as the criterion
against which any such model must be judged for adequacy.484 As well as
constituting the material source for a doctrine ofprovidence, scripture also retains
authority to arbitrate in areas that cannot be resolved on logical grounds alone.485
For example, although Helm thinks William James' analogy of the master chess
player is an 'ingenious' way ofpicturing providence, especially as it accounts for
human free-will and the contingency of events, he is forced to reject it because
482Helm, Providence. 157, 219; cf. ibid., 139, 220.





'Scripture teaches particular providence, that not only the ends are ordained by God
AQf.
but also the means to those ends.'
As do all theologians who mine the data of scripture for clues about
providence, Helm has to make a hermeneutical decision about how to correlate
scripture's seemingly conflicting images of God's relation to the world. Helm holds
to the Reformation principle of the unity of scripture—'Scripture is self-consistent.'487
In his doctrine ofGod and providence, therefore, he maintains that unity by means of
a hermeneutic of 'priority'—privileging the references to God which speak ofhis
'essential properties' over those that are anthropomorphic accommodations.488
Helm notes correctly that one's choice of a hermeneutic of scripture directly
affects one's view of the God-world relation. In his opinion, it forces one to adopt
either afree-will view of this relation (when priority is given to anthropomorphic
language), or a determinist understanding (when priority is given to the 'exact'
language describing God's 'essential properties').489 Of course, in choosing to give
hermeneutical priority to the 'exact' language,490 Helm has decided which is the
exact language and which is the language of accommodation. He explains his
rationale as follows: the apparent conflict between the biblical data which, 'on the
one hand, stress God's omniscience and the power ofhis grace, and on the other
portray him as changing his mind, and men and women resisting his grace,' requires
one to make a 'stark' choice between which type of language should receive




489Helm, Providence. 53-54. Helm is quite correct in pointing out the criterial role played in
a doctrine of providence by one's hermeneutic of scripture. While it is important to note his
methodological strategy, I will not engage Helm extensively on this matter, since I am working
primarily with these models ofprovidence as wholes. Like the divine action issue noted in Chapter
One, the hermeneutical question constitutes another whole field of subsidiary inquiry beyond the
scope of this thesis. Helm himself, for example, in the interests of his systematic focus, has chosen to
leave aside certain historical, scientific and hermeneutical questions with respect to the biblical





as Helm claims, he nevertheless says the conclusion 'seems obvious' to him, that is,
'the statements about the extent and intensity of God's knowledge, power and
goodness must control the anthropomorphic and weaker statements, and not vice
versa.' To choose otherwise would result in God being reduced to 'human
,491
proportions.
Helm is seeking to provide a 'metaphysical underpinning' for his
understanding of the biblical view of God, one which will allow for 'an unattenuated
Christian theism' in which 'God creates, judges, delivers, and redeems; he speaks,
sustains, predicts, and assures.'492 To achieve this, he reasons as follows: 'Supposing
that all such scriptural assertions about God are, when properly interpreted, true, or
that they are prima facie true, the question arises as to how, from a conceptual and
metaphysical point of view, they can all be true together.'493 By proposing a
'metaphysical underpinning,' he hopes to avoid treating 'timelessness' 'in vacuo'
from other properties ofGod,494 thus allowing him to use such abstract metaphysical
concepts as immutability and omniscience without having to argue for or against
whether such concepts owe their origin to Greek thought. He develops a
transcendental argument to support his methodological decision: 'Even if it is
granted that the idea of timelessness is pure Greek invention[,j what matters is
whether the thought that God is timeless is a necessary truth-condition of all else that
Christians want to say of God, which is certainly not a Greek invention.'495 If one
accepts that divine timeless eternity and immutability are concepts both consistent
with, and required by, the concept of God held by biblical writers, and if one further
grants that these characteristics of God ought to control one's understanding of
God's relation to the world, what do these criteria entail for a doctrine of providence?
Helm answers this question in the context of dealing with two major
problems for Christian theism: the problem of epistemic access (which includes
491Helm, Providence. 51-52.
492Helm, Eternal God. 21, 23.
493Helm, Eternal God. 21 (italics mine).
494Helm, Eternal God. 21.
495Helm, Eternal God. 22; cf. ibid., 21-22, 3-4, 11.
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problems for belief and faith),496 and the theodicy question: '"How can there be evil
in a universe which God controls?'"497 I will briefly refer to his treatment of the
theodicy problem, below, under the heading, 'A Framework for Meaning.' First,
however, Helm deals with the epistemic access problem by working out a model of
the God-world relation.
The God-World Relation
Helm recognises the impossibility of humans grasping the nature of the 'sui
generis' relation of God to the world.498 This restriction on epistemic access leaves
one with few options: one can abandon the attempt to understand the relation; appeal
to unresolvable paradox; or offer an explanatory theory 'of this unique relationship
and so make it intelligible.' Helm rejects all these strategies, and appeals instead to
the strategy of creating a model of the God-world relation which pictures the
'relationship between God and his responsible creatures which Scripture sets
forth.'499 Use of a model of the God-world relation allows Helm to stress both
certain key affirmations about God's relation to the world and remain apophatic
about less well understood aspects of that relation. In other words, the use of a
model gives him access to the 'is' and 'is not' feature ofmetaphors and to the
'staying power' ofmodels in their role as root metaphors. It is the character of
Helm's particular model itself which determines what one can know, or not know,
about God's providential care.500
496Helm develops a doctrine ofprovidence with three contexts in mind: 'the interests of the
individual Christian, ... the interests of all Christians—the Christian church—and ... the interests of
the whole of creation' (Providence. 21).
497Helm, Providence. 25.
498Helm, Providence. 163, 62.
499Helm, Providence. 164.




Helm's primary criterion for such models is doing 'justice to the biblical
data.' This is not a straightforward criterion,501 as Helm himself has shown in his
development and use of a theological hermeneutics of 'priority.' It involves deeper
conceptual issues, as well as hermeneutical concerns. David Kelsey's insight that a
theological system functions as 'an aesthetic entity' which, 'unlike an argument, doesn't
logically "begin" at any one point.'502 may help to account for the apparent circularity
in Helm's model: on the one hand, the kind of criteria he finds in scripture in support of
his model results from a biblical-theological hermeneutics of 'priority' as required by
the model itself; on the other hand, he feels scripture requires his particular theological
model. A model ofprovidence, therefore, not only assumes a particular view of the
God-world relation, but justifies it by articulating that perspective in as clear a
cni
manner as possible.
As noted earlier, Helm's theology of providence assumes the benefit
(necessity) ofmaintaining an 'unattenuated theism,' which includes such attributes of
divine perfection as timeless eternity, immutability and absolute "fore"-
knowledge—God, being timeless, does not know anything in advance, rather, 'God
knows, and that is all.'504 The primary reason for defending the idea of God as
timelessly eternal and immutable 'can be found in the need to draw a proper
distinction between the creator and creature.'505
Helm bases his argument for God being timelessly eternal upon the 'exact'
language about God in scripture, which in turn seems to require that God be
necessarily immutable. He defines 'timelessness' as 'time-freeness,... in which
nothing time-free is simultaneous in any sense with anything which occurs in
time.'506 Thus, 'God's eternal existence has no temporal relations whatever to any
501Helm, Providence. 183. For Helm's criteria for a model of 'the divine-human
relationship,' see ibid., 164-165.
502Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (London, UK: SCM Press, 1975), 137.
503Helm, Providence. 164-191.
504Helm, Eternal God. 37.
505Helm, Eternal God. 17, 20.
506Helm, Eternal God. 32.
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particular thing which he creates.' This does not mean he has no relations with
507
creation, for he has the relation of knowledge, but it is a 'time-free' knowledge.
From the forgoing synopsis, it is evident that Helm means to preserve the
traditional distinction between Creator and creature. At the same time, however, he
insists that God is intimately involved in all that goes on in the world: whether in an
individual's life, in the church, or in the world in general. In Helm's judgement, this
involvement can only be total if God is both self-sufficiently separate from creation
as its sole source ofbeing and, at the same time, in total and 'direct control' of every
aspect of that created reality.508 In spite ofhis claim to the contrary, does this 'direct
control' constitute a truly personal involvement by God, or only a uni-directional,
necessary and sufficient causation? The latter type of relation is clearly implied, for
example, in his understanding of grace: it is 'causally sufficient for . . . [the purpose
of] making a person a Christian.'509
Helm tries to strike a balance between the divine transcendence and
immanence, but his depiction seems to privilege the transcendent aspect over the
immanent, the omni-causal over the interactive, and the impersonal over the
personal. For example, God communicates with humans on a personal level, that is,
in the modes by which they are able to receive information. However, if the mutual
capacity to influence the thoughts, feelings, desires and will of the other is part of
what it means to be in a personal relation, then this metaphysical model seems to
lack an important element in its definition of the personal God-human relation—that
is, humans do not have real, but only apparent, conversations with God, since prayer
never changes God's mind. It would seem that the otherness of humans must be
restricted to mean recipients only, not true communicators.
Vincent Brummer argues that for a relation to be truly personal it cannot
involve one person manipulating the other. Helm replies by suggesting that, in fact,
we do experience personal relations that are manipulative, constraining or coercive,
507Helm, Eternal God. 36-37; cf. ibid., 15-16, 27, 39, 161, 185, 170.




such as 'between a parent and a child.'510 He concludes ('tentatively') that two
conditions are 'sufficient for a personal relation': 'that relationship is exercised
through the structure ofbelief and desire of each, and .. .that exercise does not rely
upon physical coercion or psychological compulsion.'511 One can discern here
Helm's compatibilist presuppositions shaping this definition. It is probably worth
noting that the difference of opinion between Briimmer and Helm on this issue
(noted by Helm) is largely rooted in their opposite views of human freedom—Helm's
model understands freedom as volitional, while Brtimmer has a libertarian view of
freedom. Briimmer argues, 'given that the choice of an agent is a necessary
condition for his or her act, one person can never be the complete cause of the act of
another person.' 'For the realization of apersonal relationship the initiative of both
partners in the relationship is necessary,' which entails both have 'the freedom of
will... to say "no" to the other.'512 Even Helm has to admit that in his own view
'the boundaries between such coercion and compulsion (on the one hand) and
acceptable interpersonal constraint (on the other) are unclear and controversial.'
This is especially problematic when one remembers that in light of God's full control
of all actions and structures 'ofbelief and desire,' the distinction between physical
and mental mediums of control is inconsequential.
What do these general characteristics of the God-world relation imply for
Helm's doctrine ofprovidence?
Divine providential Control and Meaning inHistory
Helm encapsulates his model as consisting of 'a "risk-free" view of divine
providence, and the compatibilist view ofhuman freedom and determinism.'514 In the
context of this theological determinism,515 Helm develops a model ofprovidence which
5l0Helm, Providence. 150, 148-153.
5llHelm, Providence. 152.
512Briimmer, Speaking of a Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge,






serves two functions: first, as an explanation of the biblical view ofGod's relation to
three contexts—individual Christian, church, and universe; and second, as a necessary
structure ofmeaning for the contemporary experience of life. Since the second function
implies the first, primary attention will be given to this meaning-making role.
A Framework for Meaning
Helm defends the more traditional and Reformed account ofprovidence as
encompassing God's preservation, sustenance, and government of the affairs of the
world.516 These aspects ofprovidence might be termed 'levels,' in distinction from
the three 'contexts' noted earlier. Presumably all three levels ofprovidence are
exercised in each of the contexts. It should be pointed out, however, that he does not
make a sharp distinction between God's creative and providential relations to
creation. As noted above, the creation of the world as a whole is God's unitary act.
Every detail of created life has been 'timelessly' decreed as an aspect of that single
whole.517 The concepts ofpreservation, sustenance and governance must be
understood in that light, and not as if there was an initial creative work, after which
God then upholds and governs the finished product already in existence. This would
imply a temporal sequence in God's creative act of the whole, which Helm disallows.
Therefore, while one can speak of the preserving aspect ofprovidence, it seems that
Helm would understand this as a logical distinction rather than a temporal or real
one. Just as, in relation to God's knowledge of temporal events, 'God knows, and
that is all,'518 so Helm might say, 'God creates/preserves, and that is all.' It is a
reflection of the limitations of a temporal perspective which requires humans to use
tensed language when referring to a timeless decree.
For the same reason, the concept of providence itself is something of a
logical distinction from the idea of the single act of creation, in spite of the fact that
Helm confusingly continues to speak of God acting within the space-time matrix as if
God were acting in time—exemplified, for example, in the change ofGod's relation
516Helm, Providence. 21-23.
517Helm, Providence. 22.
518Helm, Eternal God. 37.
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to creation after the fall, seen in his 'withdrawing his goodness' from it.519 It would
seem that what is timeless and immutable about God's relation to creation is his
relation to it as a whole. However, this 'whole' includes the many sub-acts (as
means to ends) which constitute the space-time matrix as such. Thus, it only appears
(to humans) that God acts sequentially from within time. This view seems to imply
that since the creation as a whole does not exist in time, but rather has space and time
as constitutive properties of its character, it exists (as a whole) timelessly. Two
important concerns suggest themselves here: first, is one to conclude that creation as
such exists as an eternal idea in the mind ofGod; second, would this entail that
creation (like God) is timelessly eternal (and so immutable), and if so, what might
this mean for a doctrine of creation ex nihilol Moreover, in this view, providence
seems to minimise the dynamic aspect of God's care, although in Helm's no-risk
model the immutability of the decree is a necessary description of the way in which
providence provides a context ofmeaning for human life.
The character of this logical distinction between the several aspects of
providence is reflected in Helm's revised version of double agency. In his concern to
maintain God's full control over creation, Helm objects to the classical idea of
double agency in accounting for both divine control and human freedom. He
maintains that it is not enough to say God (as the primary causal power) provides only
the 'necessary conditions' for a human action, while the human agent supplies the
sufficient element (secondary cause) for the action, for this would compromise God's
control. In order to ensure a particular creaturely action takes place, the divine
conditions have to be both 'necessary and sufficient.' In any case, having two sets of
necessary and sufficient conditions (divine and human) would be incoherent.520 This is
another way of stating Helm's metaphysical principle that God not only determines the
end, but also the means to the end.521 In the context of this theological determinism
5l9Helm, Providence. 91.
520Helm, Providence. 181, 182.
52lHelm, Eternal God. 70; cf. idem, Providence. 219.
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Helm defines how his model ofprovidence contributes to a sense ofmeaning in the
human experience of life.
Helm is well aware that his model ofprovidence evokes the charge of logical
determinism. He deals with this criticism in the context of arguing for a clear
distinction between God's will as 'decree' and his will as 'command,' between
God's secret will and his revealed will.522 Helm calls this a crucial distinction
because in the 'no-risk' model of providence, God is in complete control of every
occurrence. In order to account for both divine control and human responsibility and
the existence of evil, there must be a distinction between the two wills of God. This
demarcation will determine the kind ofmeaning one finds in life.
This distinction between the two wills of God is necessary if compatibilism is
to be credible. But the same criticism applies to both compatibilism and the "two"
wills concept (as used in this model): if God is really in total control of even what I
will freely choose, is there then anypractical distinction between God's will and my
act? Helm tries to defend the credibility of such a distinction by illustrating it as
follows:
My cherry tree exists by God's decree, but God has not
commanded that the tree exist. (We might say that he has
commanded that the tree exist, but not that he has
commanded the tree to exist.) After all, it is possible to issue
commands only to what already exists, and until God has
commanded that the tree exist there is no tree for him to issue
commands to.
If, however, God has decreed that the cherry tree exists, because this is a
unitary timeless decretal act, the decree must include the trillions of decretal
elements which ensure that it exist in this way, and if so, does not this complex all-
inclusive decree also amount to a command to exist in this way?
Nevertheless, in Helm's view, God's decree is the hidden or secret aspect of
providence. Its effect appears in any given moment in the form ofwhat is, but
humans have little access as to why God's secret will has brought about this state of
affairs. Helm also notes that while one can affirm that God exercises a relation to




creation of providential control (his decree or plan), one cannot claim 'an intimate
knowledge of the future course of God's providential purposes.'524 Aside from
glimpses given through special revelation, one can only know something of the shape
ofGod's decretal will by observing what in fact comes to pass.525 What a knowledge
of the fact of the decree does provide, however, is a sense of absolute security which
is necessary in order to free humans to live.526 One might say that if the Judeo-
Christian God were not a part of the equation of one's experience of the world, then
he or she could dispense with all talk ofprovidence. But as long as one retains belief
in this creator God (the ultimate source of this world), then one seems to need some
account of this present state of affairs in order to find the courage to continue seeking
a meaningful existence. For this reason humans need a strong doctrine of
providence; they need to know that God is in control of every aspect of existence.
Helm insists that revelation provides this knowledge and therefore it becomes the
authoritative basis of a doctrine of providence and of the confidence which derives
from that doctrine. But he cautions that it is a mistake to think one can use this
knowledge of the fact of providence, and the security it brings, either to help God
achieve his plan or to tamper with it. In fact, Helm argues that the providential plan,
in order to be God's plan, requires our ignorance of its details.527 Ifwe had insight
into the how and what of the plan, we would find ourselves either resisting
uncomfortable aspects of it, or feeling it necessary to bend our wills to comply with
it. This latter response would amount to a kind ofpsychological coercion, thus
negating our volitionalfreedom ,528 In other words, humans have to act as ifthey
were libertarianly free (although Helm does not say this explicitly529). Otherwise
they end up trying to "help" God's providential plan along. But since God alone is
524Helm, Providence. 228-229.
525Helm, Providence. 141.
526Helm, Providence. 141, 228; 136-137, 229.
527Helm, Providence. 229, 230.
528Helm, Providence. 141, 188.
529Cf. Helm, Providence. 232-233; and idem, 'Response to Critics,' in God and Time: Four
Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 79-81.
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orchestrating that plan, it requires that humans know nothing about it, at least that
they not know about it to the extent of trying to advance its fulfilment by means of
that knowledge.
At this point one might ask, is Helm correct to say the less one knows of
God's providential plan the better?530 Jim Petty, who also uses a Calvinist model of
providence, suggests that human knowledge of God's decretal will would actually be
'toxic' to our faith, 'the information would damage us.' For example, 'knowing with
the certainty of God's knowledge that we would be saved no matter what we did or
CT 1
believed would corrupt us beyond recognition as Christians.' One wonders,
however, why this would have to be so, if in fact Christ's 'death on the cross
changed ourfearful and arrogant hearts so that we are able to be joyful creatures
and not frustrated gods.'532 If God is fully in control ofhuman response to his grace,
could knowledge ofhis decretal will actually effect an unordained corruption of
one's heart?
The idea of the necessary hiddenness ofGod's decree seems to run counter to
the rationale ofHelm's whole project. If God has decreed both the ends and the
means to those ends, and if whatever one knows or does not know is controlled by
God and will serve as part of those means, would not the net result be the same
whether one knew little or much? Again, why should he bother to clarify that God
has a providential plan, ifwe are to remain in ignorance about how God is carrying it
out? Helm might reply by saying that knowing everything is timelessly decreed sets
one free to exercise and seek to enhance one's desire for God (which is decreed and
533
commanded), that this amount of knowledge at least is what God has revealed, and
is therefore intended to form a part of the means of fulfilling his decree. The
relationship between one's knowledge of the fact of the providential decree, and the
role of that knowledge in forming part of the ordained means of fulfilling that decree,
530Helm, Providence. 228-230.
53lJim Petty, 'Guidance and the Plan ofGod,' The Journal of Biblical Counseling 17, no. 3
(Spring 1999): 41; cf. ibid., 42-43.




is similar to the relationship between prayer and the fulfilment of God's plan.
Although God has timelessly ensured who will pray, and what and when they pray,
those prayers are nevertheless effective secondary causes integral to God's unitary
act of creation, which includes the outworking of his providential plan.534
The concept of the kind of knowledge God has made available regarding his
providential design introduces the concept of God's revealed will or his commands.
Helm says our knowledge of God's providential will is, for the most part, limited to
the general character of how God wants us to live, as revealed in his commands.535
This is similar to the view adopted by Jim Petty who argues that God has purposely
only given us access to 'the hidden mystery ofhow God would redeem the fallen
world .... [a] truth [which] focuses our energy on present obedience and
service.'536 The intention of these commands is to lead us to conformity to Christ,537
but it does not extend to revealing what God's larger plan is, nor how he is achieving
it. Those who co-operate with God by obeying his commands are actually privileged
to become willing co-workers in the fulfilling ofGod's providential plan—of course,
even this co-operation has been brought about by God's initiative and control. It is
through his commands that God guides us, not through a knowledge of his overall
plan (decree).538 Even when a human disobeys God's commands, God nevertheless
works through this disobedience to achieve his eternal plan. Thus, God's revealed
will (as commands, obeyed or disobeyed) actually becomes part of the means to
achieving his hidden decree.
The way Helm has explained the issue of the "two wills" of God defines how
his model ofprovidence enables one to find meaning in the ambiguous experiences
of life. One can summarise here by noting first, that a sense of significance and
meaning derives from knowledge of the fact that all creaturely acts contribute to
God's eternal plan. Second, confidence and security in the present, and hope for the
534Cf. Helm, Providence. 146, 154, 157.
535Helm, Providence. 232-233; cf. ibid., 131-135.
536Petty, 'Guidance,' 43.
537Helm, Providence. 115-116.
538Helm, Providence. 133, 134.
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future derive from the knowledge that 'providence governs everything' and that 'for
Christians no event can be ultimately tragic.' Finally, knowledge of such a model of
providence, when combined with one's past experience ofGod's providential care,
serves as an 'interpretative framework' by which to evaluate the further experiences
of life. This knowledge frees one to respond to those experiences according to God's
commands.539 By its very comprehensiveness, 'the Christian idea of providence may
be said to give us the rudiments of a philosophy ofhistory.'540
The framework ofmeaning just outlined raises a potentially devastating
moral dilemma for this model ofprovidence. It stems from an apparent
contradiction: If'God controls all events and yet issues moral commands which are
disobeyed in some of the very events which he controls,'541 then how can God be
good and humans held responsible for their evil actions.542 Helm readily admits that
the most difficult problem for a no-risk view ofprovidence is the charge that it
makes God the direct author of sin 'in such a way as to compromise his
righteousness.'543 As noted in the previous chapter, Wiles levelled the charge of
immorality against the classical (Augustinian) view of election and providence. If
the God-world relation in this doctrine ofprovidence is to have apositive meaning,
an attempt must be made to ameliorate this problem.
Helm counters this 'not entirely welcome result' of compatibilism by
charging the 'indeterministic scheme' with problems of an equally serious nature. If
the compatibilist view 'has the disadvantage ofdirectly implicating God in human
evil, since God ordains sets of circumstances which are causally sufficient for evil
actions by human beings,' then equally the 'indeterministic alternative' has God
foreknowing evil and doing 'nothing to prevent it.' Helm concludes that 'it is
certainly not obvious that someone who does something knowing that evil will result
539Helm, Providence. 219, 220-221; 218, 230, 141, 228, 223, 230.
540Helm, Providence. 118.





while not intending the evil is free from responsibility. So an indeterministic scheme
no more frees God from all responsibility than does a deterministic scheme,'
especially since God could intervene but does not.544 Helm thus concludes that in
either view of God's relation to the world as the ultimate source of the world's
existence, God must take ultimate responsibility for evil. However, in neither the
risk nor risk-free model does God intend evil; therefore he cannot be thought
'morally culpable' for that evil.545
Helm's soft determinist view of the God-world relation leads him to adopt the
'greater good' defence for the question of the existence of evil.546 He admits the
impossibility of accounting for why God decreed moral evil, but he does think we
have some clues, one of the more important being the revelation of God's 'mercy and
grace' and of 'God's own character.'547 While God could have created humans such
that they always freely did the morally right thing, he did not because he knew that
'without the occurrence ofmoral evil certain other goods could not, logically
speaking, arise. Without weakness and need, no compassion; without fault, no
forgiveness, and so on.'549 Evil, therefore, is not simply an unfortunate result of
making possible the development ofmoral human beings, but is a 'logically
necessary' element in that creative/providential goal. In this way the Christian God
decrees evil as an essential component in the providential meaning ofhuman life.
In Helm's view, his hermeneutic of scripture requires him to understand God
as immutable and timelessly eternal. This view ofGod further entails theological
determinism, philosophical compatibilism, and a model ofprovidence as expressing
absolute divine control of all creation. This model ofprovidence defines the
544Helm, Eternal God. 159, 164.
545Helm, Eternal God. 164; cf. idem, Providence. 176, 177.
546Helm, Providence. 213-215; cf. ibid., 197-215.
547Helm, Providence. 195, 215.
548Elelm, Providence. 200, 197, 163; idem, Eternal God. 156.
549Helm, Providence. 213; cf. ibid., 214.
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meaning of all of human life and action as serving God's inexorable providential
550
purpose.
In developing this model ofprovidence and the way it ensures meaning for
life, Helm has remained largely silent on the most distinctive aspect of the Christian
God: God as a Triune. This leads one to ask, what, if anything, does Helm's view of
providence and meaning have to do with the Trinity as such?
One-Dimensional Providence and a Trinitarian God
Although the personal God of the Bible (at least of the New Testament) is
Triune, Helm's understanding of the way the meaning ofhuman life and actions is
achieved does not seem to require a trinitarian God. That God is Trinity, in this
model, is simply a fact of revelation. In ruling the world, the actions of the trinitarian
Persons remain undifferentiated, that is, there is no discernible distinction between
Father, Son and Spirit which might contribute to a nuancing ofGod's providential
control of history. The fact that Helm insists on the personal relation of God to the
world, and that this God includes the person Jesus Christ, would seem at least to raise
the question ofwhat this might mean for God's providence.
Helm might respond to this question by arguing that if one is mainly
concerned with the issue of divine control, then whether God is three or one makes
little difference. In response, one could argue that, while it is not logically
incoherent to claim that in achieving the divine providential plan it makes no
material difference ifGod is three or one, one might ask whether such a model does
justice to the biblical representation ofGod as present to and in the world in the
differentiated forms ofFather, Son and Holy Spirit? Even in Helm's model of
providence, although the world effects no change in God, yet God's self-revelation to
the world, and the change that revelation effects in the way humans respond to God's
will as command, is part ofGod's overall purpose for creation. Moreover, God's
command for humans is primarily to be conformed to his Son through the Spirit's
enabling power.551 So even Helm's emphasis on risk-free providence involves
550Cf. Helm, Providence. 118-221.
55'Although Helm makes many references to God and Jesus Christ in The Providence of God,
as far as I can discover he makes no reference to the Spirit. While he pictures Christ as instrumental
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something more than mere control, mainly because of the distinct roles played in the
shaping ofhuman character and history by the involvement of the Son and Spirit in
the world. The providential control God exercises serves a specific
purpose—conformity to the Son—and is achieved (presumably) through the roles
played by the trinitarian Persons in the economy, each in a way unique to their
identity.
Helm's view ofGod's providential relation to creation, and to human history
in particular, seems to result in a uni-directional relation between God and the world,
in a one-dimensional God and a one-dimensional providence: the Father moves the
world according to his plan, and the world is moved. In Helm's words, 'providence
is the all-embracing rule of the one God' such that, even when a human carries out
his or her actions, they are 'contributing to the total of the causal order called divine
providence.'552
Perhaps the closest Helm comes to giving providence a trinitarian shape is in
his differentiation between two levels ofprovidence, each manifesting a particular
type ofGod's wisdom and power. The first is 'the power that upholds the physical
forces of the universe,' which in turn 'provides the setting, the necessary conditions
for the exercise of this other [second] sort ofpower.' The second type of
providential power is manifested in the death of Christ. It is 'a different kind of
power and wisdom,' although 'still effective in bringing about certain ends,' namely,
'the creation of the church and her preservation in time, and . .. her ultimate
glorification.'553 Helm continues to think in terms of causation and control.
Although he clearly understands Christ to be 'the eternal Son of God,' he does not
explore this trinitarian connection to see how it might nuance the causally effective
relation ofGod to the world, except to note that 'the humbling and death of Christ is
in God's providence, no account is given of the Spirit's role, either as one of the trinitarian persons, or
as having an individual role in the providential economy. What the Father plans and effects seems to
be done by the Father directly. However, given his general theological position, it seems safe to
assume that he holds a traditional view of the Spirit's person and role in the economy.
552Helm, Providence. 219.
553Helm, Providence. 226, 227.
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part of that divine providential order.'554 God's providential 'offering up of the
eternal Son of God' shows us something about the nature ofboth God's power and
purposes, that is, as 'the telos of God's providential rule' carrying us towards
'ultimate reconciliation and righteousness in God's kingdom.' Helm refers to this
'telos' as God's 'chiefpurpose.'555 Thus, he apparently sees Christ as carrying out
the Father's providential and redemptive purpose, but does not emphasise the role of
Christ in giving shape to the relation of God to the world. Christ manifests the
presence and character of God's providential purpose and power (Christ is 'the
divine provision for others'556), but does not define them. Thus Helm's doctrine of
providence gives primary place to God as Father.
Initial Assessment of the 'No-Risk' Model
Helm's classical treatment of the God-world relation stresses the
transcendence, sovereignty, glory and timeless purposes of God557 over the
importance ofhuman freedom and human understanding. If he has not succeeded in
fully deflecting McFague's charge of autocratic control and patronising benevolence,
he may at least have muted the charge of fatalism—because of the real efficacy of
secondary causes and because the controlling factor in life is not impersonal physical
forces but the personal God of the Bible.558 Nevertheless, while God creates and
governs out of love, God does not share those roles with anyone.
Even though Helm refers to Christ as a model and means ofGod's
providence, his primary emphasis is either on the Father or on the one godhead.
Focusing on God in this way means Helm's treatment of the divine attributes refers
to the attributes of the one essence of the godhead, rather than understanding the
attributes as qualities of the perichoretically constituted identity of the persons of the
Trinity. These inferred attributes of the single essence of the Trinity's shared nature
554Helm, Providence. 228, 227.
555Helm, Providence. 228, 226.
536Helm, Providence. 110.
557Helm, Providence. 215, 23.
558Cf. Helm, Providence. 118, 138, 140, 141,219, 220.
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enables Helm to give central place to the timelessly held divine attributes of
immutability, omniscience and omnipotence. From this perspective, Helm can then
develop his doctrine ofprovidence as the carrying out of timelessly immutable
decrees and commands. Given this context, one can understand the rationale behind
Helm's statement to the effect that there is no need to make an explicit connection
between a doctrine of the Trinity and a doctrine ofprovidence.559 Although in
disagreement on many other issues, Helm and Richard Swinburne agree on this
point. In his philosophical treatment of providence and theodicy, Swinburne
expressly states that the Christian understanding of God as Trinity 'makes no
difference to the issues' ofprovidence and evil (which includes, for Swinburne, a
free-will theodicy), since the trinitarian 'persons always act together.'560
Helm is essentially following the Augustinian formula, 'opera trinitatis ad
extra sunt indivisa. '561 It is probably due to this methodological choice, for example,
that one fails to find in Helm's theology ofprovidence any mention of the Holy
Spirit. Helm thus treats the life of the immanent Trinity (the divine activity ad intra)
as a single, undifferentiated whole, at least with respect to providence. Perhaps
maintaining a sharp distinction between the immanent Trinity and the economic
Trinity is another reason for Helm's lack of integration ofTrinity and providence, of
the divine life ad intra and the divine work ad extra.
In a similar way, therefore, Helm treats the work of the one God ad extra as a
single unit—in keeping with his understanding of creation as a single (timeless) act.
Helm's model almost treats creation/providence wholly as an internal act of the
Father's will. A criticism Robert Jenson raises against Augustine's 'doctrine of
divine simplicity' would seem to apply to Helm's model as well: the traditional view
of the divine simplicity makes it difficult to account for 'the complexity of the
559Paul Helm, private conversation with author, Tyndale House, Cambridge, UK, May 1998.
560Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,
1998), 253, n. 1.
561Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1991,
2nd ed., 1997), 4.
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biblical God.'562 Helm himself, for example, rightly points out the necessary
interconnection between the doctrines of creation, redemption, and personal
guidance, and therefore also the relation of one's view ofprovidence to how one
f/ri
discerns meaning in history.
One might conclude from the intrinsic interconnectedness of the doctrine of
God as Trinity with the doctrines of creation, providence, soteriology and
eschatology, that it would seem to make sense not only to see the work of salvation
as trinitarian, but all of God's work ad extra in this light. If the interconnections
mentioned above were integrated around the doctrine of the Trinity, especially the
Trinity as revealed in the economy, then a greater weight could be given to the
'relational and dynamic'564 character of the Trinity as expressed in the Trinity's
work.
A modification ofHelm's model which begins to move in this direction is
that ofTerrence Tiessen's Middle Knowledge Calvinist model ofprovidence. He
describes his model as affirming
the main features of the Calvinist model. God is
comprehensively in control in the world, accomplishing
purposes that he has determined in eternity. Because his will
is always accomplished, it is evident that God's creatures
(human and angelic) do not have libertarian freedom. This is
a compatibilist model that affirms both meticulous
providence and human freedom of a spontaneous or
voluntary kind. This model is less certain than the traditional
Calvinist model that God is absolutely timeless because of a
concern that such a concept may not do justice to God's
highly relational personal being. In a significant sense, God
is not only determining human history, he is responding to
his creatures within it. This divine responsiveness is
facilitated by God's possessing knowledge ofhow creatures
would act in particular circumstances (so called 'middle
knowledge'). God not only knows the actual future, he has
determined that future. But in order to do this, God needed to
know how creatures would respond to situations, including
562Jenson, The Works of God, vol. 2, Systematic Theology (Oxford, UK; New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 35.
563Helm, Providence. 214, 118.
564Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 324.
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their response to his own persuasions or actions. God can
know this because creatures are not libertarianly free and he
must know this in order to plan how he will act to bring about
his purposes. With simple foreknowledge God would know
the future but be unable to do anything about it. With
"middle knowledge" God is able to plan and then to
accomplish his plan without violating the responsible
freedom that he has given to his creatures.565
Tiessen feels his model ameliorates the lack of sovereign control over
creation reflected in the openness models (for example, John Sanders'), while not
"fatalistically" determining each event as in the stronger Calvinist views. Tiessen
argues that if God 'completely knows the actual future' based upon 'the knowledge
of his own will' (as decree), then there seems to be no place for God to respond to
'creaturely decisions.' This would entail that 'any appearance of significance in
those human decisions is thoroughly illusory.'566
Upon the basis of his complete middle knowledge of all possible futures,
God, in the "beginning," decided which set of circumstances he would actualise, and
which he would not. Thus, any evil that occurs is not only determined by God, but
also by the circumstances which lead individuals to act in certain ways. God actively
chose just those circumstances which would allow the Holocaust, but he divinely
permitted this for the greater good it would bring. Here he seems to agree with Helm
regarding the 'greater good' defence.567 In my view, this model fails to side-step the
"fatalism" Tiessen seeks to avoid because God's response to free creaturely acts
occurs only in the 'logical moment' of creative decision. What actually comes to
pass is still fully determined by God.568 Tiessen admits that in this model, as in the
others, one is faced with the insoluble problem ofwhy a good God, who is all
powerful and loving, would see fit to ordain evil which he could have
prevented—Tiessen's model, like Helm's, does not allow for libertarian freedom.
565Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 289-290.
566Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 319.
567Cf. Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 330.
568Cf. Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 319-320, 330.
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The chief differences between Tiessen's and Helm's models ofprovidence I
wish to note are two: first, Tiessen seems to be open to the idea that God might be
able to experience temporal relations whereas in Helm's model God can only
understand them; second, Tiessen argues that God knows the future not only because
he decreed it, but he decreed that future in the light ofhis knowledge of all possible
worlds (counterfactuals). In this latter difference Tiessen is trying to give a stronger
account ofGod's genuine responsiveness to human action, but without losing God's
absolute control. He feels this view of God's "interactive" relation to the world
better accounts for the biblical representation of the 'relational and dynamic'
character of the Trinity's actions in the world.
In order to achieve his goal of accounting for God's responsiveness to human
creatures, Tiessen also seeks to reduce Helm's emphasis on God's absolute
timelessness. Tiessen calls the idea of God's timelessness an 'utterly opaque
addition' to the biblical portrayal ofGod's relation to the world.569 Although
reluctant outrightly to reject the notion ofdivine timelessness, it seems Tiessen
cannot avoid using tensed language in talking about the 'decision' God makes in the
'logical moment' of creation. This especially seems to be entailed by his concept of
God's use ofmiddle knowledge upon which to base his creative act—some extension
of thought processes seem to be involved in "considering" which world to actualise.
This impression is strengthened by Tiessen's insistence that God acts in time in
carrying out the various phases of creation.570 Thus, his model seems to require that
God has some kind of time, whereas in Helm's model it is slightly easier to conceive
of the unitariness of God's creative act since God had nothing to "consider" except
his one idea.571
Following Millard Erickson, Tiessen argues that since the Bible clearly
pictures God as able to enter into spatial reality, it stands to reason that he can enter
569Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 322.
^"Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 322-323.
57'Although the following discussion will look at several options for resolving the eternity-
time question, no attempt is being made to solve the problem. Rather, my concern is to demonstrate





into temporal relations as well while remaining transcendent to both. In this
regard he appeals to the Incarnation as the definitive example of God's involvement
in time and space, thus drawing upon the trinitarian shape of salvation as a stand
point from which to develop a model for God's providential relation to the world.
He notes that
the incarnation gave Jesus the ability to experience
emotions in an embodied way, more closely analogous to our
own experience of them. But there is no incoherence
between the divine and the human natures. I see no reason to
assume that passibility was an experience made possible for
the incarnate Word only because of that embodiment. We
divide the divine and human natures too strongly, ifwe assert
that God felt the pain of the Father's abandonment only in his
humanity.573
Tiessen's model of the God-world relation gives greater emphasis to the way
in which the Trinity has worked in the world—although he does not work this out in
any detail. By giving greater hermeneutical priority to the 'relational and dynamic'
character of the Trinity's actions ad extra, Tiessen questions Helm's requirement of
God's timelessness and impassibility. He has also suggested that the human nature
of Jesus Christ in some way remained able to influence his divine nature: 'It was
precisely as the divine Word who had known the Father's good pleasure from all
eternity that the Son then suffered the terrible sense of the loss of that approval as he
was made sin for us.'574 Finally, he pictures the biblical account of God responding
to human decisions as effecting a real difference in the shape of the world God
creates.
The problem with Tiessen's account is that it not only pictures God as acting
in time, but seems to put God within time as well. He notes for example, that to say
God 'is somehow timeless, somehow not in time at all, is to court a host of needless
572Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 321-325.
573Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 329. That Christ only suffered in his human nature seems
to be Helm's view (cf. Helm, Providence. 224, 225; and Helm, 'Response to Nicholas Wolterstorff,'
in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001),
217; cf. also Bray, Doctrine of God. Contours ofChristian Theology, ed. Gerald Bray (Leicester, UK:
Inter-Varsity Press, 1993), 194-195).
574Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 329.
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perplexities,' and goes so far as to say that 'God's life is of endless (and
575
beginningless) duration; he has always existed and always will.' If God can
experience time, then this raises the question about God having a time. Helm has
argued that the idea of eternal duration (everlastingness) is incoherent, since it leads
to the idea ofGod being in time and therefore entails 'the idea of an actual
infinite.'576 It appears that Tiessen avoids the problem of timelessness only by
qualifying God's absolute transcendence over time such that God is able to act from
within time or, he may simply be recognising the intractability of the problems
entailed in picturing a timeless God effecting temporal acts, and thus refuses to
engage the debate at this level.577
Chapter One recorded that one of the reasons for the concept ofprovidence
falling into disfavour was a question about its intelligibility—at least as traditionally
understood. It would appear that the concept of divine timelessness associated with
that classic view of providence is so difficult to understand, and is used to support
such a highly deterministic view ofprovidence, that in order to retain belief in the
traditional view, one would have to discount the problem of intelligibility. In other
words, does the concept of divine timelessness confine discussion of the nature,
coherence and plausibility of a doctrine ofprovidence too much to the sphere of
abstract philosophical speculation?
Two further questions seem to be in order here. First, since Helm places
central importance on God's actions as revealed in the Bible as the final criterion for
a doctrine ofprovidence, is it unreasonable to ask whether divine timelessness (with
its consequences for providence) is the only conclusion one can draw from that data?
Moreover, are there ways of conceiving God's relation to time which would both
preserve the creator/creature distinction and yet be less counter-intuitive?
575Tiessen, Providence and Prayer. 322.
576Helm, Eternal God. 36-39.
577Tiessen's view seems to be similar here to that of Alan Padgett ('Eternity as Relative
Timelessness,' in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle [Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2001], 92-110), a view which, while Nicholas Wolterstorff critques it as
embodying fallacies, is also very similar to Wolterstorff s own view of God as everlasting, and
therefore embodying time as 'a feature of God's own life' ('Response to Alan G. Padgett,' in God and
Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001], 122).
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Second, Helm himselfnotes that in talking about a being who is sui generis it
becomes necessary to insist that human criteria governing such talk include the
requirement of the intelligibility of our claims. For example, in explicating the
concept of the divine goodness578 he notes that one must define it in such a way that
some correlation exists between a human idea of the good and our understanding of
the divine goodness. Can one extend this criterion, and ask if there is sufficient
correlation between the idea of divine timelessness and human experience of time
and action to warrant its usefulness? While 'usefulness' as such is not a final
criterion, clearly the idea of an 'immutable decree' funding Helm's doctrine of
providence is one of the concepts which has helped to discredit belief in providence.
If this is further rooted in such an abstract concept as divine timeless eternity,
is the case for providence aided or hindered? Are there sufficient warrants for
retaining this doctrine of timeless eternity? Is Helm's model the only credible way
of retaining a belief in a biblical idea ofprovidence, or are there other ways which
might satisfy a concern for God's sovereignty and glory, but also allow for a model
ofGod's relation to humans which incorporates the 'anthropomorphic' language of
the Bible?
Gerald Bray, for example, outlining a traditional Reformed view of God,
notes the difficulties timelessness creates for understanding how God relates to the
world:
If God is timeless, it will be difficult to establish what his
recorded activities within time might mean. For example,
how did Jesus manage to be God on earth and the eternal
Logos in heaven at the same time? On the other hand, ifGod
is everlasting in a temporal sense, what happens to his
omniscience, and what are we to make ofbiblical statements
to the effect that for God a thousand years are like a day, or
even a watch of the night (Ps. 90:4).579
Bray seeks a resolution of this problem by arguing that our own experience of
the present as a 'notional concept which we use to separate' past time from future
time serves as an analogy of eternity, that is, the present correlates to eternity in that
578Helm, Providence. 167.
579Bray, Doctrine of God. 83-84.
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both denote 'the point which time has now reached,' or the "end" of time. Since 'the
present is the vehicle by which we can [thus] apprehend the eternal,' we are able to
'transcend our [temporal] nature in our personal relationship with [God].' By
carrying the analogy further, Bray suggests that God also transcends his timelessly
eternal nature (essence) through his personhood, and in this way divine and human
persons are able to interact 'without compromising [the] . . . divine nature.' Thus,
580
following Calvin, 'we know God in his persons, and not in his essence.' But
Helm's problem seems to arise precisely because he fails to draw attention to the
interactive relations of the divine persons to creation, focusing instead on the relation
of the timeless essence of the godhead to the world. Thus, Helm's reference to the
incarnate second person of the Trinity does not alleviate the problem of a timeless
and immutable God's relation to creation,581 nor does it diminish the impression that
God's providential relation to the universe is uni-personal, omni-causal and uni¬
directional.
Terrence Tiessen's model takes into account more of the interactive character
of God's relation to creation by placing greater emphasis on the Trinity's 'relational
and dynamic' character and by rethinking how God might be related to time. Is it
possible to extend his argument, and begin with speculation about how a timeless
God relates to the dynamic unfolding of human history by observing how the
trinitarian persons have been conceived as relating to the world? While such an
approach could be seen as side-stepping an intractable problem, it allows one to take
more seriously the actions of the Trinity as recorded in the New Testament. One
effect of this methodological shift is that it requires one to limit his or her
understanding of the divine nature to what has been revealed in the actions of Father,
Son and Holy Spirit in the economy.
William Craig, for example, has recently constructed a model of the relation
between eternity and time in which he comes to the startling conclusion that 'the
580Bray, Doctrine of God. 84-85.
581Cf. Alfred Freddoso's comment that the same metaphysical problems which arise when
discussing the general Creator-creation relation arise in a doctrine of the incarnation with respect to
the two natures of Christ ('The "Openness" ofGod: A Reply to Hasker,' Christian Scholar's Review
28, no. 1 (1998): 130).
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most plausible construal of divine eternity is that God is timeless without creation
and temporal since creation.'582 In reaching this conclusion, Craig defends (with
Helm) the idea that a timeless God can also be personal. He contends 'that God's
being timeless impairs neither God's noetic structure (His system of beliefs) nor His
ability to discharge any intellectual duties He might be thought to have.' One need
not assume 'that God's being timeless or temporal is an essential property of God,
583
that either God is necessarily timeless or He is necessarily temporal.' Craig
illustrates this contingency in God's mode of existence by suggesting that
just as my [Craig's] height is a contingent rather than
essential property ofmine, so God's temporal status is
plausibly a contingent rather than essential property ofHis.
So apart from highly controversial claims on behalf of divine
simplicity or immutability [contra Helm], I see no reason to
think that God is either essentially temporal or essentially
timeless.584
As long as God 'freely refrains' from 'remembering, anticipating, reflecting'
(although he could) he "is" timeless and personal.585
Taking his argument a step further, Craig responds to the criticism that, in
order 'to be personal, He [God] must be engaged in relationships with other persons,'
and this would require him to be temporal. Craig offers two rebuttals. First, he
questions whether the 'capacity' for such relationships must be exercised in order to
be personal; second, he points out that this criticism wrongly assumes such
relationships must be with 'human persons.' Since Christians understand God to be
triune, it is possible to conceive of the trinitarian persons as 'affected, prompted, or
responsive to one another in an unchanging and, hence, timeless way.'586 Referring
to the 'doctrine ofperichoresis' in which each of the divine persons 'is completely
transparent to the others, .... in this perfect interpenetration of divine love and life,
582William L. Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time (Wheaton, IL:
Crossway Books, a division of Good News Publishers, 2001), 241.
583Craig, Time and Eternity. 82.
584Craig, Time and Eternity. 83.
585Craig, Time and Eternity. 83.
586Craig, Time and Eternity. 84, 85.
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no change need occur, so that God existing alone in the self-sufficiency ofHis being
would, on a relational view of time, be timeless.' Thus 'a timeless, divine person can
be a self-conscious, rational individual endowed with freedom of the will and engage
587
in interpersonal relations.'
While none of these examples of etemity/time models answers all the
questions nor enjoy universal acceptance, they do serve to illustrate that Helm's is
not the only coherent model of God's relation to time. Moreover, some of these
other models make a more consistent attempt to follow Helm's criterion ofpaying
attention to the biblical images of God's interactive relation to the world—images
which Helm would accept as being trinitarian. If one assumes the New Testament
reveals God as Trinity acting in the world, can one in turn derive from that account a
trinitarian picture of God's creative/providential relation to the world? In
contemplating such an approach in developing a doctrine ofprovidence one would
begin, not with the divine essence defined in unitary terms, but with the revealed
actions of the trinitarian persons ad extra. This would put all questions about divine
essence in a trinitarian context from the beginning. What impact would defining the
divine essence in trinitarian terms have on a doctrine of providence? In order to
explore this possibility, the next chapter will investigate two prominent trinitarian
theologians who seek to develop a model ofprovidence from this perspective.
First, however, I will now look at another trinitarian theologian who takes
seriously the biblical language of divine interaction with creation, and constructs a
theology ofprovidence from an Arminian (and 'openness') point of view.
John Sanders: The Divine Director
coo
The recent development of the so-called open view ofGod and the God-
world relation continues to accentuate the longstanding debate between those
theologians who, on the one hand, prefer to stress God's sovereign control of the
587Craig, Time and Eternity. 85-86, 86.
588The 'open view of God' received widespread attention as a result of the publication of The
Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1994), by Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David
Basinger. Cf. also, Clark H. Pinnock, ed., The Grace ofGod and the Will ofMan (Minneapolis, MN:
Bethany House Publishers, 1995).
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world (Christian classical theists), and those who, on the other hand, hold to a
libertarian view ofhuman freedom and a concept of God's sovereignty in which he
self-limits his providential activity to partial control of the world (open or free-will
theists).589 We have looked at one trinitarian theologian (Helm) who represents a
traditional Reformed view ofprovidence, but who does not integrate the doctrines of
Trinity and providence. I will now briefly summarise the doctrine ofprovidence as
presented by another trinitarian theologian, but from the openness perspective, and in
the process ask how his account links together the concepts ofprovidence, meaning
and Trinity.
An Overview of Sanders' Theological Agenda andMethod
In direct contrast to Helm, John Sanders, working with an open model of
God, posits a 'risky' view ofprovidence. His motivation for constructing such a
model revolves around two issues. First, there is the incoherence he finds in the 'no-
risk' model ofprovidence. He cannot reconcile the concept of an all-powerful and
all-good God with the idea of a God who directly causes suffering.590 Moreover, he
claims that the risk model 'is superior to the no-risk model of providence in having
greater fidelity to the biblical story, a more coherent view of the nature of God and
better approaches to life-application issues such as evil, prayer, guidance and a
589Even a brief sampling of the reaction to the openness view reveals how strongly
entrenched all sides of the debate remain: Norman Geisler, referring to the openness model as
'neotheism,' 'warns of a dangerous trend within evangelical circles of creating God in man's image'
and of departing 'from the traditional view ofGod held by the Fathers of the church from the earliest
times' to today (Creating God in the Image ofMan? [Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House Publishers,
1997], 11). Similar warnings appear in the fly leaf of Bruce Ware's, God's Lesser Glory: The
Diminished God of Open Theism (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2000), listing criticisms by J. I.
Packer, John Piper, R. Albert Mohler, Jr., Michael Horton, Wayne Grudem, Millard J. Erickson,
Bruce Demarest, D. A. Carson, Francis J. Beckwith, and Mark R. Talbot. John Frame, in a
sympathetic review of Paul Helm's, The Providence ofGod, draws attention to what he judges to be a
general consensus among current Christian philosophers of religion: they have a weak view of
'biblical authority, . . . [they hold] the conviction that divine supra-temporality must be jettisoned for
philosophical reasons, and . . . [they espouse] the idea that the problem of evil and the nature of
human moral responsibility require us to adopt an indeterminist concept of human freedom such as
was advocated by Pelagius, Molina, and Arminius' ('Review of The Providence ofGod.' Westminster
Theological Journal 56, no. 2 [Fall 1994]: 438-439).
590In light of Helm's account of compatibilism's understanding of human freedom as
volitional freedom (i.e., the freedom to do what one desires), it should be noted that Sanders is not
quite accurate in representing the Reformed or Calvinist view of divine-human relations in terms of
God 'forcing his will on others' (John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 175 [italics mine]).
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personal relationship with God.'591 Second, he understands that to be human, by
definition, requires libertarian freedom.592 The possibility of the experience of
libertarian freedom requires in turn a 'genuine give-and-take'593 model of God-
human relations.
In agreement with Helm, Sanders looks to the Bible as the authoritative
source of data for his theology ofprovidence, but he arrives at a very different
conclusion as to the meaning of that data.
The Source of Sanders' Doctrine of Providence
Sanders, like Helm, claims to adopt a listening approach to what the Bible
says about God and his activity in the world. In this method, Sanders maintains he is
adopting the methodology of the Reformers: that is, taking an inductive and
deductive look at 'what God has done in salvation history' as 'the source of our
knowledge ofGod' rather than 'the God known by purely by [ric] rational thought
(dignum Deo).'594 Thus, 'we should try to discern what sort of sovereignty God has
freely chosen to practice' by looking 'to revelation to see what exactly God has
decided to do.'595
Sanders notes that both Calvinistic and Arminian models of God 'use the
same Bible, [and] often even the same text against each other.'596 He contends
591Sanders, Risks. 19. It should be noted that when the terms 'relation,' or 'relational theism'
are used with reference to Sanders' doctrine ofGod, they mean specifically reciprocal relations in
which what humans do affect what God does. This is different than the kind of divine-human
relationship Helm described in which our responses to God reflect a real change in us, but the
appearance of God's responses to us are anthropomorphisms—they are not really reciprocal. Sanders
critiques 'the tradition' for having 'sometimes rejected the notion of divine conditionality while
simultaneously affirming the personal, responsive and loving nature of God's relationship to us'
(Sanders, Risks. 281).
592Cf. Sanders, Risks. 45; cf. also, ibid., 176, 220-224, 228.
593Sanders, Risks. 282.
594Sanders, Risks. 43, 153. Sanders seems not to give sufficient credit to Helm's listening
approach, since Helm too, takes scripture to be the governing source in doing theology. He does not,
as Sanders suggests, first decide what God must be like, but rather makes a decision about which
model ofGod best explains all the data of scripture.
595Sanders, Risks. 11, 43; cf. ibid., 145, 168, 173, 188, 190.
596Sanders, 'God as Personal,' in The Grace of God and the Will ofMan, ed. Clark H.
Pinnock (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House Publishers, 1995), 167.
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further that the classical or '"absolutistic" conception of God' is derived from 'a
synthesis ofGreek and biblical thought,' and as such functions as a 'control belief
which depersonalises God.597 Since, however, the anthropomorphic metaphors the
Bible uses to speak about God are divinely inspired, Sanders advocates deriving our
knowledge of God from them, rather than from the supposedly '"supra-personal"'
terms of Greek thought.598 As we saw earlier, Helm suggested that whether or not
the actual terms have a Greek source is immaterial—they are required in order to
express the concepts behind the 'exact' language about God in the Bible. Sanders,
however, suggests the 'Greek philosophic terms' used to describe God 'are just as
anthropomorphic as the metaphors in the Bible,' the key difference being that the
latter are inspired.599 He then proceeds to survey key biblical texts which support a
relational and personal model of the God-world relation. Sanders also analyses some
verses and passages traditionally associated with the risk-free view ofprovidence,
explaining them in a way compatible with the openness view.600 The problem with
his approach is that he asserts, but never adequately develops, a hermeneutic of
scripture that justifies his selective view of determining when to read a scriptural
reference to God's nature as metaphorical (God's '"arms'"), and when to take it
literally, such as statements of God's emotions.601
Bruce Ware contends there is a fundamental incoherence or inconsistency in
open theists' use of scripture.602 While the open theists strongly affirm God's
exhaustive knowledge of the past and present,603 some of the scriptures they use to
597Sanders, 'God as Personal,' 167, 180, n. 39.
598Sanders, 'God as Personal,' 173.
599Sanders, 'God as Personal,' 173.
600Sanders, Risks, chaps. 3 and 4.
60lCf. Sanders, Risks. 20. It is actually this basic hermeneutical decision which makes his
interpretations of scripture 'unfalsifiable' (Robert Picirilli, 'An Arminian Response to John Sanders's
The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence. Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 44,
no. 3 [September 2001]: 480.
602Bruce Ware, God's Lesser Glorv. 74-76, 82-86.
603Cf. Sanders' 'presentism' (Risks. 129).
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deny God's exhaustive knowledge of the future, on a 'plain' reading of scripture,604
would also deny God's exhaustive knowledge of the past and present.
As with Helm, we see once again that a prior hermeneutic of scripture
governs what Sanders hears from the Bible. This is not to imply that the
hermeneutics of either theologian is uninformed by scripture, only that a set of
second level (theological) reasons or arguments finally determine how they read
scripture. While Sanders does not explicitly admit that such a theological
hermeneutic governs his reading of scripture, he implicitly concedes the point when
he follows John Piper in maintaining that a theologian's decision as to what is God's
highest commitment determines his or her view ofwhether God enacts 'specific' or
'general sovereignty,' and therefore whether providence will be of the meticulous
variety or of the project form. Thus, the Arminian view that God's highest goal is
"'human self-determination and the possible resulting love relationship with God'"
contrasts with the Calvinist view "'that the greater value is the manifestation of the
full range ofGod's glory in wrath and mercy.'"605 It becomes readily apparent that
this fundamental theological decision will control how one interprets the biblical data
about God and God's relation to the world. Therefore, the real basis of disagreement
between Sanders' and Helm's doctrines ofprovidence seems to lie in the set of
conceptual presuppositions and theological criteria which govern their hermeneutic
of scripture more than in the data of scripture itself.
Sanders applies his hermeneutic to understanding God and God's attributes606
and also for understanding God's actions in history. He concludes (not surprisingly)
that
the Scriptures depict God in dynamic give-and-take
relationships with his creatures. God has sovereignly decided
not to control everything that happens.... In some things,
God has decided to be conditioned by us. Divine
604Cf. Gregory Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000), 87.
605Sanders, Risks. 218.
606Sanders, Risks, chap. 6; cf. ibid., 192.
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conditionality is the watershed issue between the risk and no-
risk views of providence.607
Thus 'divine conditionality' becomes the root metaphor in Sanders'
understanding of the God-world relation.
The God-World Relation
Sanders summarises his view of the God-human relation under 'four major
points':
First, God loves us and desires for us to enter into reciprocal
relations of love with him and with our fellow creatures. The
divine intention in creating us was for us to experience the
triune love and respond to it with love of our own. In this we
would freely come to collaborate with God toward the
achievement ofGod's goals. Second, God has sovereignly
decided to make some ofhis actions contingent on our
requests and actions. God establishes a project and elicits our
free collaboration in it. Hence there is conditionality in God,
for God truly responds to what we do. Third, God chooses to
exercise general rather than meticulous providence, allowing
space for us to operate and for God to be creative and
resourceful in working with us. Fourth, God has granted us
the libertarian freedom necessary for a truly personal
relationship of love to develop. In summary, God freely
enters into genuine give-and-take relations with us. This
entails risk taking on his part because we are capable of
letting God down. This understanding of divine providence
deeply affects our views concerning salvation, suffering and
evil, prayer and divine guidance.609
For those who agree with Helm's view, such a view raises two questions.
First, can this God put strong redemptive meaning into history? Second, are the
events ofhistory so conditioned by the seemingly random choices of humans, that
God has no ultimate control over the outcome of events? William Hasker (an open
theist) puts it thus:
Is the account of divine providential control given here strong
enough to secure the interests ofChristian faith? And is God
607Sanders, Risks. 280; cf. ibid., 178.
608Cf. Sanders, Risks. 175.
609Sanders, Risks. 282; cf. ibid., 169-170. For a similar summary, cf. Pinnock, et. al., The
Openness of God. 7.
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as conceived in free will theism great enough to be the proper
object ofChristian worship?610
Sanders attempts to answer these kinds of questions by positing a view of
God in active engagement with the world, an interaction which incorporates the
results of human free choices, and yet allows God to achieve his ultimate or overall
goals for the world through innovative and resourceful providence. It is this model
of the God-world relation which functions as the context ofmeaning in Sanders'
theology of providence.
Divine Providential Interaction and Meaning inHistory
Paul Helm pointed out that a doctrine ofprovidence can function as a key
component in a philosophy of history.611 Gilkey developed his doctrine of
providence based upon a phenomenological analysis of common human experience,
demonstrating in turn that such a doctrine functions as an interpretative grid for our
experiences of life. If one can think of this type ofmeaning-making role for
providence as applying not only to a philosophy ofhistory but also to a theology of
history, this would bring it into close proximity with one's worldview. While it
would not be accurate to identify a doctrine ofprovidence with a worldview, once
one has made the decision to be a Christian theist (one possible worldview) a
doctrine ofprovidence then functions in a criterial role in one's interpretation of
life's events, that is, as a framework ofmeaning and meaning-making. What one
thinks, in turn, about God and God's relation to the world (as embodied in a doctrine
of providence) will decide the kind ofmeaning one derives from applying one's
doctrine of providence to those same events.
Sanders' Framework of Meaning
The larger context or framework in which Sanders' doctrine ofprovidence
functions can be summarised briefly as follows: God is in the process ofworking out
a creative and providential project in which libertarianly free human beings interact
with the triune God on a personal level. This personal interaction is the central
6l0William Hasker, 'Providence and Evil: Three Theories,' Religious Studies 28, no. 1
(March 1992): 102-3. Hasker is himself a free will theist.
61 'Helm, Providence. 118.
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difference Sanders wants to highlight between his and Helm's models of providence.
Because Sanders' doctrine ofprovidence takes the biblical portrayal of God's
interaction with humans at face value, he claims his model has a greater coherence
with the scriptural portrayal of God.612 Such interaction requires a different
understanding ofdivine sovereignty than that employed in classical models of
providence. Sanders claims, in fact, that the key issue for a doctrine of providence is
not the nature of divine knowledge, but the kind of sovereignty God has chosen to
exercise.613 He states:
If God foreordains all things, then God is not a risk taker. If
God does not control every detail that occurs, then God takes
risks—whether he has simple foreknowledge, timeless
knowledge, knowledge of all possibilities, middle knowledge
or present knowledge.614
Sanders adopts David Basinger's argument that 'the central component of
risk taking is not a lack of knowledge of the outcome at the time of commitment but
the decision to grant creatures the freedom to be significant others from God.' This
'decision' in turn determines 'the specific rules of the game that God elects to
establish for the creature.'615 Without this kind of freedom, risk could be excluded
from the divine project, but humans could not be human as we presently understand
them.
In the context of this self-limited sovereignty, God works out his purpose for
the world, not according to a detailed master plan, but in keeping with 'a general
overall strategy,' 'a historical project,' the details ofwhich remain flexible.616
Because God has limited the exercise ofhis sovereign omniscience and omnipotence,
his specific will for individuals and particular situations can be thwarted.
As creator he established the rules by which the game of life
operates. Yet in his superiority Yahweh saw fit to create and
612Cf. Sanders' critique of 'evangelical Calvinism' on this point ("Risks. 160-161).
613Sanders, Risks. 195.
614Sanders, Risks. 199-200; cf. also, ibid., 12, 171, 245.
615Sanders, Risks. 171.
6l6Sanders, Risks. 13, 88.
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bind himself to the rules whereby he would be 'defenseless'
or vulnerable ... by sharing his powers with his
creatures... . Because of this sharing ofpowers Yahweh has
made it possible that his will may not be done; that he may
617
not accomplish everything he desires.
It is this self-limitation in the original creative design of humans which
entails that God does not know that part of the future which depends on free human
choices. Sanders does suggest that God, given his infinite wisdom and total
knowledge ofpresent events (a type of knowledge Sanders calls 'presentism'), can
make shrewd predictions about the future, but this is not the same as infallibly
knowing the future. God can, however, infallibly predict what he decides he will do
in the future, since it is in his omnipotent power to achieve what he wills.618
The 'risk' aspect in this model ofprovidence derives, therefore, from
Sanders' free will view ofhuman freedom, and from his view of the kind of
sovereignty God must employ to achieve his goal of having humans freely choose to
participate in the inner-trinitarian sharing of love. The result is 'a messy view of
providence' in which 'God sometimes brings events to a determined head and at
other times allows events to go their way.' Sanders notes that 'deism and
pancausality offer more straightforward perspectives in which God uniformly does
nothing or uniformly does everything.'619 Sanders argues that the phenomenon of
God intervening to rescue one person from suffering while seeming to neglect
another does not give rise to the charge of arbitrariness in God's actions because all
these interventions are carried out in the interest of the divine project, and thus are
always in response to choices humans have made.620 Sanders concurs with Frank
Tupper's view that 'divine providence is exercised "in conjunction with and
conditioned by the historically defined context of time and place, the participation of
human agents, the extent of the development in the situation, and the limits and
6l7Sanders, 'God as Personal,' 175.
618Cf. Sanders, Risks. 12, 52-53, 72-75, 129-137.
619Sanders, Risks. 87.
620Sanders, Risks. 298, n. 166.
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possibilities available.'"621 This requirement of a free will view ofprovidence
explains how Sanders would refute Helm's charge that the open view makes God
more culpable for evil than does the no-risk view, because God can intervene to
prevent evil, but does not always do so. In the risky view the possibility of evil is a
necessary risk in order to achieve the greater good of developing free human
responses to divine grace.
This 'messy' view ofGod's providential relation to the world, while not
preventing God from achieving his ultimate goal for those who freely choose to love
him, allows humans to become co-creators or co-shapers of history with God. 'The
actual course of divine providence,' and therefore of history, 'works itself out
through and in response to . . . specific human choices.'622 God does not just work
through history but with history.623 Drawing upon Frank Tupper's 'analogy of the
master weaver,' Sanders suggests that God, as the 'master weaver[,] utilizes the
possibilities open at any given time in order to weave his purposes into the tapestry.
The tapestry is not finished, and God is weaving alongside us to produce it.'624 This
synergy between divine and human choices results in the emergence of truly new
options in God's relation with creation. Sanders also appeals to Timothy Gorringe's
use of the analogy of 'rough theatre.'625 In this model the 'divine director' (God),
through his 'inventiveness' and 'patience,' engages the "audience" in the creation of
story (history), and in this way is 'creative without being manipulative.'626 In this
way, God is not only alongside, but is co-creator with humans, since 'the work of
God depends on the resources available in any given situation and the cooperation of
62'Sanders, Risks. 93.
622Sanders, Risks. 99; cf. ibid., 246.
623Cf. Sanders, Risks. 128, 137, 138.
624Sanders, Risks. 127 (italics mine).
625Sanders, Risks. 217.




humans.'627 At this point God's interaction with humans bears similarities to
Gilkey's divine 'lure.'
Sanders' language at times can lead one to think he is collapsing God's
628
creative and providential action into one ongoing act of continuous creation. The
fact that Sanders seems to understand God's present creative-providential activity to
result in the eschatological 'new heaven and earth' can make providence seem to be
an aspect of an ongoing creative project which evolves into a final kingdom.629 In
spite of appearances, however, he seems to work with the concept of an original
creation ex nihilo which set up certain broad 'boundaries . . . around the forces of
chaos' and established the general 'structures' of creation, after which the 'divine
providence' creates 'an environment for the sustenance of the creatures, granting
divine blessing on them, establishing communities of relationships and bestowing
tasks to be accomplished.'630
It is evident, therefore, that on the open or no-risk view, there may be no
discernible pattern or overarching plan in history. Helm had noted that we cannot
discern God's providential plan writ large across the cosmos or history because it is
hidden in God's eternal decree. Nevertheless, in Helm's model, one can in principle
ascribe everything that happens to God's control and plan. Sanders' model,
however, pictures a much more ambiguous providential pattern in history because
history, embodied in the structures of nature and human life, is the product of the
synergy between God and humans. The particular contents or shape of the divine
plan emerges as a dynamic, ever-changing gestalt,631 even though the ultimate goal
of the project is the achieving of a certain way of relating to God. In Sanders' model,
God's present project involves primarily the transformation of individuals and only
627Sanders, Risks. 137.
628Sanders, Risks. 42: 'As Creator, God has not finished being creative, for he continues to
introduce new things into history.'
629Sanders, Risks. 42; cf. ibid., 186, 187, 191, 192, 207, 214.




secondarily, societal benefits.632 Thus, there is a distinct ontological basis to the
ambiguity in Sanders model of providence.633 The hiddenness of God's providential
action in Sanders' model is an intrinsic consequence of God's openness and human
libertarian freedom. The appearance of ambiguity in Helm's model, however, has to
do with lack of epistemic access to God's plan. If, on either an epistemic (Helm) or
ontological basis (Sanders), God's providential plan and activity must remain largely
hidden to human eyes, what might this mean for a doctrine of providence as a
context for meaning? Although this question will be raised again in Pannenberg's
and Moltmann's doctrines ofprovidence, it will be addressed in more detail in the
final chapter.
There appears to be a practical similarity here between Sanders' focus on
God's adaptive providential activity and Christoph Schwobel's suggestion that
perhaps there is no need for a separate doctrine ofprovidence. Schwobel argues that
the three types of divine action (creation, revelation, and inspiration, corresponding
to the three divine persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, respectively) are 'already
providential.' He notes, therefore, that
since the notion of divine providential agency does not in fact
add anything to the concept ofdivine agency as understood in
the trinitarian model I have sketched here, it could be
questioned whether there should be a separate doctrine de
providentia divina. Rather, it seems that the proper place for
the concept of providence in Christian doctrine would more
nearly be in the section headed in traditional works of
dogmatic theology de fide.634
Although Helm's model of providence also focuses on the how, it makes a
stronger claim about the content (or, the what) of God's providential plan since
everything that happens does so in accordance with God's providential decree—God
saves because redemption is part ofhis eternal providential plan. In Sanders' model,
however, God's creative and redemptive actions are providential in that they
manifest God's caring attitude and continuing commitment to his project. Perhaps
632Cf. Sanders, Risks. 127.
633Cf. Sanders, Risks. 233.




what saves Sanders' model from being only an inference of faith is his insistence on
God's special interventions which ensure his project is not ultimately frustrated, and
which prevents God's providential activity from being reduced to a hidden, uniform
lure (Gilkey) or general preservation (Wiles).
Sanders' 'framework for meaning,' therefore, requires an adaptive,
innovative, and resourceful providence.635 While he never works out in any detail
how God can intervene at will (sometimes miraculously) to achieve unilaterally his
will on specific occasions without violating the principle of human libertarian
freedom, Sanders clearly maintains that he does.636
Moreover, he argues further that such a model of providence finds support in
God's nature as Trinity, and more specifically, in the Trinity's open, relational love.
This raises the question of how Sanders incorporates or utilises a trinitarian ontology
in explicating the open view ofGod and providence.
Innovative Providence and a Trinitarian God
Adopting a listening approach in his interpretation of scripture has led
Sanders to give priority to observing how God has actually decided to relate to the
f\\1 •
world. It has also led him to understand Jesus in a triple paradigmatic role: as the
archetypal revelation for God's risky providential action; as the definitive revelation
of the character ofGod in terms ofpersonhood, love and relationality; and as
supplying the indispensable data for understanding that God is Trinity.638 In view of
his hermeneutical decision and his conclusions about the significance of Jesus Christ,
how does he, in fact, relate a doctrine of the Trinity to his theology ofprovidence?
First, he notes that Jesus is the paradigmatic example of God's providence at
work: 'We have to observe what God has chosen to do in history—based
635Sanders, Risks. 213.
636Cf. Sanders, Risks. 79, 169, 172-173, 231, 234.
637Sanders, Risks. 43.
638Sanders, Risks. 92-95, 115-116, 106, 108-112, 91.
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preeminently on the history of Israel and Jesus ofNazareth—rather than simply
define the type of sovereignty God must exercise.'639 Sanders argues that
christology is the great stumbling stone to the classical view
of omnipotence. Our view of divine power, providence and
sovereignty must pass through the lens of Jesus if they are to
come into focus regarding the nature of God. Metaphors
such as king and potter must be interpreted in the light of
Jesus rather than our normal understanding of kings and
potters.640
Clearly, in taking Jesus' interaction with the Father to be paradigmatic of
God's providential relationship to the world, the central issue with which Sanders is
concerned is that of divine sovereignty and human free will. His interest lies mainly
in finding support for an openness in God's providential will which allows for an
adjusting of his project to the exigencies of the moment. Sanders emphasises that
ifwe begin with the God who comes to us, especially as seen
in Jesus, then it is possible to see God as interactive, parental,
generous, sensitive, cooperative, wise and mighty in the
working out of his project. If the divine project and the
particular paths God has sovereignly elected to pursue in
history are kept in mind, then it is possible to qualify the
traditional list of divine attributes in light of the scriptural
revelation. Then it becomes clear that God has all the
wisdom, knowledge and power needed to work with the sort
ofworld he freely decided to create. If God is seen as
involved in a personal way with a project in which he freely
enters into give-and-take interpersonal relations, then four
attributes of God come to the fore: love, wisdom, faithful
freedom and almightiness.641
Only such a model will serve the interest of God's project, that is, the
development of 'people who love and trust him in response to his love and manifest
their love of God in effective action to others.'642 Given this general goal, it is
impossible even for God to predict 'the way everything in human history will go,'
either for those who have faith or for those who do not. Essentially, 'what we do
639Sanders, Risks. 11; cf. ibid., 138.





know, through Jesus, is the direction in which God is moving: producing Christlike
people (Rom 8:29) to inhabit the new Jerusalem (Rev 21).'643
Sanders gives very little attention to exploring the trinitarian relations for
suggestions that God's creative/providential project might depend on each of the
trinitarian persons playing a specific role in relation to humans. He does, however,
understand the Son's incarnation to be the result of the Father's sending, and he sees
the present age as the time of the Spirit's innovative work in the church and world.644
Second, he perceives in the intra-trinitarian love (as manifested in Jesus'
relation to the Father) a model for human love. He refers to the Trinity as a
'tripersonal community in which each member of the triune being gives and receives
love from the others.'645 As a context or 'framework for meaning,' God's
providential presence and action in the world is aimed at facilitating in humans the
creation and expression of the mutual love the trinitarian persons share with one
another.646 Sanders also calls attention to the experience of Jesus (God incarnate) as
evidence that God's love is not invulnerable to suffering and disappointment.647
Sanders makes no note, however, of the difference between the infinite divine love
and finite human expressions ofmutual love. Traditionally, the concept 'God'
constitutes a sui generis category. The unique character of the inner-trinitarian
relations would seem to preclude any straightforward extrapolation from these
relations to the Trinity-world relation. Miroslav Volf voices a caution in this regard:
the inner-trinitarian love is 'the perfect cycle of self-donations [which] must start
simultaneously at all points. This is why only God is love properly speaking (1 John
4:8)—God conceived as a communion ofperfect lovers.' Thus, 'the internal love of
the Trinity' is a 'love that dances,' while 'the love that suffers is that same love
643Sanders, Risks. 127, 125, 127.
644Cf. Sanders, Risks. 128, 138, 26, 32-33.
645Sanders, Risks. 175 (While Sanders' language here could be taken as indicating a tri-
theistic view ofGod, it probably reflects instead the lack of a carefully stated doctrine of the Trinity.)
Sanders does not discuss what the differences might be between the freedom exercised by the
trinitarian Persons and that of humans—for e.g., the difference between volitional and libertarian
freedom.
646Sanders, Risks. 170.
647Sanders, Risks. 178, 180-181.
162
The Triune Provider
turned toward a world suffused with enmity.' 'The Trinitarian cycle of perfect self-
donations cannot be simply repeated in the world of sin; the engagement with that
648
world entails a process of complex and difficult translation.'
Again, while this use of the Trinity may help to define a central characteristic
of the divine love as such, it does not say anything explicitly about the distinctions of
the trinitarian persons either in relation to each other or to humans. All that this
reference to the Trinity unfolds is the fact of the mutuality of the inner-trinitarian
love, a principle which is then applied to the Trinity's relation (as such) to humans.
In effect he continues to treat the Trinity as a self-contained unit as far as its relation
to creation is concerned.
Finally, he uses the Trinity to show that God is personal, as opposed to the
impersonal model of the classical theist tradition.649 Sanders takes the non-reciprocal
relation of God to humans in classical theism to be impersonal. He defines
'personal' (in reference to God) as describing 'a being who relates with other beings;
who loves, suffers, intends, enacts intentions, responds to others and so on.
Minimally, we see God as a personal agent.'650 In Sanders' view of the Trinity,
'personhood is the ultimate ontological category. Personhood, relationality and
community—not power, independence and control—become the center for
understanding the nature ofGod.'651 What Sanders does not unpack here is what
makes the threefold personhood of the Trinity unique. Beyond supporting the notion
ofmutuality in relationships, therefore, one is left wondering how an appeal to the
Trinity helps to further refine our understanding of God's personhood, especially as
seen in the relation of the divine persons to humans.
Essentially Sanders argues that the Trinity's relations ad extra are defined
definitively in the history ofGod's relation to Israel and especially in his relations
with the God-man, Jesus Christ. He then uses this knowledge of the economic
648Miroslav Volf, '"The Trinity is our Social Program": The Doctrine of the Trinity and the
Shape of Social Engagement,' Modem Theology 14 (July 1998): 413, 414.
649Sanders, Risks. 175.




Trinity as support for his contention that all God's relations (ad intra and ad extra)
are defined by an openness to being influenced by others, and that God is personal in
a way which is, in some sense, analogous to human personality. His intent is to find
in a personal and relational ontology of the immanent Trinity (as revealed in the
economy) the grounds for reciprocal divine-human relationships.652 Although he
does not use the term 'perichoresis' in relation to the Trinity, he seems to assume the
concept in his understanding of the mutuality of the inner-trinitarian relations. But
this raises the question ofpossible ontological differences between the way the
trinitarian persons give and receive being and identity to and from each other, and the
way in which humans derive their being from God and from each other. Are humans
constituted as relational persons in the same way as the trinitarian persons?
There are two further problems with the way he handles this approach. First,
the attributes he defines relationally (love, wisdom, faithful freedom, almightiness
and omniscience653) need not be a reflection of God as Trinity, they could be the
reflection ofGod as a Unity. His appeal to 'a trinitarian metaphysics' 54 for insight
into the ontological basis of the openness of God in his relations ad extra amounts to
a confirmation of a view ofGod's character and relations ad extra already held, and
could equally well apply to a unitarian God's relation to the world. Might not a
unitarian God also enter into personal, give-and-take relations with humans? For
example, Vincent Brummer's criteria for a personal God do not seem to require God
to be trinitarian in order to enter into 'personal relationship[s]which he defines as
requiring the exercise of the 'initiative of both partners in the relationship.'655 In his
appeal to the Trinity as a support for God's relational personhood, Sanders never
652Cf. his critique of Calvin for failing to do this (Sanders, Risks. 156-157).
653Sanders, Risks. Ch. 6.
654Sanders, Risks. 175.
655Vincent Briimmer, Speaking of a Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 75. Although Sanders uses Brummer's
definition of love, and also seems to assume a similar view of personhood, he does not explicitly
reference Briimmer with respect to the latter.
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clarifies which trinitarian model he favours, and he fails to take us beyond the
affirmation that 'the Father, Son and Holy Spirit love one another.'656
In light of his failure to say more about his doctrine of the Trinity, perhaps
Sanders claims too much when he says an appeal to 'a trinitarian God of love who
enters into loving personal relations with his creatures gives some direction to the
doctrine ofprovidence.'657 Although he rightly points out that the self-revelation of
God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit indicates a trinitarian ontology or metaphysics,
his appeal to that ontology implies that God enters into reciprocal relations with
humans because that is an intrinsic aspect of the triune nature. While it may be
appropriate to claim that one's knowledge of God as Trinity supports, or at least does
not vitiate, an understanding of God in open relationships with creatures, one would
need to substantiate the stronger claim that a trinitarian ontology ofpersonhood
characterised by 'relationality and community,' entails open relationships with
humans. Just because the trinitarian persons relate responsively to each other in love
is no guarantee that God might not be a triune 'potentate forcing his will on [human]
others.' Sanders argues, here, that knowing God is 'a tripersonal community' of
persons giving and receiving love from each other assures us that 'God is no solitary
potentate forcing his will on others.' To say, however, that 'the tripersonal God is
the perfection of love and communion ... [and therefore] the very antithesis of
aloofness, isolation and domination,'659 is not the same as saying the trinitarian God
is the perfection of interactive 'love and communion' because God is Trinity. It is
not enough, therefore, to talk about divine openness or relationality (for example)
only in relation to a single divine essence, if that essence is assumed to be openly
relational because it is trinitarian. Thus, the openness of the trinitarian persons'
actual (concrete) relations to creation, and therefore the possibility of humans sharing
in a limited way in the inner-trinitarian relations, must form the context in which one







conclusion may serve as a criterion in constructing a trinitarian doctrine of
providence.
The second problem with Sanders' appeal to a trinitarian ontology as defining
his theology ofprovidence arises from his narrow focus, that is, it is not enough to
talk about God as personal and relational only in terms of the kind of sovereignty
God exercises, because this fails to take seriously the logically prior question of the
ontology of the trinitarian nature.660 While Sanders rightly argues that a doctrine of
the Trinity supports (or could support) a model of personal and loving relations
between God and humans, he has not clarified how or why. He might have followed
the lead ofWalter Kasper, for example, who has put forth a '"trinitarian ontology'"
of 'the selflessness of love,' and thus of 'the ultimate reality . . . [as] . . . person, who
is fully conceivable only in the relationality of giving and receiving.'661 Although
Kasper seems to work with a subordinationist view of the relations among the
trinitarian persons, and an "emanationist" doctrine of creation, the point here is that
he first links the differentiated acts of selfless love of the economic Trinity with the
ontology of the immanent Trinity. Only then does he make the case that such a
trinitarian ontology logically requires God to be personal and relational toward
humans. In this way the doctrine of the economic/immanent Trinity forms both the
'summation of the entire Christian mystery of salvation and, at the same time, its
grammar.'662 Seen in this way, the priority given to such a 'grammar' in
constructing theological models suggests that all other doctrines be explicated in
light of it.
Perhaps a more complete development of a trinitarian ontology (metaphysics)
would also enable Sanders to respond to Alfred Freddoso's critique of the lack of a
metaphysical structure in Open Theism with which to replace the traditional account
660Cf. Randall Otto's critique of the way in which recent treatments of 'perichoresis' divorces
it from ontology ('The Use and Abuse ofPerichoresis in Recent Theology,' Scottish Journal of
Theology 54, no. 3 [2001]: 366-384).
661Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (New York, NY:
Crossroad, 1984, 1987), 310.
662Walter Kasper, God of Jesus Christ. 311; cf. 314. Cf. the similar methodological move
made by Colin Gunton, The One. The Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of
Modernity. The 1992 Bampton Lectures (New York, NY; Melbourne, Australia; Cambridge, UK:
1993), 225, n. 19.
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of divine transcendence. He wonders, for instance, upon what basis 'Hasker and the
others' have decided to retain the divine attribute of immateriality, while rejecting
that of immutability.663
One might respond on behalf of the openness view by suggesting that
openness theologians are in fact treating the divine 'openness' itself as a substitute
for the traditional attributes of immutability and impassibility. Thus, they are not
merely deleting (deconstructing) 'immutability' but rather substituting
(reconstructing) 'faithfulness'664 as more compatible with an openness metaphysics.
Perhaps in this model, transcendent immutability need not be thought of as a logical
entailment of immateriality. God's transcendence ('otherness') is protected in this
model by God's personal (libertarian) freedom to create or not create a world.665
Moreover, it seems that the openness model is treating the personal and relational
view of the Trinity as itself constituting a new metaphysics.
In keeping with such a response is Robert Jenson's claim that 'the doctrine of
the Trinity was the creation, if one will, of a new ontology of "God" on the basis of
the gospel. The doctrine of the Trinity is the ancient church's victory over the
timeless Presence of Greek religion.'666 Colin Gunton advances Jenson's insight
here with a stronger emphasis on how this trinitarian ontology contributed 'to the
concept of the person.' He does so through use of the idea of 'space': in order for
God and the world to exist in relation they must be ontologically distinct, a
requirement which all unitarian proposals (such as deism) fail to uphold. Gunton, in
fact, claims that 'the logic of all unitarian thought is immanentist in the sense that it
finally brings God and the creation too closely together: either the world is
swallowed up in deity, or its reality is the logical, and so necessitated, outcome of the
663Alfred Freddoso, 'Reply to Hasker,' 133; cf. ibid., 132-133. Cf. also Thomas Flint's
critique of open theism (Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Cornell Studies in the Philosophy
ofReligion [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998], 95-107).
664Cf. Sanders, Risks. 184-188.
665Sanders, Risks. 185.
666Robert Jenson, as quoted by Colin Gunton, Promise. 129.
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way God is.'667 Philip Clayton, for example, in the interest ofmaintaining this same
distinction between God and the world, has had to develop 'a dipolar concept of
God' to ensure his panentheistic model of the infinite God's relation to the finite
• • 668
world will avoid the absorption of the world into God.
Thus, a doctrine of the Trinity ensures both the physical otherness (the world
is a 'contingent, non-necessary reality') and personal otherness of humans.669
Individual personhood in this model is ensured by the perichoretic 'relation-in-
otherness'670 of the trinitarian persons, and the divine eternity becomes 'neither
timelessness nor everlasting time but a function of the personal space' in which the
trinitarian persons 'give to and receive from each other what they are.'671
The foregoing discussion raises the question as to whether Sanders, in
keeping with his hermeneutic of listening to the way God actually chooses to relate
to the world, has paid enough attention to the significance of the differentiated roles
of the trinitarian persons in their relations to the world.672 In one summary of the
openness of God's project, he does give a rather cryptic account of how the
trinitarian persons define the divine project. He suggests that Jesus, as 'the image of
God,' provides us with
the definitive statement on what God is like and for the
direction in which God is working to bring his project to
fruition. Wherever the Holy Spirit blows, he seeks to take
667Gunton, Promise. 129. Cf. Gunton, Christ and Creation. The Didsbury Lectures (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company; Carlisle, UK: The Paternoster Press, 1992),
74-79.
668Philip Clayton, The Problem of God in Modern Thought (Cambridge, UK; Grand Rapids,
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000), 478-479; cf. ibid., 495-498.
669Gunton, Promise. 129-130.
670Colin Gunton, The One. The Three and the Many. 229. In this book Gunton has
developed the concept of 'relation-in-otherness' as ontologically rooted in a Christian doctrine of the
Trinity (cf. for e.g., 177, 196, 205-206, 212, 215, 229-231).
671Gunton, Promise. 134; cf. 134-135. It is interesting that while Sanders seems to be aware
ofGunton's and Jenson's work (he quotes from Gunton's The Promise of Trinitarian Theology where
Gunton argues the points noted above [Risks. 163]; he quotes from Jenson's Triune Identity in support
of the divine relationality [Risks. 145]), he never appeals to them for a more explicit model of Trinity-
providence relations.
672As Sanders repeatedly emphasises, 'God has undertaken a project, and it is only from
within this project in which God is related to us that we know God at all' (Risks. 38).
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people in the trajectory of Jesus. Jesus points us toward the
future that the Father wants to establish. Christology informs
(\T\
eschatology.
Moreover, 'the time until the eschaton is a time of the Holy Spirit; the Spirit
tries different things in history to accomplish the divine purpose.'674 From this brief
account, it seems one may conclude that the character of Jesus forms the structure
for the Father's providential care, and the Holy Spirit provides the energisingforce
evoking and enabling human co-operation with this design.675 One must conclude,
however, that although Sanders clearly intends to relate the Trinity to providence, he
fails to develop this relation in any detail. He might, for example, have made use of
Gunton's model ofprovidence. He 'suggests that we conceive of providence chiefly
in terms of two models: the Son as the giver of structure, and the Holy Spirit as the
one who gives the world space to become within, but not apart from, that
structuring.'676 This amounts to a delegation ofprovidential tasks. The unity of the
divine acts ad extra finds its source in the Father's will and from the execution of
that will by the Father's 'two hands.' The distinction of those divine acts ad extra
consists in the fact that the Father initiates, and sends; the Son provides structure and
salvation; the Spirit enables and perfects.677
Another question for Sanders is as follows: Is it enough to say that the inner-
trinitarian community, as such and as explained by Sanders, is the model of love
relations for humans? While such an assertion does highlight the unity and mutuality
that obtains among the trinitarian persons, does it pay enough attention to the
distinction reflected in the threeness of the trinitarian ontology? One wonders, for
example, if the differentiated roles of the economic Trinity might imply a kind of
673Sanders, Risks. 233.
674Sanders, Risks. 233.
675Sanders equates 'enabling or prevenient grace' with the work of the Holy Spirit (Sanders,
Risks. 245). This is a common conception in Wesleyan-Arminian circles. Cf. for e.g., H. Ray
Dunning, Grace. Faith, and Holiness: A Weslevan Systematic Theology (Kansas City, MO: Beacon
Hill Press of Kansas City, 1988), 430, 431-436.
676Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study. Edinburgh Studies in
Constructive Theology (Edinburgh, U.K.: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 192.
677Gunton, Triune Creator. 10.
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uniqueness of the trinitarian persons in their relations both ad intra and ad extra,
such that this uniqueness becomes the ground for working out a trinitarian
metaphysics of personhood which in turn accords love, as the central quality of the
trinitarian relations, a threefold dimension. In other words, love, as a way ofrelating
is of the same quality whether shared among the trinitarian persons or between the
trinitarian persons and humans, but the expression of this love can take different
forms, which in turn help to define the trinitarian persons' relations to the world and,
therefore, the unique identity of each of the trinitarian persons in the immanent
Trinity.
For example, one could think of the love of the Father for the Son, Spirit and
world as being expressed in creating the world and in sending the Son and giving the
Spirit; of the Son's love for the Father, the Spirit and the world as expressed in his
roles in creating and sustaining the world and in his taking human form and living in
the power of the Spirit; and of the love of the Spirit for the Father, Son and world as
expressed in his equipping and sanctifying work in the church, sustaining creation,
and in enabling unity-in-distinction both in inner-trinitarian relations and in human-
Trinity relations. Such a view of the Trinity's relation to the world would respect the
actual way the Bible speaks of the trinitarian persons' relations to the world, and
would allow Sanders to maintain 'personhood' as the ultimate ontological category
of the Trinity and open love as the expression of that personhood, with both
categories defined as openly relational and community-engendering. In light of the
fact that Sanders never reveals his particular model of the Trinity, such an approach
would seem to satisfy his intent in referring to the Trinity, and yet not require him to
move beyond a trinitarian way of speaking, that is to the development of a particular
model of the Trinity.
These examples of trinitarian ontologies are intended to illustrate that Sanders
had several models ofTrinity-world relations at his disposal which would have made
his appeal to the Trinity's connection to providence correspond more explicitly to the
concrete roles played by the trinitarian persons in the economy. It may be the case
that, due to Sanders' failure to develop more fully his appeal to the concrete way the
trinitarian persons actually relate to the world, his use of a trinitarian ontology ends
in an abstraction about the single divine characteristic ofmutual, reciprocal
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relationality. Miroslav Volf suggests that 'proposals about the relation between the
Trinity and human communities, though significant, are of limited value because
they remain at the level of overly diffuse generalities, say about "plurality-in-unity",
the dialectic of "one and many", or the balance between "relationality and
otherness.'"678 Volf similarly critiques Colin Gunton's analysis of 'the relation
between one and many' for paying 'too little attention to the concrete Trinitarian
narrative of the historical self-donation ofGod.'679 Jenson's caution against the
medieval reduction of the Trinity to an undifferentiated "monotheism" applies here,
as well.680 He suggests instead that Christians remain faithful to
the kinds of trinitarian discourse developed in the New
Testament and in the immediately subsequent period [and
which] have continued through the history of the church. . . .
Christians [thus] bespeak God in a triune coordinate system;
they speak to the Father, with the Son, in the Spirit, and only
so bespeak God. Indeed, they live in a sort of temporal space
defined by these coordinates, and just and only so live 'in
God.'681
With a similar interest in giving the concrete expressions of the trinitarian
relations to the world theological priority, Miroslav Volf depicts the doctrine of the
Trinity as 'the doctrinal expression of the narrative of the Triune God's engagement
with humanity.'682 While it seems to be a sound methodological decision by
Sanders, Volf and Jenson (given their view of scripture) to assign hermeneutical
priority to how the Trinity has actually decided to act in the world in creation,
providence and redemption, Colin Gunton rightly cautions against focusing on an
economic Trinity to the exclusion of an immanent Trinity, a move which could result
678Volf, 'The Trinity is our Social Program,' 412.
679Volf, 'The Trinity is our Social Program,' 421, n. 40.
680Cf. Jenson's account of how the ascription to the 'whole Trinity' of all the divine "'works
ad extra" resulted in a loss of the distinct roles played by the trinitarian persons in each work, so that
eventually it was 'no longer necessary [to make] any necessary connection between the trinitarian
persons and roles or structures of saving history' (The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel
[Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1982], 126, 127).
68lJenson, Triune Identity. 47.
682Volf, 'The Trinity is Our Social Program,' 423, n. 59.
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in a collapse of the world into God.683 For that reason he suggests the incorporation
of a dialectical approach in understanding the Trinity's relation to the world, one in
which the presupposed doctrine of the Trinity mutually influences the doctrine of the
incarnation ofChrist—a combination of a bottom-up and top-down approach in
doctrinal construction.684
Initial Assessment of the 'Risk' Model
Sanders model ofprovidence pictures God truly with humans in the most
intimate and interactive ofways (through the Spirit and the Son). And since God is
still creating history in collaboration with humans, the actual shape of historical
experience can be as innovative (new) as human imagination can make it, although
God's overall goal will always guide it toward the relational and self-giving
character of the inner-trinitarian love as definitively revealed in Jesus Christ.
This model ofprovidence, therefore, accords meaning to human activity in
the following ways: it shifts a good deal of both responsibility and glory to human
actions; it makes them co-creators of their own destiny, rather than mere participants
in God's history with the world.
Although he does not develop the link between providence and the doctrine
ofGod as Trinity in detail, Sanders has at least attempted to give recognition to the
possibility that, if the Christian God is triune, then this might make some difference
in how one views providence. It is clear, however, that even an openness model of
the Trinity does not of itself guarantee that a trinitarian God's relations ad extra will
take on unique features because that God is trinitarian, anymore than the ad extra
relations ofHelm's trinitarian God required new ways of conceptualising providence.
Even though Sanders raises the issue of the relation between Trinity and
providence, he does so only in order to illustrate the relationality of God's essence.
He does not use the triune character of the Trinity in order to define the essence.
Since Sanders claims he is focusing on the actions of the economic Trinity, one
might have expected him to give a more detailed account of the differentiated roles
683Gunton, Promise, xvii-xviii.
684Gunton, Christ and Creation. 75-76.
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of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. He seems to treat these differentiated roles,
paradigmatically revealed in the person and work of Jesus Christ, as the same
necessary and differentiated roles which make possible human fellowship with the
Father (through the Son and in the Spirit). This trinitarian metaphysics then becomes
the context ofmeaning in which andfor which God's providence works.
What Sanders has not done is to show the significance of the different ways
Father, Son and Holy Spirit are persons in relation to the world. He has not shown
how the trinitarian love might possess unique features reflective of the uniqueness of
the trinitarian persons. He fails to mention how the trinitarian personhood and inner-
trinitarian love may need to be understood as expressive of an ontology on a different
level than human personhood and love. And he has not demonstrated what, if any,
significance the uniqueness of the Father's fatherhood, the Son's sonship, and the
Spirit's unifying presence685 might have for providence and redemption. This latter
question is especially important in light of the biblical teaching that it was the Son,
not the Father or Spirit who became incarnate and is the one through whom and for
whom the world was created.686
In fact, Sanders continues in the tradition of considering the trinitarian works
ad extra as being the undifferentiated work of the Trinity as such. By restricting his
attention to the love the trinitarian Persons have in common, and to the kind of love
the Trinity as the one godhead exercises in God's relation to the world, Sanders has
not explored the significance of the different roles played by the trinitarian persons in
the economy and what this might imply about a trinitarian metaphysics. There is no
essential (logical) connection between God as Trinity and God's relational love ad
extra, and hence very little explicit connection between God as Trinity and risky
providence.
It looks, therefore, as if Sanders has derived two main contiguous ideas from
the revelation of how God has actually decided to relate to the world: on the one
685Colin Gunton, for example, argues that Western trinitarian theology has tended to lose
sight of the importance of the distinct personhood of the Spirit, as reflected in its stress on the Holy
Spirit being 'the spirit of Jesus.' He insists that the distinct personhood of the Spirit is important if
one is to preserve his 'distinctive function . . . [of] bring[ing] other persons into relationship while




hand, God's openness, and on the other hand, the triuneness of God's being.
However, he relates the concept of triuneness only superficially to the principle of
openness, since his single focus is on the reciprocal relationality between divine
sovereignty and human freedom.
There seem to be two questions raised by Sanders' appeal to a trinitarian
metaphysics. First, is the nature of God's character as personal, relational and open
love simply a datum of revelation, or is there a more explicit connection between
these characteristics and the trinitarian ontology? Second, beyond supporting the
concept ofGod's interactive love, is there any significance forprovidence in the fact
that God is a Trinity? These questions will be kept in mind as Pannenberg's and
Moltmann's models of providence are reviewed in the next chapter.
Conclusion
These two models ofprovidence ('risky' and 'risk-free') are divided by the
way they answer a basic distinguishing question: What part, relative to each other, do
God and humans play in determining the outcome of events, and what does this say
about God's goal for creation? Each author is arguing, not that his suggested
resolution of these underlying problems answers all the questions, only that his
particular model provides the most coherent (and therefore most plausible) set of
arguments for the biblical data with which they work.
Wiles and Gilkey, in the methodology they used in constructing their
doctrines ofprovidence, might be labelled revisionist theologians. Helm and
Sanders, on the other hand, adopt a fairly traditional hermeneutic of scripture as they
work to retain a doctrine ofprovidence. Helm restates the traditional doctrine,
hoping in the process to make explicit what he takes to be its inner coherence and
hence its plausibility. Sanders works from a traditional Arminian position, which he
then pushes in new directions.
Although the models ofprovidence ofWiles, Gilkey, and Sanders would all
qualify under the rubric of 'risk' models, they differ in the way they understand
God's presence with us, and the way in which (or the means by which) God creates
new meaning in history and transforms humans.
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Even though, in Sanders' risk model, God is personally present and active in
and to humans (especially believers), his action is still to a great degree hidden
behind the scenes—as it was in Wiles' and Gilkey's models.
It would seem, therefore, that the risk models ofprovidence invite Wiles'
criticism that life is too ambiguous to be able to claim categorically God is here, or
God did that. However, Nancey Murphy has argued that such claims can be
plausible (and rational) if one already has in place a doctrine (a meaning-making
structure or model) which leads one to interpret an event as having providential
meaning.687 In fact, it would be the doctrine itself (in this case, providence) which
enables one to see the providential hand of God in the event. This need not be a case
of vicious circular reasoning if one has good reasons for holding such a doctrine. For
these models such ambiguity is a necessary part of the context which makes human
life possible. Often it is only after some decision has been made, or some event has
occurred, that one becomes aware of an emerging pattern ofmeaning—which,
nevertheless, must remain a corrigible conclusion. Helm's model, of course, must
conclude that a completed event occurs according to God's ordination of it. There
remains, however, room for epistemic ignorance (and humility) in Helm's model
because one never has access to the whole picture.
Thus, God is "present" in each of these models in the sense of forming an
integral part of the meaning-making matrix on the ontological level and, to one
degree or another, on the personal level. It would seem, for example, that only in the
broadest sense of 'personal' can God be understood as present in Wiles' model. God
is present in a more individualised manner in Gilkey's model since the 'lure' is
tailor-made to each person's particular circumstance in any given decision. God is
more personally present in Sanders' model, at least with Christians, but it must be
said that God's prevenient presence to the non-Christian world (through the Holy
/too
Spirit) is more nearly like that ofWiles' general preservation and Gilkey's lure.
The fact that Sanders' model allows for occasional direct actions of God in
the events which shape human lives, creates an imbalance in his model. Gilkey's
687Cf. Murphy, 'Does Prayer Make a Difference?', in Cosmos as Creation: Theology and
Science in Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989), 235-245.
688Cf. Sanders, Risks. 245-246.
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model avoids this because his God is even more self-limited than Sanders', and
Wiles' maintains an even more uniform balance because of the "distance" God
maintains from "interfering" in his creation. Helm's model also maintains a uniform
balance, but precisely because God is in control of all details. One might point out
here that Wiles' view ofpersonal providence is the most attenuated of the
theologians under consideration, while Sanders' is perhaps the most interactive.
Helm's focus on God's unilateral and omnicausal relation with humanity, while
maintaining the distinction between the two, tends to minimise the sense ofpersonal
interaction between God and humans.
In Helm's no-risk model God is present in and through humans in the sense
of creating and sustaining the matrix ofmeaning (which includes humans) and then
presenting knowledge of the fact of that matrix to us. This presentation itself, and
the human response to it, constitutes an integral part of the matrix. In Sanders' risk
model, God is present in the sense of sustaining the necessary conditions for being
and action, and then engaging humans in creating meaning with him through their
contributions to his project.
While the purpose of this thesis has precluded extensive engagement with the
debate between theological determinists and free-will theists, it has been noted for
two reasons. First, this difference of opinion figures prominently in the history of the
debate surrounding differing models of providence, and the choice made for one side
or the other results in significantly different views about the nature of the meaning of
human life and history. Second, since these two positions are usually represented by
theologians who hold to a doctrine of the Trinity, it was thought important to ask
why they do not more explicitly integrate the two doctrines. Given the stated norm
(scripture) used in both models, and because each understands Christology to be the
norm for both God's providential presence and work in the world and for the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity, this seems to be a logical question.
The nature of the debate between the two models leads to two important
conclusions about the impact of their methodological focus on their doctrines of
providence. First, the fact that these two models both focus primarily on the problem
of defining God's sovereignty as the most important issue in a doctrine of providence
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helps to account for the restriction of their attention to the issue of the nature and
effectiveness of God's creative goal (as expressed through his decrees or strategy).
This problem requires, in turn, that they give special attention to the nature ofGod's
attributes, and therefore to the matter of God's essence. Whether God's essence is
understood as a common essence shared by the three trinitarian Persons, or simply as
the essence of the one Godhead, it is a single essence which receives attention as
being relevant for a doctrine ofprovidence.
Once the problem of the God-world relation is formulated in these terms, it
then becomes necessary to find a way of reconciling those biblical representations of
God's nature and activity which seem to place him in time and as changing his mind,
and those which seem to indicate that he knows the end from the beginning and
never changes his mind. The attempt to resolve this difficulty introduces a second
way in which their methodology impacts their models ofprovidence. It has become
apparent that what one understands from the biblical data about God and God's
providential relation to the world is as much a function of one's theological
commitments as it is of one's attempt to read the scripture objectively. Whether one
adopts a hermeneutic which privileges the exact language, or the anthropomorphic,
the biblical data itself cannot determine this. Some extra-textual conceptual device
must be employed in order to resolve the hermeneutical decision which lies behind a
so-called 'plain' reading of scripture—since such a reading can result in either the
timelessly eternal, immutable God ofHelm, or the self-limited, open God of Sanders.
Thus, the real debate between the models ofprovidence represented by Helm and
Sanders arises at the level ofjustifying a hermeneutic.
Both theologians seem to adopt a kind of transcendental approach in
resolving this dispute. Helm asks the question: What must God, in eternity, be like
in order to make possible some of the strong biblical claims about God's sovereignty
over the world? This approach seems to imply that the question of first importance
concerns the essence of the immanent Trinity, even though this question depends on
a prior resolution of the "hermeneutical" question, that is, of how to prioritise the
biblical references to the economic Trinity's character and attributes. Sanders asks
the question: Given the self-limited way the economic Trinity appears to act in the
world, what summary statement (model) best captures the overall evidence of that
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working? Again, even though the hermeneutical question ofprioritising scripture
references to God must come first in the order of inquiry, the question requiring
logical priority is that ofGod's attributes as they are expressed in his actions within
the world. Stated another way, it becomes a question about the essence of the
economic Trinity. Indirectly, therefore, the issue of the explicit relation ofTrinity
and providence seems to come to the fore, even though neither of these authors
explores that connection in any detail.
This second effect of their methodology on their doctrine ofprovidence may
be summarised as follows. Such a "subsidiary" issue as the Trinity's relation to
providence is left aside. For Helm and Sanders, whether God is thought of as an
absolute, all-controlling sovereign, or as self-limiting his sovereignty, the general
effect on providence will be the same whether God relates to the world as three
persons or as one person. The work of the trinitarian persons, in either model,
comes into the picture as an illustration of God's providential relation to the world
only after the more fundamental issues concerned with essence are resolved. In
giving so much attention to defining the essence of God, and to treating that essence
as a unity, Helm and Sanders fail to take into account the full trinitarian character of
God's relation to the world as reflected in the economy of salvation. This makes
God as Trinity irrelevant to God's providential action. Thus, one is led to ask, can
questions about the essence of the economic Trinity be divorced from questions
about the economic Trinity's activities, and further, can the issue of the trinitarian
essence and action be treated as if they are irrelevant to the kind of divine
sovereignty God exercises?
These two doctrines ofprovidence, while presenting two very different views
of the God-world relation, each try to answer the questions, what kind ofmeaning,
and how is meaning conferred on human actions (and therefore on history) by God's
fundamental providential relation to human actions? This relation, and the meaning
derived from it, is in turn defined according to one's view of the nature of the divine
being.
The questions raised by Helm's and Sanders' lack of integration ofTrinity
and providence leads to a consideration of two theologians who make the Trinity and
the Trinity's relation to the world the controlling criterion for all other doctrines
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including their understanding of the attributes ofGod, and ofhow God is understood
to relate to the world. Because of this different methodological approach, they
logically are led to integrate providence and Trinity. Such an approach seems to be a
break with tradition. In light of the four views ofprovidence explored so far, it
would seem that one would have to have some compelling reason to begin a study of
providence from a trinitarian perspective. This is what Pannenberg and Moltmann
are attempting to do. The next chapter will look at their reasons for doing so, and




TRINITARIAN DOCTRINES OF PROVIDENCE:
WOLFHART PANNENBERG AND JURGEN MOLTMANN
Introduction
The survey ofHelm's and Sanders' models of providence in the previous
chapter led to questions about whether the relational essence of the Trinity can be
divorced from a consideration of the Trinity's activities and further, can the issue of
the trinitarian essence and action be treated as if irrelevant to the kind of divine
sovereignty God exercises. Sanders clearly thinks the trinitarian essence ad intra and
activities ad extra mutually condition each other, even though he does not explore
the link. As Gerald O'Collins points out, 'patristic and subsequent elaboration of
trinitarian teaching' sought to answer the question
about the absolute mystery of the Godhead in its eternal,
divine life .... [tjhrough the 'economy' or history of
salvation, initiated in the OT and fulfilled in the NT with the
mission of the Son and the sending of the Holy Spirit....
From describing the 'economic' Trinity as experienced in the
history of salvation, they moved to say something about the
'immanent' Trinity or the life of the tripersonal God in
itself.689
Helm treats the divine essence as undifferentiated in its relation to the work
of divine providence and as unaffected by what happens in the world, even in the
incarnation. Moreover, Helm says the incarnation occurred only because of the fall,
and that therefore Christ's death is only 'exemplarist' and 'substitutionary.'690 If,
689Gerald O'Collins, S.J., The Tripersonal God: Understanding and Interpreting the Trinity
(Mahway, NJ: Paulist Press, 1999), 5; of. ibid., 141-142.
690Helm, The Providence ofGod, in Contours of Christian Theology, series ed. Gerald Bray
(Leicester, UK: Inter-Varsity Press, 1993), 100, 214.
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however, as Helm himself points out, it is impossible to separate providence and
redemption,691 one wonders if the christological focus of redemption and the Spirit's
traditional association with the creation, sanctification and mission of the church
might not open the door to seeing providence in a more explicitly trinitarian light.
Craig Keen argues that christology is precisely the dimension of the Trinity-world
relation which brings into question 'the closure, the quarantine, that is suggested by
the idea of the Supreme Being who cannot be affected' by the world. This 'closure'
'is transgressed by the doctrine of the enhypostaton; for in order for human being to
692
enter radically into the outgoing person of the Son, God must be open.'
This raises the question as to whether the role of the Logos is limited to the
original creation and to providing salvation. Even in Helm's concept of the unitary,
timeless act of creation, it would seem that a continuing role of the Logos in creation
cannot be separated from his role in providing redemption. If this is the case, can
one envision a more distinct and extensive role for the Son in God's creative and
providential work? Further, can such an extension be applied to the Spirit's role in
the economy? These are questions to be asked ofPannenberg and Moltmann in the
present chapter.
Two key points in Pannenberg's and Moltmann's trinitarian theologies affect
their doctrines ofprovidence. First, because they begin with the presupposition that
the primary basis for a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence lies in the work and
relations of the economic Trinity, the following formula suggests itself: speculation
about the identity and ontology of the trinitarian persons must derive from their
actions in the economy and not from hypotheses about what it means for each to be
person, or perfect, in a generic sense. This formula, constructed on this basis,
provides the rationale for privileging a relational ontology of both divine and human
identity. It also becomes the grammar for a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence.
691Helm notes that providence includes common grace, special grace, predestination and the
life and work of the church (Helm, Providence. 119, 214; cf. Gerald Bray's similar conclusion, The
Doctrine of God. Contours of Christian Theology, ed. Gerald Bray [Leicester, UK: Inter-Varsity
Press, 1993], 141, 145, 146-147, 224).
692Craig Keen, 'The Transgression of the Integrity of God: The Trinity and the Hallowing of
the Flesh,' The Weslevan Theological Journal 36, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 88; cf. ibid., 73-98.
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They agree with Karl Rahner's argument in support of this presupposition. If
one were to accept that any one of the trinitarian Persons might have become
incarnate,693 'then the fact of the incarnation of the Logos "reveals" properly nothing
about the Logos himself, that is, about his own relative specific features within the
divinity.' 694 Since it is already accepted that God is personal, the incarnation would
reveal nothing about the 'special differentiation of [the trinitarian] persons.' 695 Thus,
there would be no ontological connection between the Son's incarnation and the
Son's eternal identity as the Son. Rahner argues that even though the term
'"hypostasis'" can be used of each divine person, it cannot be used univocally of
each.696 On the basis of this reasoning, he concludes that 'our sonship in grace' must
have some unique connection to the Son, to 'the personal being which belongs
exclusively to . . . the Father's Logos.' If this were not the case, then 'that which
God is for us [in the economy] would tell us absolutely nothing about that which he
is in himself, as triune.' 97 Therefore, Rahner states his now classic formula as
follows: 'The "economic" Trinity is the "immanent" Trinity and the "immanent"
Trinity is the "economic" Trinity.'698 As we shall see, Pannenberg and Moltmann
will modify this formula somewhat, but they retain the essential identity of the "two
trinities."
Second, when this rationale for both the uniqueness and unity of the
trinitarian persons is given grammatical weight, then any work ascribed to them in
the economy must in some way reflect their unique identities as the three-in-one
God. This begins to come clear in Pannenberg's and Moltmann's insistence that the
Son, through the Spirit, is the principle of otherness in the immanent Trinity, and is,
therefore, the basis for created otherness. In this theological anthropology, therefore,
humans are to be understood as created in the image of the Son.
693Cf. Jenson's rejection of this idea (Triune Identity. 127).







Troubled by the problems associated with the unrelated God of Classical
Theism, Pannenberg and Moltmann are looking to a doctrine of the Trinity as a way
of avoiding the "absence" of God and as a way of privileging the doctrine of the
Trinity as the grammar of the Christian understanding of God.
Pannenberg, for example, has developed his theology of providence in a way
which gives it a trinitarian focus by treating it as an aspect of a trinitarian doctrine of
creation. Creation is given a trinitarian shape by the way in which it participates in
and derives its identity from, the inner-trinitarian relations ofFather, Son and Holy
Spirit.699 Jiirgen Moltmann has not constructed a theology ofprovidence in
traditional terms, but he has developed a trinitarian metaphysics by which he defines
God's ongoing, creative and providential relation to the world. In both of these
theologies ofprovidence the larger concerns involve such themes as God as Trinity,
the Trinity's relation to history, and history's relation to the future.700
Pannenberg: God Ahead
Pannenberg accepts the critique of the God of Classical Theism noted above
(Chapter One). He feels that the classical idea ofGod as one person is 'an
anthropomorphic idea ... and it rightly fell to the attacks of atheism.'701 He also
rejects an understanding ofGod's relation to the world in which God's omnipotent
providence means his tyranny over the creature.702 At the same time, however, he
feels that the Christian tradition provides us with the resources for the most
illuminating paradigm for understanding human experience of the world. These two
699Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans; Edinburgh, U.K.: T. and T. Clark Ltd.. 1994). Hereafter
abbreviated as Pannenberg, Systematic 2.
700Another trinitarian model of providence is that of Colin Gunton (The Triune Creator: A
Historical and Systematic Study. Edinburgh Studies in Constructive Theology [Edinburgh, U.K.:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998], see esp. chap. 8).
70lPannenberg, 'Theta Phi Talkback Session with Wolfhart Pannenberg,' The Asburv
Theological Journal 46, no. 2 (Fall 1991): 39.
702Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.; Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1991), 388 (hereafter
abbreviated as Pannenberg, Systematic 1).
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convictions play a significant role in his theological work of constructing a
systematic theology.
Pannenberg's assertion that theology is the science ofGod encapsulates both
•7AT
his theological agenda and method. If all truth is ultimately one, then the
explanatory model which makes most intelligible all the sources of data in human
experience of the world will commend itself as the most adequate interpretation of
that experience. It is Pannenberg's thesis that Christian theology provides the
resources for such a model, and in this way the Christian doctrine of God remains
eminently relevant.704
Because Pannenberg is first of all a theologian, his task is to give a coherent
account of the Christian faith. This means that his doctrine of God as 'all-
determining reality'705 allows (and requires) him to use his theological model to
integrate philosophical insights and 'the scientific understanding of the world into the
Christian view of it as God's creation.'706
However, the provisional truth claims of Christian theology in the present
await the completion of'salvation history' for their full clarification and
validation,707 and this makes history (and specifically, the history of religions) the
locus of the debate about the existence and nature of God. For this reason, a key
point of interest is God's revealing and consummating activity in the world through
his ongoing providential creation of, co-operation with, and governing of, his
creation.
703Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 19.
704Cf. Pannenberg, 'Toward a Theology of the History of Religions,' chap, in Basic
Questions in Theology, vol. 2, trans. George H. Kehm, The Library ofPhilosophy and Theology, eds.
John Mclntyre, and Ian T. Ramsey (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1971), 82.
705Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.; Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1998), 504 (hereafter
abbreviated as Pannenberg, Systematic 3). God as 'all-determining reality' designates the biblical
God who is the source of all that is ("Systematic 3:504, n. 183; cf. ibid., 505), and does not imply that
God arbitrarily determines the exact shape of the being and experience of every created entity.
706Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 60, n. 151; cf. xiv, 59-60, 71, 83.
707Pannenberg, An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.




Although the focus of this study is on Pannenberg's doctrine of providence,
because he links so intrinsically all of God's action in the world to the relations and
activities of the trinitarian persons, it will be necessary to first establish the main
contours ofPannenberg's treatment of the Trinity.
The God-World Relation: A Trinitarian Model
Pannenberg, in common with Moltmann, uses a model of the Trinity in order
to understand how God and the world relate.708 He explains as follows: 'The activity
of the Son through the Spirit of God comprises the entire economy of God's action in
creating, reconciling, and uniting the world of creatures to himself.'709 While the
Bible 'presupposes a real relation ofGod to time,' this requires that God not be
'understood as undifferentiated identity but as intrinsically differentiated unity. But
this demands the doctrine of the Trinity.'710 While Pannenberg agrees that Tillich
was correct to stress that eternity is neither timeless, nor opposed to either time or the
sequence of 'divided moments of time,' Tillich lacked the trinitarian theology of
Barth in order to also maintain 'the difference of the eternal God from the
temporality of creatures,' and also 'the movement of their incorporation into God's
eternal present.' He explains as follows:
We can do this with the help of the unity of the immanent and
economic Trinity. If the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is
the basis of the idea ofplurality in the life totality of the one
God which is eternally present to him, the doctrine of the
working of the trinitarian persons in the economy of salvation
is the basis of the existence of a plurality of creatures and
their incorporation into the life of God for participation in his
711
eternal glory.
Admittedly these are rather densely packed statements and require further
explanation.
708Cf. Pannenberg, Introduction. 67; idem, Systematic 2: 59.
709Pannenberg, Introduction. 68.
7l0Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 405.
7llPannenberg, Systematic 1: 407.
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God as Trinity: the Source and Shape of the Doctrine
The details ofPannenberg's treatment of the Trinity are complex, and are
aimed at answering many problems associated with traditional versions of the
doctrine. I will here take a summary approach with the intent of highlighting those
aspects of the doctrine that bear particularly on his doctrine of providence.
Pannenberg agrees with Wiles in rejecting the idea that the Christian concept
of God as Trinity can be derived straightforwardly from the Bible.712 Nevertheless,
he finds in the New Testament account of the relations of the Son to the Father and
the Spirit a compelling case for developing a doctrine of the Trinity.713
He begins his delineation of the Trinity with an account of the relations and
distinctions of the trinitarian persons as manifested in the economy.714 He concludes
that
one can know the intertrinitarian distinctions and relations,
the inner life ofGod, only through the revelation of the Son,
not through the different spheres of the operation of the one
God in the world. Only subsequently can one relate specific
aspects of the unity of the divine working in the world to
•••••• 71c
trinitarian distinctions that are known already.
Discussion of the unity of the essence of deity must follow, therefore, an
71 fx
analysis of the relations of the revealed Trinity. This entails that the differentiated
'unity of the essence may be found only in their concrete life relations.'717 Each
person, in fact, 'is a catalyst ofmany relations,' and 'self-distinction does not mean
exactly the same thing for each of the three persons.' The 'unity in distinction' can
be seen in that the Son glorifies the Father, while the Spirit glorifies the Son, and
through him, the Father.718
7l2Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 268-272.
713Pannenberg, 'The Christian Vision of God: The New Discussion on the Trinitarian
Doctrine,' The Asburv Theological Journal 46, no. 2 (Fall 1991): 28.
7l4Pannenberg, Systematic 1: Chapter 5.
7l5Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 273; cf. ibid., 299.
716Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 299.
717Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 335; cf. ibid., 335-336, 333.
718Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 320, 321; cf. ibid., 347.
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Pannenberg is particularly anxious to stress the mutuality of the intra-
trinitarian relations, something he thinks Moltmann has failed to consistently
maintain.719 Pannenberg rejects the ascription ofbeing or deity to either the Son or
Spirit on the basis of their origination in (or from) the Father—rather, the Son and
Spirit are ontologically equal to the Father.720 Ofkey importance in this stress on the
mutuality ofdivine persons as revealed in the economy, is the desire to bring into
focus the subjectivity of each of the three persons—an idea that carries special
significance in developing a trinitarian doctrine of creation and providence. In so
doing he can point out that they are three centres of consciousness, and that each
plays a distinct role in each of the divine works in the economy.
On the basis of these concrete relations, as revealed in the economy,
Pannenberg then defines the essence of the one God as constituted by the three
persons and as forming 'a single constellation.' This essence is the 'field of the
infinite': 'Materially, however, the specific form of the existence of God as Father,
Son, and Spirit is identical with the unlimited field ofGod's nonthematic presence in
his creation.'721 This also means, however, that the divine essence itselfonly exists
as a result of the relations of the Father, Son, and Spirit—it is not 'some reality in
799
itself to be set apart or even prior to the personal aspect' of the Father, Son, and
Spirit.
In spite of Pannenberg's concern to avoid the impersonal categories of
classical theism when referring to God, and instead to return to the personal language
of the Bible, speaking of the essence of God as the 'field of the infinite,' or as a 'field
ofpower,' has led to charges that Pannenberg has compromised the personal nature
723ofGod. Pannenberg himself admits the impersonal nature of the concept of
719Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 334.
720Pannenberg, 'Christian Vision,' 32.
721Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 359.
722Pannenberg, 'Talkback,' 39.
723The reason for this concern can be illustrated with the following statement: 'The Spirit of
God can be understood as the supreme field of power that pervades all of creation. Each finite event or
being is to be considered as a special manifestation of that field, and their movements are responsive
to its forces' (Pannenberg, Introduction 46; cf. ibid., 49). Philip Clayton says the impersonal aspect of
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the divine essence as such. This one divine essence that
makes for the unity of God is not personal by itself, but
personal only as it becomes manifested in each of the three
persons. Correspondingly, each of the personal
manifestations is characterized by a movement beyond itself,
and this is constitutive of the personal mystery in each of
them.724
This impersonal language, however, may be unavoidable since Pannenberg's
project requires him to attempt metaphysical speculations regarding the nature of
God's relation to the universe that find some resonance with scientific
understandings of the world. This is a reflection ofPannenberg's attempt to bring
theology into conversation with the sciences, in this instance through the adoption of
field theory for theological purposes.725 At the same time, however, Pannenberg
attempts to mitigate this impersonal language by his understanding of the dual aspect
of spirit as both the essence of God and as the personal Holy Spirit—an idea which
will be developed below in the discussion of the different roles of the persons of the
Trinity in the economy.
The Trinity-World Relation
Traditionally, the Father functions as the single source of deity in the intra-
trinitarian relations, and as the Creator of the world. Pannenberg rejects the first
notion and modifies the latter. The Father is Creator only in participation with the
Son and Spirit, although the uniqueness of the relations within the Trinity reserves
the sole monarchy of the Godhead (and ultimate lordship of the Kingdom) for the
Father.
the Trinity in Pannenberg's model agrees with his own thesis that not all of God is conscious
('Pluralism, Idealism, Romanticism: Untapped Resources for a Trinity in Process,' in Trinity in
Process: A Relational Theology ofGod, eds. Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., and Marjorie H. Suchocki [New
York, US: The Continuum Publishing Co., 1997], 145, n. 39). Cf. Gregory R. Peterson's critique of
the impersonal idea of 'identifying God as an all-determining field' (' What Shall We Make of
Wolfhart Pannenberg? A Symposium on Beginning with the End: God, Science, andWolfhart
Pannenberg [ed. Carol Rausch Albright and Joel Haugen]: "Where do We go From Here?,"' Zygon
34, no. 1 [March 1999]: 146).
724Pannenberg, 'Christian Vision,' 36; cf. idem, Systematic 1: 383.
725Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 79-84.
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Pannenberg argues for a model of trinitarian creation in which the Son has a
subjective role as well as the Father, a role which instantiates 'the contingency and
historicity of the reality that results from God's creative action.' The Son is 'the
principle of otherness' and 'interrelation,' both in the Trinity and in creation.726 The
Son, therefore, 'is the origin as well as the consummator of creation':
He is its origin as his self-distinction from the Father
becomes the generative principle of all the reality that is
distinct from God, both in that distinction from God and in
relation to other creatures. Here is the basis of the
particularity and independence of creaturely existence. The
Son is the consummator, however, inasmuch as all things will
• 727be gathered up into one in him.
But this gathering up into the Son will not negate the creatures' distinct
identities: first, because of the Son's instantiation of their distinction from God; and
second, because of the Spirit's enabling of their 'participation in the filial relation of
Jesus Christ to the Father.'728
The understanding of the Son's subjective self-distinction from the Father
implies, however, his continuing relation to the Father, and therefore in the creative
act he freely moves out of the 'unity of the divine life' in obedience to the Father,
which means he 'is not alone the Creator of the world.' In this way 'the Father thus
acts as Creator through the Son.'729
In this way 'creation is a free act of God as an expression of the freedom of
the fatherly goodness that in the Son accepts the possibility and the existence of a
creation distinct from himself, and of the freedom of the Spirit who links the two in
7T0 • •
free agreement.' In this trinitarian view of creation, 'the Spirit of God is the life-
giving principle, to which all creatures owe life, movement, and activity.'731 As the
726Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 27, 28, 32, 22-23, 24, 29; cf. Pannenberg, 'The Doctrine of
Creation and Modem Science,' in Cosmos as Creation: Theology and Science in Consonance, ed. Ted
Peters [Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989], 162; cf. ibid., 175).
727Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 454.
728Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 454.
729Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 29-30.
730Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 30.
73'Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 76.
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medium of the fellowship of the Father and Son, the Spirit is also the medium of
creaturely participation with God.732 In this way 'God is himself present in his
7-5-3
creation.'
While Pannenberg rejects the Augustinian and Western view of the Spirit's
relation to the Father and Son as only in terms of origin, he does maintain that
relationally 'the Spirit originates and proceeds from the Father.'734 This does not
appear to be an outright rejection of the notion 'origin,' but a shift of emphasis to the
mutuality of relations. In keeping with the scriptural language describing these
relations, Pannenberg avoids further speculation on the idea of origins. As he says,
the trinitarian persons simply are what they are in their relations to one another. On
this view the Spirit is both received by the Son, mediates the Son's relation to the
Father, and is also sent by Father and Son to believers. Thus, 'all sonship [including
Jesus'] . . . rests on the working of the Spirit.'735
It becomes important at this point to clarify the fact that Pannenberg uses the
idea of spirit in two senses: first, as a name for the divine essence as such736; second,
as the name of the third person of the Trinity, an individual hypostasis equal in deity
and personhood to that of the Father and Son. Only as these two senses are kept
distinct can confusion be avoided in understanding the Spirit's role in Pannenberg's
concept of the nature and work of the Trinity in the economy. Failure to recognise
this distinction may account, in part, for the charges of impersonalism noted above.
Spirit (or 'Spirit of love,' or 'love') as used in the first sense, is the name for
the relationship, through the medium ofwhich, the trinitarian persons
perichoretically relate to each other. It is this sense that suggests the impersonal
aspect of Spirit. This divine life, field, essence or Spirit is not a substance, but is a
life-giving force, and as such arises from the relation of the persons of the Father,
732Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 316; cf. ibid., 266, 267.
733Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 414.
734Pannenbeig, Systematic 1: 317, 318.
735Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 266 (italics mine); cf. ibid., 319, n. 18, 268.
736Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 383; cf. ibid., 427, 428.
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Son, and Spirit. It does not exist in its own right; it is not a fourth entity or person
over against the three.737
The Spirit links the 'future to the present' and 'the eschatological
consummation itself is ascribed to the Spirit.'738 The Spirit both preserves life and
maintains the identity of the creature, and will also transform the creature so that it
can participate in God's eternity in its creaturely identity.739 Thus, Pannenberg can
'view the creative working of the Spirit as the field of force of the divine future from
which events proceed contingently.'740
It is this aspect of Spirit that Pannenberg labels 'as the supreme field of
power that pervades all of creation,' and as such is 'the power of love that lets the
other be.'741 In this way Pannenberg adopts the concept of field theories in physics
as a way of conceptualising the idea of God as Spirit. He argues that because field
phenomena are 'independent ofmatter and [are] defined only by their relations to
space or space-time' they can be used to 'interpret the idea of God as Spirit.'742
Polkinghorne, however, points out that Pannenberg adopts this notion too
simplistically, that the idea of'energy' is not simply 'a kind ofspiritual concept,'
and that Pannenberg's 'notion of a field's immateriality clearly is not correct.'743
Polkinghorne suggests instead, that Pannenberg's desire to see in physics a move
toward spiritualization744 might better be found 'in chaos theory and complexity
theory' which have 'led to a recognition that notions of energetic causality need
supplementing by notions of a kind ofpattern-forming causality.'745 One suspects,
737Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 425-426; cf. ibid., 383, 428.
738Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 552, 553; cf. idem, Systematic 2: 98, 100, 101-102, 108.
739Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 554-555, 606-607, 622-626.
740Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 110.
741Pannenberg, Introduction. 46; idem, Systematic 1: 427.
742Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 382.
743Polkinghorne, 'Wolfhart Pannenberg's Engagement with the Natural Sciences,' Zygon 34,
no. 1 (March 1999), 154.
744Cf. Pannenberg, 'Doctrine of Creation,' 166.
745Polkinghorne, 'Pannenberg's Engagement,' 154.
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however, that this kind of general, top-down notion of '"active information'" would
not satisfy Pannenberg's desire to see God as creatively effecting particular
providences. This was a problem that Wiles noted in relation to Arthur Peacocke's
use of this same idea of'active information.'746
Whatever one makes ofPannenberg's attempt at correlation here, one benefit
he seeks is an understanding of 'the autonomy of the field. ... The deity as field can
find equal manifestation in all three persons': the divine Persons 'are simply
manifestations and forms—eternal forms—of the one divine essence.' Thus, 'the
specifically Christian version of the fact that the one God is the living God comes to
expression in the livingfellowship of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.'747
But Pannenberg also emphasises the second aspect of the concept of Spirit,
that is, his personhood. The Spirit, therefore,
comes forth as a separate hypostasis as he comes over against
the Son and the Father as the divine essence, common to
both, which actually unites them and also attests and
maintains their unity in face of their distinction. ... As a
hypostasis, however, the Spirit is distinct from both Father
and Son. Hence he can be at work in creation and he can also
be shed abroad in the hearts ofbelievers as a gift.748
This dual role for the concept of Spirit, both as essence of love and as
personal Holy Spirit, helps to explain how not only the Father, but also the Son and
the Spirit (as hypostases), can each, equally, be subjects of the divine love and action
in the economy of salvation. Since they do not have their existence and identity
apart from one another, and yet subsist as three separate centres of consciousness,
whatever one does they all participate in. Thus, Pannenberg can speak of their co¬
operation in their works ad extraJ
Since the creation of the world is an expression of the essence of the
trinitarian God, and therefore of the free love that unites the Father, Son, and Holy
746Wiles, Chapter Two, above.
747Paniienberg, Systematic 1: 383 (italics mine).
748Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 429; cf. ibid., 316, 383-384.
749Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 388.
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Spirit,750 all of the works of the Trinity express this differentiated unity of the divine
essence, and as expressions of it, cannot be separated from it. While 'the kingdom of
God in the world is certainly the kingdom of the Father,' this monarchy or 'absolute
lordship ... of the Father is mediated by the Son, who prepares the way for it by
winning form for it in the life of creatures, and also by the Spirit, who enables
creatures to honor God as their Creator by letting them share in the relation of the
Son to the Father.'751 Through this structure of cooperation the action of the triune
persons can be ascribed to the one God.752
In this dual aspect of essence and persons, the divine action in the world
amounts to 'the self-actualization of God in his relation to creation.' The Son's
self-distinction from, and obedience to the mission and sending of the Father, means
that creation is appropriated to the Father, and mediated by the Son (as principle of
distinction and structure of relation) and the Spirit (as life-giving power and means of
continued existence).754
Pannenberg, by avoiding talk of intra-trinitarian relations in terms of origin
from the Father, and by stressing the mutuality of these relations for the constitution
of the three persons, is able to maintain their distinction as three persons with unique
characteristics (and therefore as centres of consciousness and subjectivity), and yet
they do not have these qualities apart from their relations with each other. Thus, the
Father is Father only in relation to the Son; the Son is Son only in free self-
distinction from, and obedience to the Father; the Spirit is Spirit only as he glorifies
the Son and the Father.755 In this set of relationships they form a differentiated unity
which constitutes the single divine essence. With this model in the background,
Partnenberg can then move on to explicate how the works of the Trinity ad extra ('as
750Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 369.
75'Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 388-389.
752Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 389.
753Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 386, cf. ibid., 426.
754Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 313; and idem, Systematic 2: 6.
755Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 324-325. Insistence upon this inter-subjectivity of the
divine persons is one way in which Pannenberg modifies Rahner's understanding of the "two" trinities
(cf. Pannenberg, ibid., 308).
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Creator, Sustainer, Reconciler, and Consummator'756) can be ascribed to the one God
who exists and acts in three Persons.
This panentheistic model of the God-world relation carries overtones of
making God dependent upon the world. For example, Pannenberg notes that
identifying the immanent and economic trinities means that one 'must constantly link
the trinity in the eternal essence of God to his historical revelation, since revelation
cannot be viewed as extraneous to his deity.'757 Pannenberg insists, however, that
the economic and immanent trinities not be so identified as to absorb 'the immanent
Trinity in the economic Trinity.' He rejects the idea, therefore, of 'a divine
becoming in history, as though the trinitarian God were the result of history and
achieved reality only with its eschatological consummation.' Rather, 'the
eschatological consummation is only the locus of the decision that the trinitarian God
is always the true God from eternity to eternity.'758 In an important sense, while God
did not need a world in order to complete his being or fulfil his love, the world, once
• 75Q
it existed, becomes the locus for establishing the reality and deity of God.
Pannenberg further clarifies his meaning here by noting that the idea of 'the futurity
ofGod's Kingdom' does not imply 'a development in God.' While 'the very essence
ofGod implies time,' God himself does not change.760 Rather, it is 'our
understanding ofGod [that] changes.'761
A Trinitarian Mediation ofProvidence
Pannenberg's structuring of his systematics around the central motif of the
doctrine ofGod as Trinity entails that his doctrine ofprovidence also comes under
756Pannenberg, Systematic 2:5.
757Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 328.
758Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 331.
759Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 59, 313; cf. idem, Systematic 2: 1; idem, Systematic 3: 540; cf.
also Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom ofGod (Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press,
1969), 55.
760Pannenberg, Kingdom of God. 62.




this rubric. Within that general structure, however, he then orients providence
according to its relation with other key doctrines: creation, reconciliation, and
consummation.
Situating and Defining the Doctrine of Providence
The doctrine ofprovidence in this schema is subsumed under the doctrine of
continued creation,762 and as such, is seen as the outworking of God's eternally
creative,763 preserving and overruling action under the conditions of time and
space.764 All ofGod's works manifest the characteristic of a continuing dynamic of
coming-to-be. This dynamic results from the fact that from our perspective, God's
creative act comes from the future. Thus, the future is both the realm of contingent
possibility, and the direction of the arrival of God's in-breaking rule.765 This
ontological priority of the future, expressed in the formula, 'promise and
fulfillment,'766 also accounts for the forward direction of providence and history.
Pannenberg's situating ofprovidence can be clarified by comparing it to
Schleiermacher's. Pannenberg points out that in his own model, 'the relationship [of
the world] to God is . . . shaped by the contingency of the divine act of creation at
every moment of creaturely existence.' For Schleiermacher, however, it is shaped
'by the dependence of creaturely existence as a whole on an origin which is the basis
of the whole nexus ofnature. He thus subordinates the concept of creation to that of
preservation,'767 while Pannenberg subordinates 'preservation' to 'creation' by
bringing the dynamic of creation into every present.
762Cf. Pannenberg, Introduction. 39-40.
763Cf. Pannenberg, Introduction. 41.
764Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 42.
765Pannenberg, Introduction. 49; idem, Systematic 1: 390; cf. ibid., 419.
766Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'Redemptive Event and History,' chap, in Basic Questions in
Theology. Collected Essays, vol. 1, trans. George H. Kehm (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1970),
19.
767Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 419.
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Perhaps another reason for subsuming providence under a concept of
continuing creation is the nature of God's motive in creating the world. God's
freedom and motive of love in creating entails neither an overpowering emotion, nor
simply 'love as caprice.' Because God exists in eternity as a Trinity ofpersons
freely and mutually constituted by each other, and since this unity consists of freely
given and received love, God is free to turn this love outwards towards the creature,
without either needing the creature for the expression of this love,768 nor without
giving existence to the creature on the basis of a whim. From this perspective 'the
freedom of the divine origin of the world on the one hand and God's holding fast to
his creation on the other belong together,' since the latter idea of 'God's creative will
constantly to preserve the world' also reflects afaithfulness to creation.769 Thus, the
divine freedom and the divine motive of love are part of the reason why Pannenberg
develops a trinitarian doctrine of creation and also why he subsumes providence
under creation—the divine trinitarian freedom is the source of contingency, newness,
and history in creation, while the divine love (in its differentiated, trinitarian
structure) preserves the creature in its uniqueness and independence.770
Although the doctrine ofprovidence is subsumed under the doctrine of
creation, this latter doctrine is itself subsumed under God's eternal decision and plan
• 771for creation. Thus, providence (as preservation, co-operation and government) is
one activity (or group of activities) that facilitates this overall plan and purpose for
creation.
Pannenberg, like Wiles and Helm, sees God's creative action as 'a single act
that embraces the whole cosmic process.'772 But Pannenberg's reasons for holding
this unity of divine action are different from those ofWiles, as is his understanding
of God's relation to the 'many individual acts and phases.' Pannenberg is concerned
to relate God's eternity to created time. Wiles has a more restrictive agenda, that is,
768Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 391.
769Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 19, 20.
770Pannenberg, 'Doctrine of Creation,' 162.
77'Pannenberg, Introduction. 39-40; idem, Systematic 2: 7-8.
772Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 34.
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a concern to maintain the uniformity ofGod's action towards the world in the
interests of fair play, creaturely independence and freedom, and divine non¬
culpability for evil. This uniformity differs from the unity in Pannenberg's model of
773
the divine actions of creation, preservation, overruling and consummation, because
Wiles does not think of God as acting directly in the many subacts that make up the
matrix of the world. Moreover, Pannenberg intends to show that, 'if creation comes
to completion only with the world's reconciliation and redemption,' then this means
that 'the Creator is allied to us in the battle to overcome evil and to reduce and heal
suffering in the world.'774 There is a sense in which creation will only be complete at
the eschatological consummation. Therefore, the doctrine ofprovidence, as the
doctrine of God's ongoing relation to the universe in the present, embodies a creative
element. For this reason Pannenberg can say that 'preservation goes with creation.'
Preservation, thus defined, constitutes much more than the 'unchanging conservation
of the forms of creaturely existence laid down at the first. It is a living occurrence,
continued creation, a constantly new creative fashioning that goes beyond what was
given existence originally.'775 Thus, the differentiated unity of divine action in
Pannenberg's model reflects the personal faithfulness of the inner-trinitarian relations
in the Trinity's direct involvement with the events of the world, rather than the
uniformity of inflexible laws of nature which blindly govern the development of life.
It becomes apparent from this scenario that the event of the incarnation,
crucifixion and resurrection is not the addition of a redemptive act in a universe gone
wrong, but the event is redemptive precisely insofar as it manifests the origin, goal
and fulfilment ofGod's creative purpose. There is, therefore, a structural unity
between the divine creating, preserving, and overruling activity.
Although Pannenberg subsumes providence under a doctrine of creation, he
does develop a distinct doctrine ofprovidence, which he delineates as preservation,
co-operation, and government (overruling).
773Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 34-35.
774Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 173.
775Pannenberg, Systematic 2: xvi, 34.
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He gives the first element, preservation, a somewhat different content than it
received in the classical understanding. There it referred to the 'preservation of the
created world in its original order.'776 As an aspect of continuing creation, however,
Pannenberg understands it to refer 'to the continuous creation of new forms of
being.' Contingency and newness hold priority over what appear to be static forms.
In reality, the appearance of 'enduring forms and even ofpatterns of events now
appears itself as a contingent fact in the course of that history.'777 Preservation,
therefore, means the continuation of the identity of creaturely beings as well as the
reliability of the laws of nature, which together reflect God's faithfulness to bring the
creation process to completion.778 This maintains an emphasis on God as an active
presence in history,779 while also keeping history (and creation) open to the future.
This is an especially important point, since one of the critiques raised against
traditional forms ofprovidence focused on the way it was limited to either a hidden
780
and 'self-sustaining internal development,' or it required thinking ofGod
intervening in disruptive ways from outside the system of intra-mundane causal
structures. In Pannenberg's model the whole of creation itself, in each of its
elements, is an ongoing 'miraculous' act in which the truly new is possible, not in
spite ofpresent forms of life, but precisely because present (contingent) forms of life
are still in process ofbecoming what God intended for them.781
As a trinitarian act, creation (and therefore preservation) is 'a free act of God
as an expression of the freedom of the fatherly goodness that in the Son accepts the
possibility and the existence of a creation distinct from himself, and of the freedom
776Pannenberg, Introduction. 40.
777Pannenberg, Introduction. 41; cf. idem, Systematic 2: 42.
778Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 43.
779Pannenberg. Systematic 1: 357.
780Colin Gunton, Triune Creator. 184.




of the Spirit who links the two in free agreement.'782 Preservation of the creature
depends upon the work of the triune persons.
Only God has duration, and thus 'all limited duration derives from him.'
Creatures therefore, have not only their independence, but their preservation-in-
distinction through 'the work of the Son' and through the Spirit, for only in this way
can they participate in God.783 This participation of the creatures in the 'divine Spirit
of life,' which makes possible higher levels of complexity in the forms of life, and
therefore higher degrees of self-transcendence, does not entail the loss of
distinction,784 but precisely the opposite:
they participate in the divine life only to the extent that self-
distinction from God (and therefore the Son) takes shape in
them. The work of the Spirit in creation thus converges on
the incarnation of the Son, in which creation finds fulfillment
by the full manifestation of the divine likeness in
■joe
humanity.
In traditional models ofprovidence, ontology and meaning were funded by
protology—creation and eternal decrees, carried out in providence and predestination,
according to an eschatological goal, all ofwhich was determined by God's
no /:
# ...
'antecedent Plan.' The affirmation that God was active in history, and that God
alone was the guarantor of any meaning it possessed, assured individuals of hope for
the future. In Pannenberg's model however, the perichoresis of time and eternity,
and of past, present and future, entails that the end (God's future) has ontological
• • 787 •
priority in the shaping of our present (and what is now our past). This creative
love manifests itself in the 'release of new reality,' a reality that is truly contingent,
782Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 30.
783Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 33, 32, 34; cf. ibid., 30.
784Pannenberg stresses repeatedly that the maintenance of creaturely distinctions is God's
goal in creation, and creatures will retain their identities in eternity (cf. Systematic 1: 166-67, 422,
446; idem, Systematic 2: 20, 95; 173-74, 272; idem, Systematic 3: 554, 555, 580).
785Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 34.
786Henri Blocher, 'Yesterday, Today, Forever: Time, Times, Eternity in Biblical Perspective,'
Tvndale Bulletin 52, no. 2 (2001): 201.
787Pannenberg, Kingdom of God. 63; cf. ibid., 65; idem, Systematic 1: 405; and idem,




independent, and yet maintained in existence by God's sustaining power.
Something like this appears to be what Pannenberg has in mind when he says that,
'because he is the power of the ultimate future, God has released to each single event
its actual historical future. In relation to [our] past and present, God is constantly
-700
bringing himself back into his own eschato logical futurity.' Pannenberg seems to
mean that what is 'released' is the future as it embodies the contingent choices of our
past and present. Since the final future of each entity embodies all that went before
ofGod's provision of life and ofwhat the creature made of that provision, and since
God sees the whole from his perspective in eternity, this creative-providence from
the future need not be any more deterministic than creation from the past. The fact
that God "stands" at the end or ahead of our present place in the story is as much an
accommodation to a human time-bound perspective as saying God "stands" at the
beginning. Thus, what God releases to each moment and each entity is not a future
pre-determined by God alone, but rather a conferring of being and shape as these are
contingently co-created by the entity and God, and as they constitute and receive
shape and meaning from the end of its story. In this way Pannenberg can speak of
the retroactive influence of Jesus' resurrection on the identity and being of his earlier
life and ministry.790
Nevertheless, although Pannenberg insists that the human experience of life
includes real freedom and contingency, it is difficult to see how his model avoids a
determinism of the whole, as it is defined in terms of the future of God.791 Fear of
determinism exerted a strong shaping influence on Wiles', Sanders' and Gilkey's
doctrines of providence. Pannenberg is well aware of the tyranny of God's
providence when explicated in terms of a single subject over against the world. He
788Pannenberg, Kingdom of God. 66; cf. 70.
789Pannenberg, Kingdom of God. 62 (italics mine); cf. idem, Systematic 2: 33-34.
790Cf. his letter to Timothy Bradshaw on this point ('Appendix: Letter to the Author from
Professor Pannenberg,' in Trinity and Ontology: A Comparative Study of the Theologies of Karl
Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg. by T. Bradshaw (Edinburgh, UK: Rutherford House, 1988), 402.
79lCf. Paul Sponheim's critique on this issue ('To Expand and Deepen the Provisional: An
Inquiry into Pannenberg's Anthropology in Theological Perspective, in Beginning With the End: God.
Science, and Wolfhart Pannenberg. eds. Carol R. Albright, and Joel Haugen [Chicago and La Salle,
IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997], 390-394). Cf. also Colin Gunton's critique of
Pannenberg on this point (Triune Creator. 218).
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suggests instead that theological determinism can be avoided if one begins, not with
the idea of 'God as an acting subject,' but with God's position in eternity. This
means that God, bracketing the whole, allows the theologian to begin 'with
experience of the connections in the course ofworld history.'792 He seems to be
assuming here his relational metaphysics of the part-whole.
As Pannenberg explains it, the parts only have their meaning and identity in
reference to the whole, even though the contingent actions and experiences of the
parts on the way to the whole (which is the future of God), help to constitute that
whole.793 He suggests that the concept of spirit as field helps to account for the way
the as-yet-unavailable whole can in turn retroactively constitute the parts in via, in a
way which enables them to correspond to what they will be in the end: 'the dynamic
field can be conceived as creative of its "parts" and therefore as constitutive of them
as well as of the whole that is dependent on them as elements.'794 With this concept
of spirit as dynamic field, Pannenberg has introduced a third element into his
relational metaphysics. Formally at least, this three dimensioned metaphysics
explains both the constitution of the Trinity and of the world in terms of a part-whole
structure as these two "elements" are enabled to act reciprocally on each other.795
Pannenberg states further that 'it is this kind ofprinciple [that is, the field concept]
that is referred to in theological language about the dynamics of God's spirit as
creator of life.' And 'spirit' as used in Christian scriptures is defined by Pannenberg
as 'a kind of force, comparable to the wind but prior to bodily phenomena.'796 As
the dynamic mechanism through which part and whole relate, the spirit's universal
792Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 388.
793Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 209-210.
794Pannenberg, 'Theological Appropriation of Scientific Understandings: Response to
Hefner, Wicken, Eaves, and Tipler,' in Beginning With the End: God. Science, and Wolfhart
Pannenberg. eds. Carol R. Albright, and Joel Haugen (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court
Publishing Company, 1997), 433.
795Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell
(Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1985), 511; cf. idem 'Theological Appropriation,' 432-
433.
796Pannenberg, 'Theological Appropriation,' 433, 429.
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presence as field becomes the source of the eternal meaning of each constituent in
creation.797 It seems that with this "tri-partite" relational metaphysics, Pannenberg
wants to be able to think of the contingent present and the completed future as having
some degree ofmutual influence on each other. At the very least, this is a counter¬
intuitive proposal.
The second element in Pannenberg's doctrine ofprovidence is that of divine
co-operation (concursus). With this term he is able to give more precise conceptual
clarity to the way in which God's faithfulness underwrites preservation. It allows
him to articulate the dynamic creative aspect ofGod's action in all moments by using
traditional terminology, since what God conserves is not simply the 'original
constitution' of entities, but also 'their changes and activities.'798 It also allows him
to maintain both the ongoing dependence of creatures upon the Creator, and also
their true 'independence.' On the way to 'the future of consummation'—when
'eternity [will] have come fully and totally into time and taken up time into
itself—'the path to this point is by no means determined in every detail. Openness to
the future relative to each finite present is real, not illusory. Hence believers are
summoned to cooperate with God on his way to the future of his kingdom by their
actions and their prayers.'799 Thus, God's 'influence on the creature's freedom
[takes] the form ofpersuasion and accommodation.'800
The third element ofPannenberg's doctrine ofprovidence, the divine
801
government, plays an important role in God's creative plan. This element of
providence is crucial for ensuring that the creative process and the guidance of
individuals and world history results in their arrival at God's eschatological goal of
797Pannenberg, Anthropology. 520, 528.
798Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 46-47.
799Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 209-210.
800Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 48, 48, n. 117, 52.
801Pannenberg often uses the terms 'divine government' and 'providence' interchangeably
(cf. Systematic 2: 57, 58).
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the 'completion and glorification of all creation.'802 Pannenberg sees a close relation
between God's attributes ofpatience and wisdom and his world government.803
One of the strengths of Pannenberg's (as with Barth's) doctrine of divine
governance lies in its stress on the providential care 'that sees to the well-being of
individuals in isolation,' therefore implying the intrinsic worth of every creature, and
not seeing them 'as just a means to the higher levels of his [God's] world
government.' Each creature is 'an end in God's work of creation and therefore an
end for his world government as well'.804 This view of the significance conferred on
each created entity by its relationship to the Creator is reflected in Herbert
Butterfield's view ofhistory in which each moment ofhistory has its own
importance, a significance and meaning that exceeds its link to the end ofhistory.
He uses the analogy of 'a Beethoven symphony' in which there is beauty not only in
the whole, but also in 'each note in its particular context.' Similarly, each individual
person 'exists for the glory ofGod.'805 It is especially important for the credibility of
a doctrine ofprovidence to be able to integrate God's universal care with his
individual care, thus ensuring each entity receives the benefit of the Father's full
attention. This emphasis finds biblical precedent in Jesus' assertion that the Father's
care reaches from the birds of the air to one's clothing.806
Pannenberg also rejects 'the structuring of the older doctrine ofprovidence in
terms of end' in which the good of the individual is subservient to the good of the
universal. Even when the end good is God himself, Pannenberg still thinks this gives
God's 'world government... a harsh sound and leaves the impression that his rule is
802Pannenberg, 'Doctrine of Creation,' 159. It should be noted, however, that contrary to
Gilkey and Moltmann, Pannenberg does not foresee a 'universal reconciliation of all things,' since
this would leave 'too little place for human independence' (Systematic 3: 453; cf. idem, Systematic 2:
48).
803Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 440.
804Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 53.
805Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1950), 67; quoted in James Montgomery Boice, God and History, vol. 4, Foundations of the Christian




one of oppression.'807 Nevertheless, while Pannenberg resists any notion of a
808
government by coercion—God governs by persuasion —at the same time,
[I]t is the supreme art of God's world government to cause
good to come from evil (Gen. 50:20) and in this way to
overcome evil with good .... Hence there grow from
historical disasters opportunities for new beginnings. This is
true in the church's history as well. God's judgements on his
church force renewal on it or bring it by a detour to the state
it was resisting.809
By his government God is thus able to integrate into his 'purposes for the
world the failures and evil that these failures cause.'810 It is for this reason that
Pannenberg often uses the terms 'government' and 'overruling' interchangeably. It
is not always clear how God achieves these ends without sometimes limiting the
creature's freedom to resist his guidance. It might be helpful for Pannenberg to use
an analogy such as the that of the grand chess master, or the idea of 'rough theatre' in
which it is the task of the 'divine director' to establish the general parameters of the
play, and then to work to 'evoke talents, skills and capabilities the creature (who
remains the "actor") did not know it had. It gives God a supremely active and
creative role, leading and being alongside . . . , but does not destroy the autonomy of
the creature.'811
Although many have abandoned belief in providence, Pannenberg responds
to those who feel theology should exercise reservation with regard to claims of God's
providence by arguing that 'without preservation and world government we cannot
think ofGod as Creator.'812 For Pannenberg, therefore, belief in the trinitarian God
as revealed through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ entails a belief in
both a triune Creator and a triune Provider. Through the Son and Spirit, the Trinity
807Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 53, n. 135.
8°8cf pannenberg; Systematic 2:16.
809Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 525.
810Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 58; cf. idem, Systematic 2: 167.
8llTimothy J. Gorringe, God's Theatre: A Theology of Providence (London, UK: SCM Press
Ltd., 1991), 81, 82.
812Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 54, n. 136.
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is so intimately involved in the nature, existence and purpose of the world of
creatures that to think of God as at a distance from the life of creatures is to posit that
creature's non-existence.813 This is his theological answer to the problem posed for
belief in providence by a modern scientific world-view.
Providence and the Eschatological Kingdom
Several features ofPannenberg's doctrine of creation lend emphasis to the
notion ofhistory as moving toward an ultimate goal: creation as an ongoing project
in which the future has priority over the past and present, which in turn entails the
814
irreversibility of time (and hence instantiates contingency and history) ; eternity (as
God's ultimate future) embracing all of time and hence giving shape and meaning to
each moment and event815; and the idea of 'the process of its [creation's] ongoing
consummation.'816 These characteristics of the creative act gives providence its
forward-looking orientation, and the creative act has these features because it is
oriented toward the eschatological goal of the coming Kingdom of God. As the
'loving and saving presence ofGod,'817 providence accomplishes more than just the
maintenance of the status quo, but serves instead the goal of effecting God's
universal rule, and of establishing independent subjects of that rule—a rule which also
constitutes salvation.818
The first implication for providence that derives from its service to the
Kingdom derives from fact that only there will the goal ofGod's creative act be fully
realised, that is, when God will establishfellowship or community with and among
his creatures.819 In light of that purpose, even now there is the idea of God's
813Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 420.
814Cf. Pannenberg, 'Doctrine ofCreation,' 167-171.
815Pannenberg, 'Theological Appropriation,' 432-433; cf. idem, Systematic 3: 209-210.
816Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 447.
817Pannenberg, Introduction. 59; cf. ibid., 60.
818Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 525.
819Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 7; cf. also, Pannenberg, 'Eschatology and the Experience of
Meaning, chap, in Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 3, trans. R. A. Wilson, The Library of
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providential presence in and with his creation. As Pannenberg notes, 'Jesus called
this God whose reign was near, and even dawning with his own coming, the
(heavenly) Father.'820 And while 'heaven' is the transcendent and inaccessible
location of 'God's throne and lordship,' it also 'expresses the thought that all times
are present for the eternity of God'—God is omnipresent in all dimensions of the
universe.821 As an eternal act, God's creative act embraces the whole of the
creaturely existence, and therefore 'each individual creature—indeed, each event,
822
each moment—has its beginning [and distinction] in God's creation.'
James Loder and W. Jim Neidhardt criticise Pannenberg for being Hegelian,
that is, for subsuming the created other in the One, and for emphasising universality
over relationality.823 But Loder and Neidhardt fail to recognise that precisely in
emphasising God's ultimate future, and the whole, Pannenberg is able to maintain
both the distinction and the significance or meaning of the particulars, not only in
time, but also in eternity. Pannenberg instantiates this in the doctrine of God as
Trinity, versus Hegel's doctrine of God as a single Subject related to himself.
Pannenberg is tireless in emphasising both God's creative goal of the independence
of creatures and their free participation (through the Son and the Spirit) in fellowship
with the Trinity. He insists, for example, that 'the ultimate aim of God's election is
thus the fellowship of a renewed humanity in his kingdom. In this fellowship God's
purpose in creation will be fulfilled. For the aim of the Creator is that his creatures
• • • R94
should live in his presence.' This fellowship requires, or presupposes, an
Philosophy and Theology, eds. John Mclntyre, and Ian T. Ramsey (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd.,
1973), 202.
820Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 259.
821Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 402, 410-412.
822Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 42, 43; idem, Systematic 1:410.
823Loder and Neidhardt, The Knight's Move: The Relational Logic of the Spirit in Theology
and Science (Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers and Howard, Publishers, Inc., 1992), 53-54.
824Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 523. Sponheim's concerns regarding the possible pantheism
and loss of human freedom in Pannenberg's theology ('Inquiry into Pannenberg') can also be
answered in a similar manner.
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otherness-in-relation structure, which is Pannenberg's way of ensuring that this
structure is not reduced to a monism.
God's creative and saving presence manifests several characteristics. Beyond
the most basic sense ofGod simply being there, sustaining every dimension of the
universe, God also preserves, co-operates with, and governs his creatures. In
addition to these functional distinctions, however, the quality of that presence derives
from God's character as Father and his essence as love, and is revealed in his
825
universal care for creation as paradigmatically revealed through Jesus. This
'fatherly love of God' is intrinsically linked to his coming reign.8
A second implication of the Kingdom for providence resides in the idea of
God's ultimate rule over all creation. Providence, in its aspect of divine governing or
(overruling, is intrinsically linked to the certainty of God's coming eschatological
Kingdom, and therefore also to the final 'consummation of the creation of the
world.'827 Since Pannenberg understands the event of the cross and resurrection to
o?o
be the paradigmatic example ofGod's providential care of the world, that means
R9Q • • • • • • .
that as a trinitarian event it is the defining revelation of trinitarian providence.
This is so precisely because the cross and resurrection reveal the Father's deity,
OTA
lordship and rule over history, as mediated through the work of the Son and Spirit.
In this crucial and unique event lie the advance revelation of the goal of creation, and
oo 1
for this reason its eschatological promise and hope. The meaning of this event
includes the promise of final redemption and consummation, which consists of
825Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 259, 262.
826Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 260, 263.
827Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 540.
828Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 438. Colin Gunton holds a similar view (The Triune Creator.
174).
829Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 314; cf. Moltmann for a similar view (The Crucified God: The
Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology [London, UK: SCM Press Ltd.,
1974], 240-241).
830Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 315; cf. ibid., 322; and idem, Systematic 2: 439, n. 119.
83'Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 538; Pannenberg notes that Moltmann and others are correct to
ground 'eschatology in the concept of promise . . . inasmuch as eschatological hope can rest only on
God himself (Systematic 3: 539).
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unhindered fellowship with the Father through the Son and Spirit in the eternal
Kingdom.
A third important implication of the connection between providence and the
Kingdom consists of the role providence plays in theodicy. The fact that providence
must be understood as intimately linked to creation, soteriology, Christology,
pneumatology and eschatology enables Pannenberg to stress the unity of the divine
works in the economy. God's goal in creating a world of finite creatures cannot be
achieved without his providential oversight of the whole, and yet providence in turn
is not a work in isolation from his saving and consummating work. It is on the basis
of this overall schema of the unity of the divine works ad extra that Pannenberg is
able to deal with theodicy.
His approach to theodicy requires a providential, soteriological and
eschatological emphasis because he argues that one of the chief defects in traditional
theodicies is to seek to absolve the Creator from responsibility for sin and evil by
linking sin to the creature, and also by arguing that the present world is, in itself, as
originally created, good—that the original state was perfect, or, with Leibniz, it is the
best of all possible worlds.
Pannenberg, therefore, rejects the traditional view. First, the idea of an
originally complete and perfect creation is not an adequate doctrine of creation since
• • • 8^9
the Bible also emphasises God's continuing acts of creation and salvation. This
means that although creation appears to us as oriented to the past, it is in fact oriented
to the future, and therefore encompasses the whole of the space-time continuum. A
second and related issue is the idea that only by risking abuse of creaturely freedom
could God create independent creatures. Third, this means that creation is as yet
incomplete, and therefore the present state of the world and its orders at any given
time are on their way, still under construction, and therefore require the final and
Oil
future redemption and consummation of the eschaton.
832Cf. Pannenberg, 'Human Life: Creation Versus Evolution?,' in Science and Theology: The
New Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books
Group, 1998).
833Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 161-174. Richard Swinburne has also come to the conclusion
that theodicy cannot be treated apart from its connection to particular Christian doctrines, such as that
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Finally, in Pannenberg's doctrine ofprovidentially guided creation with is
goal in the future Kingdom, he is able to account for the necessary hiddenness of
God's presence in history. In order for each human to have the space and time to
develop a distinct identity and self-transcendence, God must grant to them the option
to freely choose, or reject, their own true destiny ofparticipating in the Son's filial
relation to the Father. This fact of anthropology, taken along with the openness and
contingency of the developing act of creation, goes some way toward allaying Wiles'
fear ofdivine determinism and arbitrariness. Nevertheless, the remaining question
about the coherence ofPannenberg's part-whole metaphysics ultimately leaves
Wiles' concern unresolved.
Initial Assessment ofPannenberg's Model
Whether or not Pannenberg's metaphysical system of a tri-partite relationality
is judged to be successful, his attempt to integrate the insights ofphilosophy,
sciences and culture under the theological claim of God as the all-determining power
moves in the right direction, for it is an attempt to develop a plausible worldview in
which a trinitarian doctrine of providence plays the key hermeneutical function of
helping its adherents to make meaning out of the ambiguities of life.
For Pannenberg, providence is an aspect of continuing creation and is not
limited to the maintenance of a static system. It effects instead the establishing of
independent creatures and sets up the Father's saving rule over those creatures.
Thus, providence has an eschatological goal and purpose and power, and as such
underwrites and encourages faith and hope, releasing humans to trust in the triune
God and to act in history. Free human activity (history) is made possible by the
Trinity's freedom in creating. The divine freedom is reflected in the contingency of
the universe (in its openness to the future), and both freedom and contingency are
essential in order for humans to become truly other than God, to have the time and
space in which to develop a self-conscious independence in and through which they
can then freely relate, as finite others, to God. The goal of creation, providence,
redemption and consummation is the development of such creatures who, after the




pattern of Jesus' relation to the Father and in the power of the Holy Spirit, enter
freely into fellowship with God.
The central role that Pannenberg gives to God's eternal act of continuing
creation defines God's relation to the ongoing events and history of the world in
strongly transcendent and immanent modes. There are moments in his development
of this model in which God seems very directive and one wonders if there is not a
hint of occasionalism in the notion of each moment being a new creation, and in even
the laws ofnature being contingent. This picture is spared the problem of
arbitrariness and coercion, however, by the character of the relation that obtains
within the inner-trinitarian life. The relation ofFather, Son, and Spirit, through the
medium of the divine essence ('the Spirit of love'), guarantees that all of God's
actions are guided by a love that makes room for, and sets free, the other. In the case
of creaturely others, they are only truly an 'other' when they become aware of their
independence and then freely accept their finite otherness as gift from God. In that
moment they participate in the freedom of true personhood and in the filial
relationship of the Son to the Father.
Another important emphasis ofPannenberg's is that even though God does
have a goal in mind for creation, his care extends to ensuring that every individual
entity find fulfilment in that overall goal. This focus on the individual counters
Wiles' focus on the whole and the tendency to lose the individual—in spite ofWiles'
concern for the freedom of the individual. Such radical freedom as Wiles proposes
necessitates a loss ofparticular divine care for the individual. Thus, a relational
metaphysics of the triune God does a better job ofpreserving both human freedom,
creativity and identity and the sense ofGod's personal availability to, and
involvement with, each creature.
The ability of God to act freely (in the form ofpromise and in the form of
creating the new), and to overrule creaturely intents, is the basis for meaning in
history. But just here Pannenberg's system is also threatened by determinism, not
from apast decree but from the all-determining future, which is God. Pannenberg
only avoids such determinism by insisting that the whole incorporates the truly
contingent, that the independence granted to the creature will not be overridden in
order to spare them the eternal consequences of sin. In other words, Pannenberg
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takes more seriously the logical consequences of libertarian freedom than does
Moltmann.
Moltmann: Eschatological, Trinitarian Panentheism
Some reviewers classify Moltmann as Reformed, while others take him to be
Lutheran in his theological sympathies. Although his theology reflects strong
elements ofboth traditions, his pursuit of a 'dialogical theology' leads him to resist
confinement to any particular '"school"' of theology.834 This fact, combined with
the diversity of influences upon his theology, seems to indicate the prudence of
835
accepting Moltmann's own classification of his theology as ecumenical.
One might expect, from the magnum opus of a systematic theologian, a
comprehensive system of theology which forms a 'harmonious' and 'integrated
OT/• fi "17
whole.' While Moltmann is certainly systematic, he refuses to attempt a unified
theological system which is complete in itself,838 or to detach theological reflection
from 'existential experience.'839 He defines his approach as a 'dialogicaV enterprise
open to other points of view.840
While his method ofpainting with broad strokes841 can leave some important
aspects of doctrines underdeveloped or ambiguous,842 there are two assets to this
834Moltmann, forward to Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making, by Richard J.
Bauckham (Hants, U.K.: Marshall Morgan and Scott Publications Ltd., 1987), viii, ix.
835Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, trans. Margaret Kohl,
The Gifford Lectures, 1984-1985 (SCM Press Ltd., 1985), xiii; cf. Richard J. Bauckham, The
Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann (Edinburgh, U.K.: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1995), 1-3.
836Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl
(origin, pub. in Britain as The Trinity and the Kingdom of God by SCM Press Ltd., London, UK; New
York, NY: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1981), xi.
837Richard J. Bauckham, Theology ofMoltmann. 4.
83SMoltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, trans. Margaret Kohl (SCM Press
Ltd., 1996), xiv.
839Moltmann, forward to Moltmann: Messianic Theology, vii.
840Moltmann, forward to Moltmann: Messianic Theology, viii.
841Cf. Moltmann, forward to Moltmann: Messianic Theology, ix-x.
842Three recent surveys ofMoltmann's theology include a treatment of some of the more
important problems and unanswered questions in Moltmann's work: Douglas Farrow, 'Review Essay:
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method. On the one hand, a negatively stated benefit arises from the recognition that
such doctrines as the Trinity, for example, exhaust one's conceptual and logical
categories. For this reason an overly rationalistic delineation of the doctrine can
result in reducing it to absurdities. On the other hand, stated positively, this approach
reflects the metaphorical nature of theological concepts, theories and models, thus
allowing some latitude for imprecision. It also accords well with Moltmann's own
stated desire to 'forego correctness in order to be concrete,' to 'take sides and speak
onesidedly.'843
The survey ofWiles' understanding of the God-world relation led to the
question as to whether Wiles ever developed a doctrine ofprovidence at all. A
similar question arises from an overview ofMoltmann's theology. Don Schweitzer
complains that Moltmann 'has never directly discussed in depth' the concept of
providence.844 This is a particularly problematic criticism in view of the purpose of
this project—ifMoltmann does not deal 'in depth' with providence, upon what basis
can he represent a trinitarian treatment ofprovidence? The answer I propose to that
question suggests that Moltmann's theology does in fact deal with the concerns of
providence, although his approach to doing theology is not compatible with a more
traditional treatment of the topic. In the process ofworking out an eschatological
and trinitarian doctrine of creation he does in fact grant a significant role to
providence, but he makes it an aspect of his doctrine of creation, framing the doctrine
in such a way as to avoid the overtones of God's predetermination of history. Since
he does maintain a doctrine ofprovidence (even if underdeveloped), the focus here
will include bringing to the fore some of the implications ofMoltmann's doctrines of
the Trinity, creation and eschatology for his view ofprovidence.
It should be noted that Moltmann's theology embodies a complex and
interconnected range of ideas spread throughout his works. It is impossible,
In the End is the Beginning: A Review of Jiirgen Moltmann's Systematic Contributions,' Modem
Theology 14, no. 3 (July 1998): 425-447; Richard Bauckham, Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann: and
Richard J. Bauckham, ed., God Will be All in All: The Eschatology of Jtirgen Moltmann (Edinburgh,
U.K.: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1999).
843Moltmann, forward to Moltmann: Messianic Theology, viii.
844Don Schweitzer, review of The Coming of God, by Jiirgen Moltmann, in Journal of the
American Academy ofReligion. 66, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 452.
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therefore, to do justice to the complexity, subtlety and scope of his thought here, or
to the intrinsic connections between major doctrines. These connections, for the
most part, will have to be assumed and only noted as far as is necessary in order to
bring into focus his treatment ofprovidence.
The God-World Relation: Trinity, Creation andHistory
The doctrine of the Trinity is central to Moltmann's whole theological
enterprise, and not surprisingly it embodies several problematic tensions. Some of
these affect his understanding ofprovidence, and will be noted in that connection.
God as Trinity
Pivotal to Moltmann's theological project is his intent to reclaim a central
role for the Christian doctrine of God as Trinity. He contends, first, that the doctrine
of the Trinity, rooted in the historical and dynamic 'relationship between the Father,
the Son and the Spirit' is the Christian doctrine of God.845 He maintains, secondly,
that the Trinity itself can serve as 'the matrix for a new kind of thinking about God,
the world and man,' by establishing the basis for thinking 'in terms of relationships
and communities.'846 This amounts to a metaphysics of relationality.
Moltmann adopts the Orthodox monarchical view of the inner-trinitarian
constitution in which the Father is understood as being "'the origin of the
Godhead.'"847 He modifies, however, what he sees as two corresponding weaknesses
in the Orthodox view. First, he qualifies the use of the word 'origin' as uniquely
applicable only to the constitution of the Trinity from the Father. When the term is
ascribed to the Father to ensure the unity of 'both the Godhead and the
["subsequent"] relationships' of the trinitarian persons, it blurs the important
distinction 'between the constitution of the Trinity and the Trinity's inner life.'848 It
845Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 64; cf. ibid., 65, 149; cf. also Moltmann, Crucified
God. 207, 239, 240, 241; Moltmann, 'The "Crucified God": A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross,'
Interpretation. 26, no. 3 (July 1972): 295.
846Moltmann. Trinity and the Kingdom. 16, 19.
847Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 165.
848Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 189, 183 (italics mine); cf. ibid., 173, 188.
213
The Triune Provider
tends to reduce what ought to be thought of as 'the equally primordial character of
the trinitarian Persons' to a modalism of the Father.849 Second, Moltmann's way of
avoiding the danger of tri-theism is to insist that 'personality and relationships [of the
divine persons] are genetically connected,' and as such 'the two arise simultaneously
and together.'850
An important third emphasis in Moltmann's doctrine of the Trinity is an
identification of the immanent and economic trinities. This move raises problems for
a doctrine ofprovidence understood in a theistic context. John Zizioulas, for
example, thinks this type ofmove threatens an important distinction between God
and the world. He argues that while it is appropriate to assert that 'the Economic
Trinity is the Immanent Trinity,' this must be qualified by saying 'the Immanent
Trinity is not exhausted in the Economic Trinity. Otherwise the Incarnation is
projected into God's eternal being' with the result that 'this kind of God offers no
real hope forMan.' Moreover, it entails that God 'transcends suffering,. . . not by
virtue of his being, but by some kind ofbecoming, which means that he is in constant
need of historical reality (involving suffering) in order to be what he will be, true
God.'851
Randall Otto raises a stronger criticism, noting that 'Moltmann's doctrine [of
God] is based on Bloch's Ontology of the Not-Yet, so that there can be no God until
the end, which there can never finally be, lest God lose the transcendence of the
future as his condition ofbeing .... God is instead a "possible God" (Gott-
moglich), coming from the future, from the non-Being of potentiality which, for
Moltmann, "must be higher ontologically than reality.'"852 Even though this
849Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 166.
850Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 173.
85'John Zizioulas, 'The Doctrine of God the Trinity Today: Suggestions for an Ecumenical
Study,' in The Forgotten Trinity 3 A Selection of Papers presented to the BCC Study Commission on
Trinitarian Doctrine Today, ed. Alasdair I. C. Heron (London, U.K.: BCC/CCBI Inter-Church House,
1991), 24.
852Randall Otto, 'The Use and Abuse ofPerichoresis in Recent Theology,' Scottish Journal of
Theology 54, no. 3 (2001): 375.
214
The Triune Provider
criticism overstates what Moltmann intends,853 and perhaps misunderstands his
theological concepts of time, eternity and the Sabbath,854 it does emphasise two
implicit dangers in his theological metaphysics: the loss of the self-sufficient Creator
God and, therefore, the permanent absence of this God,855 at least in the creatio
continua.
Moltmann actually insists, for example, that what occurs on the cross not
only reflects the trinitarian relations, but retroactively is part of the trinitarian history
of God.856 By making the immanent Trinity dependent on the experiences of the
economic Trinity, and then identifying the two, Moltmann has radicalised Rahner's
formula.857 Yet, he also insists that although the Trinity is open to the world, the
ontological structure of the nature of the Trinity remains the same from all eternity,
otherwise 'God's truth' could not be his 'faithfulness.'858 In fact, he sees the
doctrine of the Trinity as the safeguard against an identification ofdivine and created
ontologies.859 Bauckham suggests, however, that if one wishes to maintain both
sides of this ambiguity, then one needs to retain a more cautious doctrine of the
853Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 166; cf. ibid., 23-24, 107, 138, 164; cf. also idem,
The Coming of God. 294, 298; and idem, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic
Dimensions, trans. Margaret Kohl (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1990), 302; and idem, Crucified
God. 229-230.
854Cf. Bauckham, 'Time and Eternity,' in God Will Be All In All: The Eschatology of Jiirgen
Moltmann. ed. Richard Bauckham (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1999), 167-170.
855Cf. Gilkey's critique ofMoltmann's model for seeming to remove God from involvement
in current history 'into the relative chill of abstract, because future, possibility' ('The Universal and
Immediate Presence ofGod,' in The Future ofHope: Theology as Eschatology. ed. Frederick Herzog
[New York, NY: Herder and Herder Inc., 1970], 97). Cf. also, Stanley Grenz, and Roger Olsen,
Twentieth-Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age (Carlisle, UK: The
Paternoster Press; Downer Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 185.
856Moltmann, Crucified God. 240-241; cf. idem, Trinity and the Kingdom. 32-33, 160-161.
In his earlier work, Moltmann could even say the Spirit'emerges' from the event of the cross
(Crucified God. 247, 252 [italics mine]).
857Cf. Bauckham for a similar analysis of this difficulty (Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann. 154-
157).
858Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 154; cf. ibid., 153-154; and idem, God in Creation.
133.
859Cf. Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 111-114; idem, God in Creation. 98; idem, The




immanent Trinity in which 'it could be conceived as what remains unchanging in the
changing trinitarian relationships of God's history.'860 If the God behind
providential creation is the God who overcomes the transience of the history which
calls into question his ability to care for his creation, then one has to guard against
reifying the limited and temporally qualified information about God available in the
economy into the absolute categories of the immanent Trinity.
The Trinity and Creation: 'Eschatological, Trinitarian "Panentheism"'
In light of his concern to maintain God's active presence in creation,
Moltmann has developed an ecological doctrine of creation by which he intends to
move beyond the classical and dualistic concept of God as divine Subject over
against the world, opting instead for an 'eschatological, trinitarian "panentheistic"'861
O
model of God's presence in the world through the Son and Spirit. Relating this
concept to providence, therefore, one can say God preserves space within himself for
creation by actively holding back his presence and continually reiterating 'his primal
"yes" to his creation.'863 In this way, God protects creation from the threat of the
primordial 'annihilating Nothingness.'864 Hence, there is a necessary kenosis and
hiddenness ofGod in creation.
In his account of the creative process, however, Moltmann comes very close
to an emanationist doctrine of creation. He does, in fact, make use of emanationist
language and imagery. For example, his reference to the Spirit as the space and
energy of creation, even to the point of saying there is no clear distinction between
860Bauckham, Theology ofMoltmann. 156; cf. ibid., 154-157. Cf. Grenz and Olson,
Twentieth Century Theology. 182-183.
86lThis label is Bauckham's (Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann. 158).
862Moltmann, God in Creation. 13-14, 98-103, 94-98.
863Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 290.
864Moltmann, God in Creation. 96.
865Cf., for example, Trinity and the Kingdom. 107; idem, God in Creation. 75-76, 83-85; and
idem, Spirit of Life. 195.
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the divine energy which the Spirit is, and created energies,866 suggests emanationism.
Moreover, as noted above, talk of the reciprocal relation between the Trinity and
creation, as manifested in the retroactive effect of the cross on the eternal inner-
trinitarian relations,867 predisposes Moltmann's model of the God-world relation to
emanationism.868 Again, Moltmann's sometimes ambiguous definition of the
primordial 'space' established for creation can lead to the idea that it is a physical
'space' within God's own being.869
Moltmann responds to 'misunderstandings' about 'the ecological concept of
space' by noting that the perichoretic nature of all relations (divine and human)
creates their own space.870 Here, at least, Moltmann defines space as a relational
quality among existing things. This same metaphysics would also apply to the
character of time. On this view, time is internal to relations; aeonic time is the
character of time defined as the relations among completed creatures in the eschaton,
and hence equates to a "'fullness of the times'": 'In that new aeon a mutual
perichoresis between eternity and time comes into existence, so that on the one hand
we can talk about "eternal time" and on the other about "eternity filled with
time.'"871
Moltmann wishes to maintain a strong metaphysics of perichoresis which
enables not only the trinitarian Persons to exist in and out of each other (constituting
866Moltmann, Spirit of Life. 195. On the role of the Spirit as the means of the Father's
presence and the energy of the Father's creation through the Son, cf. Moltmann, Spirit of Life. 178-
179, 196; idem, Trinity and the Kingdom. 104, 111-114, 125, 122-128; idem, God in Creation, xii, 9,
10, 12, 67, 212, 262.
867Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 110; idem, Crucified God. 255.
868Cf. Grenz' and Olson's critique ofMoltmann on this point (Twentieth Century Theology.
185-186). Pannenberg also notes the danger of emanationism in Moltmann (Systematic 2: 20-21).
869Pannenberg raises a similar criticism against Moltmann at this point. He notes that while
Moltmann is correct to distinguish between 'the space ofGod . . . [and] that of the created world,' he
'cannot follow Moltmann's thesis that the space of creation precedes creation, and the spaces created
in it, as a third thing between the divine omnipotence and the world of creatures .... Opposed to this
thesis is the truth that God is omnipresent in the space of creatures' (Systematic 2: 89, n. 229).
870Cf. Moltmann, Coming ofGod. 299-300, 301.
87lMoltmann, Coming of God. 295. It remains an open question whether Moltmann has
resolved the 'time-eternity' question. Cf. Richard Bauckham's analysis of this issue ('Time and
Eternity,' 155-193; cf. esp. 179-180, 180-181, 184, n. 59, 185, n. 62, 185-186).
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both their unity and individuality), but also allows creation and the Trinity to
constitute each other to some degree.872 The concept of the perichoresis of the times
of creation (past, present, future), of eternity and time, of divine and created
O-7-l
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attributes, and ofGod's absolute eternity and aeonic time, amounts to a kind of
pan-perichoretic relational metaphysics which embraces not only the constitution of
the Trinity apart from creation, but also includes creation within the inner-trinitarian
history.
When defining the perichoretic basis of the constitution of persons, however,
Pannenberg is more careful than Moltmann in distinguishing the concept as it
applies, on the one hand, to the constitution of trinitarian persons, and on the other
hand, to the constitution of human persons.874 In the sense that both divine persons
and human persons 'achieve their selfhood ec-statically outside themselves,' 'human
personality is similar to the trinitarian persons.'875 But there are two important
differences: first, 'being a human person is not so exclusively constituted by the
relation to one or two other persons as it is in the trinitarian life of God'; second,
'because in the case ofhuman personality the identity of the person is never fully or
exclusively defined by the relation to the other, in human self-awareness the human I
and the human self are different.'876 This insight into the qualitative difference
between perichoretic relations within the Trinity and those on the human level helps
to draw the line of demarcation between God and the creature a little more
definitively.
872Cf. Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 167-168, 98-99. Moltmann argues against using
the category of 'causality' when speaking of the creative work of God, opting instead for the language
of 'an intricate web of unilateral, reciprocal and many-sided relationships' (God in Creation. 14).
873Moltmann, Coming of God. 295.
874Randall Otto thinks Moltmann's God is threatened with the non-being of always becoming
('Abuse of Perichoresis,' 366-384). Moltmann is aware of the qualitative difference between divine
and human personhood (Trinity and the Kingdom. 189-190), but tends to minimise the uniqueness of
each of the trinitarian persons as well as the distinction between divine personhood and human
personhood (cf. Bauckham's critique ITheologv of Jiirgen Moltmann. 173-179]).
875Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 430.
876Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 431.
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In spite of the foregoing problems, Moltmann clearly wants to avoid an
emanationist doctrine of creation.877 He seems to have three interconnected
strategies for achieving this goal: first, making space and time within the intra-
trinitarian history for creation; second, positing creation through the Son/Logos and
Spirit, thereby maintaining the transcendence ofthe Father, and third, appropriating
distinct roles to each divine person in their establishing of the kingdom.
Moltmann thinks of the initial creative act as the making of space and time
for creation within the inner-trinitarian fellowship or history. The Father, as Creator,
breathes out into the nihil the forms and energies of creation made possible by the
Logos and Spirit.878 It is in the Trinity's character as a differentiated, social unity
that Moltmann finds the means ofmaintaining creation's distinction over against the
Trinity. Since these created forms correspond to the Father's love for the Son, are
given their continuing form and identity through the Son, and since they continue to
exist only through the energy of the Spirit, their status as created entities (and not
divine emanations) is maintained through the forms given them through the Word,
that is, through the Son as Logos.879
This breathing out of the Word and Spirit in the creatio originalis is the first
movement or phase of the creative process. The next phase is that of creatio
continua, the sphere of God's ongoing creative work as it finds expression in the
Son's and Spirit's hidden influence in evolution,880 and in the ongoing work of the
881
Spirit as the energy of life and source ofpotentialities and transformation. The
877Moltmann explicitly rejects the reduction of creation to a modalistic self-realisation of God
on a Hegelian model (Coming of God. 335-336). He also rejects the idea of God as the eternally
creative substance (God in Creation. 83-84). It is not clear, however, whether he has succeeded in
avoiding the concept of the Father as subject being eternally creative, since his love not only
necessarily generates the Son and breathes the Spirit, but also creates an Other (cf. Moltmann, Trinity
and the Kingdom. 157).
878Moltmann, God in Creation. 206. This intimate link between the Father and the world,
made possible by the Son and the Spirit, accounts for the correspondences between the Trinity and the
world (cf. ibid., 212).
879Cf. Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 108; idem, Way of Jesus Christ. 289, 290; and
idem, God in Creation. 9, 97-98.
880Cf. God in Creation. 208-212; idem, Way of Jesus Christ. 287-305.
88lMoltmann, God in Creation. 210-212.
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Father's role as Creator, at this stage, seems to consist ofhis Tongsuffering love'
('patience') allowing creation time and space to develop its own free response to his
love.882 This creative process comes to completion in a third and final step, creatio
nova. This objective has been made possible by God taking into his own inner-
trinitarian life all the history of the world, and the very 'nothingness' and sin which
threatens his whole creation.883 This was the meaning of the trinitarian event of the
cross and resurrection. Because every disintegrating possibility and actuality was
taken up into the trinitarian life in the cross, the Son becomes the bearer and
perfecter of the humanity created to be the image of God, the created 'Other' for
God's love.884 His resurrection perfects and guarantees the final restoration of all
things.885 Therefore, the key word of the new creation is 'completion.' Thus, if the
original creative moment required a prior self-limitation (kenosis) of God's
omnipresence in order to make room for the non-divine, then that 'primordial
moment' of creatio originalis finds its completion in the 'eschatological moment' of
creatio nova in which 'heaven and earth find their final, transfigured form in God's
unrestricted omnipresence itself.'
The picture here is one of divine withdrawal, creation and return. What saves
this model from emanationism (in Moltmann's view) is that something truly new, the
non-divine, is brought into being with creation. Although the concept ofGod's887
omnipresence once again pervading all "spaces" sounds at least ambiguous, in that
return the non-divine becomes flooded with the glory of God's immediate presence,
882Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 30; cf. ibid., 98.
883Moltmann, Crucified God. 246, 218, 277.
884Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 168.
885Through the openness of the trinitarian history to that of the world, and by the former
taking up and transforming the latter, the trinitarian history is intrinsically linked to soteriology (cf.
Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 96, 178).
886Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 329; cf. idem, Coming of God. 295.
887Moltmann often uses the term 'God' when he really means 'Father.' At other times he
seems to use the term to refer to the Godhead. This ambiguity hinders the construction of a




but not absorbed into it in such a way as to lose its identity. Moltmann's
perichoretic, relational metaphysics is meant to ensure creation is not simply
subsumed into God. This eternal distinction between Creator and creation is
reflected in the distinction Moltmann makes between the 'aeonic' time of the new
creation and God's 'absolute eternity.'889 The completed creation will participate in
God's 'essential eternity,' but will not share that eternity in the same way as do the
trinitarian Persons—an implicit reference, perhaps, to the absolute difference between
trinitarian and human ontologies.890 Nevertheless, concepts such as the 'mutual'
perichoresis between divine and created attributes, and language which refers to 'the
• • 891
Creator no longer remaining] over against his creation,' but dwelling in it, seems
to stretch the ability of the concept ofperichoresis to retain dijference-m-re\ation.
This problem raises a question about the distinction of the world's being and history
from the Trinity's being and history, and therefore a question about the relevance of
continuing to insist upon God's providential care of that which is, in fact, an
expression ofGod's own intra-trinitarian love.
Moltmann further pictures this trinitarian creation as three distinct aspects of
the kingdom of God. Each aspect features the specific contribution of Father, Son
and Holy Spirit, respectively: 'creation, liberation, glorification.' In appropriating
the creative impetus to the Father,893 Moltmann differs from the traditional use of the
doctrine of appropriations, because his doctrine of creation specifies distinct roles for
the trinitarian Persons, and not merely appropriations. These roles actually reflect
the unique relations, identities and roles of the trinitarian Persons in the primordial
Trinity. In keeping with the fact of the trinitarian decision to create the world894 is
888Cf. Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 107, 138; idem, Way of Jesus Christ. 302; idem,
Coming of God. 294; and idem, God in Creation. 258.
889Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 330-331.
890Cf. Moltmann, Coming of God. 307.
891Moltmann, Coming of God. 295.
892Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 212.
893Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 112, 113, 113-114; cf. ibid., 164, 165-66, and esp.
167-168.
894Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 111.
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the work of the Trinity in carrying out the whole project. Not only does the initial
creation proceed 'from the Father,' it is also to 'be ascribed to the unity of the triune
God' because 'the Son, as Logos, and the Spirit, as energy, are both involved.'895
For example, the Father's generative love constitutes him as 'Creator,' but only as
mediated through the Son and Spirit. In this way 'God communicates himself896 to
creation.
Moltmann remains ambiguous as to whether the phrase, 'God communicates
himself,' refers only to the Father as Creator, or to the whole Trinity. If the latter,
then he might have specified that due to the equality of their perichoretic relations
(not constitution), when one Person of the Trinity is present in creation, all are
present, and yet each in his own distinct way. This was Pannenberg's important
insight,897 and it would appear to reflect Moltmann's intention as well.898
Because Moltmann places such an emphasis on the multiple roles ofSpirit in
the economy, he tends to appropriate both God's presence and transcendence to the
Spirit.899 While one could not push the model too far, it would be truer to the intent
of his trinitarian model if he consistently associated transcendence with the Father,
immanence with the Spirit, and otherness with the Son/Logos.900 In this way his
doctrine of the Trinity would more effectively ensure both distinction and relation.
Moltmann's trinitarian, panentheistic model of creation, with its special focus
on the role of the Spirit, the open nature of the inner-trinitarian history toward the
world, and the reciprocal nature of the relation between the divine and human
histories,901 provides the context for his treatment of creation and providence.
895Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 114; cf. idem, God in Creation. 94-98.
896Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 289.
897Pannenberg can speak of the 'co-operation' of the trinitarian Persons in their works ad
extra (Systematic 1:388).
898Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 9; idem, Trinity and the Kingdom. 122, 98, 212; and
idem, Spirit of Life. 295, 297.
899Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 10, 262, 9; and idem, Trinity and the Kingdom. 125.
9°°cf jecj peters for a somewhat similar appropriation (God the World's Future: Systematic
Theology for a New Era. 2nd ed. [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2000], 86).
90lCf. Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 64, 160-161.
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The Cod-World relation: Providential Creation
Although Moltmann clearly wishes to maintain some form of the doctrine of
providence, his treatment of the doctrine amounts to an emphasis within his
trinitarian doctrine of creation. Several reasons can be deduced for his non-
traditional coverage.
A Non-Traditional Coverage
First, there is a methodological reason: his primary concern is not to defend
'ancient doctrines or ecclesiastical dogmas,' but to stimulate new ideas.902
Second, there is Moltmann's stress on the unity of all God's works ad extra.
Contrary to initial appearances, therefore, Moltmann's lack of explicit treatment of
the topic of providence does not mean he ignores its essential concerns. Key foci in
Moltmann's theology include the kingdom of God (God's rule), divine solidarity
with creation, promise and hope, eschatology and new creation, and the Trinity.
These themes demonstrate that he is, in fact, very much concerned with how God
provides for his creation. The future arrival of God's kingdom as the new heaven
and earth requires (or presupposes) God's present provision for its future realisation.
Moltmann's creation-affirming doctrine of the God-world relation is reflected in its
grounding in the unifying of the divine acts of creation, redemption, and
consummation903; in the confirmation and completion provided by the incarnation of
the Son (which affirms equally: the goodness of creation; protest against the evil and
suffering experienced by creation; the promise of God's redemption of all of
creation); and in the anticipation of the eschatological transformation of creation by
the Spirit when God will be '"all in all.'"904 Moltmann's doctrine of creation
includes the work of the Son in redemption, since the Son's self-emptying is only an
extension of the pre-mundane, self-emptying of God in order to make 'room' for
creation. The work of the cross and resurrection is the creative work of the Father,
902Moltmann, Coming ofGod, xiv.
903Cf. Moltmann, Coming ofGod. 259.
904Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 237-238.
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Son and Spirit in carrying forward the project of creation. Thus, Moltmann speaks of
salvation as a work of creatio ex nihilo, as a completion of the creative work of
annihilating the 'annihilating Nothingness.'905
Moltmann's concern for relevance,906 therefore, has led him to posit that
God's creative and redemptive activity are not two distinct enterprises, but rather
reflect God's single goal of the eventual consummation of all of creation (including
every entity that has ever existed) in the new creation907—the divine-human
community in the Kingdom of Glory. Bishop Graham Leonard has suggested that in
theology,
the most important issue of the moment is the relationship
between our doctrine of creation and our doctrine of
redemption. As the prologue to Saint John's Gospel
indicates, the same God who made the world is also the
Savior who redeemed it. But we have yet to draw out the
implications of such ideas as perhaps we ought.908
It is in the context of this type of dual concern that Moltmann has developed
his doctrine of a three-phase creation sequence, and this combined concern remains a
theme throughout his work in systematic theology. This is evident in the way he sees
the future of the kingdom providing the model and the impetus for praxis in the
present, and hence for his ecological concerns and liberation sympathies. The
concept ofprovidence as a distinct work tends to be eclipsed, therefore, by a focus on
the role of all God's works as they facilitate the accomplishment of the goal of
creation. The ongoing, three-phase act of creation, rooted in the Trinity's suffering
and passionate love,909 already entails God's caring presence at every moment of its
existence: 'In the preservation of the world, nature and grace are so closely
interwoven that it is impossible to talk about the one without the other.'910
905Cf. God in Creation. 89-91, 93; cf. ibid., 208-209, 210.
906Cf. Moltmann, Crucified God, 83-4, 239.
907Moltmann, Coming of God. 259.
908Graham Leonard, 'Bishop Graham Leonard,' in Roundtable: Conversations with European
Theologians, interview by Michael Bauman (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1990), 61.
909Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 209, 98.
910Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 291.
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Third, a panentheistic model of the God-world relation presents special
challenges to the older concept ofprovidence which included a notion of God as all-
powerful Subject over against the world, governing the universe according to an
inflexible, overarching masterplan. Providence in this model often took the form of
God's unilateral, eternal decrees, which were the expression of the divine will. This
God was impassible, and was able to predict the future precisely because he had
foreordained and predestined it. Providence therefore had no room for human
innovation, but was entirely prescriptive. Creation was "outside" of God; it was his
work ad extra. Providence traditionally focused on sustaining, preserving, and
governing what was already established. Only in this way was providence linked
to historical time. Even when God was defined as Trinity, in the Trinity's works ad
extra there was no distinction between the Persons—they exercised a single lordship
and unity of activity toward creation. In Moltmann's view, this picture fostered the
metaphor of intervention, hierarchical relationships, structures of domination in
social and political relationships, and the exploitation of the earth.
In contrast to this, in Moltmann's model God maintains a much more
interactive relation to the created order. In a very real sense the exact nature of the
immanent trinitarian relations with creation will only be decided as the result of the
nature of the responses of the creation to the creative, redemptive and consummating
work ofFather, Son and Spirit—the "masterplan" is still taking shape.
Fourth, as continuous creation, all of life has a processive, and therefore
historical character,911 rooted as it is in the provision by the Spirit of dynamic
possibilities and potentialities. Remembrance, promise and hope constitute the
. « . 019
conditions for the experience of life as history. Individual life and ontology, the
life of societies (human and non-human), and even the life of the Trinity itself has a
history, is going somewhere. In this picture of the dynamic fluidity of forms and
developing complexities lies perhaps the clue as to why providence, in the sense of
91'Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 265.
9l2Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 236-237; cf. idem, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and
the Implications of a Christian Eschatology. trans. James W. Leitch. Preface to the new paperback ed.




preservation of initially given forms, tends to be overshadowed by the concepts of
innovation ('novum—the new thing'913) and promise in Moltmann's theology.
Implicit in all of these observations is the fact that the overarching scheme in
Moltmann's theology is not that of a pre-creation masterplan ofprovidence,
embodied in a set of fixed divine decrees, but rather that of the future kingdom of
God which entails a final joining of the inner-trinitarian history914 with the history of
the world and with the history of the Trinity's developing relation with the world's
history.915 Richard Bauckham points out that 'history' is a modern concept, often
associated with the ideas of change and progress.916 History as a conceptual
category, as a way of viewing the human experience of life as open process, depends
upon 'remembrance and hope,' the difference between the world as experienced in
the present and remembered from the past, and the expectations (in the present) for
the future.917
01 R
Moltmann, like Gilkey, attempts to re-Christianise history so that humans
have a present share in God's rule,919 and a role in shaping creation.920 For that
reason, 'Christian eschatology has nothing to do with apocalyptic "final solutions'"
where God unfolds his 'last act,' and where 'God has the final word.'921 In addition
9l3Moltmanri, Coming of God. 27; cf. ibid., 27-29.
9l4Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 174-175.
9l5Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 238; Cf. idem, Crucified God. 255-256; and idem, Spirit
of Life. 289-301. This reciprocal relationship allows all of creation to participate in God's own glory,
thereby glorifying God (Cf. Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 96, 90, 209; cf. also idem, God in
Creation. 5).
916Bauckham, Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann. 8-9; cf. ibid., 210-211.
9l7Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 236; cf. ibid., 245.
9l8Cf. Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation ofHistory (New York, NY:
Seabury Press, 1981), 159-160.
9l9Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 221.
920Moltmann, God in Creation. 224-225.
92'Moltmann, Coming ofGod, xi, x. As already noted, in light ofMoltmann's universalism,




to his emphasis on God's continuous 'sustenance, providence, [and] guidance,'
therefore, Moltmann places special emphasis on the potentiality inherent in creation
toward the genuinely new, since this potentiality is rooted in God who must be
thought of as 'the possibility and as the enabling of all potential realities: "All things
are possible for God.'"923 What the kingdom will be in the end both incorporates the
free actions of humans in the present and yet exerts influence on the present, thereby
enabling work toward it now to have maximum meaning for the future.
The metaphysics of becoming holds not only for present reality, but also for
the eternal creation,924 since it too, is characterised by "'eternal time,"' openness,
'history, future and possibility.' There will not be a final, disruptive ending, so much
as 'the end ofpre-history and the beginning of the "eternal history" of God, human
beings and nature.'925 In this way Moltmann is able to retain the category ofhistory
both for our present experience ofGod and for the eternal creation in which 'God
will be all in all.'
The new creation is not merely the replacement or restoration of the old (or
original) creation, but thefulfilment of the old in the kingdom ofGod.926 Thus,
concern about God's presence and present activity in the world must take as their
organising centre, not the fate of the individual soul, nor of the world, but rather, 'the
centre of both personal and cosmic hope has to be God, God's kingdom and God's
922Moltmann, 'Reflections on Chaos and God's Interaction with the World From a Trinitarian
Perspective,' in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Russell,
Robert John, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine
Action,' ed. Robert John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley,
CA: The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997), 208.
923Moltmann, 'Reflections on Chaos,' 209-210 (first italics mine); cf. idem, God in Creation.
214.
924Moltmann, 'Reflections on Chaos,' 209. Cf. idem, God in Creation, 213-214.
925Moltmann, God in Creation. 213; cf. idem, Coming of God, xi. Moltmann notes that to
use the category '"eternal history" of God, human beings and nature. . .. means thinking of change
without transience, time without the past, and life without death. But this is difficult in the history of
life and death, becoming and passing away, because all our concepts are moulded by these
experiences or transitoriness. Yet finitude is not necessarily bound up with mortality' (God in
creation. 213).
926Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 239-240; cf. idem, Trinity and the Kingdom. 90, 95; and
idem, God in Creation. 229, 242-243.
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glory.'927 And since God is triune, God's presence and provision in the economy
have a trinitarian framework.
Providential Creation Versus a Separate Work of Providence
As noted above, for Moltmann the whole project of creation (creatio
originalis, creatio continua, and creatio nova) participates in the Trinity's suffering,
passionate love, and therefore already entails God's caring presence at every moment
of its existence—all the works of God are already providential.
Talk of divine providence is, therefore, reinterpreted and given a larger
context ofmeaning, that is, one formed by hope for the future kingdom of glory, in
928addition to creation in the past. The future kingdom of glory is 'the inner ground'
of creation in the past. Moltmann's ecological doctrine of creation by the Trinity
seeks to emphasise the Trinity's intimate involvement and immanent presence in
creation, even to the point of speaking of the inclusion of created history within
God's history. This image need not be interpreted as a type ofHegelian pantheism
since the Trinity has its own distinct priority of being, even though creation, because
it is intended to reflect the kind ofperichoretic love relations that exist among the
persons of the Trinity, can be said to correspond to its Creator.929
God, therefore, unobtrusively 'accompanies' creation in all of its
movements.930 The theological idea of the world as 'in the process of
QO 1
"becoming"' does not override the laws of nature, but actually works through
them. The laws of nature themselves reflect God's faithfulness, or better, reflect the
927Moltmann, Coming of God, xv.
928Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 209.
929Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 212, 220-221, 223, 228-229; and idem, Trinity and the
Kingdom. 202. There are passages where Moltmann can sound Hegelian, such as when explaining
that it is the character of the Father's 'engendering, fatherly love' 'which begets and brings forth the
Son,' which accounts for it being 'open for further response through creations which correspond to
the Son. . . . Hence the love of the Father which brings forth the Son in eternity becomes creative
love. . . . Creation proceeds from the Father's love for the eternal Son. It is destined to join in the
Son's obedience and in his responsive love to the Father, and so to give God delight and bliss'
(Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 168). Cf. also, idem, Way of Jesus Christ. 238.
930Moltmann, God in Creation. 207; cf. ibid., 211-212.




order and wisdom which grounds creation in and through the Son. In their role as
co-creators,932 God not only accompanies humans by sustaining them in being, but
933
also in their creative contribution to the creative process (concursus). God's
continuing action receives its character from its orientation toward God's
eschatological goal 'of the new creation of all things, the divinization of the cosmos
and of the eternal creation' where God will indwell creation.934 And since
'continuous creation,' which 'is creation's ongoing history,' points to God's new
creation of all things, it reflects not only God's preserving activity, but also his
innovating activity.935 For this reason the unity of creation as original
('determined'), continuing ('undetermined' or open) and new (consummated) 'has its
foundation, not in itself, but outside itself in the Trinity.936 This opening of the
inner-trinitarian history to include the history of creation within itselfmakes the life
Q^7
of the triune God itself the context ofmeaning of creation's history and of the
QTO m .
providence which guides its direction. Thus, the world (in all phases of creation)
exists in God, and God, through the Son and Spirit, dwells within creation.
The trinitarian framework ofprovidence can be summarised as follows: the
Father's patience (born of his passionate, suffering love) preserves the world in
existence in order to give it space and time in which to respond to the offer of
932Moltmann, God in Creation. 224; cf. idem, Trinity and the Kingdom. 221.
933Moltmann, God in Creation. 211.
934Moltmann, 'Reflections on Chaos,' 209. Use here of the concept of the 'divinization' of
creation may reflect an imprecision in language, since in his earlier work Moltmann stopped short of
advocating the divinization of creation. He writes: "'Creation in the Spirit of God" is an
understanding which does not merely set creation over against God. It also simultaneously takes
creation into God, though without divinizing it [italics mine]. In the creative and life-giving powers of
the Spirit, God pervades his creation' (Moltmann, God in Creation. 258).
935Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 291. Thus, Moltmann can say that continuous creation is
innovative providence, and vice versa [God in Creation. 209-10). Cf. Moltmann, Trinity and the
Kingdom. 209.
936Moltmann, God in Creation. 163; cf. idem, Way of Jesus Christ. 240, 253-254.
937Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 5; idem, God in Creation. 162-163; idem, Way of
Jesus Christ. 291.
938Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 204, 205, 206, 207, 211; idem, Way of Jesus Christ. 103;
idem, Crucified God. 338.
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liberation (through the Son) from 'closed-in-ness,' a response enabled by the
energies of the Spirit.939 Seen in this trinitarian framework, all ofGod's works are
providential. These works are accomplished through a sequence of re-orderings
within the 'open Trinity' in which different persons of the Trinity appear more
"prominent" at different moments in the history of God with the world.940
Within this general preserving, concurring, guiding and innovating relation,
the Father, Son and Spirit each play an essential role in the sustenance and forward
motion of creation.
The Father's role
As noted above, providence must be seen against the overarching
conceptuality of the kingdom, for it is as part of that kingdom that the concerns of the
doctrines of creation and ofprovidence come into play. Because the Father is the
Creator, providence comes under the domain of the kingdom of the Father.941
Moreover, because the realisation of this kingdom is effected by a continuous
creation sequence which receives its shape from the future,
the interpretation ofprovidence must be expanded
correspondingly: providence and the general universal
government of God does not merely mean the continuing
preservation of creation from destruction. It also means that
God keeps the world's future open for it through the gift of
time, which works against all the world's tendencies to close
in on itself, to shut itselfoff. ... It is wrong simply to see the
kingdom of the Father as a 'kingdom ofpower'. Self-
limitation, self-emptying and the patience of love already
begin with the creation of the world, and it is these things that
mark out God's whole government of the world, and his
providence, as being the kingdom of the Father.942
939Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 210-211; cf. ibid., 212-213.
940Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 93, 94.
941Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 210, 207, 205.




In the creative sequence, Christ is the mediator of the creation.943 For this
reason the creation is sustained through the Son and is enabled to participate in the
Trinitarian relations of the Son, the Father and the Spirit.'944
The cross event, with its retroactive influence on the immanent Trinity, is
really only a concrete instance of that 'eternal obedience which he [the Son] renders
to the Father in his whole being through the Spirit, whom he receives from the
Father. Creation is saved and justified in eternity in the sacrifice of the Son, which is
her sustaining foundation.' In a way which can seem to make the Trinity dependent
for its being on creation, Moltmann says 'the Son's sacrifice ofboundless love on
Golgotha is from eternity already included in the exchange of the essential, the
consubstantial love which constitutes the divine life of the Trinity.' 945
The incarnation of the Son was not simply a contingency rescue plan
necessitated by human sin, but rather 'creation represents the external framework and
preparation for the Son's incarnation' planned from all eternity.946 The incarnation,
and the salvation from death achieved by it, is all part ofGod's original provision for
the steps necessary in creating and establishing an 'Other.'947 On this view, 'what is
at stake is the fulfilment of the promise given with creation.'948
The Son, or Logos, is the continually spoken creative Word, the continually
reiterated 'primal Yes' which gives created entities their distinct forms and
identities.949 'All created things'950 receive their preservation through the Word from
943Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 104, 108, 168; cf. idem, Way of Jesus Christ. 287-
289.
944Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 122; cf. ibid., 121, 117, 168; idem, Way of Jesus
Christ. 287; and idem, God in Creation. 95.
945Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 168.
946Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 115,114; cf. ibid., 50, 107, 114-118, 168; cf. also
idem, God in Creation. 242-243.
947Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 117, 108, 114.
948Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 118.
949Moltmann, The Source of Life: The Holy Spirit and the Theology of Life, trans. Margaret
Kohl (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1997), 118, 115-116; cf. Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 290.
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the threat of disintegration back into the 'nothingness,' in the face ofwhich, they
were created.951 While 'the Word specifies and differentiates through its efficacy,'952
the very fact that all forms come from, and correspond to, this one Word ensures that
they receive their unity and fellowship ('community') in the one creation of the one
God through him.953
Moltmann's understanding of the world's relation to Christ as both its
structure, redemption and completion highlights the importance ofChrist's role in
understanding providence. IfChrist's role relates only to the redemption of the
world, then it holds little insight as a paradigm for human free relation to God. If,
however, Christ also has creative significance, then God must intend humanity's free
response to the Trinity, since this is modelled in Christ's relation to the Father.
Whether or not this also requires a fully mutual, reciprocal syncreticism between
human and divine action, it can at least point to a qualified reciprocity between God
and humans in interpersonal relationship. The goal of such a model of a-
symmetrical,954 but truly reciprocal personal relations, gives the incarnation of the
Son a dual purpose: redemption and completion of the creation of a divine-human
community.
The Spirit's role
With his trinitarian, panentheistic model of creation, Moltmann intends to
supplement Barth's christocentric model of trinitarian presence by including a
stronger emphasis on the Spirit's role in creating, sustaining, redeeming and
950Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 290.
95lMoltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 288; cf. ibid., 282, 287; cf. also idem, God in Creation.
95.
952Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 289.
953Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 287; cf. idem, God in Creation. 116; and idem, Source of
Life. 118-120.
954Cf. Kevin Vanhoozer's critique of Brummer on this point, that is, it is difficult to conceive
of the creator-creature relationship as fully mutual and reciprocal, even if one allows for certain
dimensions of the relationship to have the quality of reciprocity—limited of course, by the finite
capacities of the creature ('Introduction: The Love ofGod,' in Nothing Greater. Nothing Better:
Theological Essays on the Love of God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer [Cambridge, UK; Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001], 18-19).
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renewing the world.955 Moltmann understands evolution to be evidence of 'the self-
movement of the divine Spirit of creation,'956 since 'the Spirit is the principle of
957
creativity on all levels ofmatter and life,' and as such 'creates new possibilities.'
Thus, 'the whole creation is fabric woven by the Spirit, and is therefore a reality to
which the Spirit gives form.' But this 'form' is not a predetermined blueprint so
much as a 'harmony' of relationships, 'a dynamic web of interconnected
processes.'958 Because God creates through his life-giving and life-sustaining Spirit,
and since this world is not presently 'in accordance with God,' then God the Spirit
endures a kenosis just as does God the Son.959 This suffering immanence of God
becomes the promise ofnew creation and therefore of hope because the very fact that
the world continues in being, sustained by the energies of the Spirit, is evidence of
God's intention to bring it to consummation.960 In this regard, one might say that
Moltmann's understanding of providential creation in the Spirit involves a dynamic
openness of the world 'for God and for his future.'961 The world as history has this
character because history is intimately and fundamentally grounded in the history of
the Spirit's sustaining, quickening, and renewing work in creation, on all levels.962
Moltmann sees his doctrine of 'creation in the Spirit' as the solution to the
weakness of 'differentiated panentheism.' The Spirit is able to both differentiate and
bind together the 'interconnected processes' of creation.963 The Spirit is the presence
of God in creation, and yet just because he is God, he continually 'preserves and
955Moltmann, God in Creation. 10; cf. ibid., xii, 96-97.
956Moltmann, God in Creation. 19.
957Moltmann, God in Creation. 100; cf. ibid., 207, 214.
958Moltmann, God in Creation. 99, 100, 103.
959Moltmann, God in Creation. 102.
960Moltmann, God in Creation. 100, 102-103.
961Moltmann, God in Creation. 103.
962Moltmann, God in Creation. 102. This picture reflects the tension within God's own
being, and the ideas of the uniting and redemption ofGod (cf. idem, Coming of God. 305-306). These
concepts reflect, in turn, the 'event' character of the Trinity (idem, Crucified God. 247).
963Moltmann, God in Creation. 103.
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leads living things and their communities beyond themselves.'964 Through the
creative, innovative and sanctifying Spirit, God's providential creation is given
redemptive power and potential.
The Father's providential care of creation, therefore, is effected or mediated
through the Son (or Word) and by the indwelling Spirit: 'The Word specifies and
differentiates; the Spirit binds and forms the harmony.'965 As stated here, the roles of
Son and Spirit are very close to the way Pannenberg pictures them, although
Moltmann does not always clearly maintain the distinction between their roles.
Thus, the Son is the principle of distinction both within the Trinity and the economy,
while the Spirit is the bond ofunity. In this way creation participates in the character
of the inner-trinitarian relations.
In summary, it is clear that for Moltmann the fact that God's history and
human history are reciprocally related means God is presently acting in the affairs of
this world—creation is continuous. What the Father provides in creation is not a
super-imposed over-arching design, but the freedom of creative potential; not
authoritarian rule, but an invitation to freely love,966 an invitation to community.967
The Son provides the restoration of a freedom for potential lost in the 'servitude to
sin,' and the Spirit provides the resources to participate in 'the energies of the new
Q/:o
creation.' The freedom God provides and enables through the Son and Spirit is
'freedom as initiative, as creativity and as a passion for the future.'969 It works not
by imposition, but as a calling.970
964Moltmann, God in Creation. 103; cf. ibid., 101, 211-212; idem, Trinity and the Kingdom.
111,113, 122, 209; idem, Source of Life. 120, 124; 123.
965Cf. Moltmann, Source of Life. 116; cf. also idem, Trinity and the Kingdom. 177-178.
966Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 209, 217, 163.
967Cf. Bauckham, Theology ofMoltmann. 176-177.
968Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 210, 211. Moltmann notes that 'the freedom of the
Christian faith' is a 'participation in the creative Spirit of God' (ibid., 217).
969Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 218. This is a multifaceted freedom, defined as
'community,' 'fellowship,' or 'love and solidarity,' and freedom as oriented to a 'project,' as 'a
creative initiative,' as a 'creative passion for the possible,' and hence as oriented toward the pregnant
future (ibid., 216-217).
970Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 218.
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Thus, in his reinterpretation ofprovidence Moltmann does not reject or
replace the doctrine, but rather gives it a future orientation through the idea of the
openness of the original creation toward the new creation of the future. It is this
future orientation which funds the ideas ofpromise, history and hope,971 and for this
reason, Moltmann's reinterpreted providence focuses more on promise than
prescription, openness rather than fixed edicts, and on the Father's almighty power as
• 972
understood in terms of 'self-limitation, self-emptying and the patience of love.'
His view here is similar to that ofTimothy Gorringe, who suggests that 'what makes
Q7^
God God is not prediction but promise, God's hesed or covenant faithfulness.'
This fits well with Moltmann's concept of creation being open through the work of
the Son in incarnation and of the Spirit in transformation and by these means also
open to the participation of humans in the shaping of the future of creation. If the
distinction can be maintained, one might say Moltmann understands God to have a
general goal orpurpose for creation (divine indwelling974) rather than a
'predetermined "divine plan for the Kingdom.'"975 Admittedly this purpose or goal
entails a plan, but the difference in emphasis is what is important.
The complex set ofperichoretic relations which constitute not only the
trinitarian being of God, but also of humans, society, and ofGod's relation to
creation, applies equally to the relation ofpast, present and future. Thus Moltmann's
pan-perichoretic, relational ontology of reality means that humans have their identity
not in some particular feature of their being (such as reason), but in their ongoing,
holistic and developing history of relations with God and each other.976 Following
971Cf. Moltmann, Source of Life. 120, 122-124.
972Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 210; cf. idem, Coming ofGod. 145, 137.
973Gorringe, God's Theatre. 63. Moltmann, however, rejects the idea of linking providence
to covenant if it refers to the past. Instead, he replaces the covenant established in the past with the
glory of the future kingdom as the inner ground of creation and providence (Trinity and the Kingdom.
209).
974Moltmann, God in Creation, chap. 10; cf. idem, Coming ofGod. 307.
975Moltmann, Coming of God. 145.
976Moltmann, God in Creation. 257, 266, 229. Cf. Moltmann, 'Perichoresis: An Old Magic
Word for a New Trinitarian Theology, in Trinity, Community and Power: Mapping Trajectories in
Weslevan Theology, ed. M. Douglas Meeks (Nashville, TN: Kingswood Books, An Imprint of
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the Old Testament method of defining a person by his or her history, and therefore
by 'the relationships in which he lives,' Moltmann notes that 'the human being has
really no substance in himself; he is a history.''911 Thus, the openness of creation
which makes evolution possible is rooted in the openness of the trinitarian relation of
love to make space and time for a created 'other,' and more specifically, rooted in the
messianic nature of creation. The concept of the messianic nature of creation brings
978into focus again the process orproject character of the world and history. It
stresses the fecundity of creation in its continuing development into ever more
complex forms, and hence the creation of ever more possibilities. The messianic
principle provides the promise and paradigm, the possibilities and character, of
God's creating-redeeming-consummating work.979 Messianic creation is new
creation in the power of the Spirit (resurrection life), 'eschatological creation.'980
Therefore, both creation itself, and the image of God in humans, find their paradigm
981
in Christ. As messianic creation, creation takes its character from the future, from
Q87 ...
resurrection, and therein lies its hope.
Abingdon Press, 2000), 113. Cf. also John Polkinghorne's insistance that modern physics requires a
holistic model of the universe in which, in all of its levels including its relation to God, 'there is an
interconnectivity in things' (Serious Talk: Science and Religion in Dialogue [Valley Forge, PA:
Trinity Press International, 1995], 88, 86); and also Polkinghorne's One World: The Interaction of
Science and Theology (London, UK: SPCK, 1986; First Princeton Paperback printing, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1987) 84-85, 89-92.
977Moltmann, God in Creation. 257 (italics mine); cf. ibid., 261, 262, 265. This is the kind of
language which invokes Randall Otto's critique of the lack of ontology in Moltmann's metaphysics of
both the divine and the human. On the nature of human ontology as characterised by open historical
process toward the new, cf. Moltmann, Theology ofHope. 284-285; and idem, God in Creation. 229.
978Cf. Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ. 301, 302.
979Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 225-229.
980Moltmann, God in Creation. 66.
98lMoltmann, God in Creation. 225ff. As the Logos, Jesus Christ is the pattern of creation, as
the risen Christ, Jesus is the possibility and model of all other human relations with God (ibid., 242-3).
Cf. Moltmann, Spirit of Life. 122; and idem, Trinity and the Kingdom. 117.
982Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 196-7, 184.
983Moltmann, God in Creation. 66.
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Beyond the explicit retention of such traditional (but reinterpreted) elements
ofprovidence as sustenance and concursus, Moltmann also deals with the
providential question of divine rule.
Divine Rule
Moltmann notes that 'theology is never concerned with the actual existence of
a God. It is interested solely in the rule of this God in heaven and on earth.'984 The
nature of this rule, however, is derived not from an understanding of God as sole
sovereign or lord, but rather from the nature of the inner-trinitarian love. In this way
the doctrine of the Trinity is seen, not as a problem, but as the solution to the divine
sovereignty/human freedom issue.985 As Bauckham summarises, 'God is defined as
love rather than as lordship' and hence does not usurp human freedom, since this
'love is compatible with freedom (or rather: constitutive of freedom).'986
Moltmann's concept of divine governance takes the form of a qualified use of the
term 'rule':
Where it is the Father of Jesus Christ who reigns,. . . [and]
who preserves the world through his patience, the liberty of
created beings is given space and allowed time,.... The
Father 'rules' through the creation ofwhat exists and by
• • QR7
opening up the eras of time.
Two motives lie behind Moltmann's stress on God's "'rule'" as characterised
by the Father's 'self-limitation, self-emptying and the patience of love.'988 First, he
rejects all forms of theological monotheism (by which he means unitarianism),
monarchianism, hierarchical structures, and metaphors ofpower (with their political
and ecclesiastical correlates).989 Second, because of the requirements of his
984Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 191.
985Richard Bauckham, Theology ofMoltmann. 171. It was noted earlier, that in the relations
and identities that define the life ofTrinity, each divine person both gives and receives identity and
love.
986Bauckham, Theology ofMoltmann. 158.
987Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 210 (italics mine).
988Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 210.
989Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 192-202.
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anthropology (and psychology), 'liberation from ... ['this closed-in-ness']--
liberation for primal openness—cannot come about through superior strength or
compulsion, but only through vicarious suffering and the call to that liberty which
vicarious suffering alone throws open.'990
Moltmann claims that the rule of a unitarian God is inevitably coercive and
limiting of human freedom 'because it points to complete dependency in all spheres
of life.'991 Such a charge, however, may be open to question. Moltmann himself
stresses the total dependence of creation upon the creative, providential and salvific
roles of the Father, Son and Spirit. This dependence results in the redemption and
completion of all creation. Moltmann never seems to recognise or accept that this
dependence has a coercive aspect, even when he claims that it is God alone who
decides to save and therefore will save all.992 Perhaps it would be more consistent
for Moltmann to insist upon God's rule by 'attraction' as characteristic only of the
new creation, since at some point on the way to that kingdom the Trinity will have to
put a stop to both sin and sinfulness. Moltmann does picture this type of rule as
characteristic of the 'heavenly city,' where 'God rules his world and his humanity,
not through power but through the force of attraction,'993 but he also wishes to avoid
the concept of divine rule by domination in the present situation in history, and
reinterprets God's rule as a perichoretic community of love. One wonders whether
couching God's overcoming of sin in terms of 'help'994 really mitigates the problem
caused for human freedom by this universalism. This universalism does not explain
how God overcomes the wilfully recalcitrant without forcing them to obey him by
manipulating their desires. This seems to be very close to Helm's view, the only
difference being that Helm speaks ofGod's ruling relation in terms of the single
divine essence, while Moltmann speaks in terms of the Trinity. Moltmann, therefore,
"°Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 210.
"'Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 191-192. Cf. Sallie McFague's similar criticism
(Models ofGod: Theology for an Ecological. Nuclear Age [Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1987],
59-69).
"2Cf. Moltmann, Coming of God. 245, 244, 132.
993Moltmann, Coming of God. 313.
994Moltmann, Coming of God. 244.
238
The Triune Provider
seems to remain ambiguous about his understanding of freedom. On the one hand,
he speaks as ifGod grants humans libertarian freedom,995 while on the other hand he
defines the freedom of the kingdom of glory as the freedom to do God's will, 'ofjoy
in the Good and in doing what is right simply as a matter of course.'996
It may be the case that the logic ofMoltmann's panentheistic model actually
requires the total inclusion of all creation in the Kingdom of glory, since nothing
exists "outside" ofGod. This is worked out in terms of the merging of the trinitarian
and human histories. Hence, an eternal state of disharmony at the creaturely level
(for example, the traditional view of an eternal hell) would disrupt the harmony of
the inner-trinitarian relations. Ultimately, therefore, Moltmann's universalism, and
the tension it creates for the reality of human freedom, may be required more by his
panentheistic trinitarian ontology than by the nature of trinitarian love. The concept
ofmutual love which Moltmann wishes to base upon the inner-trinitarian love is
threatened by an implicit co-dependence between God and creation. This reflects the
implicit emanationism and determinism in his model ofprovidential creation and
fails to recognise the true difference between divine and created ontologies. Gunton
is correct, therefore, to insist that precisely because the intra-trinitarian love is 'self-
sufficient' means that God is free to posit a creation upon which God does not
become dependent.997
It is not as ifMoltmann has no way out of this dilemma. He seems to think
that if he allows the true otherness afforded creatures to entail the possibility of
eternal recalcitrance, it will bring into question the freedom and integrity of the
inner-trinitarian life. But, since he thinks ofhell as an existential experience and not
as 'some remote place,'998 he has the option of allowing creatures to freely choose
995Cf. Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 265.
996Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 214.
997Gunton, 'God the Holy Spirit: Augustine and his Successors,' chap, in Theology Through
the Theologians: Selected Essays 1972-1995 (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1996), 127; cf.
also, Gunton, Triune Creator. 9-10.
998Moltmann, Coming of God. 252.
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non-being. God, who sustains each creature in the face of the annihilating
nothingness, could simply stop repositing their being.
Initial Assessment ofMoltmann's Model
Moltmann's emphasis on God's intimate involvement with all of creation
enables a strong emphasis on God's active presence in the world. His concept of the
openness of the Trinity and the world to each other provides a theological structure
for thinking of God's ongoing interaction with the world, especially in his forward-
looking doctrine of continuing creation and the formation of the eschatological
community. But, although he clearly presupposes a doctrine of providence which
includes God's preservation and innovation, government and guidance, his rather
brief remarks on the subject leaves more to be said about it. While he establishes a
structure for providence in his concept of the trinitarian structure of the creative-
redemptive-consummative process, the doctrine needs to be more fully explicated.
Moltmann is right to extend the doctrines of creation and providence to
include all of creation, thus making human history a subset of the history of all of
creation.999 This accords well with a more contemporary understanding of the
interrelatedness of all things. But the success ofMoltmann's model in connecting
God to the universe is weak in maintaining the distinction between the divine and
creaturely, something the more traditional doctrines of creation and providence
accomplished in a more explicit fashion.
Treating the issues ofprovidence within the framework of eschatological and
trinitarian creation enables him to speak of a goal ofhistory that will only come to it
from God in his future advent. God's present work in creation, shaped as it is by
God's goal of the eschatological consummation of creation, constitutes a new focus
for providence. Although Miroslav Volf argues that in focusing on the category of
'completion' Moltmann has not given sufficient emphasis to redemption,1000
Moltmann seems to make a legitimate point by arguing that completion, by
999Moltmann, God in Creation. 31, 36.
1000Miroslav Volf, 'After Moltmann: Reflections on the Future of Eschatology,' in God Will
Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jtirgen Moltmann. ed. Richard Bauckham (Edinburgh, Scotland: T.
and T. Clark Ltd., 1999), 245-252.
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definition, includes redemption.1001 Yet there is an important sense in which the
focus on completion tends to minimise the significance of human sin, and places sin
on an equal footing with transience and contingency, that is, makes it an inherent
condition of the history of creation.
But whatever the problems inherent in Moltmann's particular version of
panentheism, the points at which he is helpful are as follows. First, trinitarian
panentheism places stress on God himself as the context ofmeaning for all phases
and dimensions of life, hence making providential creation an intrinsic aspect of the
potentiality, development and meaning of life. This emphasis seems to accord well
with a biblical emphasis on God's involvement in human history. Second, emphasis
on God's redemptive suffering and solidarity with creation establishes the basis for a
profound theodicy. It is especially effective in that it refuses to answer ultimate,
speculative questions about 'why' God allows evil, and instead focuses on what God
is doing about it. Third, Moltmann's focus on the eschatological future as new
creation, achieved by a providentially guided creative process, ensures that hope for
and in the future is as sure as God himself. Fourth, the providential movement of
creation toward this ultimate goal provides meaning in and significance for, history
in via. It means that what is achieved now in history can be caught up, on the way,
by God's recreative Spirit, and thereby transformed and completed. Fifth, the
presence of the creator Spirit as the source of transformative grace extends the work
of the Spirit beyond the church and beyond the personal transformation of individual
Christians—because the Holy Spirit is the creator Spirit, the very same energy which
gives and sustains all of life is employed in transforming all of life. Sixth, the role of
the Son in liberating and completing creation, and as the means of the inclusion of
humans in the inner-trinitarian life, makes possible ultimate reconciliation and
redemption.
The benefit of this re-Christianising ofhistory for a doctrine of providence is
that providence now becomes an intrinsic element in this larger story. Providentially
guided and empowered, Trinity-world history becomes the context ofmeaning for all
l001Moltmann, 'Can Christian Eschatology Become Postmodern? Response to Miroslav
Volf,' in God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jurgen Moltmann. ed. Richard Bauckham
(Edinburgh, Scotland: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1999), 262-263.
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of created life. God influences this history from the "inside," and yet remains
eternally transcendent to it. For this reason creation (and therefore the Trinity itself)
remains eternally open to the future. In this way hope is supplied on two levels: first,
as the completion and consummation of creation which includes the removal of
transience, sin and the possibility of sinning; and second, as the creative openness of
the new creation. The first level of hope speaks to the human need of redemption,
reconciliation and completion; the second to the need for fulfilment through creative
expression. In this way also, history itself is redeemed, taken up to a new level, and
becomes a feature of the new creation. Thus, providential creation ensures not
simply that there will be a future history—that would be only more of the same—but
rather it underwrites the hope that there is coming a Sabbath ofperfected historical
community.
Serious questions remain, however, regarding Moltmann's model of
panentheism. First, in the interest ofmaking the doctrine of the Trinity relevant, has
he sacrificed too much ofGod's transcendence by making God's eternal history
dependent upon the developments within created history?
Second, while Moltmann insists on maintaining the ontological distinction
between Trinity and world, focus on multiple roles of the Spirit toward creation and
on the perichoretic nature of all reality gives a preponderance of emphasis to God's
immanence.1002 Moreover, the role of the Spirit often threatens to eclipse the roles of
the Father and Son.1003
A third issue involves Moltmann's universalism: Does universalism allow
him to retain the emphasis on human freedom which seems to underlie, for example,
his The Trinity and the Kingdom? Moltmann defines God's freedom and the
freedom of created beings as being free to do or communicate the good. But will a
single definition of divine and created freedom work? On the one hand, the
trinitarian Persons have no beginning, and mutually constitute each other in a more
complete manner than do the relationships of a human. To speak of the freedom of
l002Moltmann speaks of the creator Spirit, cosmic Spirit, and the Holy Spirit (Godjn
Creation. 95-98. 98-103. 2631.
l003Cf. Moltmann's emphasis on the Spirit's role as not only the power of life, but as the
means of differentiating selves (God in Creation. 100-101).
242
The Triune Provider
the triune persons one can only speak of their freedom as constituted by and
exemplified in, the eternal act of love, a perfect infinite self-donation.
On the other hand, human persons do have a beginning, will never
completely constitute each other in fully mutual self-donation,1004 and actually go
through a process of development before they reach full personhood (which includes
self-consciousness and volition). This process clearly entails the possibility of bad
choices and wilfully sinful choices, often with evil consequences for innocent
bystanders. Both Moltmann and Helm emphasise, therefore, that in the new heaven
and earth the possibility of sin and sinning will no longer exist. Redeemed humans
will only desire and do the good, just as God does now. For Helm, this is achieved
through God's inexorable divine decrees to achieve a certain goal for elect humans.
Moltmann does not resort (explicitly) to this type of decretal language, but the effect
is the same—in some way (left unexplained) God will irresistibly lure all humans
(and even the Devil) to freely love and obey him. And since this clearly does not
occur for many before physical death, it implies that at some point after death God's
love will prove sufficiently illuminating and transforming as to produce the desired
salutary effect.
Conclusion
Of the authors reviewed in this thesis, Pannenberg has worked out the most
comprehensive trinitarian metaphysics as a context ofmeaning in which a trinitarian
doctrine ofprovidence plays a key role. Although his panentheistic model also
carries the potential threat of losing the individual creature and its autonomy, his
particular trinitarian metaphysics provides a more adequate basis than Moltmann's
for ensuring creaturely otherness in eternity.
Nevertheless, in a trinitarian model ofGod, Pannenberg and Moltmann are
finding resources for a way to think about God in personal and relational terms
which are not oppressive, but liberating and constitutive of freedom-in-relation. It is
precisely in their explication of the differentiated-unity of the triune being, and the
way in which this defines the inner-trinitarian essence in terms of a dynamic
fellowship open to the world, that their models of the God-world relationship are
i°°4Cf pannenberg, Systematic 1: 431.
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more adequate than Helm's and Sanders' in forming the structure for a Christian
doctrine ofprovidence. A question remains, however, especially in Moltmann's
model, as to whether his social Trinity treats the triune persons as being persons in
the same way.
These two models argue that the Trinity, through the Son (structuring
principle) and the Spirit (empowering principle), is open to the creating of others,
and subsequently including them within the inner-trinitarian life. Perhaps it would
be more appropriate to picture this in terms of the Trinity opening itself to creation,
rather than creation being drawn into the inner-trinitarian life. This would better
ensure creaturely distinction.
This trinitarian metaphysics accords well with Gilkey's interest in allowing
the providentially funded, co-created elements ofhistory a lasting and even
developing place in the eternal kingdom. In this way a doctrine ofprovidence serves
as a way of grounding the issue of the significance ofpresent creation, or of creation
as such, in the overall story of creation history—something which Wiles seems to be
aiming for in his model of the creation-preservation of the whole space-time
continuum as a single divine act.
The concept of part-whole as a metaphysical structure for creative-
providence, as developed especially by Pannenberg, may raise questions of
determinism, but it does serve as a fruitful device for instantiating the meaning and
significance ofwhat takes place on the way to the eschaton. It also helps to
emphasise God's transcendence even while fostering faith in his intimate
involvement in the creative sequence. Pannenberg's concept of creative-providence
from the future supports the concept of the creation of a-symmetrical, reciprocal
relations between God and humans. A further support toward this goal occurs in
Moltmann's concepts of open historical process, and eschatological 'completion' in
terms of 'correspondence.'
In Pannenberg's and Moltmann's panentheistic, trinitarian models of the
God-world relation, the term 'providence' continues to function as an essential
expression of God's relationship to the world. It seems that some form of the
concept is required if the Trinity's distinction from the world (transcendence) is to be
maintained, even while insisting upon the Trinity's active presence (immanence) in
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the world. But panentheistic models have a more difficult time maintaining this
distinction than do theistic models. In Pannenberg, for example, once there is a
world, God's rule and being in some sense depend upon the world. In Moltmann's
model, to some degree the inner-constitution of the Trinity includes the Trinity's
history with the world.
Both models depend heavily upon the concept of spirit in order to account for
God's creative and providential immanence in the world. Pannenberg and Moltmann
each work out a view of the Holy Spirit and his role in creation, providence,
redemption, and consummation which gives the Spirit special prominence in the
Trinity's relation to the world. Thus, Moltmann can speak of the creator Spirit,
cosmic Spirit and the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is not only the power of life, but also
the means of differentiating selves. For this reason, Moltmann's understanding of
the multiple roles of the Spirit tends to eclipse the roles of Father and Son.
Pannenberg can speak of the spirit as the impersonal ground of the trinitarian Persons
and of creation, and of the Holy Spirit as the personal manifestation of this ground.
Pannenberg's concept of spirit as both the field of the trinitarian persons and the
creative field out ofwhich and in which the world comes into being seems to blur the
distinction between the divine and the created.
Moltmann's model of kenotic creation and providence suffers even more
from the threat of absorbing the created into the divine. This may reflect
Moltmann's more pragmatic interest in finding ways to express the active presence
ofGod in creation, but it also requires him to work out a more clearly defined
metaphysics of the God-world relation which can instantiate an otherness-in-relation
ontology. An ontology is required which more fully clarifies the sui generis nature
of the Trinity while also accounting for how the Trinity, as a differentiated unity,
relates to the world in such a way as to establish permanent creaturely otherness from
the one triune God.
Pannenberg and Moltmann seem to agree, however, that the basic structure of
the inner-trinitarian relations is manifested in the economy through the relation of
Jesus Christ to the Father and the Spirit, and that this christological connection
models the paradigmatic pattern for all human relations to God. Thus, humans are to
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relate to the Father through the Son in the Spirit. Whatever God does for humans in
creation, providence, redemption and consummation reflects this structure.
The relationally constituted Trinity becomes the basis for understanding time
and eternity as the context for God's providential relation to the world. If God's
eternity is defined by, or abstracted from, the inner-trinitarian relations, then it need
not be thought of as changeless or static, but itself embodies God's "time," the
"time" of the inner-trinitarian relations. Otherwise, one would have to think in terms
of absolute eternity circumscribing God. Instead, the dynamic inner life of the triune
God defines such categories as substance, subject, space, time and eternity. It is
therefore the quality of the inner-trinitarian relations that defines their movement and
openness, and this quality is love. This is why God's own "future" is open—not open
to change in the quality of relations, but open to change in the quantity of relations.
In a similar way, created space and time are defined internally by the
relations among creatures—things matter. In distinction from the sui generis relations
which constitute the trinitarian persons, humans are defined not only by their
horizontal relations, but in addition by their vertical relation to God. This relation to
God, while again defining creatures internally, is an a-symmetrical relation in its
causal effect—creatures are constituted as what they are in ontological dependence
upon the Trinity, while the trinitarian persons receive no part of their essence or
existence from their relations to creatures, although Moltmann might disagree on this
last point. Moreover, in Pannenberg's and Moltmann's models, human relations to
the trinitarian persons reflect a unique and differentiated set of relations according to
the uniqueness of each trinitarian person. Thus, humans relate to the Father through
the Son in the Spirit. It is the vertical relation of the creature to the Trinity
(according to this structure) which enables created time, space and human history to
be open to the truly new.
The Trinity's mode of existence (eternity) is defined by the absoluteness of
the quality of the inner-trinitarian relations: love. This theological metaphysics is the
basis for creaturely constitution. In a finite manner, creaturely modes of existence
are defined by the quality and properties of creaturely relations, including their
relations to the Trinity. Based on these similar relational ontologies, creaturely time
can be transcended by the creature, and participate in God's eternity of love.
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Therefore, humans already have built into their ontological structure the possibility
ofparticipating in God's eternal "time"~according to the limits of their finitude.
The Trinity's "future" is not fixed in the number of possible relations which
can be forged with creatures, but is instead an open project—at least from our present
time-bound perspective. Pannenberg can say that only from the future will it be
decided what God will be. Moreover, in his view, Jesus had a real, contingent
history in which the resurrection both revealed and constituted who he was. And
Pannenberg also speaks of God cycling back from the future and positing the present.
This perichoretic rhythm of the times, funded by, and redeemed through their
cycling through God's "time" (defined as the inner-trinitarian cycle of love
relations), provides the ontological or metaphysical basis upon which to understand
that God's being is in his becoming. I would qualify this by saying that "becoming,"
as applied to the Trinity, applies to the range of relations that come into existence
with the creative-providential process, but not to the absoluteness of the inner-
trinitarian life. Furthermore, in agreement with Moltmann, I would argue that the
future must remain eternally open, since it is an aspect of the inner-trinitarian
relations, and since eternity is already understood to bracket the space-time of
creation (Pannenberg's 'true Infinite'1005).
On this model of time, as constituted by the relations among entities, and
therefore as internal to those relations, providence is given a new orientation to
history. History is neither cyclical (and static), nor simply a linear progression, an
unfolding of a pre-written plot, but rather embodies kairotic possibilities. Providence
itself facilitates the creation of the genuinely new. On this view, eschatology is not
the end ofhistory or ofprovidence, but precisely the perfecting of creaturely
relationship with the Trinity. This move toward the perfecting of the quality of
relating becomes the ever re-newed basis of history. Thus, the eschaton is not so
much a "when" (time) or "where" (space) as it is a "what," a quality of existing
(eternal Sabbath). In this way one can indeed experience 'teleology now'1006 as
holiness begun, and hope for teleology 'then' as the perfecting of the environment or
l005Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 400; cf. ibid., 397-401.




conditions of holy relating (Sabbath). In this way it is possible already to participate
in, and exhibit, the quality of the new community as it will exist in the context of the
eternal Sabbath. As a being-renewed and re-newing people, it becomes intrinsically
impossible to live as if one's new being is waiting ahead, in the eschaton; a Christ¬
like spirit cannot fail to love its neighbour as itselfnow. In this way, even the fallen
and imperfect structures of this world can be redeemed, made into shelters where the
true human spirit can be fostered and from within which it can be creatively
extended. In this way providence, as eschatologically oriented grace, working within
each human to actualise authentic humanity (defined paradigmatically in Jesus
Christ's relation to the Father through the Spirit) has an individual focus but a cosmic
scope. Whether one thinks of the eternal Sabbath as influencing the present from
"behind," "above," or "ahead," the goal is the same: formation of community




TOWARD A TRINITARIAN DOCTRINE OF PROVIDENCE
Introduction
This final chapter begins by listing problems and issues with a doctrine of
providence, as raised in the earlier chapters, and which would need to be addressed
by any contemporary work on reconstructing the doctrine. The second section will
present a set of suggestions focused around the idea that a trinitarian doctrine of
providence, as embodied in a community model of the God-world relation, is a
fruitful way to address these problems, especially those questions which have made
faith in providence an acute problem, namely, history, meaning and hope. This
community model, as a context for a doctrine ofprovidence, will be defined in terms
of trinitarian 'pansyntheism'1007
This second section will suggest the use ofmultiple models of trinitarian
divine action as a way of showing that a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence accords
better with contemporary holistic and relational concepts of reality; with the
trinitarian nature of divine action in the New Testament; and with a Christian's
personal experience of God's providence—for example, in prayer, as directed to the
Father, through the Son, in the Spirit; in redemption, as mediated through the Son;
and in the Father's guidance as provided by the Holy Spirit.
The final step in this section will illustrate the heuristic value of this model in
addressing the problem of the hiddenness of God and its impact on meaning; in
linking a model ofprovidence to personal experiences of grace; in exploring the
1007The term 'pansyntheism' was coined by Ruth Page (God and the Web of Creation
[London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1996], 40).
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connections between providence, eschatology, Sabbath and community; and in
relating trinitarian providence to human freedom.
Outlining an Agenda for a Doctrine of providence
Although the scope of this thesis precludes detailed discussion ofmany of the
concerns raised for a doctrine ofprovidence in the foregoing chapters, it may be
helpful to restate some of them here as a way of acknowledging their importance in
constructing a model ofprovidence.
As the foregoing surveys illustrate, one can no longer assume a "traditional"
definition of God or ofprovidence. A full monograph on providence would,
therefore, require attention to the following points already made in Chapter One: the
crisis of confidence in a concept ofprovidence arising out of an increased awareness
ofwidespread evil; loss of faith in progress toward an increasingly better world;
belief in radical human autonomy and the contingency of historical development; the
privileging of scientific naturalism and rationality; and a disenchantment with the
God of Christian Classical Theism.
Subsequent chapters also identified the following concerns and questions to
be addressed by a doctrine of providence. Listed in no particular order, they include:
the issue ofhow to define God; how God can be understood as "with" us in the face
ofhis apparent absence; rendering some account of God as personal and as personal
agent; giving some account of the widespread criticism raised against Classical
Theism for its impersonal and non-relational language in referring to God's relation
to the world; the role of a holistic and relational metaphysics in reconstructing a
doctrine of providence; the nature of, and the relation between, time and eternity; the
nature of, and the relation between human freedom and divine sovereignty; the role
of interpretive models in discerning God's providential working; the role of faith in
discerning God's providential care; the relation between personal grace, human
history and cosmic structures; the relation of a doctrine ofprovidence to the question
ofmeaning in—and of—human lives; the relation ofprovidence to the question of
history, that is, as giving history a focus, direction and purpose; the problem of evil
and suffering, a key focus ofwhich must include both God's and humankind's
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relation to the complex and multiple dimensions of the non-human world; and
defining a set of criteria for constructing a model ofprovidence.
The issue of criteria raises the question of internal and external coherence in a
doctrine of providence, and also the issue of comprehensiveness or scope. External
coherence, for example, includes the connections between a doctrine ofprovidence
and one's personal experience of grace, with one's understanding of the world as
historical,1008 and of the world as interpreted by modern science.1009 Internal
coherence includes the connections between the doctrine of providence and other key
doctrines—creation, redemption, christology, pneumatology, Trinity and eschatology.
Integral to these connections is the criterion of comprehensiveness or scope. As
Gilkey stressed, a doctrine ofprovidence must maintain both a sense of the overall
meaningfulness of history, as well as the value of the individuals who make up that
history.1010 Thus, not only must individuals be 'brought back into the permanence
and harmony of the divine life,' but also 'the historical communities in which
humans exist, and whose creations are the work in part of God's providence in
history.'1011 Although not accepting the universalism ofGilkey's view, Pannenberg
also stresses that only when seen from the perspective of the end (or whole) of
temporal existence does one's life achieve maximal meaning.
Methodologically, therefore, providence, meaning, hope and eschatology are
inseparably linked. William Stoeger, for example, argues that 'the eternity of the
Trinity is essentially temporal, as long as we understand the essence of temporality in
terms of relationality,' that is, 'time' is an emergent reality arising internally from
relationships, and thus 'God's eternity is not timelessness nor persistence in
being,. . . but rather God's faithfulness in action through God's relationships.' The
1008Cf. Philip Hefner, 'The Continuing Work of Creation,' Fourth Locus: The Creation, in
Christian Dogmatics, eds. Carl E. Braaten, and RobertW. Jenson (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press,
1984). Cf. also O. C. Thomas, and E. K. Wondra, Introduction to Theology. 3rd ed. (Harrisburg, PA:
Morehouse Publishing, 2002), 228-244.
1009Cf. William R. Stoeger, S. J., 'God and Time: The Action and Life of the Triune God in
the World,' Theology Today 55, no. 3 (October 1998): 365-388.
1010Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History (New York, NY:
The Seabury Press, 1976), 296-297.
101'Gilkey, Reaping. 297 (italics mine).
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'internal character of time with respect to person and event means that, . . . time is
neither circular nor linear, but rather a "gathering in" of the past and the present into
the future.'1012 Michael Welker defines eternity as the fullness of three kinds of time
as these are associated with the triune persons.1013 Kathryn Tanner reports the
traditional view of eschatology as affirming that 'a gap exists between the results of
world processes and the world's consummation, a gap to be bridged by a God with
the power to reverse those results, the power to bring what is otherwise absolutely
unexpected into existence—say, a world that knows neither loss nor suffering.'1014
Moltmann says something similar concerning the grace that transforms, enabling all
creation to participate in 'eternal life as eternal livingness in love,'1015 to be realised
in the 'kingdom of glory.'1016 In Moltmann's view, 'death is the boundary of our
lives, but not the boundary of God's relationship to us.' He believes 'that God's
history with our lives will go on after our [physical] deaths, until that completion has
been reached in which a soul finds rest.'1017 Only in this way can the lives of those
who are now dead be said to have meaning, and by implication, the lives of all other
humans presently alive in the world.
While one need not embrace the universalism in Gilkey's, Moltmann's and
Wiles' models ofprovidence, together with the other views examined in this thesis
they illustrate the fact that comprehensiveness, coherence, scope, and eschatology are
intrinsically interrelated, especially as they embrace such key concepts as
community, the dimension of the personal, history, meaning and hope. Although the
10l2Stoeger, 'God and Time,' 376, 375.
IOI3Welker, 'God's Eternity, God's Temporality, and Trinitarian Theology,' Theology Today
55, no. 3 (October 1998): 323-324. Welker's model will be examined below.
IOI4Kathryn Tanner, Jesus. Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 99. Tanner herself seems to opt for a kind of 'teleology
now' (the phrase is Ruth Page's, fWeb of Creation. 63-73]).
l015Moltmann, 'Is There Life After Death?,' in The End of the World and the Ends of God:
Science and Theology on Eschatology. eds. John Polkinghome, and Michael Welker, Theology for the
Twenty-First Century Series, eds. Wallace M. Alston, Jr., Robert Jenson, and Don S. Browning
(Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), 246.
IOI6Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine ofGod, trans. Margaret Kohl
(London, UK: SCM Press, Ltd.; New York, NY: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1981), 212.
l017Moltmann, 'Life After Death?,' 246, 252.
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authors reviewed in the foregoing chapters disagree at many basic points concerning
the list of problems associated with a doctrine ofprovidence, they generally agree
that the doctrine needs to address this cluster of concepts. It may be helpful,
therefore, to summarise their areas of agreement as a way of introducing key themes
to be incorporated in the next section.
First, each author has been motivated by a desire to make his or her view of
God and God's relation to human history relevant to contemporary Christian
experience. Each agrees that this is not a straightforward task, and that the
credibility ofbelief in the Christian God depends upon developing a plausible
explanation of God's ongoing relation to the world. Since this sphere ofbelief
traditionally came within the scope of a doctrine of providence, they have interacted
with this doctrine as they sought to demonstrate how their model of the Christian
God, and of God's relation to the world, enables life to be experienced as history
under God's care, and how this model functions as the source ofmeaning and hope
for human life.
For example, in Wiles' neo-Deist model ofprovidence, meaning emerges in
the context ofhumanly constructed religious beliefs within the general parameters of
the structures of life. While Gilkey would generally agree with this statement, he
posits a more direct assistance from God as humans creatively modify their inherited
past and construct new options for the future as these are presented to them by the
divine lure. For Paul Helm, the meaning of individual life and history as a whole is
fully orchestrated by God. While each human forms an essential part of that story,
each is inscribed into a "pre-written" narrative. For Sanders, God establishes the
general boundaries of life, and then partners interactively with each human in
developing the meaning ofhis or her life. In the panentheistic models of Pannenberg
and Moltmann, God himself forms the context of life, and then partners with humans
in constructing the meaning of both their history and God's history. For Pannenberg,
in particular, even meaning for God is not fully defined as yet, since even God is
determined from the future. In Moltmann's model, the present is especially defined
as open to truly new possibilities arriving from the future, but ultimately God will
include all humans in the consummation of history in the Kingdom of glory.
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As a description ofhow God relates to the world, a doctrine ofprovidence
must, therefore, be able to link together the doctrines of God, creation, anthropology,
soteriology, and consummation.1018 Moreover, since Christian theology takes as its
defining centre some understanding of Jesus Christ, a Christian doctrine of
providence needs to relate itself to this centre. Whether or not one formulates it in
specifically trinitarian terms, he or she at least needs to give some account of a
trinitarian understanding of God.1019
A second general point of agreement, therefore, is the paradigmatic role
played by Jesus Christ in understanding the nature of God's providential relation to
humans as they live out their lives in their historical contexts.1020 This suggests that
an important role might be accorded the biblical account ofChrist as an entrance into
the question of God's providential care of the world. In the words of C. Norman
Kraus, 'In Christ,..., God reveals to us what kind of God he really is—what his
intention is for human history, how he is at work in the world, and what he expects of
us. God does this through a manifestation of his own personal presence and power in
Jesus Christ.'1021 If one takes as the paradigm ofGod's love and God's relation to
the world the incarnation of the Son and the sending of the Spirit, then one has a
concrete focus and basis for understanding both the purpose ofprovidence and the
power ofprovidence.
Such an approach involves the question of the nature of Jesus Christ as 'God
with us,' and what that might mean for a doctrine ofprovidence. God, as 'the com¬
passionate one' normatively revealed 'in Jesus as God's Son,' reveals himself to
1018Cf. William Burt Pope's assertion that 'Providence' is 'the most comprehensive term in
the language of theology,' connecting 'the Unseen God with the visible creation, and the visible
creation with the work of redemption, and redemption with personal salvation, and personal salvation
with the end of all things' (A Compendium of Christian Theology. 2nd ed., revised and enlarged, vol. 1
[New York, NY: Phillips and Hunt; Cincinnati, OH: Cranston and Stowe, 1880], 456).
10l9Cf. C. Norman Kraus, God Our Savior: Theology in a Christological Mode (Scottdale,
PA; Waterloo, ON: Herald Press, 1991), 88.
1020It is recognised, of course, that there is a wide range of views on the nature of Jesus
Christ, but discussion of that point is beyond the scope of the present thesis.
l02lKraus, God Our Savior. 46.
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humans and stands with humans in order to establish relationship and create
community with them.
If, therefore, one accords the Christ-event central hermeneutical priority in
understanding providence (as do most of the authors reviewed in this thesis), it
suggests that community-formation is God's goal in creation, providence,
redemption and consummation. Of course, this also raises once again the question as
to whether God is triune, and if so, what the implications might be for providence.
Beginning with christology as a point of access in understanding God's providential
relation to the world further implies the possibility of finding in soteriology (and
also, therefore, in personal experiences of grace1023) a central locus for understanding
God's providential relation to the world.
Gilkey, however, had noted that while the Old Testament concept ofGod's
providential activity was presupposed in the New Testament, it seemed to be
overshadowed by a focus on the 'redemptive activity of God in and through Christ,
in the church and to come in the future.'1024 Helm went a step further, and noted that
the history of Jesus provides the paradigmatic instance of God's providential care of
creation. However, neither Gilkey nor Helm understood the Christ event as
providing the hermeneutical key which requires providence to be trinitarian in all its
aspects in both the Old and New Testaments. If the approaches ofGilkey and Helm
represented all that could be said about providence from a christological (and
therefore, trinitarian) perspective, they would raise some question as to whether a
trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence could in fact claim to have a decisive role in a
scripturally informed account ofprovidence. In response to Gilkey's assessment, I
have argued instead that it would be more appropriate to think of God's new works
of incarnation, redemption, and sanctification, through the Son and the Spirit, as
themselves new providential works, a further unfolding of God's purpose for, and
l022Kraus, God Our Savior. 94, 50.
I023Philip Clayton argues that in the Hebrew Bible 'the Israelites gradually conclude that the
one who redeemed and rules them was also the Creator of all that exists' (God and Contemporary
Science. Edinburgh Studies in Constructive Theology, eds. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Philip Clayton
(Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 25; cf. ibid., 29.
1024Gilkey, Reaping. 410, n. 4; 241-242.
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presence and activity in, history.1025 As such, even God's Old Testament
providential and saving activity is now revealed to have been the work of the triune
God-Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As Frank Tupper notes, 'God's [the Trinity's]
work of reconciliation illuminates and clarifies God's providential work in the whole
of creation and thereby uniquely in the arena of contingent human history.'1026 Karl
Barth earlier had contended that,
if faith in providence is Christian faith, and therefore faith in
Jesus Christ as the Word of God and therefore the self-
revelation ofGod, there is for it no obscurity concerning the
nature and will and work of the Lord ofhistory, no ambiguity
concerning His character and purpose, and no doubt as to His
ability to see to His own glory in history.1027
Thus, in the New Testament work of redemption, understood as the work of the
Trinity achieved through the Father's sending of the Son and pouring out of the
Spirit, the divine providential work moves to a new level of intensity, specificity and
clarity—it 'restores Creation on a higher plane.'1028 In the trinitarian work of
redemption, not only does the work of the Father in the history of Jesus become the
paradigmatic instance ofGod's general providence (on the order of the story of
Joseph in the Old Testament, especially Gen. 50:20), but in addition, God's
providence itself comes to be understood in a new light as the differentiated work of
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Moreover, although God was understood as
personal in the Old Testament, he remained hidden in unapproachable glory.1029 As
Oden states, however, in the New Testament 'a new note was sounded: the teaching
ofprovidence became intensely personalized in relation to the history of Jesus,' as
evidenced especially in Jesus' references to the 'parental care of "'Our Father in
l025P. 105, above. Cf. Philip Clayton, Contemporary Science. 60.
I026Frank Tupper, 'The Providence of God in Christological Perspective,' Review and
Expositor 82, no. 4 (Fall 1985): 580.
IOZ7Karl Barth, The Doctrine ofCreation, vol. 3, pt. 3, trans. G. W. Bromiley and R. J.
Ehrlich, Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1960), 34.
l028Leo Scheffczyk, Creation and Providence, trans. Richard Strachan (London, UK: Burns
and Oates Limited; New York, NY: Herder and Herder, 1970), 32.
l029Cf. Isaiah's experience in the temple (Isa. 6:1-8). Isaiah experienced the common fear
that to see God was to die.
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heaven.'"1030 The hermeneutical function of christology in relation to a trinitarian
view of providence, and the way in which providence is thus personalised, helps both
to ground faith in providence in the personal grace and guidance of the Holy Spirit in
one's life,1031 as well as to link this personal grace ('individualprovidence'1032) with
the Trinity's work in all of creation—past, present and future. This linking, in turn,
also enables lessons learned in Old Testament instances of God's providential acts to
be applied in the present.
If all the works of the Trinity in the economy are understood as forming an
integrated whole, and are therefore, inclusive of the divine works in both testaments,
this implies that a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence more adequately accounts for
that biblical unity by attributing to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit the whole work of
the economy.1033 This is borne out in such verses as Hebrews 1:3 (RSV) which
states that the Son was instrumental in the creation of the world and continues to
sustain 'the universe by his word ofpower.' This is the same Son/Word/Logos (John
1:1) through whom, and for whom, the world is created, sustained and redeemed
(Colossians 1:15-20).1034 Thomas Oden observes that
providence is the term we use to speak of that entire history
stretching between creation and consummation that has its
central focus in the teaching of redemption. .. . [S]in has a
long career, and . . . the divine governance of currently
ambiguous moral history must be seen finally in the light of
Christ. In this way, the teaching of providence is the central
bridge between creation and redemption.1035
1030Oden, The Living God, vol. 1, Systematic Theology (HarperCollins Publishers, Inc,
1987; 1992; Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 1998), 307, 308.
103*Cf. Millard Erickson, Christian Theology. 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1983,
1984, 1985, 1998), 863, 862.
i032Owen Thomas and Ellen Wondra (Introduction to Theology. 122-123).
1<)33Cf. Pannenberg, An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Co.; Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1991), 68; cf. also Thomas Oden,
The Word of Life, vol. 2, Systematic Theology (HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1989, 1992; Peabody,
MA: Prince Press, 1998), 73.
1034Cf. John 1:1-18.
1035Oden, Living God. 287.
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One might say that a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence provides the
hermeneutical key to understanding not only the connection between creation and
redemption, but also to the whole creation story. Although in the order of revelation
a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence comes later in the Christian scriptures, precisely
as a more complete insight into the nature of God it must function as the grammatical
rule under which all earlier understandings ofGod and God's providence are
interpreted. In this way, a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence can claim to be a more
adequate way of understanding a scripturally informed doctrine ofprovidence,
especially as it emphasises the trinitarian Persons' roles in this providence. As
Gunton argues, there is in this model a mediation of the Father's will and work in
providence, but it is through the equally divine and personal Son and Spirit, and not
through impersonal causal laws or a graded hierarchy of causes.1036
As a third general point of agreement, most of the authors in the foregoing
survey find themselves in a struggle with Classical Christian Theism and the type of
providence traditionally associated with it. In trying to distance themselves from
various aspects of the problems and paradoxes associated with the older theism, they
endeavour either to show how the problems can be resolved without losing the
essential features of the model, or they modify their model of God and the God-
world relation. All (except Helm) reject the notion that God is related to the world
only in his energies or as active benevolence, if that means that God in se remains
unaffected by the created domain.
Fourth, all the authors agree that God must be personal, but they do not agree
on what that means for either a doctrine of God or ofprovidence. On the one hand,
Wiles' and Gilkey's models of the God-world relation at least look in the direction of
a personal relation between God and humans. However, because in their models
personal contact remains at aminimalist level, it amounts to a kind of attenuated
"interaction," and does not include interpersonal communication between God and
l036Cf. Gunton, Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay towards a Trinitarian Theology
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985), 102, 103; Gunton, The Triune
Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study, Edinburgh Studies in Constructive Theology (Edinburgh,
UK: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 176; and Gunton, 'The End of Causality? The Reformers and
their Predecessors,' in The Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics. History and Philosophy, ed.
Colin Gunton (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark, 1997), 76, 79-80.
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humans. On the other hand, Helm, Sanders, Pannenberg and Moltmann insist that
God interacts with humans on the level of interpersonal communication. Moreover,
interaction on this level functions as a necessary prerequisite for the development of
fully human creatures, and for the achievement of God's goal of forming an
eschatological community with humans. Insistence on this goal of a divine-human
community accounts for the authors' further insistence on God not being less than
personal. This goal ofpersons-m-commumiy thus forms the setting for all that God
does in the economy, including his providential working.1037
Finally, all agree that God must be the ultimate sovereign over creation, that
creation has its source and meaning in the freedom of God to create or not to create.
Belief in the transcendent creator God ofChristian theism is necessary in order to
provide the context in which meaning and hope can emerge out of contingency and
novelty. How God chooses to manifest that sovereignty is due to his unconstrained
decision, that is, unconditioned by anything "outside" ofGod. However, all agree
that "once" God decided to create this world, certain logical constraints on the
structures of the world came into play. Their understanding ofwhat these constraints
consist introduces a critical point at which their models ofprovidence begin to
diverge.
Review of these models ofprovidence illustrates major points of concern
with a doctrine ofprovidence, as well as points of general agreement about the issues
it needs to address. The wide range of issues linked to a doctrine of providence
confirms that the doctrine continues to merit serious attempts to retrieve it. While
the scope of the present work precludes addressing all of these concerns,
nevertheless, a model of God's relation to the world which understands God's
primary goal and work to be that of community-building, and which embodies
multiple trinitarian models of divine action, will be suggested as a heuristic
framework within which to continue discussion of these problems. A narrow
i°37Cf pranp Kirkpatrick's thesis that the ultimate goal of God's acts in history is 'the
building up of an inclusive community in which all have become reconciled with all—in which the
bonds of love have bound together all of creation and in which God is to be the focus and the source
of the mutual celebration of loving communion, ultimately triumphing over the counterforces of evil'
(Together Bound: God. History, and the Religious Community [Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1994], 142; cf. ibid., 151-152, 165-180).
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selection of these difficulties will then be addressed in order to illustrate the heuristic
value of the model. The implications of a trinitarian model ofprovidence for the
other longstanding problems associated with providence would need to be worked
out in subsequent projects.
Toward a Trinitarian Doctrine of Providence
Any suggestions as to possible fruitful directions in constructing a trinitarian
model of providence must acknowledge, further to the list of problems and issues
noted above, the need for a doctrine ofprovidence that embodies several structures
of divine action.
The Need for a Model ofProvidence
According to Niels Gregersen, the rich, polyvalent language associated with
providence, taken in conjunction with a coherence theory of truth and the fact that
'empirical arguments' cannot either confirm or refute claims to knowledge of God's
providential actions, mean that any particular doctrine ofprovidence must function
1038
as an explanatory model as it incorporates 'the "whole of [one's] experience.'" In
other words, because a doctrine ofprovidence is so closely linked to a particular
understanding of God, of God's relation to and action in the world, and since the
debate about the certainty and shape of this knowledge of God and God's action is
beyond any final resolution,1039 one must be prepared to accept a certain amount of
ambiguity in a doctrine ofprovidence.1040 This is the place for faith as it
incorporates an interpretive model ofprovidence.
An appeal to faith need not be seen as a retreat into obscurantism and fideism.
The requirement of faith is part of the doctrine of providence itself, since faith
involves having good reasons for a full commitment to the God behind the hidden
1038Niels Henrik Gregersen, 'Providence in an Undeterministic World,' CTNS Bulletin 14,
no. 1 [Winter 1994], 19, 18.
1039Cf. Gregersen, 'Providence,' 19-20. Cf. also J. Wentzel van Huyssteen on the similarity
of rationality between science and theology as they conceptualise and make 'reliable truth claims'
about dimensions of reality beyond one's experience (Theology and the Justification of Faith:
Constructing Theories in Systematic Theology, trans. H. F. Snijders [Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989], 156).
l040Cf. Kirkpatrick, Together Bound. 160-163.
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workings of providence. John Puddefoot insists that both scientists and theologians
seek evidence to support theories, not to refute doubt—although the stronger the
evidence for the theory the weaker the doubt.1041 Nancey Murphy and Frank
Kirkpatrick have argued similarly that in order for faith-claims of experience or
knowledge of God's providential action in the world to be rational, one needs to have
in place a model of divine action which incorporates a set ofbeliefs about the divine
care.1042 For faith in providence to be rational, therefore, it must incorporate a model
of providence which clarifies its understanding of this care, and which specifies what
counts as confirmation ofbelief in providence. Such a model of God's
comprehensive relation to the world is especially important when interpreting the
meaning of one's life as lived coram Deo, since humans have, at best, only partial
epistemic access to God's workings and purposes.1043
Although beyond the scope of the present project, a full monograph on
providence would, therefore, need to be developed as a system of doctrinal
components within a master MODEL of the God-world relation—for example, the
formation of a divine-human community.1044 This is due in part to the fact that,
although confidence in providence has often been reduced to the level of personal
experiences of grace, one cannot restrict discussion of it to this sphere, because
1041Puddefoot, 'Response by John Puddefoot,' in Science and Theology, eds. Murray Rae,
Hilary Regan, and John Stenhouse (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd.; Grand Rapids, MI: William
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 142; cf. Diogenes Allen's argument, following Austin
Farrer, that 'one is first to have faith in order to be in a position to recognise the manifestation of
divine activity in nature, history, and individual lives' ('Faith and the Recognition of God's Activity,'
in Divine Action: Studies Inspired by The Philosophical Theology ofAustin Farrer. eds. Brian
Hebblethwaite, and Edward Henderson [Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1990], 198).
l042Murphy, 'Does Prayer Make a Difference,' in Cosmos as Creation: Theology and Science
in Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989), 235-245; Kirkpatrick,
Together Bound. 148-150.
1043Cf. Helm, The Providence of God, in Contours ofChristian Theology, series ed., Gerald
Bray (Leicester, UK: Inter-Varsity Press, 1993), 163, 62, 141, 228-230; cf. also Kirkpatrick, Together
Bound. 152.
I044ln order to distinguish between the different levels ofmodels being referred to in the
following discussion, hereafter 'MODEL' will refer to the overarching model or goal of the God-
world relation, understood in terms of divine-human community. Models of divine work (creation,
providence, redemption, consummation), and models of the trinitarian structure of those works, will
be referred to with a lower case use of 'model.'
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personal grace and history are linked to wider social and cosmic structures.1045 A
holistic and relational metaphysics requires one to develop a theology ofprovidence
which corresponds to God's encompassing of the whole of the history of creation.1046
Frank Tupper correctly notes that 'the complexity and scope' of the problems and
issues associated with providence point to 'the conclusion that providence is not so
much a discrete locus of doctrine as a comprehensive symbol [or model] for the
question of the relationship ofGod, the world, and human history.'1047 As such, one
would need to make clear the reasons for the standpoints assumed, as intrinsic
elements in his or her larger theological model, on certain key issues: for example,
how the Christian scriptures are utilised as a source of data in theological
construction; one's perspective on such issues as 'divine sovereignty and human
freedom, radical evil and the goodness of creation, petitionary prayer and the
availability ofGod, the meaning of life and the mystery of death'1048; the nature of
God's foreknowledge, and the nature of, and relation between, eternity and time;
how the world, as interpreted through modem scientific disciplines, can be
understood as open to the divine care; the character of divine action; and one's
understanding of God, for example, as Trinity. It would be necessary, therefore, to
offer some account of one's position on these and other issues (as listed above) if
one's doctrine ofprovidence, as an interpretative grid for finding and making
meaning out of life, is to have rational plausibility and existential credibility. A
doctrine ofprovidence will, therefore, self-consciously incorporate particular
assumptions about God, the world, and human history.
l045Cf. Polkinghorne, Serious Talk: Science and Religion in Dialogue (Valley Forge, PA:
Trinity Press International, 1995), 88, 86; and idem, Polkinghorne (One World: The Interaction of
Science and Theology (London, UK: SPCK, 1986; First Princeton Paperback printing, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1987) 84-85, 89-92).
1046Cf. Owen Thomas' and Ellen Wondra's comment that 'the difficulties [with a doctrine of
providence] derive from the fact that providence is the doctrine that asserts most comprehensively
God's present relation to the world' (Introduction to Theology. 122).
1047E. Frank Tupper, A Scandalous Providence: The Jesus Story of the Compassion of God
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995), 7. Cf. Edward Farley's almost identical statement in
his review ofReaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History, by Langdon Gilkey, in
Religious Studies Review 4, no. 4 (October 1978): 233.
1048Tupper, Scandalous Providence. 7.
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Suggestions for a TrinitarianModel ofProvidence
One of the working assumptions in this thesis has been that the Christian God
is triune. As argued in Chapter One above, the ecumenical creeds and the New
Testament documents have provided the basis for this understanding.1049 If accepted,
this doctrine entails that all of God's works ad extra are trinitarian, even if such
works are in some way undivided (Augustine; Aquinas1050). This appears to be
especially so in the work of redemption, where the trinitarian nature of the divine
work ad extra seems to be most clearly demonstrated. If redemption, in turn, is then
understood as an integral part of a larger story, then the organic unity of all God's
works ad extra implies that similar trinitarian distinctions apply to all the divine
works in the creative sequence.
On this view, trinitarian creation, providence, redemption and consummation
forms the theological structure for thinking about God's presence in, and care of, the
world, and therefore provides the context for understanding the world's theological
meaning and hope. It then becomes necessary to think of providence as one
important link in the Trinity's project of creation, redemption and consummation.
Two basic criteria seem to impose themselves on such an enterprise: first, to
develop a model of providence which remains faithful to the triune nature of God,
and second, doing so in such a way that the resulting trinitarian doctrine of
providence actually facilitates the retrieval and reconstruction ofprovidence in a
credible fashion. Although this type of theological project privileges key Christian
views about God and the nature of the world in constructing a doctrine of
providence, this prioritising should not be taken to imply a naive discounting of
contemporary scientific understandings of the world.
1049 Cf. Edmund J. Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the
Trinity. Theological Resources, eds. John P. Whalen, and Jaroslav Pelikan (Philadelphia, PA:
Westminster; London: Hutchinson and Co. [Publishers] Ltd., 1972), 1-35; cf. also Thomas Torrance's,
The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church (Edinburgh, UK: T.
and T. Clark Ltd., 1988), 2; and IngolfU. Dalferth: '[T]he conviction that the "doctrine of the Trinity
simply is the Christian doctrine ofGod" seems to be one of the least contentious claims among
Christian theologians today' ('The Eschatological Roots of the Doctrine of the Trinity,' in Trinitarian
Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph Schwobel (Edinburgh, UK: T. and
T. Clark Ltd., 1995), 147.
1050Cf. Leo Scheffczyk, Creation and Providence, trans. Richard Strachan (London, UK:
Burns and Oates Limited; New York, NY: Herder and Herder, 1970), 147.
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Discussion about the role ofmodels in understanding providence also raises
the problem of the limitations of any one model. It might be more helpful, therefore,
to work in terms of a master MODEL of the God-world relation which encompasses
not only a doctrine ofprovidence, but also multiple models or structures of divine
action. John Mclntyre adopted a somewhat similar method in elucidating the
complexities of the concept of the love of God. He created a model of God's love
composed of 'a constellation' of six terms representing the dynamic variety in God's
'attributes, . . . actions, operations, purposes, relations and attitudes': 'Love is
Concern, Commitment, Communication, Community, Involvement, Identification,
Response and Responsibility.' No one term is adequate by itself, but rather, 'each
has a quite separate contribution to make.'1051 As Kevin Vanhoozer points out, this
is a more adequate approach than Brtimmer's single 'overarching relational model'
in which love is "'a relationship of free mutual give and take.'"1052
The present thesis will employ an analogous method in depicting the
trinitarian structure of the divine acts ad extra. Since no one model fully captures the
complexity of this structure in the works of creation, providence, redemption and
consummation, this thesis will incorporate key elements from multiple models of
trinitarian divine action.
Accepting that God is triune, then all levels of the Trinity's relations to the
world embody a trinitarian structure. The master MODEL for this relation is that of
a divine-human community. The means to achieving that overarching goal or project
include the divine works of creation, redemption and consummation. The work of
providence can be understood as the unifying thread which ensures that these works
form the single whole which will achieve the overall goal.
Community as a Context for Providence
A doctrine or model of providence not only describes key aspects ofGod's
ongoing relation to the world, but it also implies a purpose behind that relation which
l05lJohn Mclntyre, On the Love of God (London, UK: Collins, 1962), 35, 37.
1052Vanhoozer, 'Introduction: The Love ofGod,' in Nothing Greater. Nothing Better:
Theological Essays on the Love of God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge, UK; Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 23, 18.
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gives the doctrine greater significance. Deciding what that purpose is helps to define
what one understands the shape and role ofprovidence to be. This is where it is
helpful to think of a doctrine ofprovidence within a more comprehensive MODEL of
the God-world relation.
As noted by several of the authors in this thesis, the loving personal God of
Christian theism has a purpose in creating this world which goes beyond giving
creatures existence. Many of these authors have insisted that this goal is best
understood in terms of God forming community with free creatures, both in present
history by the work of the Spirit, and especially in the eschaton through a completing
of the created other. Allowing and enabling humans to participate in finite forms of
the divine freedom and personhood while remaining in solidarity with the rest of
creation, ensures that all aspects of creation can participate in the glory of God.1053
Such a view correlates well with a view ofboth created and divine realities as
characterised by relationality.1054 Moltmann and Pannenberg, for example, have
utilised personal and relational categories in order to form a new metaphysics. Denis
Edwards agrees with this move, suggesting that 'the basic metaphor for the trinitarian
God ... is not actus purus but persons-in-communion.'1055
Stanley Grenz has also used a community concept within which to develop a
theology of God's eschatological purposes being worked out through his providential
relation to the world.1056 Adopting a community MODEL as the context for the
l053Cf. Gunton, Triune Creator. 197.
l054Cf. Polkinghorne, Serious Talk. 88, 86; Moltmann, 'Perichoresis: An Old Magic Word for
a New Trinitarian Theology, in Trinity. Community and Power: Mapping Trajectories in Weslevan
Theology, ed. M. Douglas Meeks (Nashville, TN: Kingswood Books, An Imprint of Abingdon Press,
2000), 113, 117; William Stoeger, 'God and Time,' 365-388; cf. also, LaCugna, God For Us: The
Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFranisco, 1991; Harper Collins Paperback
edition, 1993), 168.
1055Denis Edwards, 'The Discovery of Chaos and the Retrieval of the Trinity,' In Chaos and
Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey
Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke, A series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert
John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for
Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997,) 159-160, 165.
I056Grenz, Theology for the Community ofGod (Carlisle, U.K.: The Paternoster Press; n.p.,
USA: Broadman and Holman Publishers, 1994), 147-151.
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providential purposes of the God-world relation, it can function as a heuristic device
for discussing many of the problems with a doctrine ofprovidence.
While the parameters of this thesis does not allow for a full development of a
particular community MODEL as a context for a doctrine of providence, it is
necessary to specify a few qualifications for such a MODEL, as well as state a
minimal set of assumptions for it.
Certain qualifications need to be observed when talking about a concept of
community when it includes a relationship between the divine and the created. First,
the inner-trinitarian life, referred to in some social doctrines of the Trinity as a
'community of love,' needs to be carefully qualified if it is not to imply tri-theism.
Second, in whatever analogous way the concept of 'community' is applied to
the inner-trinitarian life, its application to the formation of human community will
imply a different understanding of the term 'persons' as constituents of that
community than when the same term is used of the divine Persons. As Pannenberg
points out, for example, while the trinitarian Persons can be thought of as fully
constituted in and through their relations to each other, human personhood or identity
'is not so exclusively constituted by the relation to one or two other persons as it is in
the trinitarian life of God.' Moreover, 'in the case ofhuman personality the identity
of the person is never fully or exclusively defined by the relation to the other, in
human self-awareness the human I and the human self are different.'1057 Thus, the
concept of relational constitution being assumed here is more limited than
Polkinghorne's and Moltmann's thorough-going relational ontologies which seem to
include some degree ofmutual constitution between divine and human being.
Moreover, I accept Harriet Harris' caution that it is important to distinguish
between the 'numerical identity' of a person (which does not change as a result of
relationships), and changes in that person's 'personality' or character as a result of
his or her particular set of relationships.1058 As Harris argues, if one is constituted as
a person (identity) exclusively through one's relationships to others, then it is hard to
affirm the 'continuity ofpersonal identity'—even though one can allow for the quality
l057Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 431.
1058Harriet Harris, 'Should We say that Personhood is Relational?,' Scottish Journal of
Theology 51. no. 2 (1998): 218; cf. ibid., 232-234.
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or character of that person to undergo development and change through the influence
of relationships to other entities.1059 One may also accept John Zizioulas' argument
that only because a human being has its constitution in the free creative and
sustaining act of God, as mediated through the Son, does it have continuing
givenness or identity and, therefore, a basis from which to form relations, and
through those relations come to be recognised as person.1060 Thus, Harris suggests
that while persons are inherently relational and that 'relationships . . . [are] essential
to our development,' personhood itself does not arise from relations.1061 If humans
relate to the Father by participating—on a finite level—in the Son's filial relation to
the Father, it is precisely this structure ofbeing as established from outside the
human person which ensures the enduring identity of the person as a unique entity
over time. By definition the divine-human relationship is a-symmetrical: God first
posits in being the human and then, while sustaining that being and cooperating with
its activities, God establishes personal relationship with the human. This personal
relationship has traditionally been constituted within the framework of covenant
communities such as the church and the kingdom of God. For the purposes of this
thesis, therefore, use of the concept of relationality in the context of divine-human
community focuses on the qualitative transformation engendered by that personal
fellowship, rather than on the constitution ofhuman being as such.
Third, therefore, when speaking of the Trinity forming community with
humans, the distinction between divine and human ontologies must be respected if,
on the one hand, humans are not to be subsumed into the inner-trinitarian life
(divinised), or on the other hand, the trinitarian Persons are not to be reduced to
super-humans. While the principle of otherness-in-relation may formally be applied
to the relations of the triune persons with each other, to the relations of the Trinity to
humans, and to the relations between humans, its material content in each case will
l059Harris, 'Personhood is Relational?,' 222 (italics mine).
1060Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person. Towards an Ontology of Personhood,' in Persons. Divine
and Human, eds. Christoph Schwobel, and Colin E. Gunton, King's College Essays in Theological
Anthropology [Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1991], 41-46). Cf. Harris' similar point
('Personhood is Relational?,' 229).
l06lHarris, 'Personhood is Relational?,' 229, 224-227.
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differ with respect to the differences of the underlying ontologies of the members
forming the community. The Trinity is not like a group of three friends that opens
their circle of friendship to include humans. Rather, humans relate to each of the
three divine Persons in a different way. The 'highly differentiated threefold
relationship' that humans have with the Trinity means that 'true human community
comes about not as an image of the trinitarian fellowship, but as the Spirit makes us
like Jesus in his community with the Father and with others.'1062 Moreover, while
humans are fully constituted as such by the ontological and personal relations of the
divine to the human, the triune being ofGod does not depend upon the human for its
identity or completeness.1063
Minimally stated, the kind of community God is seeking to establish is 'a
redeemed people, living within a renewed creation,. . . enjoying the presence of their
God,' 'fellowship with each other, and harmony with all creation.'1064 This
description corresponds to Moltmann's concept of the eschatological Sabbath,
expressed in terms of the Kingdom ofGlory in which 'God will be all in all.' Frank
Kirkpatrick's definition of community is also apropos: it is 'a model of personal
relationships in which the unique gifts of each person are celebrated and nurtured,
and in which the celebration and nurturing of others are the primary intentions of all
the members,' that is 'a community of genuine and full mutuality.'1065 Such a
community, made possible by the trinitarian event of the incarnation and
resurrection, takes the form of a 'messianic community' in the present and the fully
realised kingdom of God in the eschaton.1066
l062Bauckham, 'Jiirgen Moltmann's The Trinity and the Kingdom of God and the Question of
Pluralism,' in The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age: Theological Essays on Culture and Religion, ed. Kevin
J. Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), 161.
l063Cf. Gunton, 'God the Holy Spirit: Augustine and his Successors,' chap, in Theology
Through the Theologians: Selected Essays 1972-1995 (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark, 1996), 127,
128.
l064Grenz, Theology for the Community. 148, 151.
1065Kirkpatrick, Together Bound. 169, 166; cf. also, Miroslav Volf, "'The Trinity is our
Social Program": The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement,' Modem Theology
14 (July 1998): 403-423.
1066Kraus, God Our Savior. Chap. 6.
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The workings of providence, therefore, are best seen in the context of the
Trinity's creative-eschatological purpose, that is, as the purposeful energy behind the
formation of divine-human community. This comprehensive perspective can
incorporate the concept of a perichoretic relationship between the created times, and
between time and eternity.1067 It also relates to God's sovereignty over the whole
creative project, a sovereignty which grants the whole its ultimate unity as a single
project, and which in turn gives providence and the concept of history a
cohesiveness, agenda and meaning.1068 In the same way that theodicy must not be
thought of apart from eschatology (Pannenberg), so also providence must not be
thought of apart from the creative-redemptive-consummative sequence.1069 As in
Moltmann's and Pannenberg's theologies, God's paradigmatic revelation in Christ of
his eschatological identity with, and redemption of, fallen humanity forms the
hermeneutical key to God's present providential working.1070 God is working to
form the kingdom of God, to establish his rule within his creation, and part of this
project includes working through his subjects, not dominating, but empowering.1071
Providence, therefore, is one aspect of a much larger trinitarian positing of,
and movement toward, the world. It is much more than the sustaining of an initial
creation. It is, rather, an expression of the living and active presence of Father, Son
and Holy Spirit in the different dimensions of their relations to the world (creative,
providential, soteriological), aimed at creating Christ-like others for community.
Although labels can be limiting, such a wide-ranging scope of divine activities as
accorded to a doctrine ofprovidence merits some attempt at revising nomenclature.
l067Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, trans. Margaret
Kohl, The Gifford Lectures, 1984-1985 (SCM Press Ltd., 1985), 126-139; and Laurence Wood, 'Does
God Know the Future? Can God be Mistaken?: A Reply to Richard Swinburne,' Asburv Theological
Journal 56, no. 2; 57, no. 1 (Fall 2001; Spring 2002): 5-47.
1068Cf. Thomas Oden, Living God. 182.
1069Cf. Gunton, 'End ofCausality?,' 81; and Gunton, The Promise ofTrinitarian Theology.
2nd ed. (Edinburgh, UK: T. and T. Clark, 1991, 1997), 203.
l070Cf. Tanner, Jesus and Humanity. 5; Oden, Living God. 182; Gunton, Triune Creator. 177-
178, 190, 192, 202, 223; and Tupper, Scandalous Providence. 3.
107lCf. Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (New
York, NY; Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988), 89-90. It should be noted here that the kingdom
model can be supplemented with other models such as those of the church and of the body ofChrist.
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Defining Providence in Terms of Trinitarian Pansyntheism
The dilemma of a doctrine ofprovidence centres in an intriguing but
troubling tension: on the one hand it claims that God is intimately with us; on the
other hand it makes this claim in the face of a bewildering sense of the absence of
God. For this reason a doctrine of providence seems to embody, if not a
contradiction, at least a profound paradox. As Ruth Page expresses it, on the one
hand, God's relationship with creation entails a strong sense of God's Tetting-be,'
and on the other hand it ensures God's 'loving presence' with each dimension of
creation. Page has coined a term to encompass this dual emphasis:
'pansyntheism.'1072 While no aspect of the world is "outside" 'the divine presence,'
neither is the world subsumed into God. Rather, the emphasis on "'God with
everything'" highlights the distinction of the world from God even as the world
depends on God for its existence.1073 While Page does not understand God to be an
ontological Trinity, formally at least, the dynamic of otherness-in-relation embodied
in 'pansyntheism' corresponds to the trinitarian ontology and activity advocated here.
Traditional labels such as Deism, Classical Theism, Panentheism, Process
Theism, Pantheism, and the more recent Open Theism, each try to capture some key
aspect of the God-world relation. Often it is a matter of finding a balance between
two extremes, or of highlighting what is considered an essential (and perhaps
neglected) feature of the relationship.1074 The present thesis suggests that the term
'pansyntheism' can be adapted to express the overarching MODEL of the divine-
human community. It captures succinctly in a single term the ontological structure
of relation-in-otherness; it expresses the key idea of the trinitarian event of the
incarnation: Immanuel, God with us, as the biblical interpretation of the significance
of the incarnation; and it allows for an absolute and universal dependence of the non-
divine upon the triune God for being, and yet reflects the true identity-in-distinction
structure of divine-human relations.
1072Page, Web of Creation. 40.
1073Page, Web of Creation. 40-41 (italics mine).
1074The fact that each of these models can claim to speak of God's relation to the world
illustrates the ambiguity of the term, especially as used in reference to God. Michael Welker critiques
this concept as being 'completely vague' ('God's Eternity,' 319, n. 2).
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For example, when linked to the differentiated trinitarian relation to the
world, it does a better job than either Classical Theism or panentheism in assuring
that God has real relations to the world. God's eternity can bracket, embrace and
interact with the times of temporally and spatially defined creatures, as manifested in
the incarnation of the Son and the work of the Spirit. Phillip Clayton argues,
however, that panentheism does a better job than Classical Philosophical Theism in
modelling God's relation to the world. In panentheism, 'God includes the world
within himself, although God is also more than the world. By contrast, Classical
Philosophical Theism holds that God is fully distinct from the world, though present
to it.' Although the two positions have similarities, Clayton argues that 'there may
be a greater resonance between panentheism and key tenets of the biblical account of
God's relation to the world than there is between that account and CPT.'1075 But
panentheism is primarily an ontological category (implying a focus on ontological
continuity between God and the world), whereas pansyntheism brings into focus the
mutual withness ofqualitatively (ontologically) distinct entities. On the human side,
the distinctness is ensured by gracedparticipation (not merger) in the relation of the
otherness of the Son from and to the Father, as enabled by the Spirit. Precisely
because the Father can be present to us by being in us through the Spirit and with us
as the Son, his transcendent-immanent, differentiated care and guidance is personal,
and always values human otherness. Thus, pansyntheism better accommodates a
personal relation between God and humans without divinising humans.
This personal relation with the triune God, as a result of the incarnation, is
given a concrete reference in the divine-human Christ. Jesus Christ is 'God with us'
in a unique and concrete way. This unique personal intimacy and withness is not lost
to us when Christ ascends to the Father, since he and the Father send 'another
1075Clayton, 'The Case for Christian Panentheism,' Dialog 37, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 202.
Cf. Thomas Finger's argument that traditional trinitarian theism can more adequately instantiate
otherness-in-distinction than panentheistic models ('Trinity, Ecology and Panentheism,' Christian
Scholar's Review 27. no. 1 [Fall 1997]: 90-96).
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Comforter.'1076 Moreover, with the outpouring of the Spirit, Christ is actually said to
be 'in you' through the Spirit being 'in you.'1077
The term 'pansyntheism,' therefore, has the flexibility to express the
characteristics of intimacy, pervasiveness, concern, power, wisdom, patience,
adaptability, faithfulness, levels of complexity and different types of relationship,
longsuffering, and the commitment of God's covenantal presence with, or alongside
each entity. God's withness with each element of creation is as varied and rich as the
creation itself, and as dynamic as the inner-trinitarian relations. For humans, it
involves a universal creative/preservational component (the Father's love and will as
mediated through the Son and Spirit), a universal soteriological potential in the re¬
creative redemption provided by the Son and as made available in the form of
renewing grace through the Spirit, and a universal possibility of form
(identity/personality formation) and community with the Trinity through the Son and
Spirit. For this reason creation, salvation and consummation must be thought
together, and a trinitarian doctrine of providence forms the link making that possible.
Pansyntheism emphasises God's intentional presence and interaction with each
element of creation, his active engagement in both their continued existence and in
their activities—a mode of presence traditionally referred to under the categories of
'concursus' and 'special providence.' 'Concursus' can be given an impersonal
interpretation, but 'special providences' better captures the personal nature of the
God-world relation,1078 especially as revealed in the experience of'God with us' in
Christ and the Spirit.
Pansyntheism, therefore, accords well with the all-encompassing structure of
trinitarian providence. The structure of trinitarian love ensures all three divine
Persons are equally involved in every moment of human life, albeit, in different
ways. The otherness-in-unity that defines the inner-trinitarian love becomes the
structure through which, in the Son, humans participate in that love.
1076Cf. John 14:16-17, 25; 15:26; 16:7 (RSV).
1077Romans 8:9-11 (RSV).
1078Owen Thomas and Ellen Wondra prefer the more personal categories 'historical and




God relates to creation as loving providence forming a divine-human
community. Formation of such a community requires the space and time1079 for
humans to develop true otherness after the pattern of the Son relating to the Father.
Such a model can appreciate Wiles' concern for true creaturely independence, but
one need not stop with the establishment of independence as an end in itself. Wiles'
model accentuates the quality of the unitive "moment" of the creative act in which
space and time are given to creatures to become independent others. However,
because his model sees independence as the ultimate goal of the creative act, it
cannot account for a more personal and interactive relationship between God and the
emergence of creaturely others as an essentialpart ofthe process ofbecoming an
other.
Gilkey's model moves further in this direction, with his concept of God's
universal and resourceful 'lure.' His model also gives a more holistic account of
God's creative project in that what has its partial and incomplete beginning in this
life is extended into, and perfected by, life after death—although Gilkey remains
vague about this. A question which arose for both Gilkey's and Moltmann's model
at this point, however, was whether their universalism adequately accounts for the
true independence granted to humans. This universalism seems to derive in part
from God's choice to be constituted, at least in part, by his relations with the world.
This relational ontology between the divine and human, even if it remains a-
symmetrical in degree, fails to recognise the distinction between divine and human
being, and also the distinction between human identity and human personality
(Harris). Perhaps for the same reasons, Gilkey's model also lacks a truly personal
interaction with God because the 'lure' operates at some level below the conscious.
It would seem that Pannenberg is more consistent here in maintaining the true
created otherness and identity of humans such that they can make a real choice, on
the level ofpersonal relations, to choose not to participate in the Son's relationship
with the Father.
1079Cf. Gunton, Triune Creator. 142, 173, 188-189, 192. Cf. also Robert Jenson, 'Time,
Created Being, and Space,' chap, in The Works of God, vol. 2, Systematic Theology (Oxford, UK;
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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If one conceives of God as the trinitarian Persons ofFather, Son and Holy
Spirit (as do Helm, Sanders, Pannenberg and Moltmann), this further complicates the
question ofhow each is "person," and how the triune persons sustain, govern and
provide redemption for the world.
One of the problems noted in Chapters Three and Four had to do with how to
account for the apparent "overlap" of the work of the trinitarian Persons: for
example, Father, Son and Holy Spirit are each involved in the creative act; both Son
and Spirit sustain the universe; both Father and Son speak the sustaining word.1080
This problem was resolved by Augustine through the doctrine of appropriations and
the formula, opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa. It was noted, however, that this
remedy has not always adequately accounted for the significance of the distinctions
between the trinitarian roles in the economy, especially if these differences are
thought of as reflecting distinctions within the triune godhead.1081
This leads to the question ofhow to develop a trinitarian doctrine of
providence which respects these distinctions without, on the one hand, separating the
triune persons into three gods, or on the other hand, treating the divine works ad
extra as the work of an undifferentiated single divine essence (a problem in Helm's
and Sanders' models ofprovidence). The suggestion being adopted here is to
extrapolate from the divine works in the economy the unique role of each of the
• • 1089 ... • • •
divme persons and the trinitarian structures of divine action, which in turn can
inform the shape of a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence. It is the complexity and
variety of this trinitarian structure which the following section will attempt to
address.
1080Heb. 1:3 (RSV).
1081Cf. Pannenberg, Chapter Four above, 'The Trinity-World Relation.'
l082This is the approach adopted by Moltmann and Pannenberg; Catherine LaCugna (God For
Us. 13, 168-169); Thomas Finger ('Trinity, Ecology and Panentheism,' 74-98); Robert Jenson, (The
Triune God, vol. 1, Systematic Theology [Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
1997], 60, chap. 4); and Gary Badcock (Light of Truth and Fire of Love: A Theology of the Holy
Spirit [Cambridge, UK; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997], 253-
256). This is, however, an appropriate place to acknowledge Gunton's concern that one not grant so
much weight to the economic distinctions among the trinitarian roles that the creative act is seen to




Trinitarian Structures of Divine Action
In order to respond to these challenges, five models will be presented as ways
of thinking about the structure of trinitarian action in the world. These models do not
represent an exhaustive list of options, but serve rather to illustrate complementary
ways ofpicturing the structure of trinitarian providential action enabling the
formation of a divine-human community. Neither are the five structures of divine
action intended as remedies for scientific problems with providence, nor as
resolutions of such philosophical problems as the relation between divine
sovereignty and human freedom. They serve instead to point toward theological
conceptions of divine action which correspond more closely with the Christian
doctrine ofGod as triune. Nevertheless, such theological models of divine action
should correspond better with modern scientific perceptions of the world when it is
thought of as an integrated, relational whole, and they should provide a heuristic
framework within which to think about the sovereignty/freedom issue.
Palamas'/Aquinas' Sequential-Uniqueness Model
As noted in Chapter Three above, although Helm and Sanders both assume a
doctrine of the Trinity, they treat God's creative, providential and redemptive work
as if it were the work of a single divine essence, thus ignoring the New Testament's
emphasis on the distinctions between the roles of the trinitarian persons. The first
version of trinitarian divine action summarised here begins to address that issue, and
is based on Bruce Marshall's interpretation of Gregory Palamas' and Thomas
Aquinas' understanding of the unique identity of each of the divine persons, and the
distinctions between their roles in the economy.1083
Palamas and Aquinas agree that 'the actions of the Trinity ... are common to
the persons of the Trinity,' just as is the 'one numerically identical (ouaia).'
However, this emphasis on 'the undivided character of God's actions ad extra seems
to make it difficult or impossible for those actions to display the distinctions between
1083Bruce D. Marshall, 'Action and Person: Do Palamas and Aquinas Agree About the
Spirit?,' St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1995): 379-408. Cf. also, Gerald O'Collins,
S.J., on the Thomistic understanding of the differentiated unity of the divine actions ad extra (The




the divine persons.'1084 Singleness of action seems to imply singleness of agent, thus
reducing to irrelevance the trinitarian nature of God.1085 The problem becomes, how
to 'count persons without counting actions.'1086
Palamas resolves
this problem by saying that while the action of the divine
persons is always numerically one, each person enacts or
undertakes it in a different way. Each person has, as it were,
a different role or place in the one divine action.... The
difference consists in the unique location each person has in
an irreversible sequence according to which all the actions of
the Trinity are carried out. ... [as follows:] . . . 'the
movement of the divine will is one, originating from (eK) the
Father as primary cause, going forth through (8ia) the Son,
and being manifested in (ev) the Holy Spirit.' This suggests
that every divine 'movement' is enacted by the Father as the
one 'from' whom it occurs, the Son as the one 'through'
whom it occurs, and the Spirit as the one 'in' whom it
occurs;.... The outcome of every divine action bears the
stamp of the particular sequence in which the persons enact
it, and thereby each divine person in his distinction from the
others.1087
In this sequence, both the distinction ofpersons and their roles are
maintained, while also affirming that every divine act ad extra "'is one action of the
three.'" For example, one can say 'the Father creates [or governs] ... as the one
from whom this action originates, while the Son creates [or governs] as the one
through whom this same action takes place.' The Spirit's distinct contribution is to
manifest 'the origination of the action from the Father and its execution through the
Son.' In this way one can 'count persons without counting actions.'1088
Marshall affirms that 'Thomas agrees with Palamas on three crucial points' in
this model ofdivine action:
l084Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 394.
1085Gunton makes a similar complaint (Promise. 3-4, 198; cf. Gunton, Christ and Creation,
the Didsbury Lectures [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company; Carlisle, UK:
The Paternoster Press, 1992], 62).
l086Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 394, 395.
1087Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 395-396.
l088Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 396.
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i) the actions of the triune God in the world display
distinctions between the divine persons; ii) the actions
display such distinctions because each person enacts or
undertakes every action in a way unique to that person, and
different from the ways in which the other persons engage in
the action; iii) every action of the three persons is,
nonetheless, numerically identical for the three.1089
Aquinas adds a fourth point which is only implicit in Palamas: 'the
distinctions displayed in the divine actions ad extra have their visible root not only in
the irreversible sequence in which the actions are undertaken . . . , but, beyond that,
in the eternal and incommunicable uniqueness of each of the divine persons
themselves.' In other words, the unique identity of each divine person in relation to
the others accounts for 'the distinctions displayed in the divine actions ad extra.,mo
For this reason, 'the divine actions display distinctions among the divine persons
precisely by exhibiting the persons themselves in their innermost distinction from
one another; the different ways in which the divine persons each undertake their
action manifest, beyond the sequence of the action, the incommunicable uniqueness
of each of the persons.'1091 It is this combination of features which suggests the title
given to this structure of trinitarian divine action: a sequential/uniqueness model.
According to Aquinas, therefore,
to 'appropriate ... is nothing other than to draw that which is
shared toward that which is proper (commune trahere ad
proprium).' The 'propria' here are the characteristics or
attributes which are absolutely unique to each divine person,
in particular those which constitute the personal identity of
each, and so are not shared with anyone else—in no way are
they commune. To 'appropriate' is thus to ascribe or 'draw'
(trahere) actions and attributes shared by the three persons
differently to each, and primarily to one, on the basis ofwhat
is incommunicably unique to each person.1092
1089Marshall, 'Action and Person.' 396, 397.
l090Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 397.
I09lMarshall, 'Action and Person,' 401.
l092Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 399-400.
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Upon this basis Aquinas appropriates or ascribes the act of adoption to the
Father, although all three divine persons are equally and essentially involved in the
act:
The Father is the auctor ofadoptare, the original source
without whose initiative the divine act of adopting creatures
would not take place at all. The Son is the exemplar of
adoptare, since we are adopted when we come to have, by
participation, a relation to the Father which resembles his
own eternal filiatio. The Spirit is the imprimens of adoptare,
the agent who terminates the one divine act of adoption by
uniting us to the exemplar, and in this way creating in us a
participated likeness of the exemplar. '1093
If adoption is understood as giving 'to those who are not one's natural
offspring a share in the goods one gives to those who are,' then 'in the Father's
eternal act ofgenerare, all that the Father is and has' is given to the Son, while in the
act of adoption humans are given a share in the Son's reception of these goods, and
thereby the Son plays the role of'exemplar' or 'model for our own sonship' as 'a
"participated likeness" of the eternal Son's natural relation to the Father.'1094
Applying this model to providence, it is not so much that Father, Son and
Holy Spirit each do a particular part ofprovidence (as if each could act without the
other),1095 but rather, providence is accomplished within the following general
trinitarian structure: in any divine act ad extra, the Father is the 'source' ['auctor'] of
the act, the Son is 'its pattern (exemplar),' and the Holy Spirit is the 'agent'
(' imprimens'')1096 who makes the work ofprovidence effective in all levels of
creation. This pattern would apply whether providence is understood either as a
subsequent sustaining and governing of a universe which has first been created, or as
an aspect of continuous creation.
Kathryn Tanner, adopting this model, applies it to creation and providence as
follows:
1093Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 398.
l094Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 398-399, 397-398.
l095Cf. O'Collins, Tripersonal God. 180.
l096Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 398.
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the world ... is created, sustained, and directed generally by
God. Existing through the outreach of the Holy Spirit,
coming forth from the Father as the source of all good in the
form of or after the image of the Father which is the Son, and
pervaded as the Son is by the Spirit resting on and through it,
the world as it comes to be and takes shape from God reflects
the dynamics of the trinitarian life.1097
Clarifying further, and in imagery similar to that used by Colin Gunton,1098
Tanner states: 'By the breath of his mouth and in the image ofhis Word, the Father
creates, preserves and saves the world; the Father brings into being, orders, and
redeems, using, as Irenaeus would say, his two hands, Son and Spirit.'1099
Gunton argues that, 'according to the New Testament, creation is through and
to Christ, and this means that it is, so to speak, structured by the very one who
became incarnate and thus part of the created order ofwhich we are speaking. It is
good because God himself, through his Son, remains in intimate and loving relations
with it.'1100 For this reason it is appropriate to ascribe "'wisdom to the Son'"1101
since creation, redemption and consummation, and the providence which links them,
find their continuing pattern and telos toward perfection in him.
This model is similar to that developed by Pannenberg (Chapter Four, above)
in which the Son provides the structure of otherness to the Father, a relation in which
creation is enabled to participate by the operation of the Spirit.1102 Pannenberg,
however, modifies the Palamas/Aquinas model slightly by arguing that the Son has a
subjective role as well as the Father.1103 The Son's 'self-distinction from the
1097Tanner, Jesus. Humanity. 41.
1098Cf. Gunton, 'End ofCausality?,' 77; idem, 'Relation and Relativity: The Trinity and the
Created World,' in Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act, ed. Christoph
Schwobel (Edinburgh, Scotland: T. and T. Clark Ltd., 1995), 97; and idem, Triune Creator. 54, 60.
1099Tanner, Jesus. Humanity. 40.
"°°Gunton, Triune Creator. 10. Cf. Gunton's statement, 'Jesus Christ is the one through
whom all things take their shape and to whom the Spirit directs them' (Christ and Creation. 97).
'""Marshall, 'Action and Person,' 401.
"02Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 22-23, 24, 29, 32, Systematic 3: 454.
"03Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 29-30.
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Father'1104 is 'the principle of otherness' both in the Trinity and in creation, and it is
the Son's subjectivity which instantiates 'the contingency and historicity of the
reality that results from God's creative action.'1105 The Son, therefore, 'is the origin
as well as the consummator of creation.'1106
The strength of the uniqueness/sequential model of divine action lies in its
ability to recognise distinctions between the triune persons and their roles in the
economy, without at the same time thinking of them as separate persons as is the
case when 'person' is used in reference to humans. It is clear, however, that such a
model cannot account for the full range of complex definitions, relations and actions
associated with the triune godhead. One key problem in this model is the way in
which the Son and Spirit tend to remain passive instruments of the Father's will as
they carry out his providential purposes. For that reason it may be helpful to turn to
Moltmann's revolving trinitarian patterns in order to model the subjectivity of the
Son and Spirit in providence.
Moltmann's Revolving Trinitarian Patterns
Earlier, Moltmann's panperichoretic metaphysics was noted as the basis for
his understanding that the triune persons subsist and exist in and out of each other.
This relational metaphysics in turn, makes possible the openness of the inner-
trinitarian history for creating and including within itself the history of all that is not
God. On all levels of reality, therefore, it is possible to conceive of 'community
without uniformity, and personality without individualism.'1107 Although
Moltmann's model of the Trinity and of creation leans toward an unacceptable
emanationism, within the framework ofhis panperichoretic metaphysics he was able
to develop a more nuanced understanding of the sequence of relations through which
the Trinity embraces the world and its history. In fact, it is God's creatio originalis,
ll04Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 454; cf. Millard Erickson, God in Three Persons: A
Contemporary Interpretation of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1995), 309-310.
1105Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 28, 27.




creatio continua and creatio nova which gives the world its history, and thus links its
history intrinsically to that of the triune God's.
Moltmann's concept ofshifting trinitarian patterns improves upon the
previous sequential model by allowing for a re-ordering of the sequence of trinitarian
patterns of relating among the divine persons—at least in their relation to the
economy. Each pattern of the relations between the trinitarian persons gives priority
to a different trinitarian person, depending upon which aspect of the creation-
redemption-consummation sequence is in focus. Thus, the distinctions among the
trinitarian works in the economy reflect distinctions within the immanent Trinity, but
in such a way as respects the 'total equality of the divine persons': 'Each person is
indwelling and room-giving at the same time.'1
According to Moltmann, therefore, the specific form providence takes at any
given moment and place in the history of God's relation to the world varies
according to what God is working to accomplish at that moment. He illustrates as
follows:
In the sending, delivering up and resurrection ofChrist we
find this sequence:
Father—Spirit—Son.
In the Lordship of Christ and the sending of the Spirit the
sequence is:
Father—Son—Spirit.
But when we are considering the eschatological
consummation and glorification, the sequence has to be:
Spirit—Son—Father.1109
The New Testament exhibits a variety and distinction with respect to the
work of the divine Persons which reflects the perichoretic nature of their distinction-
in-unity. Gary Badcock states this as a 'structural principle' in which
the Spirit is the point of terminus of the descending
movement by which God comes to us, just as the Spirit is the
point of the initiation of the journey back to the source. . ..
Christologically, it means that the work of the Son is wholly
geared to that of the Spirit, to spiritualization, as we might
call it; pneumatologically, it implies that the work of the
"08Moltmann, 'Perichoresis,' 114 (italics mine).
1109Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 94.
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Spirit in and through the Son is directed to the goal ofmaking
others sons and daughters of God.1110
With regard to God's providential presence, Millard Erickson reminds us that
the Holy Spirit 'is the particular person of the Trinity through whom the entire
Triune Godhead currently works in us.' As such, 'the Holy Spirit is the point at
which the Trinity becomes personal to the believer.'1111
It should be noted that these structures of trinitarian action cannot be pressed
too far. For example, in his work on the Trinity, Gunton struggles with how to
define the relation and roles of the Son and Spirit.1112 Richard Bauckham can say
'our mode of relationship to the Spirit is not interpersonal at all.'1113 Although he
does not address all these issues, C. Norman Kraus helpfully traces the ambiguous
nature of 'Spirit' in the New Testament. 'On the one hand, the Spirit is identified
with the personal God. On the other, it is always God in a special activity or
function.'1114 For this reason, 'the word spirit may and likely does indicate both
God's effective presence and the attitude or spirit which it effects in us.'1115 This
ambiguity of reference can lead to a 'pantheistic identity of God's Spirit and the
human spirit.' Nevertheless, 'when we speak of the Holy Spirit of God, we are
speaking ofGod's enlivening, purifying, encouraging presence in and through the
lives ofChrist's followers.'1116 This corresponds to Gunton's emphasis that the
moGary Badcock, Light of Truth. 271. Cf. Tanner, Jesus. Humanity. 20.
""Millard Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1983,
1984, 1985, 1998), 863, 862; cf. Grenz' comment that, 'since his out-pouring at Pentecost, the Holy
Spirit facilitates the fulfillment of Jesus' assurance of his continual presence with his followers,'
(Theology for the Community. 149).
11'2Gunton, Promise. 199.
""Bauckham, 'Moltmann's Trinity.' 161.
'114Kraus. God Our Savior. 133-134.
"l5Kraus, God Our Savior. 134.
"l6Kraus, God Our Savior. 134.
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Spirit is in fact the third person of the Trinity, and as such is able to enter into 'free
personal relation with us,'1"7 just as do the Father and Son.
A similar double reference for the term 'spirit' occurs in Pannenberg's
trinitarian ontology: spirit is both the force field or field of life of the Trinity, and
also takes the distinct form of the personal Holy Spirit. Whether or not one adopts
Pannenberg's pneumatologically-based ontology of the Trinity, his model of the
trinitarian God-world relation ensures that the divine Spirit does not become merged
with human spirit. The Son is the power of distinction in the Trinity, and the Spirit is
the principle ofunity. Thus, the Spirit ensures that human spirit remains linked with
the Father, but only through the Son.1118 Gunton argues, differently than
Pannenberg, that it is the Spirit who ensures not only the completion of (and so,
unity between) 'the relations ofFather and Son,' but also their distinction from one
another, precisely 'as a Person' who 'leaves other persons free.'1119 It is also the
Spirit, therefore, who enables created others to remain both truly themselves, and yet
enter into relationship with the Trinity.1120 In either model, however, it is the Spirit's
work to enable relationship between creation and the Trinity through the Son. As
Moltmann, Pannenberg, Gunton and Thomas Finger insist, it is through the Son's
incarnation that creation is completed. Each created entity ultimately has its form,
identity, distinction and relation to the godhead through the Son, by means of the
Spirit.
While one might agree with Wiles that creation as such is a single divine act,
it is also an act that includes space and time, and which also includes a wide variety
in the Trinity's creative and providential activities. Terence Fretheim notes that
while the Old Testament presents a 'comprehensive divine working' in the history of
the whole world, the modern 'focus on history and on decisive events in that history
narrowed the range of God's activity.' He points out, however, that even the Old
lll7Gunton, 'God the Holy Spirit,' 109. Gunton recognises the difficulty in formulating a
definition of either the being or function of the Spirit. This predicament derives in part from the 'self-
effacing' quality of the Spirit's role in the economy (ibid., 122).
m8Cf. Tanner, Jesus. Humanity. 39-4; cf. also Colin Gunton, 'God the Holy Spirit,' 118.
m9Gunton, 'God the Holy Spirit,' 128, 126, 126, n. 39.
ll20Gunton, Enlightenment. 106; idem, Promise. 133, 131.
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Testament wowo-theistic God varies the 'intensification' of God's action in different
events and situations. Thus, 'in developing a typology of divine presence, one might
speak of variations in intensification in comparing God's general (or creational)
presence, God's accompanying presence, God's tabernacling presence, and God's
theophanic presence.'1121 This illustrates the point that the MODEL of divine-human
community focuses on the level of covenantal personal relationships between God
and humans, and takes for granted the ontological creative/sustaining presence of
God as the basis for this level of relating.
One aspect of the variety encompassed within the unitary creative act is the
"moment" ofpresent time and the present type of relation of the Trinity to the world
in which time and space is made available through which human creatures not only
come into being, but actually contribute to their own constitution as others-in-
relation to the Father through the Son in the Spirit. The role of humans in this
process occurs within the context ofGod's varied providential presence. Richard
Bauckham suggests a trinitarian structure of this presence which ensures the
development of creaturely freedom and therefore identity-in-difference from God.
Bauckham's "Spatial" Structure for Human Freedom
This third structure of the Trinity-world relation is developed by Richard
Bauckham in the context of his critique ofMoltmann's 'Trinitarian Doctrine of
Freedom.'1122 Moltmann proposed this model as the structure of the Trinity's
relation to human freedom. In it he defines freedom as having three 'stages' or
'transitions,' or as having three strata, each one ofwhich can be appropriated to one
of the divine persons. The first level of freedom is appropriated to 'the kingdom of
the Father, [where] God is the Creator and the lord of those he has created,' thus
making 'men and women' secure and significant 'servants' of the Father. Second,
'in the kingdom of the Son .... servants of the Lord become the children of the
Father.' Through the Son they now have 'free access' to the Father. The third level
112lFretheim, 'The God Who Acts: An Old Testament Perspective,' Theology Today vol. 54,
no. 1 (April, 1997): 8, 15.
""Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 212.
284
The Triune Provider
of freedom is 'the kingdom of the Spirit' in which 'the servants of the Lord and the
children of the Father become God's friends.'1123
Bauckham thinks it is questionable whether these appropriations can be
sustained.1124 For example, in the New Testament, we are 'servants of Christ the
Lord' as well as of the Father as Lord. Further, it is the Spirit who enables
relationships both to the Father as Father and to the Son as Friend, and thus the
category of 'friend' is not simply associated with the Spirit. Bauckham points out
that the type of freedom associated with the Spirit is rather that of 'being "led by the
Spirit.'"1125
He suggests, instead, the use of another set ofmetaphors in which we
know God in three dimensions: as God above us (the Father),
alongside us (Jesus, the Son), and within us (the Spirit). The
fact that this is the stmcture ofGod's love for us excludes the
domination that eliminates freedom. But also the fact that
God's love for us has this structure excludes the merely
paternalistic care that inhibits freedom. The structure gives
Christian freedom three poles between which it takes shape:
authority with belonging, solidarity, spontaneity. The
correlation of these three poles with the three trinitarian
persons is not to be pressed too far, but they do indicate a
••• •• • 1126
trmitanan shape to the Christian experience of freedom.
Bauckham argues further that, if carefully unpacked, these 'three poles' could
show that God's lordship, far from being incompatible with human freedom, actually
'enables human freedom.'1127 Thus, in this spatial model God is with us as three
dimensions of our experience of freedom.
The question arises, however, as to whether this set ofmetaphors and
appropriations does not also lend itself to the danger of a functional modalism, that
"23Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 219-220.
1124Bauckham, 'Moltmann's Trinity.' 163.
ll25Bauckham, 'Moltmann's Trinity.' 163. Cf. Michael E. Lodahl's cogent discussion of how
the divine persons are not all persons in the same way, and the significance of this for Trinity-world
relationships (' Una Natura Divina, Tres Nescio Quid: What Sorts ofPersonae are Divine Personae?,'
Wesleyan Theological Journal 36, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 218-230).
1126Bauckham, 'Moltmann's Trinity.' 164.
"27Bauckham, 'Moltmann's Trinity.' 164.
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is, these spatial images of the Trinity's relation to humans may be nothing more than
reflections of the different ways in which Christians experience God. This would
reduce the triune character of divine action to a kind ofpsychological Trinity. If so,
then thinking of God as triune would serve as a useful fiction, but have no basis in
trinitarian ontology. Moreover, not only does the New Testament picture the Son as
'alongside' us, but also the Holy Spirit (as Paraclete); and not only is the Spirit
'within' us, so also is Christ.1128
Perhaps Bauckham's model could be clarified or strengthened if integrated
with Marshall's interpretation of Palamas and Aquinas, and with the trinitarian
model ofMoltmann. Moltmann, like Pannenberg, shifts from spatial imagery to
temporal imagery—God is ahead of creation. While the perichoretic unity of the
godhead entails that this imagery "locates" all three triune persons in the
transcendent future, nevertheless, it is possible to conceive of the triune Persons
playing distinct roles in their one relation to the whole of the creation story. If the
sequence ofdivine action suggested by Palamas and Aquinas, and as supplemented
by Moltmann, is further applied to Bauckham's model, the unity of trinitarian action
is maintained, even while allowing the appropriation of creation and providence to
the Father who is ahead of creation (rather than 'above"), and to whom we relate in
the present by our participation in the life of the Trinity as mediated through the Son,
in the Holy Spirit. Just as the Son has yet to hand over the kingdom to the Father, so
also, as we participate in the Son's filial relation to the Father, are we yet to enter the
completed kingdom of glory when, as Moltmann says, 'God will be all in all.' The
idea of the Father ahead of creation, used metaphorically and not literally, minimises
the negative overtone of the dominance implicit in Bauckham's metaphor of 'above.'
Instead, this temporal transcendence allows Moltmann's concept of heaven, as the
domain ofpossibilities,1129 to act as a "storehouse" of truly new options which can
transform present reality toward the Sabbath of the new creation.
This model of transcendence of the future requires, however, a more nuanced
model of the Trinity's relation to time in order to enable creation to move ahead into
U28Cf. Colossians 1:27; and Ro. 8:10 (RSV).
"29Moltmann, God in Creation. 162-164.
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its future as empowered and directed by the action of the triune Persons. On the one
hand, Moltmann has worked out a concept of the interlaced times of history1130 and
of the perichoresis of time and eternity,1131 but in a way which seems to imply
becoming in God. Nevertheless, the perichoretic nature of created times, and of time
and eternity, models a way in which God's relation to the world is not limited to
temporal sequence. 'Past and future can then no longer be reduced to the same linear
temporal concept, for their relation to one another is now one of qualitative
1132
difference. It is the difference between "old" and "new."'
On the other hand, Pannenberg's Plotinian and Boethian concept of God's
relation to time in terms of simultaneity1133 seems to more adequately ensure the
distinction between God and creation even while making it possible to conceive that
God's relation to creation transcends the limits of past, present and future. This
model of the relation between eternity and time ensures that time is real, even for
God, and yet God's "ffame-of-reference" is such that all moments of time are present
at once to him. Thus, 'on the level of its own creaturely reality, that which is present
to God belongs to different times. But before God it is present. In this regard God's
eternity needs no recollection or expectation, for it is itself simultaneous with all
events in the strict sense.' In this model 'eternity is the undivided presence of life in
its totality.'1134
Laurence Wood advocates a similar understanding of eternity and time,
drawing upon the theory of relativity to illustrate how it is conceptually
possible—although counter-intuitive—to conceive of time as 'a real fragment of
eternity': 'To put it metaphorically, God can travel faster than the speed of light so
that the past, present, and future are always present to him.'1135 In this model,
ll30Moltmann, God in Creation. 133-134; cf. also 124-139.
ll31Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology. trans. Margaret Kohl (SCM Press
Ltd., 1996), 295.
"32Moltmann, God in Creation. 134.
ll33Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 90-102; cf. idem, Systematic 1: 403-406.
ll34Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 91, 92.
1135Wood, 'Does God Know the Future?,' 10, 30. Cf. William Stoeger's argument that
'temporal reality as a dynamic manifold of interrelated finite beings actually issues from the temporal
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therefore, it is possible to appropriate the future (as the field ofpossibility) to the
Father, but as mediated to each present through the Son and in the Spirit. Strictly
speaking, in their perichoretic unity Father, Son and Holy Spirit embrace all of time,
and yet the dynamic relationality of the inner-trinitarian life allows the going out of
the Son into the creation (by the Spirit), and the return of the creation in the Son (by
the Spirit) to the Father.1136
With these revisions in place, one might suggest the following appropriations:
to the Father, as 'auctor,' envisionment of the whole and "aheadnessto the Son, as
'exemplar,' structure and withness', and to the Spirit, as 'imprimens? empowerment
and "in-ness". As with Bauckham's metaphors, these appropriations cannot be
pressed too far, especially in light of the perichoretic unity of trinitarian Persons and
activities. Nevertheless, they do attempt to begin modelling a trinitarian structure of
relating to the world which reflects real distinctions between the Persons even while
refusing to accept separation of the Persons. This model also raises the question of
the need for a more nuanced model of the Trinity's relation to time—where time is
understood not only in terms of quantity and sequence (chronos), but also in terms of
differing qualities (kairos).
Perichoresis of the Trinitarian Times
A fourth model of trinitarian divine action is suggested by Michael Welker's
correlation of created times with the trinitarian persons' activities in the economy.
He adopts a concept similar to Moltmann's perichoretic concept of the times of
creation, calling 'into question not only the abstract opposition of God and eternity
over against time and temporality,' but also 'the totalization and unification of
• 1137 • •time.' His view of eternity seems to be similar to that ofPannenberg and
Boethius, that is, it is not 'a timeless abstraction,' but 'instant unlimited duration,' 'a
eternity ofGod's inner relationships as a communion of three persons' ('God and Time,' 373; cf.
ibid., 375, 376).
U36Cf. Gunton, 'God the Holy Spirit,' 127; Stoeger, 'God and Time,' 375; and Thomas
Finger, Christian Theology: An Eschatological Approach, vol. 2 (Kitchener, Ont.; Scottdale, PA:
Herald Press, 1989), 446-448.
ll37Michael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 321.
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"quality of life, not mere quantity, something quite different from everlastingness,
1138
something infinitely richer and fuller than timelessness or perpetual duration.'"
Welker assumes a bottom-up approach to understanding the triune work in
the economy, taking his orientation from the biblical images and metaphors of God's
relation to, and activity in, eternity and time. In this way he refers to the 'modes' of
the trinitarian being ('or the so-called "persons" of the Trinity')1139 and their
activities as differentiated, but perichoretically related, kinds of time. On the one
hand, Welker's language here implies a kind of functional modalism. On the other
hand, this model, like Moltmann's and Pannenberg's, seems to be a form of
panentheism: the distinct kinds of time, ascribed severally to the triune '"persons,"'
are so inextricably linked to each of the triune '"persons'" that creation exists within
the differentiated relationships of the immanent Trinity.1140 Thomas Finger argues
convincingly, however, that there are resources within 'historic Christian
trinitarianism' as derived from 'biblical history' which can address the relational and
ecological concerns which make the panentheistic option attractive,1141 thereby
avoiding the emanationism which often accompanies panentheistic models.
Leaving aside the question of functional modalism and panentheism,
Welker's first type of time is associated with the Father as creator. This is
cosmological time, the 'divine and creaturely attunement of cosmological, biological,
and cultural realms ofphenomena and temporal rhythms.'1142 Although
cosmological time is rooted in the orders of creation, this is not a static preservation
of an "'eternal recourse of the same,"' partly because it includes the cooperative
efforts of creatures in correlating the 'cosmological, biological, and cultural'
dimensions of time, and partly because it participates in the 'liveliness' of the
"38Laurence Wood, 'Does God Know the Future?,' 7, 6.
1139Michael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 324.
I140Chapter Four noted some of these problems with Moltmann's pan-perichoretic
metaphysics.
ll41Finger, 'Trinity, Ecology and Panentheism,' 90, 91; cf. also, ibid., 90-98.
"42Michael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 322-323.
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trinitarian being. This type of time is constituted 'of a connection of times that can
be universally measured'' and is 'reversible.'1143
The second dimension of time corresponds to the second "'person'" of the
Trinity, the Son or Logos, and includes 'the complex ofhistorical times.' The
character of this time, in itself, is 'irreversible and past-present-future,' and for that
reason 'these temporal forms' (such as the life 'and activity of Jesus ofNazareth')
can decisively 'shape and mark the course of a multitude of other events in particular
ways.'1144
The reversibility of the Father's cosmological time or activity is seen most
clearly in its perichoretic relation to the third type of time, the salvific and renewing
work of the Spirit. 'Through the Spirit, God's creative powers are mediated and
become known as saving and renewing powers that, without interruption, act upon
and through creatures.'1145 One assumes Welker to mean here that the salvation
energies of the Trinity do not violate the regularities of creation as it is first given,
but repeatedlypick up again that same creation, saving it through renewing it.
Just as, and just because, the divine '"persons'" are perichoretically
constituted and so form a dynamic unity, so the creative-cosmological, historical, and
salvific times/activities of the divine persons are perichoretically related. In this
way, even though the trinitarian work ad extra is a differentiated work requiring the
activity of each '"person" or mode of being of the Trinity' in order to constitute the
'fullness, pleroma, doxa, and eternal life' of the Trinity, precisely for this reason 'the
external work of the Trinity is indivisible.'1146 This also means that God's creative
and preserving time/activity is always available in the historical dimensions of time
through the renewing, re-creative work of the Spirit. This makes possible
"43Michael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 325.
ll44Michael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 325.
ll45Michael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 326 (italics mine).
II46Michael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 324, 325.
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redemption and consummation from times that have been distorted and de-
harmonised.1147 As Thomas Finger observes,
the gospels . .. portray the apocalyptic sufferings of the entire
creation being borne in this event [that is, the crucifixion of
Jesus Christ]. The early resurrection accounts proclaim that
this Son was raised by the Father through the Spirit,
announcing this event as the beginning of a whole new
creation. The resurrection leads directly to the outpouring of
the Spirit, who gathers a new community and sends it into
mission to the ends of the earth, anticipatingfuller
transformations of nature.1148
As noted above, however, Welker's model of the relation of the different, but
perichoretically related, times of the Trinity's activity in the economy seems to imply
a functional modalism—he refers, for example, to the 'modes' or 'the so-called
"persons" of the Trinity.' For this reason, his model of the Trinity could benefit from
the irreducible both/and structure ofMoltmann's Trinity: 'personality and
relationships are genetically connected,' and as such 'the two arise simultaneously
and together.'1149 This type of dynamic structure becomes the basis, for example, of
Gunton's emphasis on a relational ontology of relation-in-otherness.1150
Moreover, if adopted without qualifications, Welker's concept of
'reversibility' fails to respect the real effects of errors in historical time, as seen in his
implied universalism.1151 It tends to simply replace, instead of transform, not only
spoiled dimensions of creation, but even good achievements in history, with a wholly
new creation ex nihilo. Therefore, the present thesis proposes emphasising the
transformational and trans-gathering-up aspect of creative time. It is
transformational because the Spirit makes available the truly new of re-creative time,
but only as it takes up and modifies the non-reversible effects ofhistorical time. This
1I47Cf. Gunton for a similar view of the Spirit's function in making 'present the things that
are promised for the end of time, moral goodness among them' (Enlightenment. 103; cf. 104-105,
143. 151: and Promise. 50-51. 1741.
ll48Thomas Finger, 'Trinity, Ecology and Panentheism,' 91 (italics mine).
1149Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 173.
1150Cf. Gunton, Promise. 195, 202, 204, 205, 12-13.
II5lMichael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 327.
291
The Triune Provider
gives the Trinity's relation to the world trans-historical, trans-temporal and trans¬
formational dimensions which correspond to God's ability to bring good out of evil.
This seems to be Pannenberg's emphasis in the concept ofprovidence as a
divine 'overruling.' He insists that, unlike in Hegel's concept ofAufhebung in which
the individual is sacrificed to the good of the 'general,' 'Christian eschatology
preserves the indissoluble relation between our individual and our common
destiny.'1152 One might suggest, therefore, a version ofAufhebung in which old
paradigms are not simply discarded, but gathered up as old forms or ways ofbeing,
and incorporated, along with new insights, into a new paradigm or synthesis. In that
very process old information, the old way-of-being, takes on a new gestalt. The new
gestalt is not an ending, but a momentary feature of a deeper, more profound process.
A picture emerges of gestalts-in-motion—emerging, "dying," being subsumed into
more complete gestalts. As long as these gestalts-in-motion are understood as both
sublimating the old—discarding what is evil, retaining what is good—and giving it a
new way-of-being, then Welker's idea of the irreversible time of the Son can be
incorporated into the re-creative time of the Spirit and both together serve the
Father's purpose of establishing creatures who can participate in an eternally
"historical" mode-of-being in which the truly new is possible,1153 but without losing
either the harmony of the right relationships in which they subsist or the underlying
ontology which defines the essential properties of their identity. The concept of
Aufhebung would only be 'too Hegelian' if applied to becoming in God—a weakness
in Moltmann's trinitarian ontology. The concept ofAufhebung is only dismissive of
past achievements, oppressive ofpresent freedom, and deterministic with reference
to the future if it is seen as a unilateral work of the Spirit. Instead, the distinction and
identity given to humans through the Son and Spirit (Pannenberg) requires their
continued participation in their own future. Gunton argues for a similar concept, that
is, creation as both a project and 'a process by which that which was in the beginning
is not so much restored to a former integrity as returned perfected to the Father
"52Pannenberg, Systematic 3: 636.
,153Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 213-214; and idem, Coming ofGod, xi.
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through the Son and by the Spirit-an eschatological rather than protological return, if
we may so speak.'1154
Gunton's understanding of creation as project, like Welker's trinitarian times,
entails an overlap in the doctrines of creation, providence, redemption and
consummation.1155 First, creation establishes the basic forms of created being.
Second, providence guarantees both their continuance in existence (preservation) and
God's co-operation (concursus) with their created powers of acting (including their
relative freedom). Third, 'the continuing creative divine agency toward the
world'1156 guarantees that creation will continue to develop in its 'richness and
variety'1157 toward 'a completion that is destined, but not fully determined, in
advance.'1158 Finally, redemption and sanctification guarantee that creation's present
tendency toward destructive ways of "development" can be reversed so that creation
can be returned to its original constructive movement toward its designed end—for
humans, this means relating to the Father after the pattern of the Son's relating. The
aspect of continuing creation (as project) means that the provenance ofprovidence
includes a divine governance of a dynamicprocess ofdevelopment (versus the
maintenance of static orders of relating).1159 The means God uses both to restore this
dynamic process of development to its original healthful way-of-being, and for
continuing it in its constructive mode, is the redemptive and perfecting work of the
"54Gunton, 'God the Holy Spirit,' 127; cf. also idem, 'End ofCausality?,' 81; idem, Triune
Creator. 10, 86, 170-71, 177-8, 188-9, 223; idem, Christ in Creation. 46, 50; and idem, Promise. 199,
xxx.
"55Gunton, Triune Creator. 223, 10, 192; Gunton, 'Relation and Relativity,' 97; Cf. Thomas
Finger's linking of the concept of the inner-trinitarian 'perichoresis, the mutual self-giving and
receiving among Father, Son and Spirit. . . of love, energy, and adoration,' to the perichoretic unity of
the divine acts of creation, redemption and eschatological transformation ('Trinity, Ecology and
Panentheism,' 93).
ll56Gunton, 'End ofCausality?,' 81.
"57Gunton, Promise. 203.
ll58Gunton, Triune Creator. 184; cf. ibid., 192.
ll59Gunton stresses the importance of emphasising providence as action ('as providingfor')
rather than 'in terms of knowledge' ('as seeing in advance'), since the latter emphasis 'is difficult to
disentangle from suggestions of determinism' (Triune Creator. 191). It is debatable whether such a
restriction of emphasis achieves this goal, but at least it does allow for an important emphasis on the




Son and Spirit. In this way a close link is maintained between the doctrines of
creation, providence, redemption and eschatology.
Gunton's trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence, therefore, helps to clarify
Welker's model of trinitarian divine action. Gunton's model 'suggests that we
conceive ofprovidence chiefly in terms of two models: the Son as the giver of
structure, and the Holy Spirit as the one who gives the world space to become within,
but not apart from, that structuring.'1160 This is reflected in his definition of
providence (noted above) as 'mediated by the two hands ofGod.'1161
There is, however, at least a latent weakness in Gunton's model which is
similar to the problem with the model of Palamas and Aquinas: it involves a
"delegation" ofprovidential tasks from the Father to the Son and Spirit. The
language used to express this "delegation" tends to make the Son and Spirit passive
in the outworking ofprovidence: the unity of the divine acts ad extra is achieved by
deriving their source in the Father's will, and from the execution of that will by the
Father's 'two hands.' Nevertheless, in emphasising the distinctions within the divine
acts ad extra, each of the divine Persons contribute something distinct and essential
to the one act: the Father wills, and sends; the Son provides structure and salvation;
the Spirit enables and perfects.1162
These models of trinitarian action ad extra (sequential/uniqueness model, and
Tanner's adaptation of it; Moltmann; Pannenberg; and Gunton) help to show how
Welker's 'three wreaths ofmetaphors' for time, as a model of trinitarian divine
action, can be adapted to a trinitarian model ofprovidence. This is seen especially in
focusing on the kind of activity associated with each of the divine persons. What
each of the trinitarian persons provide is a necessary element in the single matrix of
divine activity/time ad extra, which in turn constitutes the context for human life and
redemption as it moves toward the final shape of the divine-human community. As
ll60Gunton, Triune Creator. 192.
ll61Gunton, Triune Creator. 176.
"62Gunton, Triune Creator. 10.
294
The Triune Provider
such, this model both respects the unidirectional arrow of time1163 (the irreversible
dimension of the historical time of the Son; the enduring identity ofpersons), and yet
has resources to transcend this temporal progression in the cosmological time of the
creative Father as mediated through the salvific and transformational time of the
Spirit. It is these latter two types of activity/time which introduce the possibility of
an intersection between eternity and the space-time matrix, and therefore they
become the basis ofprovidentially supported hope in, and for, what occurs in history.
Because this thesis has treated providence primarily as it relates to humans,
one further model of divine action can add another perspective on the trinitarian
structure of God's providential action in the world, especially as it relates to God's
interpersonal relations with humans.
Communicative Theism
This thesis has suggested that the locus of a doctrine of providence is best
understood in terms ofGod's relation to the human world in terms of community,
and not as an aspect of one of God's attributes—such as foreknowledge or
'omnipotent will.'1164 Nevertheless, this relation and work ad extra does reflect
God's character. As such, a doctrine ofprovidence constitutes the comprehensive
statement of the link between God and the world. If, as Kevin Vanhoozer argues,
love is taken as the most appropriate root metaphor for describing God's essential
character and God's relation to the world,1165 and further, if a trinitarian doctrine of
providence were to be taken as the comprehensive expression of, and matrix for,
love's work ad extra, then a doctrine ofprovidence would have a ubiquitous
presence in all other theological doctrines1166 just because 'the love of God
. . . occupies] no one place in a theological system, but every place.'1167
ll63Cf. Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (New
York, NY: Bantam Books, 1988, 1990), 143-153.
"64Cf. Gunton's critique of these models (Triune Creator. 150, 150-153).
"65Kevin Vanhoozer, 'Effectual Call or Causal Effect?,' chap, in First Theology: God.
Scripture and Hermeneutics (Leicester, UK: Apollos; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002),
94-95.
"66William Burt Pope, A Compendium ofChristian Theology, vol. 1: 456.
"67Vanhoozer, 'Effectual Call,' 95.
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In Vanhoozer's 'communicative theism,' this love is the love of the Trinity
expressed toward the world as the three modes of the divine speech act. First, 'the
Father's activity is locution. God the Father is the utterer, the begetter, the sustainer
ofwords.' Second, 'the Logos corresponds to the speaker's act or illocution, to what
one does in saying. The illocution has content (reference and predication) and a
particular intent (a force) that shows how the proposition is to be taken. It is
illocutionary force that makes a speech act count as, say, a promise.' Third, the
activity of the Spirit corresponds to the perlocutionary aspect of a speech act, that is,
'to the effect an illocutionary act has on the actions or beliefs of the hearer.' Thus,
'the Spirit [first] illumines the reader and so enables the reader to grasp the
illocutionary point, to recognize what the Scriptures may be doing. Second, the
Spirit convicts the reader that the illocutionary point of the biblical text deserves the
appropriate response,' such as 'belief, obedience, praise or some other.'1168 The
work of the Spirit amounts to an enabling of the hearer's intellect and will to respond
in ways appropriate to the particular communication (Word—structure). This
respects the person's integrity and freedom as a personal other, allowing them to
chose how to respond to the communication.
In this model of trinitarian action ad extra, 'God not only communicates
information and does things but also communicates himself. . . . The Father is the
cause of his communicative and self-communicative action, the Son is the Maker or
Form, and the Spirit is the Perfecter/finisher of the action.'1169 Each divine Person
plays a unique, but essential, constitutive role in the one communicative act. God as
Trinity is self-communicated in the complete and single communicative act of
locution-illocution-perlocution. Thus the perichoretic unity of the Persons is
reflected in the perichoretic unity of their communicative actions. Analytic in that
unity are the irreducible distinctions between Persons and actions.
If there is an element of inner-trinitarian subordinationism in this model, it
could be interpreted as the freely chosen "subordinationism" Pannenberg envisions
1168Kevin Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech Acts,' chap, in First Theology: God. Scripture
and Hermeneutics (Leicester, UK: Apollos; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 154-155.
1169Kevin Vanhoozer, email communication with author, Tuesday, 24 December 2002.
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for the Son who freely obeys the Father. The struggle with this trinitarian model of
divine action, as with all such models, is to respect the limits of the analogy.1170
This communicative theist model of divine action is helpful on several levels.
First, as 'a subset of the God-world relation,' it avoids impersonal causal language.
1171
While not denying God's causal agency in the non-human and human worlds,
Vanhoozer has sought to move beyond the impasse of having to choose between
models based upon causality ofwill1172 versus the models of relational mutuality in
many panentheistic theologies, and speaks instead of 'communicative theism' as a
1173
type of agency more appropriate to humans.
Second, the communicative theist model accommodates the several kinds of
divine action involved in interpersonal communication as experienced in covenantal
community with God. Here, the triune God acts by a variety of speech acts in which
each of the divine Persons makes a unique contribution. Finally, it privileges the
trinitarian, dynamic, free, and personal nature of God's love. This latter point
enables one to affirm 'that the principal mode in which God is "with" his people is
through speech acts,' and this is especially important since 'discerning] God's
presence' requires 'communication on God's part.' 17
While no one of the above models of trinitarian divine action, nor even all of
them together, fully address all the issues in the complex providential workings of
the Trinity, they do provide ways to begin thinking ofprovidence in a trinitarian
context. It might be helpful at this point to illustrate how a master MODEL of
community, which incorporates a doctrine ofprovidence as worked out in trinitarian
structures of divine action, can provide an illuminating milieu in which to address a
few of the issues raised in earlier chapters.
"70Vanhoozer points out that this model is still under construction. He also notes that he
'see[s] it as applicable to the economic Trinity more than to the immanent Trinity' (email
communication with author, Tuesday, 31 December 2002).
"7lKevin Vanhoozer, 'The Case Remains Unproven,' Dialog [Fall 1999]: 284; idem, First
Theology. 90, n. 65.
"72Cf. Gunton, 'End ofCausality?,' 65, 66; Gunton, Triune Creator. 150-153.
"73Kevin Vanhoozer, 'The Love of God,' chap, in First Theology: God, Scripture and
Hermeneutics (Leicester, UK: Apollos; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 90-91.
"74Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech Acts, 149.
297
The Triune Provider
Illustrating the Benefits of theModel
There are several benefits to incorporating a doctrine ofprovidence into a
community MODEL of the God-world relation. First, viewed generally, it allows
discussion ofprovidence, especially of its purpose and method, to begin with
christology and hence soteriology, which in turn ensures that the discussion will
remain in touch with individual experiences of grace, that is, in touch with the
concrete experiences of Christians. For this reason it takes into account the church's
actual experience of God as triune.1175 Beginning with christology ensures that
discussion ofprovidence remains in touch with the paradigmatic understanding of
God's relation to the world as embodied in the Christ event. Second, it corresponds
well with a holistic and relational metaphysics. Finally, a focus on communitarian
versus causal language directs attention to the personal aspect of divine providence.
In reference to more particular issues, providence as developed within a
community MODEL enables a new perspective on some of the aspects ofprovidence
noted in foregoing chapters. The issues chosen for treatment here are: the
hiddenness of God and its impact on meaning; linking a model of providence to
personal experiences of grace; exploring the connections between providence,
eschatology, Sabbath and community; and relating trinitarian providence to human
freedom.
Relating Hiddenness and Meaning
An important symptom (noted in Chapter One) of the problems with a
doctrine of providence was the sense of the absence of God. The Death of God
Movement represented a crisis of intellectual and experiential adequacy for
traditional views of God and providence. This failure of credibility led to talk of
1176'"the death of the God ofprovidence.'" This in turn raised the question ofhow to
U75Cf. Niels Gregersen's three 'pragmatic contexts in which the meaning of providence is
actualized': '1) the reference to God's action (and nature) in the context of first-hand religious
experience, relative to concrete life situations; 2) the reference to God's action (and nature) in the
context of liturgy and hymns, that is, in a transpersonal symbolic language that refers to typical
situations; and 3) the reference to the action (and nature) of God in the context of reflected and
doctrinal belief systems' ('Providence in an Indeterministic World,' 17).
"76Maurice Wiles, 'Providence,' Epworth Review 21 no. 1 (January 1994): 82.
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continue making theological meaning of one's experience of life. Part of the new
situation for a doctrine ofprovidence, therefore, is the loss of the concept of a
universe of fixed meaning which humans are simply to discover, and with which
they are to comply, and the realisation that human intellect is itselfpart of an
emergent, self-creative milieu.1177
One way of addressing this problem is to set aside discussion ofphilosophical
problems with the God ofClassical Theism, and suggest instead that any model of
the God-world relation will involve a necessary "hiddenness" of God's sustaining
and governing presence. In response to the question ofmeaning as it relates to the
seeming absence of God, the suggestion offered here is that while the truly new may
now seem more possible (Gilkey; Moltmann) than traditional doctrines ofprovidence
allowed, what is needed is not a claim that God absents himself from interaction with
creation (Wiles), nor even a new realisation of God's absence (or "death"), but
instead a new understanding of the kind ofworld God's creative and providential
activity underwrites. Part of this new understanding takes into account the seeming
randomness and contingency, not only of quantum events, but also of human actions.
The ambiguity regarding whether an event, either at the micro1178 or macro level,1179
fits into an overarching meaning is reflected not only in science-theology
discussions,1180 but also in theological and philosophical models ofhuman free
will.1181 All three disciplines find it necessary to take into account the pervasive
,177Cf. Robert O. Johann, S.J., 'Creativity and Unbelief,' in The Presence and Absence of
God. The Cardinal Bea Lectures, ed. Christopher F. Mooney, S.J. (New York, NY: Fordham
University Press, 1968, 1969), 6-7.
1178Cf. William G. Pollard, Chance and Providence (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1958); cf. also, Christopher F. Mooney, S.J., Theology and Scientific Knowledge: Changing Models
of God's Presence in the World. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 106.
"79Cf. Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural.
Divine and Human, enlarged edition (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1990).
"80Cf. John Polkinghorne's model of'free' or 'flexible process' (Science and Providence:
God's Interaction With the World [London, UK: SPCK, 1989], 66-67, 31, 88-89).
ll8lCf. the models ofHelm and Sanders in Chapter Three above. Cf. also Pannenberg,
'Meaning, Religion, and the Question of God,' chap, in Metaphysics and the Idea of God, trans. Philip





sense of contingency, relativity, and openness in the universe, on both the
1183inanimate and human levels.
If the concept ofprovidence as a context ofmeaning is to survive, therefore,
it will need to be linked with a theological model which is able to account for both
contingency and novelty in human experience. What appears as a newproblem for
providence-God's absence—can be addressed in terms of a new perspective on an
old issue—God's hidden covenantal grace. The development of a scientific
worldview, in conjunction with an increased awareness ofevil and a more holistic
understanding of the interconnectedness of all of creation requires an adjustment in
the terminology, categories and models associated with providence, but not
necessarily an abandonment ofbelief in God's active care for the world.
The argument put forward here sees the community MODEL of the God-
world relation as a context which requires and embodies a sense ofGod's hiddenness
in order to establish created others, whose otherness in turn is required if they are to
become constituents in a divine-human community. The concept ofGod's
hiddenness, therefore, as one sub-doctrine within a larger model, helps to account for
the apparent ambiguity, randomness, contingency (and even absence) of God's
providential care.
Each of the models surveyed in previous chapters, explicitly or implicitly, has
answered the critique of the Death of God Movement regarding the felt absence of
the intervening God ofClassical Christian Theism, by showing that God must appear
hidden to one degree or another for either epistemological or ontological reasons.
Even though this hiddenness is sometimes misinterpreted as "absence," it need not be
understood as an intrinsic weakness applicable only to the immutable God of
classical theism, but can just as well be understood as an intrinsic feature of any
transcendent God's providential relation to the world, a relation in which some kind
II82Cf. Peacocke. Theology for a Scientific Age. 64-65, 119, 152-157, 307-309.
U83The space and time afforded to creation by God is seen by many to be made possible by a
sovereign divine self-limitation. Cf. Moltmann, God in Creation. 86-90; Mooney, Theology and
Scientific Knowledge. 106-108; and Polkinghorne, Science and Christian Belief. 81. Ron Highfield,
however, argues that appeals to such .^//-limitation, whether by determinists or open theists, amounts
to an actual limitation ofGod's deity ('Divine Self-Limitation in the Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann: A
Critical Appraisal,' Christian Scholar's Review 32, no. 1 [Fall 2002]: 66-68).
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of ontological distinction (with God's attendant hiddenness) is required in order for
humans to establish an identity distinct from, yet dependent upon, God. It becomes
necessary to distinguish between God's creative/preservational "presence" and God's
personal/covenantal presence. As such, God's hiddenness on both an ontological
level, and to some degree on a covenantal level, becomes a necessary corollary of
God's presence, for only when there is creaturely distinction and identity can there
be an other to which the Trinity can be personally present.1184
In Helm's model ofprovidence, for example, God's hidden will was thought
to be necessary in order to ensure God's absolute sovereignty. Helm's model was
unable to grant humans a level of freedom which could actually change God's mind.
In Sanders' and Pannenberg's models some degree ofhiddenness ofGod's will,
presence and action was thought to be necessary in order to give humans space and
time to develop and exercise free loving commitment to God.1185 Wiles' model
overemphasised the independence aspect of the human creature by eliminating any
interaction with the creator on a personal level, making God's transcendent
hiddenness a necessary part of the God-world relation. Gilkey's model of
providence saw God's hiddenness as linked to the ontology of God himself, and
resulted in the loss of God's ultimate control of creation's future. Moltmann tried to
honour the balance of otherness-in-relation by affirming a divine self-limitation and
therefore hiddenness, but ultimately his model was threatened with a loss of divine
self-sufficiency, and also with the determinism he had rejected in the classical model
ofprovidence. Pannenberg and Sanders perhaps came closest to maintaining the
integrity of the balance, by insisting that humans do make free decisions which
determine their eternal destiny.
This thesis suggests, therefore, that the hiddenness of the Christian God can
be accounted for in trinitarian terms as follows. In terms of divine action, this
ll84It is recognised that the concept of'personal relation' encompasses a range of possible
meanings, such as 'parent to child, friend to friend, friend to enemy, sovereign to servant' (Vanhoozer,
'Case Remains Unproven,' 284). This is an issue which would need to be more fully analysed and
clarified in a full monograph on providence.
"85Pannenberg, Systematic 2, 173-174. In Pannenberg's model, it is the contingency of
events in world history, 'as an expression of the freedom of God in his action' (Systematic 1: 388; cf.
ibid. 418), which hides the fact that the connections between events are rooted in God's action.
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hiddenness is "seen" most obviously in the pre-mundane creative will of the Father,
in the invisible "causal joint" between the Son (as source of form and structure of
creation) and the properties of creaturely entities, and in the role of the Spirit as
invisible energizer and enabler.1186 The Spirit is self-effacing in order to protect
creaturely otherness—the same pattern as seen in the Spirit's presence in Jesus' life
and work (although a different ontology is involved). The Spirit enabled the
miracles, but it was Jesus who was visible. Thus, one "sees" the Spirit only
indirectly by the presence of his gifts—the basic gift of life, the human capacity for
creativity, faith in Christ, and the gifts of the Spirit. Polkinghorne, for example,
advocating 'the flexible process of the world,' is thereby able to model the active
presence of God in the sacraments as the immanent working of the Spirit 'within the
openness of the Christian community' in such a way that the Spirit does not
intervene so much as interacts.1187
This "hidden" or self-effacing role of the Spirit's providential action was
manifested in a paradigmatic way in the incarnation of the Son. Kathryn Tanner, for
example, suggests that the best way to relate the divinity and humanity of Jesus is to
see them from the perspective of his life as a whole, and not as a matter of
speculation about where the divine attributes stop and the human element begins.
From this concrete perspective of the whole of the actual life of Jesus, 'the second
Person of the Trinity's assumption of the human is as invisible as God's acting to
create and uphold the world: it transpires silently, behind the scenes; it makes no
appearance in itself but is identifiable only in and from its effects. ... the divinity of
Jesus becomes an inference from the character of Jesus' life and its effects.'1188
Thus, some level of hiddenness in God's presence is intrinsic to the
otherness-in-relation ontology which gives structure to the purpose God's
,186Cf. Pannenberg, 'Insight and Faith,' chap, in Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 2, trans.
George H. Kehm, The Library of Philosophy and Theology, eds. John Mclntyre, and Ian T. Ramsey
(London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1971), 34-5, n. 11: 'the operation of the Spirit of God in the creation
remains utterly hidden.'
1 l87Polkinghorne, Science and Providence. 93, 86. A point requiring development beyond
the scope of this project is that of clarifying the several senses of God's 'presence' with creation. In
the present work, primary focus is on God's presence in the form of personal interaction with humans,
rather than only on his creative/preservational 'presence' as the source of creaturely being.
"88Tanner, Jesus. Humanity. 16-18.
302
The Triune Provider
providential work. The created human other receives the power to be an other
through the Spirit,1189 takes the form of a community constituted in and by Christ,1190
which in turn becomes the framework that determines the kind ofmeaning
providence engenders.
Gunton differs from Pannenberg (as noted above) in ascribing to the Spirit
the unique role ofmaintaining distinction between created entities. It might be better
to say Christ is the principle of otherness or distinction, and the Spirit is the one who
makes that otherness realisable in the creature. Nevertheless, Gunton helpfully lists
three main functions 'attributed to God as Spirit,'1191 one ofwhich is that of'the
creator of community'1192: 'God as Spirit is God making corporate community [that
is, the church] possible and so liberating the energies of the individual precisely to be
both with and for his fellows.'1193 The Spirit is 'the one whose distinctive function is
to bring other persons into relationship while maintaining their otherness, their
particular and unique freedom.'1194 Again, Gunton's language here implies that the
Spirit actually has dual roles—maintaining distinction and creating
relationship—which tends to minimise the role of the Son. It should be stressed,
instead, that the maintenance of otherness is the function of the Son, although
realised through the Spirit's enabling work.
Another function of the Spirit refers to him as 'a way of speaking ofGod at
work in the believer, but in such a way as to respect the due independence and
"89Gunton, Christ and Creation. 59; cf. 51, 52, 55, 56, 90-91.
ll90Gunton, Triune Creator. 10. Gunton states: 'Jesus Christ is the one through whom all
things take their shape and to whom the Spirit directs them' (Christ and Creation. 97).
"91Gunton, Enlightenment. 104. In order to avoid the modalistic tone of this phrase, Gunton
might better have said 'God the Spirit.'
1192Gunton, Enlightenment. 103; idem, Christ in Creation. 46; idem, Promise. 51.
"93Gunton, Enlightenment. 106.
1194Gunton, Promise. 133. Gunton clarifies this thought further by saying, 'The model for the
otherness of the Spirit is, of course, the relation of Jesus to the Spirit in the Gospels, where the Spirit
is portrayed as over against Jesus, driving him into the wilderness to be tempted, supporting him
through the temptation and empowering the ministry that follows. All this demands a doctrine of the
personal distinctness of the Holy Spirit in relation to both the Son and Father, and that in turn




autonomy of the agent.'1195 This 'grace' is not 'mechanical,' nor 'irresistible,' but it
is 'overcoming: on occasions overriding our refusal to emerge to freedom from our
sinful past,' but 'more positively,' it is 'an enabling to do what should be done, not
because it is "imposed" from the outside but because it is given from within.'1196
Although Gunton does not clarify how this view avoids determinism, he insists this
'enabling' grace is not in conflict with our creaturely autonomy because it does not
twist us "'into alien form'" but instead moulds us into our 'own most proper
form.'1197 Gunton approves John Oman's insistence that 'any conception of
irresistible grace denies at once the personality of God and that of the objects of his
grace.'1198
Perhaps, therefore, one could think of the Father, seen from the perspective of
humans within creation, as the ultimate transcendent "pole" within the godhead, that
is, as constituting an absolute personal Other such that relation to him must always
be mediated through the Son by the Spirit. In this way the issue of divine
transcendence and immanence can be seen as a matter of the level or aspect of
providence one is speaking of at any given time. Stoeger sees God's transcendence
and immanence as complementary aspects ofGod's 'causal activity': God as primary
cause 'completely transcends secondary causality, and at the same time is perfectly
immanent in secondary causality, supporting it and giving it efficacy.' As primary
cause God's causality supersedes all our categories, and lack of epistemic access to
this level of causality accounts for its hidden and ineffable character.1199 For





ll99Stoeger, 'Describing God's Action in the World in Light of Scientific Knowledge of
Reality,' in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert John
Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke, A Series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine
Action,' ed. Robert John Russell (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley,
CA: The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997), 253.
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the just and the unjust'1200) can be seen as the most transcendent aspect of the
Trinity's providential relation to the world. The Son's particular role as mediator
and redeemer of creation has a dual aspect: as divine Logos, he is the transcendent
source of creation's structure and purpose; as human Son, he is 'God with us' and is
therefore not just God immanent, but most importantly, with us on the level of
human inter-personal interaction. The Holy Spirit, as the animating source of life
and power is more distinctly God immanent.
In personal and relational terms, it is precisely through the Son and in the
Spirit that the Father becomes known as Father. However, one cannot simply
attribute hiddenness to the Father and revealedness to the Son and Spirit, since the
Son's 'withness' retains an aspect ofmystery, and the Spirit's sustaining presence
continues to transcend human categories for personhood.
This hiddenness also extends to God's plan,1201 presence and working, and is
a necessary precondition for creaturely otherness in both the timeless and temporal
views of God (albeit, for different reasons), and in both the neo-deistic and
"interventionist" models ofprovidence. Some authors, therefore, explain this
hiddenness in terms of a necessary hiddenness defined, for example, as God's hidden
lure or persuasive influence (Gilkey), or in terms of the grain of things (Wiles), or in
terms of a 'psychological effect in which we feel strength or consolation in time of
grief or trouble.'1202 In each case, the (partial) hiddenness of divine presence,
activity, plan and purpose functions as a necessary presupposition for creaturely
distinction from the creator. As William Stoeger points out,
God is not present and acting just as another cause, to fill
causal gaps. . . . Rather, God is transcendently and
immanently, and thus pervasively, present as that which gives
existence and distinct character to all that is, the ultimate
immanent ground (immanent precisely because God is fully
transcendent) of the created, temporal universe. God endows
us and all things with existence and concreteness in such a
l200Matt. 5:45 (RSV).
l20lThe term 'plan' as used here and subsequently is not meant to imply a fixed, pre-ordained
blueprint, but rather God's general design and purpose for creation.
l202Kirkpatrick. Together Bound. 159.
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radical way that God's presence and action is all but hidden
from analysis.1203
Therefore, the hiddenness ofmuch ofGod's providential presence and action
becomes an intrinsic feature of the coherence of the God-world relationship.
In view of the above discussion, there can be no simplistic notion of God's
care or presence. However defined, this God is not 'the rescue God who is allegedly
always available to the religious person.'1204 Such a God would not correspond with
many Christians' experience of ambiguity and suffering in life. Rather, for many
'the absence of God in the death of Jesus becomes the place of the Presence of God
through Jesus crucified dead.'1205 For just this reason Moltmann's centring of God's
relation to the world and the constitution of the triune identity in the event of the
cross-resurrection is the strength of his "theodicy," and it meets the criterion of
accounting for the negative experiences of life.1206
It has been argued in this thesis that the purpose behind God's providential
working is the formation of a community with humans who participate, in finite
forms, in the free self-donation of the inner-trinitarian love.1207 From this basis one
might account for some of the seeming ambiguity in the meaning and purpose of the
suffering allowed in one's life, by relating this question to the nature of a community
structured by love. Such a community, formed between the infinite triune Persons
and finite humans, necessitates a deep sense ofmystery. In Frank Kirkpatrick's
words,
it is the mystery of relationship, the mystery ofwhy love
expresses itself in so many perplexing ways. Love is never
susceptible to complete rational predictability or modeling.
1203Stoeger, 'God and Time,' 368-369.
1204Tupper, Scandalous Providence. 194.
l205Tupper, Scandalous Providence. 194.
l206On the importance of this criterion, cf. Michael Welker, 'God's Eternity,' 324; John
Polkinghorne, Science and Providence. 17, 64; Niels Gregersen, 'Providence in an Indeterministic
World,' 17; and Wendy Farley, Review of Escape from Paradise: Evil and Tragedy in Feminist
Theology, in The Princeton Seminary Bulletin NS 16, no. 2 (1995): 258.
1207Cf. Volf, "'The Trinity is our Social Program," 403-423.
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Love is, by its very nature, surprising, transrational, and
confusing. But it is not, for all that, irrational or absurd.1208
One of the key features of the divine love, in both the Reformed and Open
Theist models, is that it seeks others with which to relate. On the one hand, Helm
readily admits the mystery behind the motives of the divine creative and providential
love, and chooses to account for this mystery in terms of the hidden will of God. On
the other hand, Sanders and Pannenberg insist this purpose requires a world in which
contingency, randomness, free process and human free will characterise the
structures of life. John Polkinghorne writes:
I imagine God's guiding hand to be at work within the
cloudiness of unpredictable open physical process. If that is
the case, two things follow. One is that God's action will
always be hidden. It will not be demonstrable by experiment,
though it may be discernible by faith. The other is that God's
providence is conceived as acting within the grain of natural
process, not against it.1209
Polkinghorne's insistence that 'the future is not yet formed; it is not waiting
for our arrival, for we make it as we go along,'1210 accounts in part for Moltmann's
emphasis on promise versus providential plan. It also accounts for Pinnock's
insistence that the open and relational model ofprovidence provides the most
1211
encouragement for human action: 'we are the way God's will gets done on earth!'
On either the Reformed or Open Theist view, perhaps one can relate the two
concepts of God's hiddenness and revealed presence as follows: each is a matter of
perspective. On the one hand, God's hiddenness or transcendence, which is
sometimes mistaken for God's absence, is really a function ofGod's hidden
l208Kirkpatrick, Together Bound. 160, 161.
l209Polkinghorne, Serious Talk. 53; cf. ibid., 51-54.
I210Polkinghorne, Serious Talk. 54.
12llPinnock, 'Evangelical Theologians Facing the Future: Ancient and Future Paradigms,'
Weslevan Theological Journal 33, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 27. Cf. Polkinghorne, Serious Talk. 88: 'I
believe that divine and human coherence in prayer is genuinely instrumental; it can make things
possible that would not be so if we and God were at cross-purposes'; cf. Pinnock, 'From Augustine to
Arminius: A Pilgrimage in Theology,' in The Grace ofGod and the Will ofMan, ed. Clark Pinnock
(Grand Rapids, MI: Academia Books, an imprint of Zondervan Publishing House, 1989; Minneapolis,
Minn: Bethany House Publishers, 1995), 18. Cf. also Philip Hefner's concept of humans as 'created
co-creators' ('The Evolution of the Created Co-Creator,' in Cosmos as Creation, ed. Ted Peters
[Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989]).
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sustenance, his partially hidden plan, and government. These aspects ofGod's
relation to the world are sovereign actions of God to the degree that they represent
God's faithfulness to the kind ofworld he has created, and they ensure his
transcendence to, and distinction from, the world.
On the other hand, God's revealedpresence can be thought of in terms of our
perception of his sustenance, our knowledge of his partially revealed plan, and our
experience of his specific direction in both individual lives and in the life of those
communities open to his guidance. In New Testament categories, God's revealed
1212
presence is further particularised according to the work of the trinitanan persons.
Thus, the 'personal presence' aspect of God's relation to the world is interactional,
and brings to our awareness God's immanence in the world. It is in the awareness of
and interaction with God's presence that community, as a conscious reciprocal
fellowship, becomes possible. This is the level ofprovidence where 'communicative
theism' becomes relevant, and where consciousness of the metaphysical principle of
otherness-in-relation becomes intelligible.
There is, however, an important qualification to be added to the concept of
God's providential absence and presence. Because God is not just an impersonal
giver of life, but a holy and personal giver of life, there can be a violation of the rules
of community between God and humans, at both the individual and corporate levels,
which results in, not just hiddenness, but a true personal non-availability, a true
absence of God. Frank Tupper points out that even Jesus, in the context of
i 7 i -j
identifying with sinful humanity, experienced God's absence in this form. The
question of God's personal presence and absence raises the question of the link
between providence and personal experiences of grace.
Linking a Model of Providence to Personal Experiences of Grace
The problems raised for providence because of the necessary hiddenness of
divine providential working suggests that a community context for providence might
1212Cf. John Fienberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God. Foundations of Evangelical
Theology, ed. John S. Feinberg (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, a division of Good News Publishers,
2001), 495-496.
12l3Tupper, Scandalous Providence. 194.
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further help in the retrieval of the doctrine by highlighting the personal aspect of both
God and humans. Each of the authors reviewed above have insisted that God must
be thought of in personal terms. Even though God transcends the concept of 'person'
as used in reference to human persons, God nevertheless cannot be less than
personal.
As seen in Helm's traditional view ofprovidence, God's providential relation
tends to be reduced to the one divine essence, expressed through the one divine will.
Ironically, because he also worked with the category of causal language, Wiles felt
the only option open to him was to adopt a neo-Deist view of the God-world relation
in order to protect the integrity of the world, and especially human freedom.
As Vincent Brtimmer argues, however, focus on the one divine essence and
will leads to the kind ofpan-causal language used by the Reformers in protecting
God's sovereignty in matters of salvation. It tends to minimise the significance and
role ofGod as personal and as open to personal interaction with humans.1214 The
concept of creation as aimed at forming community seems to be sacrificed to the
concept of creation as a unilateral divine work ad extra. God, as apersonal pan-
causal agent, may have been suitable for a worldview which saw all of creation as
God's direct handiwork, and which thought that God ruled by intervention.1215 The
orders of human society themselves provided apersonal environment in which
God's plan was worked out, with the Church and Christendom mediating the sense
of God's care as personal. But when popular worldviews no longer included God's
personal interventions as an essential component of history, the substitute and
reductive idea of God as a hidden causal teleology in nature was not thought to be
religiously significant. Thus, any reconstruction of providence would seem to
require a way to root the doctrine in the personal relation of God to the world, and
especially to humans. One way to do this that is faithful to the New Testament basis
12l4Briimmer, Speaking of a Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 83-89.
1215Cf. John Wesley's view of providence, formed in the context of a Newtonian view of the
universe, where God must suspend the laws of nature in order to answer prayer (John Wesley, 'On
Divine Providence,' Sermons, vol. 2, The Works of John Wesley, vol. 6, [London: Wesleyan
Methodist Book Room, 1872; repr., Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill Press, 1978], 315, 322).
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ofChristianity is to begin reconstruction from the perspective of the church's
experience as a grace-established, providentially guided community, that is, in
trinitarian soteriology and ecclesiology.
John Polkinghorne points out that 'motivation for belief in divine providence
is found in the religious experiences ofprayer and of trust in a God who guides.'1216
Moltmann makes a similar point as to the source ofbelief in the Trinity: 'We have
seen that the knowledge and the representation of the immanent Trinity is to be
found in the sphere of doxology, which responds to the experience of salvation and
anticipates the kingdom of glory.'1217 Because doctrines of providence are the
constructions of human creatures,1218 it seems that the personal human experience of
transforming grace within the present situation of the world is that which fuels faith
in God's general providence, in God's wise directing of cosmic and human history
toward the realisation ofhis kingdom. In the end, faith in general providence
requires a concrete focus in special providence, for example, in prayer and personal
transforming grace. The connection to prayer and grace indicates a soteriological,
christological, pneumatological, and therefore, trinitarian basis for providence.1219
Frank Kirkpatrick contends that, in addition to the decisive acts of God in history to
ensure the success ofhis ultimate goal of liberation,
Christians also claim an ongoing, present experience of
God's acts in history, namely the experience in their own
lives or in the lives of those whose witness they are willing to
credit, of divine grace, presence, comfort, and healing. These
experiences, as we have suggested, provide the indispensable
l216John Polkinghorne, 'The Metaphysics of Divine Action,' in Chaos and Complexity:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. 2nd ed., eds. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and
Arthur Peacocke, a series on 'Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,' ed. Robert John Russell.
(Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications; Berkeley, CA: The Center for Theology and
the Natural Sciences, 1997), 155.
l217Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 161.
1218Ruth Page points out that there may well be an unavoidable anthropocentrism in our
categories, terms, and models when speaking about God and God's relation to the world, even when
referring to the non-human world (Web of Creation. 105-112). This is also recognised by Denis
Edwards in his insistence that all human experiences, including of God's action, 'must be mediated in
consciousness through images, concepts, words, and stories, all of which are socially and historically
conditioned' ('Discovery of Chaos,' 172).




counterpart to any attempt to find evidence ofGod's acts in
previous histories.1220
This is the case whether special providence and the experience of prayer are
interpreted in very subjective terms (Wiles) or in more objective and interactionist
terms (Sanders). As Peter Hodgson notes, 'we are empowered to struggle for a better
tomorrowjust because we are sustained by God's amazing grace, suffused by divine
• • 1221
presence, today. The transhistorical horizon invigorates the historical field.' In a
similar vein Kirkpatrick concludes: 'But wherever we find sustained and sustaining
communities of love, we believe, we find continuing evidence ofGod's work in the
world, precisely because those communities seem to be the underlying, continuing,
constant intention ofGod throughout all ofbiblically recorded history.'1222
The connection ofprovidence to personal experiences of grace is important,
since a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence must not remain an abstract doctrine, but
demonstrate its usefulness for helping the Christian negotiate life as lived coram
Trinitatis.
Providence, Eschatology, Sabbath and Community
It would seem that if one is going to reclaim a doctrine of providence as a
context ofmeaning, not only for individual lives in the present, but as providing a
sense ofmeaning and significance for individual, corporate and cosmic history as a
whole, then some explicit link to eschatology is required.
It was noted in Chapter Two, on the one hand, that Wiles limits coverage of
eschatology to some speculations on the immortality of the individual soul. Gilkey,
on the other hand, emphasised the importance of history as a divine-human creative
enterprise, and as such it in some way must be redeemed (since individuals only exist
in historical communities),1223 but he, too, had little to say about eschatology and
final hope. Moreover, in his concern to instantiate human freedom over against
1220Kirkpatrick, Together Bound. 152-3, 153; cf. ibid., 127, 130-131, 162.
l221Peter Hodgson, Winds of the Spirit: A Constructive Christian Theology (London, UK:
SCM Press Ltd., 1994), 327.
1222Kirkpatrick, Together Bound. 153.
l223Cf. Gilkey, Reaping. 297.
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classical views ofprovidence, Gilkey avoided the concept of divine governance of
the world, a neglect which militates against the achievability of God's ultimate goal
for the universe.
In order to facilitate the providential redemption ofboth the corporate and
individual aspects of historical existence, perhaps one could think, not in terms of
time as an undifferentiated sequence (chronos), but rather in terms of times. As
described above, these times are intra-permeable, because the Trinity is related
equally to all times as their transcendent ground. For this reason the Trinity is able to
become, through the Son and the Spirit, the medium in which the character or quality
of a particular time, as chronos (quantity), can be transformed into kairos
(quality),1224 and therefore redeemed and included in the divine eternity in a finite
way. This is possible on the view that the 'eternity of the Trinity is essentially
temporal, as long as we understand the essence of temporality in terms of
199 5 • ...
relationality.' On the basis of this metaphysics, time is also internal to created
reality, that is, an abstraction from, or a function of, the quality of the relations
between entities. From this viewpoint it is what happens to those entities that
determines the quality of the time associated with them. This notion is similar to the
different kinds of time in Welker's model ofdivine action.
Whether or not one accepts such a definition of eternity, as argued above,
eternity must be seen as capable of intersecting with time, or better, capable of
including time within itself, ifwhat happens in time is to be redeemed. Only in this
way is it possible for Moltmann's idea of the Sabbath rest as God's goal of eternal
community between the divine and the creaturely to be achieved. All times and
places, shaped by the historical time of the Son (Welker), with their 'maimed,
neglected or suppressed hopes,' are in fact subject to the recreative power of God's
1224Tillich defines 'the kairoi [as], the times in which the eternal breaks into the temporal'
(Existence and The Christ, vol. 2, Systematic Theology [Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press, 1957], 164). Cf. Outler. Who Trusts in God: Musings on the Meaning of Providence (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1968), 48-51.
1225William Stoeger, 'God and Time,' 376; cf. ibid., 365-388.
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future, as made possible by God's Spirit.1226 This Sabbath rest indicates a
permanence of the conditions for eternal community with God, but it need not imply
the end of the creative project-God's eternity remains open. This can be
extrapolated from the concept of Sabbath in the creation story of the Bible.
The Sabbath rest concept, therefore, also has relevance for present
providence. As Leo Scheffczyk points out, 'God's "Sabbath rest'" is a theological
concept, and
has a thoroughly positive meaning: it declares not that the
world is unfinished, but that its basic structure is complete
and that creative activity has now been extended so as to
establish a new relationship between God and the world.
God's sabbath rest affirms his benevolent attitude towards the
created world. It is our assurance that this world is now the
object of God's affection and sustaining care.1227
This sabbath concept reveals the basis in creation for God's relation and
attitude toward the world. God established and sustains an environment for human
thriving, the key element ofwhich is a free engagement with God in community. As
Outler puts it, the purpose ofprovidence is to maintain a world in which human
freedom and possibility are upheld, a world that is 'the arena in which God's
righteousness becomes man's blessedness. This is what our lives are for: to receive
the kingdom through Christ its bearer and to share with him the love of the Father in
the Holy Spirit.'1228
The very necessity ofworking for one's daily bread ensures that humans
receive their life, at least in part, indirectly from God, that is, through secondary
causes. This ensures their otherness, and therefore establishes the basis for I-Thou
relationships with God.1229
1226Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, trans.
Margaret Kohl (London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1990), 238-240; cf. also Moltmann, Coming of God.
294-295.
l227Scheffczvk. Creation and Providence. 11.
12280utler, Who Trusts. 105.
l229However, Welker rightly notes that such 'anthropological. . . figures of thought' as that
of 'I-Thou' relationships are 'insufficient' when thinking of human relations to the Trinity ('Gods'
Eternity,' 319, n. 2). This inadequacy points to the need for further refinement of language when
speaking of divine-human relationships.
313
The Triune Provider
The ontology for this is based in a trinitarian doctrine of creation. 'Creation
through the Word' reflects
that the Creator is a personal and spiritual being as well as the
transcendent Lord; but it also wishes to stress the essential
difference of created being from the divine being—Creation
by means of the Word is to exclude any idea of emanationism
or pantheism.
Yet the creative Word does not merely distinguish and
separate, it also produces community and continuity; for if
Creation came into being through God's word, it must always
remain open to this Word, it can never retire from out of the
range of the Word which has established it.1230
This openness to the creative Word can be related to the freedom of God to
'break into the course ofhis creation and initiate new events in it in an unpredictable
way.'1231 As Gunton argues, what might be interpreted as miraculous divine activity,
is in reality 'natural,' since 'what is natural is that which enables the creation to
achieve its promised destiny.'1232 God's promises, combined with his providential
actions that ensure their fulfilment, makes history possible: 'The tension between
promise and fulfillment makes history.'1233 Thus, it is the action of the Trinity which
first creates history, incorporates human actions into that history, and then unifies all
actions (divine and human) into a coherent whole.1234 The proleptic realisation in the
present of the future rule ofGod in which God will dwell with his people, is realised
in the present economy by the Spirit's non-coercive calling together of a community
formed around the 'crucified and risen Lord.'1235 Thus, 'the Spirit is . . . the agent
and mediator of the rule ofChrist in both judgement and salvation until he [Christ]
hands over the rule to God the Father at the end of the age.'1235 The ability of God to
l230Scheffczyk, Creation and Providence. 8.
123lWolfhart Pannenberg, 'Redemptive Event and History,' chap, in Basic Questions in
Theology. Collected Essays, vol. 1, trans. George H. Kehm (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1970),
18.
1232
Gunton, Triune Creator. 176, 177.
1233Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'Redemptive Event and History,' 19.







act faithfully and yet freely (in the form ofpromise and in the form of creating the
new), and to overrule creaturely intents, is the basis for meaning in history.
If one accepts the close connection between Trinity, creation, salvation,
providence and eschatology, then salvation can be understood as something more
1237
than a one-dimensional forensic transaction between the Father and the Son. One
can see the gift given as not only a legal transaction for sins, but 'as a ransom for
many'1238 in the larger sense ofmaking humans 'partakers of the divine nature.'1239
In this way one can see it as transformational in purpose (effecting holiness in
the present1240) and trinitarian in structure. This perspective implies seeing humans
as being written into the relation between Father and Son, through the Holy Spirit.
The already-not-yet characteristic of the church's life expresses the present
movement of this salvific presence of the Trinity within the context ofhuman
history. The economic Trinity, active in the world by the creative, sustaining Spirit,
is manifested linguistically and liturgically (and thereby concretely and
doxologically) by the ecclesiological symbols ofWord and Sacrament, making
present the Father and Son ('truly our fellowship is with the Father and his Son Jesus
Christ'1241). In the words of John Milbank, 'since God is not an object in the world,
he cannot be available to us before our response to him, but in this response—our
work, our gift, our art, our hymn—he is already present.'1242 The church, defined
thusly, reveals the "moment" in and through which the Trinity has opened the inner-
1237Cf. Henry Spaulding II, 'The Path of Peaceful Flight: Milbank's Trinitarian Ontology and
a Re-Narration ofWesleyan-Holiness Theology, Weslevan Theological Journal 36, no. 1 (Spring
2001): 147-149, 151, n. 67, 153, 155, 158.
1238Mark 10:45 RSV.
I2392 Peter 1:4 RSV; Cf. Spaulding, 'Path of Peaceful Flight,' 155: 'Salvation is not only
forensic; it is therapeutic.'
1240The importance of right-relating in all dimensions of relationship, traditionally expressed
in terms of sanctification and holiness, is similar in concept to Ruth Page's 'teleology now' in which
'every moment becomes eschatological, an end in itself, so to speak' in the context of the 'divine
presence . . . seeking response, mutual relationship and concurrence which echoes Jesus Christ's in the
enlargement of freedom and love in this world' (Web of Creation. 63, 64; cf. ibid., 63-73).
124ll Jn. 1:3 (RSV).
l242John Milbank, 'Intensities,' Modern Theology. 15, no. 4 (October 1999): 486; quoted in
Spaulding, 'Path of Peaceful Flight,' 173-177.
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divine life to the world. This opening is intrinsically redemptive, since 'salvation has
always been given, even from the foundation of the world.'1243 And it is also
intrinsically creative and therefore providential. The Incarnation (taken here as a
comprehensive symbol of the whole Christ event) is not only redemptive in the sense
ofbeing remedial; it redeems by completion as well, completion of salvation and
creation, issuing in the eschatological 'Kingdom ofGlory' (Moltmann).
Relating Trinitarian Providence to Human Freedom
As several of the authors reviewed above have argued, the goal of creation
and providence is the establishment of created others with whom the Trinity may
form a fellowship, understood in terms of the kingdom of God, the church, or as a
divine-human community. The goal and pattern humans are meant to exhibit is that
of the free relation of the Son to the Father, as mediated by the Holy Spirit.1244
The nature of human freedom, as defined by one's view of divine
sovereignty, was noted in Chapter One as constituting a complex topic and
longstanding philosophical debate in its own right within a model of providence.
Moreover, this debate becomes even more complex when one recognises the close
link between one's model of divine sovereignty/human freedom and the theodicy
question. Since the chosen foci of this thesis have been the questions ofwhether a
doctrine ofprovidence should be trinitarian, and how a doctrine ofprovidence
addresses the issue of history, meaning and hope, the freedom debate has not been a
primary focus.1245 However, since the issue ofhuman freedom recurs so persistently
in the treatments ofprovidence referred to in foregoing chapters, it is important to
ask how a specifically trinitarian view of providence relates to this issue.
1243Spaulding, 'Path of Peaceful Flight,' 153. Cf. Robert Jenson, The Works of God, vol. 2,
Systematic Theology [Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999], 14-15.
1244Cf. Robert Jenson's appropriation of Jonathan Edwards' understanding of human
participation in the relation between the Son and the Father: 'As the union of God and creature
becomes "more and more . .. perfect," what this means is that it becomes "nearer ... to that between
God the Father and the Son'" (The Works ofGod. 19).
1245See p. 37, above.
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An initial response to this question involves a methodological issue. As
noted in Chapter One, some trinitarian theologians (such as Pannenberg and
Moltmann) do not begin with a doctrine ofprovidence and then ask ifmaking it
trinitarian facilitates its retrieval or adds to its credibility, nor do they begin by asking
whether making a doctrine of providence trinitarian facilitates a better understanding
of human freedom. Rather, they begin with the claim that the Christian God is
triune, and only then ask what this might mean for providence.1246 Insofar as
providence addresses the freedom question, this too, must be addressed within a
trinitarian context.
Second, in keeping with the Community MODEL adopted here, I am
presupposing that the triune persons (as manifested in the economy) form a
community of free beings.1247 If, by extension, one accepts that God creates humans
for participation in that community, then one may assume that he creates them as free
persons.1248 As already noted, Frank Tupper, Colin Gunton, Norman Kraus, Kathryn
Tanner and others have argued that it is in the Christ event (the definitive triune act)
that one finds the hermeneutical key for understanding God's providential
relationship to the world. Pannenberg and Moltmann have also contended that in a
trinitarian understanding of creation and providence one discovers the irreducible
trinitarian structure through which God relates to humans.1249 For Moltmann, this
trinitarian context for freedom unfolds as follows: the Father provides the freedom of
1246That is, they begin with a focus on a doctrine of the Trinity as grammatical rale. Cf.
Claude Welch's affirmation that 'trinitarianism is not an inductive conclusion from scientia, but an
arche, a presupposition of thought which is given to men in the new logos in Christ' tin This Name:
The Doctrine of the Trinity in Contemporary Theology [New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1952], 245). See also, p. 27, above.
1247As Miroslav Volf cautions, one cannot assume a straightforward analogy between divine
and human community, since divine ontology is of an entirely different order than creaturely ('"The
Trinity is our Social Program": The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement,'
Modem Theology 14 (July 1998): 413, 414). Cf. similar cautions by Ian McFarland (Difference and
Identity: A Theological Anthropology [Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press, 2001], 136-137), and
Kathryn Tanner (Jesus. Humanity. 82-83).
l248This claim does not yet address the issue of which kind of freedom may be in play on
either level.
l249Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 438; idem, Systematic 1: 259, 262, 314; cf. Moltmann for a
similar view (The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism ofChristian
Theology [London, UK: SCM Press Ltd., 1974], 240-241). Cf. Gary Badcock, Light ofTruth. 271.
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creative potential in the form of an invitation to freely love,1250 an invitation to
community1251; the Son provides the restoration of a freedom for potential lost in the
'servitude to sin'; and the Spirit provides the resources to participate in 'the energies
of the new creation.'1252 In Pannenberg's model of providence, this trinitarian
structure is required precisely because the cross and resurrection reveal the Father's
deity, lordship and rule over history, as mediated through the work of the Son and
Spirit,1253--'for the revelation of the deity and lordship of the Father depends on the
work of the Son and Spirit.'1254 Pannenberg stresses that 'the activity of the Son
through the Spirit of God comprises the entire economy ofGod's action in creating,
1255
reconciling, and uniting the world of creatures to himself.'
In this structure, taking again as hermeneutical key the relation of the Son to
the Father,1256 one discovers in the Father's free giving ofhimself to the Son, and in
the Son's free self-distinction from the Father and free obedience to the Father (both
movements mediated by the free activity of the Spirit of love), the pattern for human
relating to the Trinity. This structure of freedom and being, as manifested in the
interrelations of the divine Persons of the economic Trinity, becomes the divine
analogue for understanding human freedom coram Trinitatis.
This level of discussion about freedom represents a somewhat different focus
than asking which kind of freedom is in play in these relations—a special concern of
Helm and Sanders. Rather, it addresses the question about the economic identity of
God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and how that relocates the question of human
freedom from philosophical debates about what freedom must be (volitional or
libertarian), to reflection on what freedom actually looks like, as modelled by Jesus
1250Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 209, 217, 163.
125lCf. Bauckham, Theology of Moltmann, 176-177.
1252Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 210, 211.
l253Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 315.
1254Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 322.
1255Pannenberg, Introduction. 68.
l256Pannenberg, Systematic 1: 273, 299.
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Christ. Admittedly, these two questions cannot be ultimately separated, but they do
represent different starting points for discussion about human freedom.
There are at least three, interrelated issues requiring recognition here. First,
there is the theological question of how human freedom is instantiated when it is the
result of the Trinity's preservation of, cooperation with, and governance of humans.
Second, there is the spiritual formation question of how this freedom actually comes
to be established in humans—a spiritual, psychological and developmental question.
Finally, there is the more philosophical question as to what kind of freedom this is.
Addressing these issues in reverse order, I will first make some brief observations
about the latter two points, and then devote the remainder of this section to the first
issue.
With regard to which kind of human freedom is appropriate to one's view of
divine sovereignty, the authors reviewed in this thesis have chosen between two
broad options: either an Augustinian/Calvinist view of freedom (volitional), or an
Arminian type (libertarian). As noted in Chapter Three, however, the ultimate choice
one makes between these two families of views on human freedom depends upon
• • 19S7
one's hermeneutic of scripture and upon one's larger model of the God-world
relation. Although outside the scope of the present thesis for development and
defence, as indicated in Chapter Three,1258 my own preference would be for a
Wesleyan-Arminian view which stresses not only free willn59 (Arminius), but free
will only as it is made possible byfree grace mediated (preveniently) by the Holy
Spirit (John Wesley).1260 In this model, establishment of the ground for relationship
l257John Feinberg, arguing for a compatibilist view of human freedom, recognises that 'no
[biblical] verse tells us whether freedom is indeterministic or deterministic' ('God Ordains All
Things,' in Predestination and Freewill: Four Views on Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom by
John Feinberg. Norman Geisler. Bruce Reichenbach. Clark Pinnock. ed. David Basinger and Randall
Basinger [Downers Grove, ILL: InterVarsity Press, 1986], 32).
1258See n. 471, above.
1259Tomis Kapitan notes that 'it is debated whether freedom is properly ascribed to the will or
the agent, or to actions, choices, deliberations, etc.' (Robert Audi, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy [New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995], s.v. 'free will problem,' by Tomis
Kapitan).
1260H. Ray Dunning suggests prevenient grace is so much the work of the Spirit that it can be
understood as 'synonymous with the work of the Spirit' (Grace. Faith, and Holiness: A Weslevan
Systematic Theology [Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill Press ofKansas City, 1988], 430).
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(through the Son), and the enabling of relationship (through the Spirit), is all of
grace—'the initiation is God's and also the enabling.'1261 It remains, however, for the
human individual to exercise the Spirit-enabled acceptance of the Father's offer of
relationship in order for that grace to take effect.1262 The reason for this latter
assertion is to allow for humans to be held responsible for their free choices.1263 The
point being made here, however, is not to develop a defence of libertarian free will,
but to point out that one's choice in this matter (for either volitional or libertarian
freedom) does not depend solely upon whether one's view of God is trinitarian or
unitarian. Rather, one's preference in this matter emerges as an integral feature of
the requirements for coherence among the many beliefs, doctrines, assumptions and
arguments that make up one's whole model of the God-world relation.
The second question above, of how humans in their personal life-histories
come to have or develop freedom, would involve developing a model of spiritual
formation based upon a doctrine of redemption and a theological anthropology—with
some reference to the physical, mental, psychological and spiritual constitution and
development of humans. In other words, it would involve addressing how one comes
to have freedom rather than what that freedom (as end result) looks like. Wiles,
Gilkey and Moltmann, for example, stressed that the telos for human freedom was
that of afreely chosen relation of love to God, such that disobedience would no
126'Timothy L. Smith, 'A Historical and Contemporary Appraisal ofWesleyan Theology,' in
A Contemporary Weslevan Theology: Biblical. Systematic, and Practical, vol. 1, ed. Charles W.
Carter (Grand Rapids, MI: Francis Asbury Press of Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 65; cf. ibid.,
64-65. Cf. Dunning, Grace. Faith, and Holiness. 431 -441.
I262I recognise, of course, that this is a highly debated proposal. Roy C. Weatherhead, for
example, wonders whether it is possible to ever identify what the 'entity—whether called mind, soul,
self, agent, or originator'—is which makes this undetermined decision (Ted Honderich, ed. The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy [Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995], s.v.,
'Freedom and Determinism'). Cf. David Fergusson's view which stresses the role of prevenient grace
as necessary in accounting for 'human responsibility,' although Fergusson does not 'place any
emphasis upon belief as a free act.' Nevertheless, he stresses that 'only a theology that recognizes the
freedom finally to rebel against God can avoid the determinism of either double predestination or
universalism' ('Will the Love of God Finally Triumph,' in Nothing Greater. Nothing Better:
Theological Essays on the Love of God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 186-202. Cambridge, UK; Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001 201, n. 33, 196). Cf. also the debate in
Basinger and Basinger, eds., Predestination and Freewill.
1263Cf. Vincent Briimmer's argument that libertarian free will is necessary for human
responsibility, and that this set of conditions is necessary in order to have personal relations of love
with a personal God (Speaking of a Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology [Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 139-145).
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longer be chosen. This was to be achieved through the patience of the Father in
successfully "persuading" (Wiles), luring (Gilkey), and inviting (Moltmann) all
humans to see the wisdom of joining with the Son in eternally and freely loving and
obeying the Father.1264 However, the actual psychological mechanism by which such
a goal can be achieved, without ultimately violating libertarian freedom, was left
unexplored and ambiguous. For Helm, the goal is similar: all those humans who
eventually come to choose salvation will do so because they want to do so, as
determined by God's hidden providential working. Helm's model, however, did not
explore how this would be achieved (psychologically), perhaps because he could
appeal to the hidden, unilateral, creative and providential working of God.
It is to the first issue noted above that I want to devote the remainder of this
section: how is human freedom instantiated when it is the result of trinitarian
providence? Since humans are created to bear the image of the Son,1265 Pannenberg
notes that human independence, and therefore, freedom, is assured by participation in
the Son. This amounts to
the freedom of a new immediacy to God that believers have
as his children (Gal. 4:4-6). It is mediated by the sending of
the Son and his vicarious death. It is actualized, however, by
the Spirit of sonship in believers themselves. The Spirit thus
brings the mission of the Son to completion.1266
It is the Spirit who leads believers into the truth 'which makes them free.'1267 This is
the freedom ofparticipating with the Son (through the Spirit) in freely chosen filial
obedience to the Father.1268
Gunton pictures this trinitarian framework of freedom as follows: 'the world
has its "inscape" provided by the Son, the one who became part of the world for the
1264And since this process is clearly not successful for every human in this life, it would seem
to require a continuance of the process after death.
l265Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 208, 220, 230.
l266Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 436-437.
1267Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 437.
l268Pannenberg, Systematic 2: 57, 173-174.
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sake of the world, and the Spirit, whose characteristic form of action is to enable the
world to become itself.'1269 Kathryn Tanner takes this further by noting that
the Holy Spirit unites us in Christ even as the Holy Spirit
encourages the uniqueness of our persons by a diversity of
gifts of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit respects our differences
while uniting us in Christ in the same way that the Holy
Spirit respects and maintains the differences between Father
and Son even as it attests to and bears the love of the Son
back to the Father.1270
Human freedom is a function of the Spirit's enabling of creaturely otherness as it is
defined by identity in Christ.
In Moltmann's terms, the freedom God provides and enables through the Son
•••• •• • 1271
and Spirit is 'freedom as initiative, as creativity and as a passion for the future.'
It works not by imposition, but as a calling—'liberation from . . . ['closed-in-ness']
cannot come about through superior strength or compulsion, but only through
vicarious suffering and the call to that liberty which vicarious suffering alone throws
open.'1272 This is a multifaceted freedom, defined as 'community,' 'fellowship,' or
'love and solidarity,' and freedom as oriented to a 'project,' as 'a creative initiative,'
as a 'creative passion for the possible,' and hence as oriented toward the pregnant
future.1273
Although the present project cannot engage the longstanding philosophical
debate about whether human freedom is of the '(liberty) of indifference' kind, or of
the '(liberty) of spontaneity' type,1274 I will, however, make a distinction between
1269Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God. Creation and the Culture ofModernity.
The 1992 Bampton Lectures (New York, NY; Melbourne, Australia; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 229.
1270Tanner, Jesus. Humanity. 83. In referring to the Holy Spirit as 'it,' Tanner seems to
compromise the personal nature of the Spirit.
1271Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 218.
1272Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 218, 210. Cf. Pannenberg's assertion that God's
'influence on the creature's freedom [takes] the form of persuasion and accommodation' (Systematic
2:48, 48, n. 117, 52).
I273Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 216-217.
1274Cf. Robert Audi, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary ofPhilosophy (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), s.v. 'free will problem,' by Tomis Kapitan. Cf. also the debate in
Predestination and Freewill, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger.
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freedom as the ability to choose between options, and a more relational definition of
1275
freedom as the ability to be freefor something, in this case, free for God. As
Moltmann argues, we are only truly free when we are free to actualise our true
destiny of relating to God, which involves 'joy in the Good and in doing what is right
simply as a matter of course.'1276 It is the restoration of this freedom for God which
a doctrine of redemption addresses, and therefore which again brings into focus the
providential work of the Trinity as the divine means of orchestrating this redemptive
possibility. How that freedom is instantiated or realised, therefore, is by means of a
trinitarian structure: participation in the Son's filial obedience to the Father, as
enabled by the Spirit. In this case, freedom is understood as freedomfor God, for
1 977
others, and for one's true self.
The possibility of human freedom, and the experience of it, are rooted in the
trinitarian acts of creation, providence, redemption and consummation. As Gunton
puts it, 'if Jesus Christ is a model of God's determination of the creature, then clearly
• • • • • 197R
it is a determination that realises rather than stunts freedom.' In this model it is
the Spirit who enables the human Jesus to be truly himself.1279 Thus, 'the Son of
God in free personal relation to the world ... is the basis for an understanding of
God the Father's relations with his creation.'1280 Just as knowledge of the purpose of
i275H. Ray Dunning, following Dietrich Bonhoeffer, defines freedom relationally as '"being
free for the other.'" As such it is defined by four basic relations: '(1) Freedom for God; (2) Freedom
for the Other; (3) Freedom from the Earth or World; and (4) Freedom from Self-domination. The first
three are explicitly spelled out symbolically in Genesis 1-11, and the fourth is implied quite clearly in
the other three' (Grace. Faith, and Holiness. 278-279). Cf. Gunton for a somewhat similar relational
understanding of freedom (Christ and Creation. 107).
l276Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 214. Similarly, Pannenberg notes that humans are
only truly free when they freely come to accept their creaturehood and freely obey the Father
(Systematic 2: 180). Cf. also, Frank Tupper, 'The Providence of God in Christological Perspective,'
582.
I277As noted above, Gunton makes the point that one of the Spirit's roles is to liberate 'the
energies of the individual precisely to be both with andfor his fellows,' to free us for our 'own most
proper form' (Enlightenment. 106, 104 [italics mine]).
1278Gunton, Triune Creator. 183.
1279Gunton, 'End ofCausality?,' 79, 80; cf. idem, Promise. 131; and idem, Triune Creator.
184.
1280
Gunton, Triune Creator. 183.
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God derives paradigmatically from Christ, so the knowledge of, and shape of,
freedom derives from the same source.
I would suggest, therefore, that what a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence
especially brings to the discussion of human freedom can be summarised in the
following two points. First, a trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence takes as its starting
point a biblically based, irreducible trinitarian structure: we are constituted as human
persons by graced participation within the structure of relating to the Father through
the Son in the Spirit.1281
Second, this trinitarian structure enables the development of a biblical and
theological concept of freedom as freedom for God and others, as enabled by
participation in the relations of the economic Trinity. What the trinitarian discussion
offers is a model ofGod in which the triune God, out of the free dynamic of the
inner-trinitarian relations, is able to "go out" into creation (through the Son), and
bring the creation back "into" the dynamic love of the triune godhead through the
Spirit. This is for humans a 'participation' in those relations by grace, not a
divinisation of humans, thus maintaining the ontological distinction between the
divine and human. This distinction is further reinforced by the fact that humans do
not relate to each of the divine Persons in the same way. Thus, a trinitarian doctrine
ofprovidence provides a theological/trinitarian structure for human freedom. Within
that narratively encoded, providentially orchestrated, freedom, one discovers a
theological (patrological) purpose for freedom, a christological shape for freedom,
and a pneumatological enabling of that freedom.
This trinitarian structure of freedom may imply a circularity between the
notions ofparticipating in the Trinity and being free: Is participating in the relations
of the economic Trinity the prior condition of human freedom or is it what human
freedom looks like? It is the divine initiative in creative, providential and redemptive
grace which breaks this apparent circularity, and which prevents a semi-Pelagian
view of human freedom. From a Wesleyan-Arminian perspective, one might say that
one is already constituted as human by being included in the economic trinitarian
128'Since all of creation, both the human and the non-human, is from the Father, through the
Son and by the Spirit, one could extrapolate from this same formal trinitarian structure of being and
freedom and suggest that each created entity, in accordance with its own level of complexity and set
of properties, is instantiated by the same trinitarian structure.
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relations (as mediated through Christ, and as a gift of grace prior to any response by
humans), but this only becomes effectual in one's life as one actively accepts this
grace (faith). A key part of this givenness ofbeing included in Christ involves the
restorative work of the Spirit in awakening the possibility of a positive attitude
toward God, and in enabling one to respond positively to saving grace. Thus, on the
one hand all are given the option of being restored to right relation to God (in Christ),
and, therefore, at this minimal level 'participation' in the trinitarian relations is a
prior given, while on the other hand, it only becomes a reality when one acts on the
grace already received—the act of accepting faith. At that point participation in the
trinitarian relations (through Christ and in the Spirit) are actualised, and also at that
point that is what freedom looks like (as modelled definitively by Christ's relation to
the Father in the Spirit). In a way analogous to a doctrine of the original creation of
humans in which God first established humans with the freedom to continue in right
relation to him or to refuse to do so,1282 in his re-creative work the Spirit of God first
establishes the basis and possibility of right response prior to the human individual's
use of this ability. Whether one understands the prevenient work of the Spirit as an
effectual call (in a determinist sense) or as an enabling call (in an indeterminist
sense) the point is that all initiation of re-creative grace is a unilateral work of the
triune God.
Utilising a modified view ofBauckham's 'spatial' model of freedom, one
might suggest a trinitarian shape for providence and freedom as follows. Beginning
with a christological focus, it is human participation in the Son's free otherness from
and for Father and Spirit which ensures human free otherness from and for Father
• • 1283and Spirit. In this way the divine cooperation with humans can be ascribed to the
Son (structure and withness\ Bauckham: God 'alongside us'). The Spirit can be
understood as having the sustaining role ofpreserving humans in being as sons and
daughters (empowerment and "in-nessBauckham: God 'within us'). This
1282Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic 2:166-167.
1283
Again, it must be noted that there remains also a distinction of human sons/daughters




sustaining ofparticipation of humans in the Son's otherness establishes thefree
subjects which become the focus of the governance of the Father (envisionment of
the whole and "aheadnessBauckham: God 'above us'). The Father guides and
governs the humans maintained as sons/daughters by the Son and the Spirit. These
appropriations have limits, but they illustrate the way in which a trinitarian model of
providence instantiates humans as free participants in God's kingdom community.
Once it is accepted that the Trinity comes (all at once) to humans as the
differentiated unity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, then one might further argue that
a trinitarian, Communicative Theism model, for example, respects human dignity
and otherness, precisely in the Father addressing us through the Word (objective
structure) and Spirit (subjective enabling—to hear and respond). This is a definitively
divine and trinitarian communication and self-communication, because Father, Son
and Holy Spirit are equally God. And just because it is a trinitarian model of
communication it is a differentiated mode of communication which respects and
requires human personal distinction and otherness from God. It therefore also
requires some form ofhuman freedom which reflects the freedom of the Son to be
addressed by the Father, and in turn to respond to the Father. Whether this model is
worked out in terms ofvolitional or libertarian freedom, the human participant in the
triune communicative act is no more an automaton than is the Son in both being
spoken by the Father and in being addressed by the Father. It is through participating
in this kind ofpersonal relationship that humans can be said to interact with God.
And insofar as humans constitute real 'others' for God, so also the freedom with
which they are graced comes to be a feature of that relationship which shapes and
characterises the divine-human community as one involvingpersonal relationships.
A trinitarian structure ofhuman freedom, therefore, as underwritten by a
trinitarian doctrine ofprovidence, provides a concrete locus for working out the
meaning ofhuman choices as these shape individual and corporate histories. Just as
Moltmann approached the theodicy question not by asking, Why is there evil, but
rather by asking, What is God doing about the problem of evil, so here one can begin
by asking, What structure for the choices I make in life has God provided which will
give those choices significance and meaning? In the suggestion put forward here, the
answer focuses initially not so much on the nature of the freedom involved as it does
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on the location andpossibility of that freedom as underwritten by the trinitarian acts
of creation, providence, redemption and consummation.
Conclusion
In summary, pansyntheism, as the MODEL of divine-human community
achieved through the divine work of loving providence, encompasses the doctrines of
creation, redemption and consummation. The element of redemption focuses on
Christ as God with us, and as such the narrative of his incarnation, crucifixion and
resurrection forms the hermeneutical key for a theology ofprovidence. It is the
critical point of epistemic access to the meaning of the whole creation-consummation
story. As the supreme illustration of the divine trinitarian love, this act of incarnation
and redemption by the Son also enables the completion of creation, the establishment
of the Sabbath of the Kingdom ofGlory in which God's love will be experienced as
fully ubiquitous, and as differentiated and unified as is the life of the Trinity itself.
Pansyntheism also embraces a holistic and (qualified) relational metaphysics,
is able to speak to ecological concerns, and understands the triune God as the source
of the structure in which providence is worked out.
The range of issues it embodies constitutes it as a comprehensive context of
meaning. It allows for both human histories (narratives) and divine history.
Moreover, it allows these two stories to interact with each other. The possibility of
human community with God can only be actualised as each relationally-constituted
individual cooperates with what he or she knows about God. It is especially at this
point that the concept of 'communicative theism' becomes important as a model of
divine action. The fact that the triune God is intimately and lovingly present to and
for all aspects of human life, and that this presence is governed by the goal of
establishing divine-human community, establishes the possibility for all of life to be
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